芬蘭的民主與民主化

此篇為論文 "Democracy and Democratization in Finland: Perspectives from Outside and Inside" （芬蘭的民主與民主化：來自外界與自身的觀點）之摘要。

芬蘭圖爾庫大學學者 Maija Setälä 以芬蘭民主化與民主鞏固的過程，討論芬蘭到底是不是一個本生的民主（自譯，原文為 immanent democracy）。

原文見於臺灣民主基金會的期刊 Taiwan Journal of Democracy 。

Immanent democracy，按 Maija Setälä 的定義，是民主已經被人民深刻的內化，被認為是本質化的（我們本來就是民主的）、不證自明的，不需要外界肯定。甚至如果懷疑、質疑國家是否適宜民主，會被認為不忠誠，背棄共同體的基本價值。

這篇文章主要的論點是：芬蘭並不享有本生的民主。

從外部指標來看，儘管許多調查跟研究都指出芬蘭享有高度的民主，芬蘭人自己也有極高的比例認為民主是最適合政府的制度，芬蘭人自己對外在政治效能的感受卻連續下跌了三十年。

“However, “external political ef cacy,” frequently measured in survey research, has been in decline in Finland. External political ef cacy refers to citizens’ subjective evaluations of the extent to which they can exert in uence on politics. In other words, external efficacy measures citizens’ belief in the responsiveness of the political system to people’s political preferences and action. According to recent studies, the subjective perception of the responsiveness of the political system has declined in Finland since 1975.”

儘管歐盟成立影響人民對政治反應自身需要的效能感，也影響民主政治的課責性，但無法解釋為何芬蘭人對外在政治效能的感受低於北歐其他國家。

Maija Setälä 提供兩個解釋：第一個解釋是，芬蘭的命運，一直被外國強權決定。例如，兩次世界大戰時的德國、統治芬蘭數百年的瑞典、以及二十世紀中葉芬蘭化（Finlandization）的主要對象俄國/蘇聯；第二個解釋是芬蘭的政黨政治：芬蘭是多黨政治，主要政黨的支持率大概都只有 1/4，使得最大黨必須聯合其他政黨組成內閣執政。而選制又是開放名單的比例代表制，這讓主要政黨的政策方向會比較模糊，以保留勝選後聯合其他盟友執政的合作機會。這樣，使得民眾很難理解自身投票的選擇，跟最後出台的政策到底有什麼關係。

“There are several possible explanations for the decline of external ef cacy
in Finland. Traditionally, there have been certain submissive elements in the Finnish political culture. Finns seem to have had a feeling that their capacity to determine their own destiny is limited, and that they are dependent on decisions made by more powerful players in international politics. The history of Finland, indeed, seems to support this, as for several times the destiny of Finland has been dependent on power politics among Sweden, Russia, and Germany, in particular.”

Democracy can hardly be regarded as a “civil religion” in Finland; it is not a crucial element of self-identi cation or an issue of national pride. For a long time, national survival was the primary goal in Finnish politics, and democratic norms and procedures sometimes were overlooked for the sake of this goal.

Moreover, Finns are also relatively well aware of the de ciencies of their democracy. During the past decades, in particular, there has been much public debate and critical re ection on the relapses of Finnish democracy, especially during the postwar era of “Finlandization,” when the Finnish political establishment was, in retrospect, sometimes too eager to please the Kremlin. From the comparative perspective “from outside, looking in,” this kind of critical re ection may have improved the quality of democratic life in Finland; it has been the motivation for the “parliamentarization” of Finnish democracy, and it has increased the public awareness of the importance of democracy.

儘管芬蘭在很多指標都是世界領先，比如快樂指數、清廉、社會信任、教育，芬蘭人仍然常常認為自己是貧窮落後的國家，特別是跟隔壁瑞典比較的時候。

芬蘭的歷史是向強鄰屈服的歷史，然後在艱困環境求生存。這到現在也在加入歐盟之後對主要大國的事大主義中延續。

在民主建立早期，芬蘭的民主政治由中產精英領導，內戰亦由代表資產階級的議會派擊敗共產主義者獲勝。芬蘭人對民主並不特別感到驕傲。在二十世紀初葉的歷史，他們感到驕傲的是在一二戰與戰後艱困求存的敘事。唯一比較常被提起的是，芬蘭女性是歐洲最早被賦予投票權的。

代議制的選舉民主宰制了芬蘭的民主實踐，在效率主義下芬蘭政府跟民眾對直接民主（例如參與式創新、審議民主等等）的嘗試意願跟期待，低於歐洲的領先國家。主流政黨與媒體也較不支持新型態的公民參與。芬蘭人相較之下比較重視決策與勤奮工作。相比瑞典，比較不重視建立共識的過程。

In general, Finnish governments have been quite reluctant to try new forms of citizen participation in politics. The use of participatory innovations, such as institutions of direct democracy or deliberative citizen forums, has not received much support in Finland. This reluctance is largely due to skeptical attitudes among political elites; the idea of electoral democracy also totally dominates the public debate. Neither the main parties nor the mainstream media are particularly supportive of new forms of citizen participation. Based on comparative research, Finland is not necessarily exceptional among advanced democracies in this respect. However, when it comes to the use of instruments of direct democracy, for example, Finland has been one of the most cautious countries in Europe.

In Finnish society, much value has been given to the ef ciency of decision-making and hard work; these seemed to be crucial, for example, during World War II and the postwar reconstruction. Indeed, the Finnish culture arguably differs from the Swedish culture dramatically in this respect. In Sweden, much more value is given to consensus-seeking dialogue, which from the Finnish perspective, is often found time-consuming and frustrating. One might thus argue that Finns do not value democratic procedures as much as Swedes, but rather appreciate ef ciency in achieving certain given goals. Of course, such a posture is possible only in situations where the common goals are not questioned. This kind of a consensus may no longer prevail in Finland because national survival is no longer the paramount goal in politics. Furthermore, the Finnish population has become increasingly multicultural in its composition, which potentially undermines the consensus on basic values.

Maija Setälä 據此的主要結論是：儘管芬蘭被認為是成熟的民主國家，有強健的公民社會、幾無貪腐、人與人高度信任，論文的結論仍不認為芬蘭是一個本生的民主。

Reflection

按該文定義，台灣顯然也不是本生的民主，脈絡有跟芬蘭相似的地方，也有相違的地方。我們都有反民主並有侵略威脅的強鄰，也都有作為小國常見的事大主義傾向，不過台灣並不是內閣制，而芬蘭沒有台灣內部的認同戰爭，也沒有作為走過黨國、戒嚴、後威權國家需要處理的轉型正義問題。轉型正義未完成對台灣民主鞏固帶來的影響，一個是緬懷威權的情愫，對威權時代仍不乏緬懷威權的言論，這對防衛性民主或許是不利的；另一個是，按一些對東歐後共產國家的研究指出，轉型正義的淨化，對國民的政治信賴會有正面影響。