The Detroit Pistons: Summer of uncertainty

Trades and major moves seem eminent for the Detroit Pistons this offseason. How much faith should the team have in it’s core?

Paul Headley
16 Wins A Ring
10 min readJun 17, 2017

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After a promising 44–38 record and a short-lived playoff run in 2015–16, the Detroit Pistons disappointed in 2016–17. Chemistry problems, poor shooting and underwhelming individual performances aligned to frustrate fans and set up a summer full of uncertainty. While a reasonable team defense trotted out every night (11th in defensive rating), the offense was a shambles. Not surprisingly, the team’s biggest names have become the subject of trade speculation. Let’s examine what went wrong, look for positives and examine how the team could feasibly improve going forward.

Andre Drummond and the offensive system

It’s strange to remember how close to untouchable Andre Drummond was just a few years ago. The native New Yorker might be the best rebounder of his generation. When focused, the big man gobbles up boards, plays passing lanes with his condor-like wingspan and dunks with thunderous intensity.

As the Pistons’ floundered this pass season, Drummond’s flaws have become more and more pronounced. The big man can’t shoot free throws. His rim-protection is suspect. He either disappears when games matter, or his free-throw shooting renders him unplayable. How much of the blame lies with Drummond himself, and how much can be attributed to the team around him?

One dramatic change in Drummond’s game over the last few seasons has been his shot distribution. Drummond’s first two years in the league, he shot over 81% of his shots within three feet of the basket. That number has dropped precipitously over the past few seasons. In 2016–17, just 49.4 percent of Drummond’s shots came at the rim, with the rest mostly coming between 3–10 feet (42 percent). As a result, Drummond’s effective field goal percentage has declined in recent years (from 62.3 percent his sophomore year to 53.1 this past campaign.)

Drummond posted-up on 27.5 percent of his possessions this past year, a real problem because he’s a terrible post player. Drummond scored just 0.73 points-per-possession with his back to the basket, by far the worst rate in the league for any player with at least 4.0 attempts per game. Drummond seldom ever shoots a traditional jumper. Instead, most of his offensive game outside of three feet consists of hook shots. Drummond can make them dependably between three to five feet if he lowers his shoulder and creates separation. Outside of that range is mostly a crapshoot. Drummond shot just 38.1 percent on shots between 3–10 feet:

The big-man doesn’t really display a lot of range in his offensive movements. If his first move is well-guarded, he doesn’t have a lot of counters to create easier shots. Drummond’s lack of passing compounds the problem. While not an inherently selfish player, court-vision and accuracy are not his strong suits.

A lot of Drummond’s problems on offense stem from the Piston’s poor spacing. It’s very difficult to play spread pick-and-roll if you don’t have good three point shooters:

Image courtesy of NBA.com stats and info

It vexes me when fans and commentators remark that Stan Van Gundy’s “system” doesn’t work as effectively today as it did during his Orlando Magic heyday. The 2009 Magic that went to the NBA finals featured a pick-and-roll monster (future hall-of-famer Dwight Howard*) surrounded by six different guys shooting 37 percent or better from three point range. The 2016–17 Detroit Pistons featured just one guy above league average (Reggie Jackson at 35.9 percent).

*My opinion

Marcus Morris and Tobias Harris don’t have the gravity prime Rashard Lewis had. Such a statement seems obvious, but it often gets lost in the shuffle when assessing Drummond’s play and the team’s offense. Lewis shot 39.7 percent on seven attempts per game. The lanky forward’s presence ensured the paint would be as unclogged as possible to allow Howard space to dunk everything in existence. Drummond doesn’t have that same room to operate in.

Marcus Morris is a fine role-player on a ridiculously cheap contract (the lesser known Morris is owed just over 10 million dollars over the next two years). Just like his brother, Morris can do a lot of things well. He can post up a little bit, hit from the mid-range, move the ball and defend. Morris’ three point shooting fell from 36.2 percent in 2015–16, to just 33.1 percent this past season. While Morris can shoot the ball better (his career high is 38 percent), he seems destined to be a guy who lingers around that 34 to 36 percent range most of his career. At any rate, Morris is not nearly the type of long-range bomber necessary when you have a paint-bound center as a franchise cornerstone.

Opponents are happy to leave Harris on the perimeter. The former Magic forward shot 34.7 percent from three on the season, despite smarter opponents frequently neglecting him to focus in on Drummond or cut off driving lanes for Reggie Jackson with the bench unit:

Harris is a very skilled player. He can run a pick-and-roll, score in a lot of ways around the basket, and grades out above average shooting from just about every spot on the floor except from three. Harris makes more sense on a team where his ability to quasi-stretch the floor is a luxury, rather than a key cog in the team’s offense. He is both a victim of Detroit’s lack of spacing, and a contributor.

Spacing was clearly a problem, but so too was pick-and-roll execution and decision-making. This is, of course, a reference to the Pistons much-maligned point guard, Reggie Jackson. Jackson is one of the most frustrating players in the league to watch. One of the most pick-and-roll heavy guards in the league, Jackson actually scored fairly efficiently out of the play. He scored 0.89 points per possession on a whopping 9.4 attempts per game. Drummond attempted just 1.8 shots per game as the roll-man, scoring a perfectly average (though down from the previous season) 1.06 points per possession.

It’s hard not to label Jackson a selfish player. At best, he’s a flawed decision-maker who seems struck down with myopia on every drive. How can the players around him reach their full potential when their point guard sees long, contested twos as a better option than open lanes and threes? Teammates are often left statuesque, frozen in time waiting on passes that never come. The concept of making your teammates better seems old-fashioned, but it’s a real thing:

The Pistons were a middle of the road 11–10 in the games Jackson missed due to injury. The team was Plus 2.4 points per 100 possessions without him. With Jackson back in the line-up, the team had a net rating of minus 3.5. Advanced Line-up data is even more unkind. Every single two-man combination listed by basketball reference is negative, ranging from minus 4.2 to minus 10.1. The fact remains that Ish Smith, a six-foot journey man who can’t shoot threes, had more impact on winning basketball games for the Pistons this year than Jackson.

Kentavious Caldwell-Pope:

The story of the Pistons’ off-season, at least as far as contracts, is the up-and-coming restricted free agency of Kentavious Caldwell-Pope. The Brooklyn Nets are lurking, desperate to replenish their roster with some young talent. If the Nets offer KCP the max (and why wouldn’t they?), how willing will the Pistons be to match? The Pistons balked on extending KCP the type of contract he wanted back in October (something in the region of 20 million annually), so will they be willing to match the 103 million dollar offer the Nets might make this summer?

KCP was a polarizing figure for Pistons’ fans in 2016–17. An excellent start to the season (14.9 points per game and 40.4 percent from three-point range over the first 39 games) was derailed by a shoulder injury on January 12th. KCP was clearly not the same player upon his return just four games later, and the results on the court were startling. Per pistonpowered.com:

“…the Pistons were +4.6 points per 100 better when he was on the floor before his shoulder injury, and after his return they were a barely believable -18.5 points per 100 worse when he played.”

KCP seemed more tentative upon his return, perhaps wary of re-injuring a shoulder than continued to cause him discomfort. Let’s look at how his shot distribution and efficiency changed upon his return.

Before shoulder injury:

Restricted area: 2.3 attempts (56.2 percent)

Mid-range: 3.6 attempts (41.1 percent)

Left corner three: 0.9 attempts (63.6 percent)

Right corner three: 0.3 attempts (40 percent)

Top of the Key: 4.3 attempts (36.6 percent)

After shoulder injury:

Restricted area: 1.6 attempts ( 60 percent)

Mid-range: 3.1 attempts (38.9 percent)

Left corner three: 0.7 attempts (26.9 percent)

Right corner three: 0.2 attempts (42.9 percent)

Top of the Key: 5.0 attempts (30.4 percent)

The numbers back-up the eye test. KCP shied away from contact post-injury, resulting in a decline in shots at the rim and in the mid-range. While his blistering 63.6 rate from the corner may not have been sustainable the rest of the year, there’s no doubt he was shooting the ball a lot more fluidly:

Footage post-injury was also low on acrobatic flurries to the rim like the following:

I don’t want to labor the point, Caldwell-Pope was terrible during the second half of the season, but for very real and understandable reasons. KCP, while probably never destined to be a star, is a very valuable piece going forward if he can get healthy.

Detroit can only hope that Brooklyn decides to opt for Otto Porter instead, perhaps saving them something in the region of 20 million dollars over the duration of his contract. While Porter is good, and fits beautifully with the core the Wizards have put together, I’d rather have KCP all things considered. KCP’s ability to guard point guards and wings, as well as his off-the-dribble game, make him a slightly more dynamic piece. Yet, who knows how much KCP’s value was damaged by his play over the second half of the season.

The Draft

The Pistons draft strategy will (or at least should) be colored by how much faith they have in their core. Van Gundy has said he believes in his guys, publicly at least:

“We didn’t make the progress we wanted to make this year, but I still like the core of our guys and we have the makings of a good basketball team. We’ve got to come back and have a better year.”

If that’s the case, you have to draft for need rather than the best available guy.

I’ve written before that Florida State’s Jonathan Isaac probably has the lowest floor of any prospect outside of Markelle Fultz. Projected to go in the top eight (at least in most draft guides), Isaac is a talented shooter who should be able to play multiple positions at the NBA level. Ironically, the lanky forward reminds me of Rashard Lewis on offense. Isaac is unlikely to be on the board when the Pistons select 12th. If Detroit were to trade up in the draft (always a possibility in a draft loaded at one particular position, in this year’s case point guard), he would give the team’s front-court the breathing room it so desperately needs going forward.

If the team decides that wholesale changes are in order, a dynamic point guard is the order of the day. Perhaps someone like NC State’s Dennis Smith, a phenomenal athlete with huge upside, could be someone the team would look at. A back-court pairing of KCP and Smith could be ferocious.

Things are seldom ever as bleak as they seem in the NBA. Hit on a few picks, maybe strike gold on an underappreciated free agent or two, and suddenly you’re back in the thick of it. The team’s success in 2015–16 created unreasonable expectations for what was still a raw, underdeveloped team. The team’s core is still young. Drummond’s warts are festering, but the big center is still full of potential. Fit means everything in this league, particularly when it comes to young players.

It’s unclear how much Stanley Johnson’s early struggles on offense have come due to problems within the team’s dynamics. Johnson, the eighth pick in the 2015 draft, was putrid on offense this past season. While the young forward still performed well on defense, the team desperately needs lottery-level offense from him next season. Johnson is still just 21, but questions are already being asked.

Every team is looking for shooting. It doesn’t come cheap, and it often comes with it’s flaws (just ask Cleveland’s defensive coaches). A decent point guard, one who can run an offense and keep other guys engaged, is another must.

Assuming the team can pluck some support from the draft, and deal away Jackson, the pieces have the potential to fall into place. If they don’t, things could get really ugly in Motown.

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Paul Headley
16 Wins A Ring

NBA writer and host of The Wraparound NBA podcast. Born in Ireland, live in Korea.