United Nations Climate Compensation Debate
As climate change intensifies, governments around the world are debating who should pay for the damages. Last November at COP 27, representatives from Pakistan argued the “moral case” for wealthy nations creating “loss and damage funds” to help developing nations adapt to the costly effects of climate change [1]. Their case is clear: wealthy countries have prospered in large part due to the emissions that fueled their industrialization, and developing nations who are relatively blameless for the rise in global temperature are paying the price. This debate is more than a passing dispute, it’s a matter of equity and justice on a global scale, and it is certain to have major geopolitical consequences for decades to come.
It’s no surprise that Pakistan leads the charge for “loss and damage funds” at COP 27, having experienced catastrophic floods the past summer that scientists have linked to climate change [2]. Researchers predicted that 8 million people have been displaced by the floods, and 1700 have been pronounced dead. In addition to the human toll brought on by the floods, the economic impacts are giving rise to a humanitarian crisis, as the government estimates that nearly 9 million people can be pushed into poverty. And to make matters worse, the floods left behind an estimated 30 billion dollars in damages in their wake [2]. It goes without saying that Pakistan is in dire need of international assistance.
Pakistan’s previous calls for aid have centered around achieving “climate justice, but during the Prime Minister’s recent trip to the UN general assembly, the government expanded its narrative to include debt relief and climate financing, saying that “all hell will break loose” if rich countries do not provide Pakistan with debt relief [2]. At COP 27, Pakistan reiterated their arguments to the UN, calling for debt relief through “debt-for-climate” swaps that would entail debt relief on the condition that the money is used for climate adaptation, mitigation, and disaster management. Their calls for action were echoed by myriad developing nations hoping to achieve compensation for the damages afflicted on them by a climate crisis which they did not create.
Since the climate compensation debate at COP 27 deals with disproportionate environmental outcomes and the systems that perpetuate those outcomes, utilizing a critical environmental justice framework is crucial for gaining a full understanding. Critical environmental justice builds on the principles of traditional environmental justice but goes further by addressing the root causes of environmental inequality — capitalism, colonialism, politics, etc. As I will make clear in this article, the climate compensation debate is rooted in past colonialism, and its outcomes have the potential either rectify past structural inequality or, if actionable steps are not taken, further entrench the structural inequalities that can be traced back to 18th-century colonialism.
An influential environmental sociologist, David Naguib Pellow, goes beyond traditional environmental justice to incorporate social and economic factors into his analysis of disproportionate environmental outcomes. As Pellow puts it, “Critical environmental justice is a way of thinking about the environment that attends to questions of power, inequality, and resistance in relation to both environmental problems and scholarship” [3]. In the case of climate compensation, the unequal distribution of resources dates back to colonial times when natural resources were extracted from countries that were unable to defend themselves from theft. If we were to look at the disproportionate effects of climate change without incorporating historical context, then one could argue that it’s simply a result of chance. But if we incorporate historical context into the debate, then we see that the unequal burdens of climate change are a direct result of centuries of exploitation.
To fully understand why such clear climate injustices are wreaking havoc on developing nations, it’s necessary to examine the systems that perpetuate inequality. To that end, let us turn back the clock to 18th-century colonialism. According to the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), an intergovernmental body of the UN that advances scientific knowledge about climate change, colonialism left behind “development challenges that heighten vulnerability to climate impacts” [4]. Furthermore, an article by the World Economic Forum argues that “One thing shared by many former colonies disproportionately impacted by climate change: a relatively small carbon footprint. Pakistan is responsible for about one megaton of emissions per capita annually, compared with well over four in the UK, and more than 13 in the US” [5].
As many Western countries were entering their phases of industrialization, they sought out raw materials to fuel their development [6]. Using superior military power, many Western nations stripped innocent nations — primarily in Africa and South Asia — of their raw materials to bolster industrialization and accumulate wealth. Unsurprisingly, this gave colonialists an economic advantage over nations that were unable to defend themselves and allowed wealthy nations to accelerate their development at the expense of the countries they robbed. As a result, industrialized nations accrued vast amounts of wealth while emitting greenhouse gasses into the atmosphere. Much of the comforts we enjoy today are the result of this colonialist process, but the consequences are quickly catching up to us, some nations more than others.
Here lies the crux of this environmental injustice: some nations were exploited for their raw materials to fuel other nations’ industrialization, and the exploited nations are bearing the brunt of the environmental consequences [6]. Since 1751, the United States and European Union alone have contributed almost 50% of global greenhouse gas emissions, making the emissions per capita magnitudes higher than the rest of the world [7]. Today, the United States and European Union make up some of the wealthiest nations in the world, allowing them to more easily adapt to the damaging effects of climate change. Other countries aren’t so lucky — take Pakistan for example. Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, Pakistan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, recently highlighted the disproportionate climate burden that his country bears. He argued that Pakistan contributes “a negligible 0.8 percent of the global carbon footprint, but we are among the 10 most climate-stressed countries on the planet” [8].
Moreover, according to the New York Times, wealthy countries such as the US, Canada, Japan, and much of Western Europe “are responsible for 50% of all the planet-warming greenhouse gasses released from fossil fuels and industry over the past 170 years” [9] For a while, these emissions served colonizing countries well by propelling them through periods of economic expansion and development. But eventually, the economic benefits that came from fossil fuel usage became overshadowed by the destruction brought on by climate change. But the the impacts of climate change are not uniform across the globe — they affect different areas of the world differently. As a consequence, some countries that are relatively blameless for the rise in global temperatures are bearing the burden which they did not create. Providing climate compensation is a way for wealthy nations to lighten that burden and stand in solidarity with the countries covering the cost of our prosperity. Unfortunately, these efforts are stymied by economic and political systems that prioritize countries’ self interest — but more on that later.
Although Pakistan is the latest country to lead the charge for climate compensation, the first debates began in 1992 when the small island state, Vanuatu, proposed an international insurance pool for small island states [10]. Vanuatu argued that the world’s most notorious polluters ought to provide financial relief for the rising sea levels that threaten their very existence. Unfortunately, Vanuatu’s ambitious proposal fell on deaf ears, but it is remembered as being the starting point for holding wealthy nations accountable for the prosperity they enjoyed at the expense of climate stability.
Unfortunately for Vanuatu and other small-island states, time is of the essence. Vanuatu’s economic well-being heavily relies on climate stability, as extreme weather events, rising sea levels, and coastal erosion have devastating impacts that inevitably lead to humanitarian crises, clearly through no fault of their own. According to The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Vanuatu to the United Nations, “One direct consequence of climate change is the increase in extreme weather events, which increasingly destroys crops and thus, has an adverse effect on many people’s livelihoods. Shortages in food cause sharp increases in prices leading to hunger and eventually to humanitarian crisis.” For example, Cyclone Pam, which hit Vanuatu in 2015, affected 64% of the economy and 60% of the population as well as destroying 96% of food crops [11]. These numbers speak for themselves, and they are a clear demonstration of developing nations paying the price for industrialized nations’ prosperity. Since the proposal calls for financial relief have been echoed by dozens of other nations as severe droughts, heatwaves, and other climate disasters impose harsh economic realities on developing nations across the globe.
After Vanuatu first raised the idea of climate compensation to the United Nations, years went by while the progress toward climate compensation stalled while climate change intensified. Finally, in 2007, talks of climate compensation reappeared at COP 13 in Bali, when wealthy nations agreed to provide financial incentives to prevent deforestation and pledged aid for countries vulnerable to the effects of climate change. Better yet, at the 2009 conference, wealthy countries pledged $100 billion per year by 2020 to provide monetary assistance to developing countries [12]. For a moment it seemed like environmental justice was being realized, but climate change is a dynamic problem, and restoring justice is rarely a linear process.
In the years since the promising pledge of $100 billion per year by 2020, wealthy nations have fallen well short of their goal, even by the most generous of calculations. According to The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), pledging countries only dedicated $100 billion by 2020 [13]. It’s important to note that the OECD is composed mainly of wealthy nations (the countries that are pledging), and it based its figures on reports from the wealthy countries themselves. Still, promises were broken, even as the damages from climate change became more severe. Not all pledgers are equally culpable though: Multiple analyses of a notional fair share for these payments — based on factors such as wealth and past emissions — found that the United States, along with Canada, Australia, and Greece, were contributing less than their pledge calls for [13]. Unsurprisingly, climate justice was proving to be evasive.
This is not to say that wealthy countries most responsible for climate change aren’t making great strides toward righting their past wrongs. For example, at the last COP Conference in Egypt, “a variety of European nations have voluntarily pledged more than $300 million to address loss and damage so far, with most of that money going toward a new insurance program to help countries recover from disasters like flooding” [13]. This most recent conference is an encouraging sign that wealthy nations are still willing to pay their dues, despite a number of setbacks. Nevertheless, the job is far from finished, and as climate change progresses, more and more compensation will need to be provided.
Unfortunately, as much as wealthy nations say publicly that they want to provide financial relief, their internal political incentives act against these promises. Politicians in the United States, for example, have a vested interest in protecting their own citizens over citizens in other countries. As Republican Senator John Barrasso put it, “Sending U.S. taxpayer dollars to a U.N. sponsored green slush fund is completely misguided…the Biden administration should focus on lowering spending at home, not shipping money to the U.N. for new climate deals [13]. After all, politicians are re-elected by citizens of their own country, and if they provide billions of dollars in aid to other countries while internal issues rage, then the interest of politicians, as well as citizens with an isolationist lean are jeapordized. Hence, there is a tension between restoring justice for victimized nations and wealth nation’s own economic interests.
The modern political barriers preventing climate justice from being realized can be illuminated by David Purucker’s critique of Pellow’s conception of critical environmental justice. While Purucker ackowledges the advances Pellow made to the field of environmental justice, he takes issue with how Pellow portrays government’s capabilities in ameliorating environmental injustices. Central to Purucker’s critique is the assertion that governments are “not doomed to produce oppressive relations,” as Pellow’s work suggests. Moreover, Purucker argues that “states are not seen as complex assemblies of social relations layered with contradictions” and not monoliths as Pellow’s work makes them out to be [14]. He ultimately concludes that while Pellow’s work was a needed advancement in the field of environmental justice, it’s insufficient in providing clear guidance for environmental movements. Moving forward, states should be viewed as “contested fields of power,” which may be structurally tilted towards oppressive relations, but are capable of progressive reform through statigization.
Purucker’s optimistic take on the State’s capability for change is an encouraging sign for achieving justice in the climate compensation debate. Although there is inherent tension between a government’s internal political incentives and its motivation to compensate other countries, Purcucker’s perception of the state as “contested fields of power” implies an ability to achieve justice through persuasion. Furthermore, if the American population were to be convinced of compensating other countries, then it is within the realm of possibility for them to do so. This may sound like a pipe dream, but the United States provides humanitarian aid for countries all the time, it’s just a question of whether they will be able to provide aid on the scale necessary to help developing countries adapt to a rapidly changing climate.
On the other hand, it seems as if Purucker’s conception of the State’s role in environmental inequality might not fit perfectly into the climate compensation debate. Purucker’s conception of the State as “contested fields of power” refers to the internal politics of any particular government, but in the case of climate compensation debate, there are hundreds of different countries, each with their own internal contradictions. When Purucker writes optimistically about the State’s ability to respond to pressure from constituents, he is addressing a single country. Unfortunately, there are 190 different countries at COP 27, each with their own unique political challenges that sytmie cooperation for justice on a global scale. Although seeing the State’s actions as “contested fields of power” may be a great rallying point for justice, the sheer scale of geopolitics may nullify his argument.
In Pellow’s book “Resisting Global Toxics: Transnational Movements for Environmental Justice,” Pellow argues that environmental injustices are not just local or regional issues but are interconnected with global economic and political systems [15]. In terms of climate compensation, this couldn’t be more true. No matter where a country is located in the world, their emissions are felt by everyone. Therefore, government action to address climate change cannot be achieved through isolationist policies, it requires global cooperation. To even have a chance at achieving coordinated global action, it’s necessary for wealthy nations to rectify their past wrongdoings, and more importantly, to take responsibility for their disproportionate contributions to climate change. Climate compensation is the first step in this direction, but governments must come to terms with the fact that climate change does not exist in a vacuum.
So what does critical environmental justice have to do with the climate compensation debate? A critical environmental justice framework places an emphasis on the systems that uphold structural inequalities, and in the case of climate compensation, structural inequalities are ubiquitous. Colonialism, domestic political incentives, and climate change’s disproportionate impacts around the world create inequalities that are exacerbated as climate change intensifies. As exemplified through Pakistan and Vanuatu, extreme weather events, sea level rise, drought, crop failure, and all of the other devastating impacts of climate change are causing economic costs to pour down on vulnerable countries, exacerbating the already existing inequality. Climate compensation is a way to ameliorate this inequality, and if we’re lucky, it can incentivize developing countries to develop sustainably.
The last COP conference showed that the issue of climate compensation is far from over. Climate change will continue to be a stressor on economic systems worldwide, and countries will scramble to adjust to a changing world. Since climate change affects different areas of the world differently, regardless of responsibility, it is imperative that nations recognize the tension between their own self interest and climate justice, and construct specific, structured plans that ensure climate justice for relatively blameless countries.
Citations
[1] Person, and Zofeen T. Ebrahim. “Flood-Hit Pakistan Seeks Loss and Damage ‘Compensation’ at COP27.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, November 4, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/business/cop/flood-hit-pakistan-seeks-loss-damage-compensation-cop27-2022-11-04/.
[2] “Pakistan’s Roadmap for COP27: In Search of a Strategic Vision,” United States Institute of Peace, November 14, 2022, https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/11/pakistans-roadmap-cop27-search-strategic-vision.
[3] David N. Pellow, What Is Critical Environmental Justice? (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2018).
[4] “Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability,” IPCC â Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, accessed May 15, 2023, https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/.
[5] “What Does Colonialism Have to Do with Climate Change?,” World Economic Forum, accessed May 15, 2023, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/09/colonialism-climate-change-pakistan-floods/.
[6] “Did Colonialism Fuel Industrialization?,” Science ABC, March 20, 2023, https://www.scienceabc.com/social-science/did-colonialism-fuel-industrialization.html.
[7] “Global Emissions.” Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, December 1, 2022. https://www.c2es.org/content/international-emissions/.
[8] “Pakistan Presses U.S. to Lead Global Response to Climate Disasters.” United States Institute of Peace, September 30, 2022. https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/09/pakistan-presses-us-lead-global-response-climate-disasters.
[9] Popovich, Nadja, and Brad Plumer. “Who Has the Most Historical Responsibility for Climate Change?” The New York Times. The New York Times, November 12, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/11/12/climate/cop26-emissions-compensation.html.
[10] “Loss and Damage: Why Climate Reparations Are Top of the Agenda at COP27.” World Economic Forum. Accessed April 23, 2023. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/10/cop27-why-climate-reparations-are-one-of-the-biggest-issues/.
[11] “The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Vanuatu to the United Nations.” Climate Change | Vanuatu. Accessed April 23, 2023. https://www.un.int/vanuatu/vanuatu/climate-change#.
[12] Timperley, Jocelyn. “The Broken $100-Billion Promise of Climate Finance — and How to Fix It.” Nature News. Nature Publishing Group, October 20, 2021. https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-02846-3.
[13] Brad Plumer et al., “In a First, Rich Countries Agree to Pay for Climate Damages in Poor Nations,” The New York Times, November 19, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/19/climate/un-climate-damage-cop27.html.
[14] Purucker, David. “Critical Environmental Justice and the State: A Critique of Pellow.” Environmental Sociology 7, no. 3 (2021): 176–86. https://doi.org/10.1080/23251042.2021.1878575.
[15] Pellow, David N. Resisting Global Toxics: Transnational Movements for Environmental Justice. The MIT Press, 2007.
