In Defense of the Deal
The recent nuclear accord between the P5+1 nations (US, UK, France, China, Russia, and Germany) and Iran, slated to relive the Islamic Republic of economic sanctions in exchange for a marked reduction in uranium enrichment capability, is far from perfect. Nevertheless, given the circumstances -a cornered, defensive Iran only months from nuclear threshold status set against the backdrop of a combustible region already lit half aflame by the sparks of ancient divides and modern extremism- this agreement is the best possible option.
The deal itself centers upon nuclear capacity reduction and verification. Per the document, Iran agrees to diminish its uranium stockpile by 98%, decrease its centrifuge count from over 19,000 to around 6,000, and pledge to enrich fissile fuel to only 3.67%, far from the 90% level necessary for a bomb. Moreover, two facilities erected with questionable intent, Fordo and Arak, are being refitted to serve explicitly civilian purposes, and the construction of new reactors is forbidden.
To ensure adherence to these mandates, Tehran agreed to “extraordinary and robust monitoring, verification, and inspection” of its nuclear sites, and accepted the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s right to investigate anything deemed suspicious. UN inspectors may also enter military facilities such as Parchin, although visits must be requested and processing may take up to twenty-four days.
As aforementioned, the deal is not perfect; it has holes. While the stockpile of fissile fuel and existing centrifuge infrastructure will be considerably reduced, the Iranian “break out” time needed to develop a bomb is still estimated at only around a year. Furthermore, the procedure necessary to inspect military sites offers Iran opportunities to conceal evidence of activities violating the terms of the agreement. Others have condemned the proposal’s failure to stipulate that Iran cease sponsoring international terrorism, and have questioned what will transpire when many of its tenets expire in ten or fifteen years.
Yet while its negatives are readily apparent, the accord’s benefits resonate more upon examination of the available alternatives to diplomatic compromise. The key consideration is what would likely occur if Secretary Kerry had spurned the current proposal in hopes of a nonexistent “better deal.” First, even if international sanctions were maintained, Iranian enrichment would progress unhindered, as evidenced by the expansion of centrifuge quantity from 3,000 in 2006, when sanctions were first imposed, to over 19,000 today. Concluding that economic restrictions would remain indefinitely and possessing the capability to weaponize in two to three months, Iranian leaders would certainly be tempted to tread the path of proliferation.
Moreover, were talks to have been abandoned, the international community would be incapable of verifying the intent of Iranian atomic development, consequently inciting many to advocate military force against the potentially nuclearized state. War may not loom over the immediate horizon, as President Obama has implied, but the likelihood of conflict would inevitably escalate if the US could only hypothesize and fret about what was transpiring deep underground at Fordo.
Additionally, rejecting the present arrangement would not necessarily prompt reaffirmation of a crippling sanctions regime. Over the past few months, numerous states, including Russia and China, have been sought to tap into the previously underutilized Iranian market. Without an agreement, these actors would grow frustrated with the US for holding out indefinitely for a “better deal” and would begin to gradually erode the global trade embargo. And despite the assertions of presidential hopefuls like Scott Walker and Rick Perry that global partners could be convinced to back the imposition of even stronger sanctions, powerful economic forces would likely overcome even legitimate American objections to trade with Iran.
A scenario in which the deal collapses therefore entails an Iran unencumbered by technological restraints or IAEA supervision, incited to proliferate by the presence of international threats, and financially bolstered by an array of economic opportunity-seekers. This is Iran at its most dangerous: an incensed, unpredictable rogue state.
Iran under the conditions of the agreement, on the other hand, becomes inherently less threatening. Yes, the regime will expand aid to proxy forces in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, and elsewhere. However, estimates that Iran will inherit $100 billion to back global terror are inflated; unless the government aspires for financial collapse, the majority of newly unfrozen funds will be utilized for desperately needed economic development. Indeed, even if the accord were rejected, Iran would still have access to an expanded capital base, and in that case, its proxies could be additionally bolstered by their nuclear-equipped protector state. And while US envoys were recently unable to secure the release of four Americans detained in Iran, the talks opened a previously nonexistent channel for bilateral communications that makes possible future negotiations for their otherwise doubtful liberation.
The document produced by Iran and the P5+1 is in many ways not an endpoint, but a beginning. While certainly not addressing all issues associated with the Islamic Republic’s current status and behavior, it succeeds in achieving one goal: fundamentally reducing Iran’s ability to approach weaponization capacity. And while Tehran may continue to destabilize the region, its proxies will not be emboldened by a nuclear umbrella. Without persistent diplomacy and vigorous enforcement, this agreement may fall to shambles. But for the time being, a nuclear specter has been removed from an already turbulent Middle East, and for that reason, this is a good deal.
Matthew Gregory (SFS ‘17) is the President of the Georgetown University College Democrats.
