POLITICS
Here’s how the 2020 transition team managed a safe and secure transition for Joe Biden and Kamala Harris
Original interviews reveal unprecedented obstruction, cyber security concerns, and social media worries affected the transfer of power
As rioters stormed the Capitol on January 6th, 2021, thousands of volunteers were at home helping get the Biden-Harris administration ready to take power two weeks later.
Through countless investigations and on-going court cases, we now know much about the planning for January 6th and its ultimate failure to interrupt the transfer of power. We know the key figures inside and outside of government, including the role of the former President and his allies in the White House.
This isn’t the case for the equally important work going on to prepare for that transfer.
To be sure, a lot that happened during the 78 days of the 2020 Biden-Harris transition will never be known. Such is the consequence of a political process that happens before official governing begins. Few documents were preserved from the transition and many members of the transition team went straight into the Biden administration, making them unavailable for interview.
Nevertheless, the findings from the more than 75 interviews I conducted for research presented virtually at the 2023 American Political Science Association annual meeting this week reveal much about the inner-workings of the 2020 transition team. The interviews confirm this was a transition like none other in American presidential history.
To start, the misinformation environment that dominated planning for the Biden campaign and Biden-Harris transition had major impacts on the work of the transition team. In general, members of the team reported that the transition succeeded beyond their expectations, despite the pandemic and cybersecurity precautions. Though worried about the leaked John Podesta emails from 2016, no major hack on the transition team succeeded between the election and the inauguration, despite the federal government facing the SolarWinds security breach in December.
This was the consequence of — for the first time — a robust cyber security transition staff hired by the transition and extreme attention to deploying secure hardware and software, including dedicated laptops shipped to team members, mandatory use of Signal, and a newly-designed Google workspace.
The team also completed its tasks to prepare for Day 1 in the face of a less than cooperative outgoing Trump appointees and an attempted coup two-thirds of the way through its work. Many described highly qualified colleagues on the transition committed to a noble cause to peacefully transition between administrations.
Nonetheless, problems emerged.
The misinformation environment resulted in occasional confusion on roles and limits on collaboration between teams. Virtual work expanded who could serve on the team, but also limited the close connections and face-to-face interactions some believed would have been helpful. And, cybersecurity concerns pervaded the work of the transition team from the leadership down to rank-and-file members.
Looking ahead, the 2020 transition was unique for a variety of reasons, most which a future transition team will not confront, but lessons should be shared and best practices replicated. Many of these align with what the Partnership for Public Service concluded last year.
First, virtual work, concerns about hacks and misinformation, won’t go away, but future teams can learn from the success of the 2020 transition to prioritize cyber security.
Second, future transition teams must begin preparing early to learn from the successes of 2020 as well as solve the persistent technological and human resource problems that emerged. Peaceful transitions in the future will depend on this organizational learning that will only be possible through greater transparency, openness, and cooperation within and across transitions. This is a hallmark of federal law, but must be diligently acted on in the future.
Third, the Trump administration’s unwillingness to embrace these principles in 2020, one would hope, will not be precedent-setting for the future. Instead, the cooperation between Bush and Obama established during the 2008 transition is a more reasonable model. Though, as reported by political scientist Martha Kumar in her excellent 2017 book, during that 2008 transition, it was a covert cyber program that the US had used on Iran that President Bush shared with President-elect Obama. In future transitions it will likely be cyber threats closer to home.
Nevertheless, cooperation will remain the hallmark of successful presidential transitions in the future, whatever the information and political environment is at that time.
Note: If you’re interested in the full version of the paper, message me and I’d be glad to share it.
