Tesla and Teslamate — The DANGER of Tesla Cars and Your Data on Grafana — If you make mistakes
Tesla who?
What is Teslamate?
What is Grafana?
Grafana open-source software enables you to query, visualize, alert on, and explore your metrics, logs, and traces wherever they are stored. Grafana OSS provides you with tools to turn your time-series database (TSDB) data into insightful graphs and visualizations. The Grafana OSS plugin framework also enables you to connect other data sources like NoSQL/SQL databases, ticketing tools like Jira or ServiceNow, and CI/CD tooling like GitLab.
The Issue
Unauthenticated Teslamate
An unauthenticated Teslamate instance can pose several significant security risks. Teslamate is an application that allows Tesla car owners to track and manage their vehicles. When it’s not properly secured, the following issues can arise:
1. Unauthorized Access to Vehicle Data:
- Data Exposure: Anyone can access sensitive information about Tesla vehicles, including location data, charging status, and more.
- Privacy Violation: Owners’ privacy is compromised as their movement patterns and habits can be tracked.
2. Remote Control and Manipulation:
- Vehicle Control: In extreme cases, attackers could potentially gain control over certain vehicle functions, like unlocking doors or manipulating the climate control system.
- Malicious Commands: Attackers might send false or malicious commands to the vehicle, causing unexpected behavior or damage.
3. Location Tracking and Stalking:
- Stalking: Malicious individuals could track the real-time location of specific vehicles, which could lead to stalking or targeted attacks.
- Geofencing Bypass: Geofencing features could be bypassed, allowing unauthorized access to restricted areas.
4. Data Manipulation and Falsification:
- Odometer and Mileage Fraud: If an attacker can manipulate the reported mileage or odometer data, it could lead to fraudulent activities, especially in the resale market.
- Tampering with Trip Data: Trip history and usage data might be altered, leading to false insurance claims or warranty disputes.
5. Denial of Service (DoS):
- Overload: An unauthenticated instance might be susceptible to DoS attacks, where attackers flood the service with requests, causing it to crash or become unresponsive.
- Service Disruption: Denial of service attacks could disrupt the service, rendering it unusable for legitimate users.
6. Brute Force Attacks and Account Hijacking:
- Brute Force: Attackers might attempt to gain unauthorized access by trying multiple username and password combinations, potentially leading to successful account hijacking.
- Credential Stuffing: Stolen credentials from other breaches could be used to access Teslamate accounts if users reuse passwords across different platforms.
7. Security Misconfigurations:
- Default Credentials: If default credentials are not changed, anyone aware of them can access the system.
- Unprotected APIs: Unprotected APIs can be exploited to extract data or perform actions without proper authentication.
8. Legal and Regulatory Implications:
- Data Protection Laws: Violation of data protection laws and regulations, such as GDPR, could lead to severe legal consequences and fines for the owner/operator of the instance.
To mitigate these risks, it’s crucial to secure Teslamate instances by implementing proper authentication mechanisms, ensuring strong password policies, encrypting sensitive data, regularly updating the software, and adhering to security best practices. Failure to do so can result in serious privacy breaches, financial losses, and legal complications.
Attack Scenario
A researcher discovered a vulnerability that allowed access to the unauthenticated Teslamate. This access was trusted and as such, they were allowed to gain unrestricted access to the Grafana instance which housed the user’s data in real time. This means that the attacker could get all the user’s real-time information including but not limited to the:
Address
Charge levels
Locations visited
Car locked on unlocked
Car sleep/charging
Alert Management
The attacker could do what the owner could do. They could even activate the satellite view for closer inspection along with amending the data registered. For example, an attacker could modify the home address to redirect to another destination or to be stored as another name. Since both the Teslamate and Grafana instances were vulnerable, the attacker could easily navigate through both. This means that they could export the data stolen into graphs, which will further help them.
They could even simply override the car lock and resort to physical hacking attempts such as taking the vehicle or selling the information to thieves. This is true as the events are captured in real-time. A terrible exposure to PII like this is critical.
In this scenario, the attacker exploited a vulnerability in an unauthenticated Teslamate instance, gaining unrestricted access to a connected Grafana dashboard. Here’s an analysis of the potential impacts and risks associated with this breach:
1. Unauthorized Access to Teslamate and Grafana:
- Severity: Critical
- Implication: The attacker gains unrestricted access to Teslamate and Grafana, essentially becoming the user. This includes access to sensitive real-time data.
2. Access to Real-time User Data:
- Data Accessed:
- Addresses
- Charge Levels
- Locations Visited
- Car Lock Status
- Car Sleep/Charging Status
- Implication: The attacker can monitor the user’s current location, track their movements, and access details about their vehicle’s status in real time.
3. Manipulation of User Data:
- Actions Possible:
- Modify Home Address
- Redirect Destinations
- Change Stored Names
- Implication: The attacker can alter user data, potentially leading to physical security risks. For instance, changing the home address could redirect the user to a dangerous location.
4. Visualization of Data:
- Capability: Export Stolen Data into Graphs
- Implication: The attacker can visualize and potentially analyze the stolen data, which might reveal patterns or behaviors that could be exploited further.
5. Physical Security Threats:
- Actions Possible:
- Override Car Lock
- Physical Theft of Vehicle
- Implication: The attacker can directly interfere with the car’s security systems, possibly stealing the vehicle or engaging in unauthorized physical access.
6. Potential for Financial Gain:
- Action Possible: Sell Stolen Information
- Implication: The attacker could monetize the stolen data by selling it to malicious entities, leading to further privacy violations for the user.
7. Privacy Risks:
- Implication: Personally Identifiable Information (PII) exposure is severe. The user’s privacy is compromised, potentially leading to identity theft, harassment, or other malicious activities.
8. Legal and Regulatory Consequences:
- Implication: Violation of privacy laws and regulations, potentially resulting in significant legal penalties and reputational damage for the affected company or organization.
9. Need for Immediate Remediation:
- Urgency: The situation demands immediate attention and remediation to prevent further data exposure, privacy breaches, and potential physical security threats to the users.
Note
This vulnerability is not specifically the fault of Tesla or Teslamate but was found to be an issue with an outdated version of Teslamate and the user’s configuration. Does this mean that this is not a huge risk?
What to consider?
- Authentication Bypass: If there was an authentication bypass vulnerability in Teslamate, the attacker could gain unauthorized access to the system without needing proper credentials. Once inside Teslamate, they could exploit other vulnerabilities to escalate privileges.
- Insecure Data Transmission: If Teslamate and Grafana communicate data insecurely (for instance, without encryption or using weak encryption), an attacker could intercept and manipulate the data in transit. By manipulating requests, they could trick Grafana into believing that the requests are legitimate, gaining unauthorized access to Grafana.
- Shared Authentication Tokens or Sessions: If Teslamate and Grafana share authentication tokens or sessions due to misconfigurations or vulnerabilities, an attacker gaining access to one system could use the same session information to authenticate with the other system without needing separate credentials.
- Session Hijacking: If Teslamate and Grafana use session-based authentication and Teslamate has a session hijacking vulnerability, the attacker could steal a user’s session after logging into Teslamate. With the stolen session, they could impersonate the user and access Grafana.
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): If either Teslamate or Grafana is vulnerable to XSS attacks, the attacker could inject malicious scripts into one system, which, when executed by other users, could perform actions on their behalf, including accessing other systems or stealing their session tokens.
- API Vulnerabilities: If there are insecure APIs or misconfigured API permissions, the attacker might exploit these vulnerabilities to make requests to Grafana on behalf of Teslamate users, essentially bypassing the normal authentication mechanisms.
In a secure setup, these scenarios should not be possible due to robust authentication mechanisms, encrypted communication channels, secure session management, and proper authorization controls. However, if these security measures are lacking or flawed, an attacker might exploit the vulnerabilities present in both Teslamate and Grafana, allowing them to move between the domains.
To discuss further
- User Error: If the user indeed made a mistake or misconfigured their Teslamate installation, it could have left the system exposed. Misconfigurations are common sources of security vulnerabilities and can lead to unauthorized access.
- Outdated Installation: Outdated software is often vulnerable to known exploits. If the Teslamate installation was not kept up to date, it might have contained security holes that were later patched in newer versions.
- Overestimation of Technical Abilities: If the user overestimated their technical abilities and failed to properly secure their installation, it could have created a situation where unauthorized access was easier for an attacker.
- Responsibility: However, even if the user made errors, it’s crucial to note that the responsibility for security ultimately lies with the developer too. Systems should ideally be designed with security in mind, making it harder for users to inadvertently expose themselves.
- Education and Support: Developers have a responsibility to educate users on proper installation and security practices. Providing clear documentation, warnings about potential risks, and prompts for necessary updates can help users maintain a secure environment.
- Continuous Monitoring: Regardless of user errors, systems should be continuously monitored for vulnerabilities. Regular security audits and automated checks can help identify and mitigate risks promptly.
- Ethical Hacking and Responsible Disclosure: If a developer suspects that a user has an insecure setup, ethical hacking practices can be employed to validate this concern. If a vulnerability is discovered, it should be reported responsibly, allowing the user to fix the issue before any public exposure.
- Default Authentication: The Teslamate Grafana image has authentication enabled by default, emphasizing the importance of default security settings. Users are encouraged to keep authentication active to enhance their system’s security.
The Developer did well and responded timely
User Responsibility: Users are ultimately responsible for the proper configuration and deployment of self-hosted applications.
While developers provide necessary configurations and documentation, it’s the user’s duty to implement them correctly. This includes understanding and applying security measures.
Developer Support: The Developer aims to provide documentation and recommendations to guide users in configuring their systems securely. This support can help users avoid misconfigurations and potential security pitfalls, highlighting the importance of default security settings, user responsibility in system configuration, and the role of developers in offering guidance and support through documentation. Users are encouraged to follow best practices and utilize provided resources to maintain a secure self-hosted environment.
In summary, while user errors and misconfigurations might contribute to security vulnerabilities, developers have a responsibility to design systems that are resilient to common mistakes and to support users in maintaining secure setups. Both parties play a role in ensuring the security of a system.
Response thoughts
How we respond to these discoveries is vital for safeguarding users and their data. Let’s explore a scenario where the flaw is detected and the subsequent steps are taken to ensure user safety.
Let us create a hypothetical scenario
Alex from Rivertown finds Sarah’s Teslamate on the internet unexpectedly— Oh! Noo!
Alex inadvertently discovers a vulnerability within the Teslamate app, exposing the real-time data of a user named Sarah, who frequents the local Tesla service center. Recognizing the urgency of the situation, Alex initiates a responsible disclosure process, aiming to protect Sarah’s privacy and security.
- Discovery of the Vulnerability: Alex, a meticulous cybersecurity researcher, identifies a flaw within Teslamate’s security protocols. Through careful examination, they uncovered Sarah’s personal information, including her contact details and her Tesla’s real-time data.
- Determining Sarah’s Frequent Location: Investigating further, Alex discovers that Sarah regularly visits the Tesla service center located on Rivertown Avenue. Realizing the potential risk, they understand the gravity of the situation.
- Notifying Tesla: Recognizing the urgency, Alex contacts Tesla’s security team. They provide comprehensive details about the vulnerability, emphasizing the immediate need for action to protect Sarah’s data and ensure the security of TeslaMate users.
- Tesla Notifies the Service Center: Tesla promptly acts on the information and notifies the Rivertown Avenue service center about the potential breach involving one of their customers. They stress the importance of vigilance and cooperation in safeguarding Sarah’s data.
- Locating Sarah: Concerned about Sarah’s safety, the service center manager, David, attempts to contact her using the information available in Tesla’s records. Surprisingly, Sarah does not respond to the service center’s attempts to reach out, raising concerns about her security.
- Reviewing Security Footage: Determined to ensure Sarah’s safety, David reviews the service center’s security footage. After careful analysis, he identified Sarah’s vehicle entering and leaving the service center premises, confirming her regular visits.
- Collaboration and Investigation: David collaborates with Alex, combining their expertise to cross-verify the vulnerability details. Together, they confirm the authenticity of the flaw and its potential impact on Sarah’s privacy.
- Sending a Security Notice: Armed with verified information, the service center sends a detailed security notice to Sarah, explaining the situation and providing instructions to enhance her online security. The notice urges her to take immediate steps to safeguard her personal information.
Plot Twist: Upon receiving the security notice, Sarah realizes the gravity of the situation and contacts both the service center and Alex. Grateful for their efforts, she collaborates with them, unveiling a sophisticated cyber-attack targeting TeslaMate users. Together, they work to enhance cybersecurity measures, ensuring the safety and privacy of Tesla enthusiasts in Rivertown and beyond.
In the past
A researcher hacked dozens of Teslas in the past and you can find that article here. They provide far more pictures than I can as the user is still at risk and I hope you understand.
Conclusion
The technical aspects of the vulnerability in the Teslamate instance involve unauthenticated access to sensitive data in real time. Here’s a breakdown of the technical details:
1. Unauthenticated Access: The vulnerability allows unauthorized users to access both Teslamate and Grafana instances without the need for proper authentication.
2. Access to Grafana: Once inside, the attacker gains unrestricted access to the Grafana instance. Grafana is a data visualization tool that integrates with various data sources, allowing users to create real-time dashboards. In this context, it contains sensitive real-time information about the user’s Tesla vehicle, including details like address, charge levels, locations visited, lock status, and charging/sleep status.
3. Modification and Export of Data: The attacker not only has read access but can also modify the stored data. They can change critical information like home addresses, redirecting them to malicious destinations. Moreover, the attacker can export this data, potentially for further analysis or malicious use.
4. Real-time Events: The vulnerability provides access to real-time events captured by Teslamate. This means the attacker can monitor the user’s activities as they happen, allowing for malicious actions like overriding car locks or initiating physical hacking attempts.
5. Potential Physical Attacks: With real-time access, the attacker can initiate physical attacks, such as stealing the vehicle. They can track the user’s location, know when the car is locked or unlocked, and even analyze patterns to identify opportune moments for theft.
Collaboration with Grafana Data: By accessing both Teslamate and Grafana, the attacker can create detailed visualizations and graphs, potentially to aid in further attacks or to sell the information to third parties.
The key technical issue here is the lack of authentication controls, allowing unfettered access to real-time, sensitive user data. This vulnerability poses significant risks to the user’s privacy and physical security, making it critical for the companies involved to address the issue promptly.
