Lai Ching-te’s Inauguration: Fundamental Judgments on Taiwan’s Current Situation
The Third Eye: China, explained?
On May 20, the 16th President of the Republic of China, and the fifth directly elected President of Taiwan, Lai Ching-te, took office. In his inaugural speech, Lai Ching-te expressed his determination to use industrial planning and economic development as a foundation to ensure national defense and expand Taiwan’s international space. This speech essentially downplays the legal orthodoxy of the “Republic of China” while continuing a pragmatic push towards Taiwan independence.
Following Lai Ching-te’s inauguration, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi immediately extended congratulations, highlighting that Japan and Taiwan share fundamental values. Alicia Kearns, Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the UK House of Commons, mentioned that Taiwan is an important democratic partner for the UK and emphasized the need for continued relationship development. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken also promptly issued a statement, noting, “The people of Taiwan have once again demonstrated the strength of their democratic system,” and expressed the desire to deepen cooperation with Taiwan. Additionally, Italy and other countries sent delegations to attend the inauguration.
Meanwhile, Beijing responded with a mix of verbal and military intimidation, criticizing “Taiwan independence” rhetoric and conducting military exercises around Taiwan on May 23 and 24, with a clear focus on “Formosa”.
While the dust has settled, uncertainties remain. For the West, the “Far East” still seems distant. This distance not only creates a sense of beauty but also results in a certain degree of “misfocus.” The following are several ABC-level Q&A for reference.
Q1: What is the political landscape in Taiwan after the election?
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidates Lai Ching-te and Hsiao Bi-khim were elected President and Vice President of Taiwan, securing about 40% of the vote, making them the apparent winners. However, in the Legislative Yuan, the Kuomintang (KMT) secured 52 seats, the DPP 51 seats, the Taiwan People’s Party 8 seats, and independents or non-party affiliated individuals 2 seats. Therefore, the ruling DPP did not gain a majority in the Legislative Yuan, which means their future agenda may face resistance from the KMT and the People’s Party.
And it happened just now. Recently, multiple legislators clashed in the Legislative Yuan over disputes related to parliamentary reform bills, resulting in injuries to six individuals.
Q2: What changes are there in Beijing’s policy towards Taiwan? Would the result be different if the KMT were in power?
Both Beijing and Taipei have largely continued their previous cross-strait policies, given there was no change in party leadership. However, given Lai Ching-te’s more resolute stance on “Taiwan independence” compared to former President Tsai Ing-wen, Beijing has not only maintained its previous policy of “no contact, no acknowledgment, and no renunciation of force” but has also intensified military and propaganda efforts.
If the KMT were in power, the results might not differ significantly. While the CCP views the KMT as a more communicable party, if KMT candidate Hou You-yi were elected President, he would also have to navigate the “national unification” path, which includes accepting the “1992 Consensus” (acknowledging “One China” as a premise).
From this perspective, Lai Ching-te’s election might actually lower mutual expectations, potentially facilitating further policy implementation. This scenario is akin to Chinese encounters where skipping pleasantries, despite seeming blunt, fundamentally remains unchanged.
Q3: What is the mainstream public opinion in Taiwan and the mainland?
**According to a report by National Chengchi University in February 2024, 61.1% of Taiwanese support “maintaining the status quo indefinitely” or “deciding the status quo later,” which represents the mainstream opinion. Assistant Professor Wang Hong-en from the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, noted in his commentary that the new trend of “permanently maintaining the status quo” indicates that more Taiwanese are choosing to “actively preserve the status quo” or “actively refuse to discuss unification or independence”.
Wang explained that from 2008 to 2024, neither the ruling KMT nor the DPP managed to lead Taiwan beyond the “status quo,” causing some people to adopt a relatively passive or reactive approach to the unification-independence issue, perceiving the status quo as unchangeable. Additionally, international upheavals have influenced public sentiment: the 2019 Hong Kong protests, China’s stringent zero-COVID policy in 2020, and frequent incursions by Chinese military aircraft in recent years have resulted in a negative perception of Beijing among Taiwanese. The war in Ukraine has further fueled fears of a similar conflict in Taiwan.
In mainland China, public opinion on the Taiwan issue is less well-documented. However, it appears that while not all support military action against Taiwan, a significant majority favors unification due to strong Chinese identity sentiments. This is not surprising. Meanwhile, some rational Chinese view Taiwan as a model of democracy and freedom among Chinese communities, rejecting the notion of conflict.
Q4: Will mainland China attack Taiwan? If so, when?
During a meeting with US President Joe Biden in San Francisco in November 2023, Chinese President Xi Jinping denied having plans to attack Taiwan by 2027 or 2035. However, Beijing has never renounced the option of force. After then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022, the mainland has conducted periodic military exercises around Taiwan, seemingly approaching real combat scenarios in terms of geography and tactics.
Many believe that Xi Jinping might delay military action due to domestic economic constraints. Unfortunately, for China’s authoritarian regime, maintaining political power is the foremost concern. Even if attacking Taiwan could lead to economic setbacks or collapse, this would not deter authoritarian rulers.
When is the optimal time? While international dynamics are ever-changing, Beijing’s focus can be straightforward: the United States. Military experts suggest that Beijing considers it optimal to attack Taiwan when it can prevent substantial US intervention and reduce US support for Taiwan.
In addition to the long-standing Taiwan Relations Act, the US has increased its support for Taiwan in recent years. The 2024 US National Defense Authorization Act includes multiple provisions related to US-Taiwan defense relations, requiring US assistance in training Taiwan’s military. Currently, US military aid to Taiwan primarily operates through Foreign Military Financing and Presidential Drawdown Authority channels.
Q5: What has Taiwan done right to gain more international space?
The issue of Taiwan’s “international space” fundamentally involves the sensitive sovereignty question in cross-strait relations. The “Republic of China” or “Taiwan” is not a sovereign state but seeks to participate in international activities with sovereign status, which has become increasingly challenging. A simple example is that Taiwan did not receive an invitation to the World Health Assembly in May. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin stated that without Beijing’s consent, Taiwan has no right or reason to attend the WHA.
In recent years, following the lead of former US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, officials and parliamentary delegations from the EU, Germany, Sweden, Australia, and Canada have visited Taiwan in official capacities, creating a semblance of bustling diplomatic activity. Many believe that former President Tsai Ing-wen’s “pragmatic diplomacy” was successful.
However, the “One China” principle remains an ever-present challenge. During Tsai Ing-wen’s eight years in office, Taiwan lost 10 diplomatic allies, leaving only 12 countries with formal diplomatic relations, including the Vatican. Beijing’s relentless pressure has made it challenging for Taiwan to maintain its international presence.
So, what has Taiwan done right? In reality, not much. In the international arena, democracy and ideology are merely surface-level rhetoric; interest-driven politicians rarely care about these. Taiwan’s strategic location in global supply chains and maritime trade routes, coupled with its geopolitical significance, are the real reasons for its international attention. Furthermore, the Ukraine war has served as a crucial lesson for the international community over the past two years.
Thus, the question remains: will the West be as concerned if a conflict arises in Taiwan, which is not as proximate as Ukraine?
