The Wages of Unreliability
American Foreign Relations and the Trump Presidency
In 1937, with the Great British public unwilling to commit to war against Nazi Germany over the extant situation, the best Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain could achieve was Adolf Hitler’s agreement to the minimum terms for peace between the two countries. Usually cited to define the failure of appeasement, a more useful perspective is that Chamberlain’s Munich Agreement defines the transformative role of reliability in international relations and diplomacy. Setting the stage for one of the more enduring examples of political resolve in war of the 20th century, when Hitler proved his word was unreliable and his diplomacy not worth the paper upon which it was written, war became not only politically feasible, but popular. The German Chancellor’s diplomatic perfidy made manifest the scale of the threat his regime presented, galvanizing the Britons to endure a significant struggle. That Germany was able to repeat this diplomatic charade with the Soviet Union was remarkable — but like the UK, that the USSR also needed more time to prepare for the coming conflict made even a worthless deal attractive for the delay it provided. And for the Soviets, as for the British, the political will for war was built in large measure upon the ruins of Nazi reliability.
Returning to present day, this WWII example matters now because reliability’s influence across spectrum of America’s dealings abroad is on the rise. While the now seemingly routine daily cycle of scandal and disruption make it difficult to imagine how the Trump administration will survive another month, let alone the next four years, we must act as if it will. The first days and weeks of a new administration are often tumultuous as inexperience tells in steering the ship of state. In no case to date has an administration failed to right itself and function appropriately. Assuming there is at least a short term political resolution to the current tempests tossing the infant Trump Administration allowing it to settle into its work of governance, it is reasonable to consider the administration’s prospects in its dealings abroad. In this realm, the history and enduring nature of the international system within which foreign relations operates suggests a troubled course ahead for the US.
Proving that the Trump campaign was prelude not posturing, events of the last few weeks have solidified a profile of unreliability that the administration will struggle with as it attempts to pursue its international policy agenda. Thus, even as the administration settles into governance, for American foreign relations its reliability has already been negatively defined. This will not only change the parameters of American policy, but the intellectual approach to the subject as well.
The intercourse between states is unduly affected by reliability because of the nature of the international system. On the one hand, trust between states is inherently difficult. On the other, some amount of trust is necessary for anything beyond armed autarky. The only means to overcome the paradox of these two characteristics of the international system and create trust is by way of the steadying predictability of other states and their leaders. Absent the redemptive characteristic of reliability, the functions of government efforts abroad risk failure. At the worst, as seen above the unreliable international actor can be the sufficient harbinger that conflict with another state is unavoidable. But it affects the broad scope of relations beyond war. Foreign policy initiatives falter without committed steadfastness. Diplomacy, already too sensitive, cannot survive much violence of emotion or change. Nor can alliances, a natural contradiction to the primacy of state self-interest in matters of defense and security, endure long under the duress of a fickle partner.
Ruled by a tyranny of intangibles, reliability is manufactured as much by style and process as substance. Thus, whereas domestic policy contests will struggle over the content of a president’s agenda largely unaffected by his persona, the qualities of the individual have a role in events in foreign relations. Importantly, they shape foreign perceptions of the government across a number of issues. Beyond that, they influence diplomatic actors in their interactions with the US government. And there can be no doubt that decisions are ultimately made based upon them. At worst, failures arising from an actually or expected to be unreliable administration could be the irredeemable segue to war; at best it will certainly add friction to already sticky diplomatic processes. Thus, irrespective of stated aims, the specter of reliability will determine the terms of relations with other states and the results of formal diplomacy.
To suggest that Trump presents a profile in unreliability is no partisan slander. Rather, the terms of this characteristic are derived from his own avowed business practices and record, qualities sold as his strength for the job. According to his business philosophy, success is achieved through bluster and aggression, margins improved by squeezing smaller players, and slights are returned with significant interest. Failure is fine if its costs are laid off on others, and at the end of the day, it is the brand and its image that matters most. Nor does he worry about the principles of such an approach, proclaiming his pride in such tactics as a tax write-off that meant he paid no Federal income taxes — “that makes me smart” — because they have conveyed great wealth and apparent success to him and his family.
In the briefest review, the evidence of the Trump presidency’s first six weeks demonstrates all of the terms of the unreliability. The administration did not begin well with antagonisms of long-standing partner as the dispute over immigration shook the US-Mexican relationship. As if intent to prove no friendly country was immune, the Sweden terrorism gaffe can only be described as a diplomatic own goal. On policy, the abrupt shift on Israel-Palestine away from a two-state solution, even if intended, was announced in a manner destined to confuse. Against the most unsettling of Trump’s campaign positions was to undermine relations between Europe and the US. At the NATO summit one month into the administration, the hope engendered by the seeming comfort from Vice President Pence and Secretary of Defense Mattis on the American commitment, partners walked away troubled by mixed messages on the EU and strong negative messages to NATO. This is against a struggling State Department, as Tillerson’s woes mount as he settles into a job which has already been sidelined by the White House and what responsibilities they do have falter for the risk of politicization within the ranks. Finally, his recourse to retribution was demonstrated by Trump’s unsubstantiated accusations of wiretapping by Obama, a charge incalculably serious if true. And running alongside these major events is a steady stream of commentary directly from the President himself which serve only to inflame and confuse the impression of America’s position and future abroad.
As its profile in the eyes of world is shaped into ‘perfide America’ by the administration’s unreliability, the less the nation will be able to continue as a leader within the global order. While the recourse to a particular form of dollar diplomacy to curry favor with the administration will be a facet of the coming years, personal tributes should not be confused with formal and functional relations. In the latter, there will be a necessary adjustment as other states amend their stance towards the US as they recognize the peril in negotiations according to a model which intends to fundamentally disfavor one party. They further cannot enter agreements with a President whose mood tomorrow will force a renege. Nor can they express amity towards a partner whose hurt feelings will embarrass them to their own people. If this is the obvious and rational response to an actor like Trump, the margins of revelatory analysis will be in those cases where another state does attempt normal relations.
All of this matters not just as another tale of woe regarding the Trump administration. Whether one reads this shift in America’s place in the world as disaster or destiny, recognition that Perfidious America is a growing global perception will require a reorientation of how the foreign affairs community analyses and advises on American policy to take account of the new status of an altered, if not diminished, freedom of action abroad. Any output which does not will be interesting but irrelevant acts of navel gazing. Although this prospect is disappointing to consider for its causes, it also presents this intellectual community to address their subject from long forgotten perspectives. Too long a driving force in international relations, it will be interesting to see how this sector adapts to a new American reality.
