The Problem of Gerontocracy

T. Drake
6 min readMar 26, 2020

Although much of the American government has become a gerontocracy, only the military system has it as an inherent structural component.

The US Military is a gerontocracy. This has been the case for essentially all of the post World War II era — indeed, in the modern US military age and rank are directly correlated. Because of the requirements of the DOPMA, there is essentially no way to create a young senior leader in the US military. Conversely, there are also no old junior members of the military. Thus, the US military is both by definition and by law a gerontocracy. Although not automatically bad, in the case of the modern US military it does create significant challenges, both in warfighting capability and in general organizational design. Indeed, there are three key areas that the gerontocracy creates problems for the military. First, there is the real (but rarely spoken out loud) problem of age related cognitive decline. Next, this basic biological problem combines with rapid, accelerating, and potentially exponential change in technology and its integration into larger systems, and a period of significant cultural change within American society. These tectonic changes themselves have significant implications for everyone who lives in our society, but the implication for an organization with exclusively older leadership is significant. People generally start to become “set in their ways” around age 20. Even if many of our senior leaders were exceptions to this rule, it is unlikely that they would be exceptions after age 40 or 50. Although fixing the problem is beyond the scope of this article, it is crucial that the military begins to recognize the implications of a structural gerontocracy and develops strategies to mitigate these issues.

The first major issue that exists within any gerontocracy is age related cognitive decline. Although there are differing views of how much this impacts actual abilities as a leader and arguments regarding the age at which typical onset becomes a serious issue, it is nonetheless something the military should discuss. If — as appears to be the case given the “pyramid” structure of the bureaucracy and “up or out” promotion system — we truly intend to select the most qualified leadership, then the military cannot ignore this issue. The evidence is clear — on average, cognitive ability begins to decline to some degree as early as the age of thirty. In many cases this cognitive decline is mitigated by a multitude of factors — experience, pattern recognition, managerial skills, or other capabilities that develop with age. Nonetheless, it would seem to be reasonable to suggest that the senior leaders of the military could be expected to exhibit these factors as well as maintain exceptional mental acuity. Some might counter with the argument that the personnel system already does this — as senior leaders are regularly evaluated and only move to the next “rung of the ladder” if they exhibit superior performance. Perhaps. Assume the system works as designed and this is the case. This is nonetheless just an application of the Peter Principle (in which everyone in a bureaucracy advances to the level where they become incompetent). Advancement throughout the military is focused largely on past performance and rarely attempts to predict future capabilities in any meaningful way. Given the realities of age related cognitive decline and the general increase in age across the force, it seems prudent to think of creative ways to ensure that we do not promote the individuals who have the best record of performance unless they are also the most likely to perform effectively in the future. Ensuring that aging leaders are not suffering from cognitive decline and are not likely to suffer from it in their next duty is a prudent way to do this and ensure that the force is led by the best possible people.

There are also significant concerns beyond those of age related cognitive decline. Indeed, in many ways the staffs that surround senior leaders in the modern era have the ability to mitigate the loss of some cognitive function. In contrast, however, there is a very real concern that the gerontocracy is ill equipped to fully understand the modern world. The first place this manifests is in technology. No senior leader in the military today is a digital native, and only the most junior members of his/her staff are young enough to be one. Does that matter? Probably it does. Watch a young servicemember use their personal technology and then watch an average 50–60 year old — as a general rule you’ll probably find some pretty stark differences. The reasons for this should be clear — individuals who literally grew up using technology are almost guaranteed to find its use easier, more intuitive, and simpler to understand. In an era of Moore’s Law and a continually increasing pace of technological change, is it the right answer to structure an organization in a manner that guarantees the leadership to be less aware of or comfortable using the newest technology? This could surely be mitigated in many other organizations. Indeed, most companies do the most they can to ensure younger, more relevant perspectives are captured. In the military, however, due to the nature of flag officer staffs and rank requirements associated with them, our aging senior leaders are necessarily surrounded by staff officers who are only slightly less old. This leads to a lack of knowledge and perspective that is difficult to mitigate yet almost certainly has a negative affect on our overall capability.

A second place where the gerontocracy’s lack of understanding of our modern world manifests is in overall cultural knowledge. There are three key facts here. First, the military is proportionally almost entirely under the age of thirty. Second, military senior leadership is entirely over the age of fifty. Third, the cultural beliefs, desires, and preferences of different generations are going to be different. These facts are well known, obvious, and straightforward. The problem with the military gerontocracy specifically is that it has far more power to dictate the specifics of life for the younger generation than the leadership of almost any organization. Does this matter? I suspect it does. Some examples might help to illustrate my point. The Marine Corps insists on restricting tattoos. Why? They have literally no affect on warfighting capability and only tangential effect on appearance in uniform (to wit: long sleeve uniforms cover nearly all tattoos). The sole reason the service restricted tattoos appears to be that some senior leaders (of an older generation) did not think they were “professional.” So what?, the reader might ask. Well, in a world where more than a third of our entry level demographic has tattoos and we are already concerned about the fitness of younger Americans to serve, one might wonder why we would arbitrarily disqualify people from service purely based on a cultural distaste.

The tattoo policy is an easy example, but it is also a superficial one. A better example of differing cultural norms may be the way we lead. Younger Americans expect fundamentally different leadership than their predecessors. Unfortunately, military life is almost completely designed, managed, and directed by individuals of more senior rank — who are unlikely to understand or condone different lifestyles that may be not only accepted, but completely normal in a younger generation. There are myriad other examples of this sort of cultural misunderstanding, usually brushed away by leadership with statements such as “it was good enough for me, it’s good enough for them,” or “they just need to get with the program.” Unfortunately, this sort of attitude corrodes discipline, trust, and any belief in a common good throughout the service. It is, in and of itself an example of an out of touch cultural attitude (Gen X, primarily) interacting with a culture that does not accept it (Gen Z and younger Millenials).

The solution to the problem of gerontocracy in the military is a difficult one. The rank structure and personnel laws we operate under lock us into a scenario where we are required by law to operate as a gerontocracy. There may be some distant future scenario where we adjust our personnel system into a truly meritocratic one, but it will be a long time from today. Understanding that, how can we deal with the fundamental, systemic and structural problems that come along with having a gerontocracy as our leadership structure? The answer is probably a cultural one. We must foster an atmosphere and service culture that encourages dissent and feedback. It must recognize that intelligence and knowledge are not monopolies of age and higher rank, but that even the youngest individuals in the service likely have more to offer than simply labor on a working party. The military needs to figure out how to do a better job recognizing its people as individuals with unique talents. We need to move beyond the industrial age system that our entire force is structured around and think of new ways of doing business that emphasize the talents and abilities of each member of our force — regardless of their age.

--

--

T. Drake

Grunt, planner, etc. I use this forum to write and think about military stuff. Usually Marine Corps focused.