Members from the U.S. Army 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team conducts combat jump operations from a C-17 Globemaster III during a joint coalition training exercise.

Exploring the Menu of Military Options

Every time a new American president takes the reigns, a flood of new political appointees assume positions of leadership in the Department of Defense. In the words of Machiavelli, it falls to the military to “educate the prince” (so-to-speak) on the use of force to achieve political ends. For those military officers that will support this transition, this period becomes a flurry of information papers, power point briefs, and hard questions. Although frustrating at times, within this period also exists an opportunity to make change despite the “pentacrete” resident in the bowels of the American military bureaucracy.

Today’s political leaders love to have options. It seems reasonable to explore the menu of options that the military provides for future political leaders. Additionally, it makes sense to attempt to tie this list of military options to a menu of possible policy goals. To that end, this brief discussion explores the question: is it possible to develop a menu of military options, tied to desired strategic outcomes, to assist policymakers in the prudent application of the military instrument of national power?

A Draft Menu of Military Options

To develop a generalized list of military options that policymakers have, I began with existing lists such as the range of military operations from joint doctrine and the list of military missions detailed in the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review. Then, I looked at other diverse sources such as ones for UN peacekeeping. Finally, I grouped each military options by how they seek to influence the will of others (assure, deter, or compel). The result is the draft menu below.

Draft Menu of Military Options by Desired Strategic Outcomes

Shortfalls of The Draft Model

This, as with any model, has its flaws and shortcomings. The first major shortcoming is that there are often unintended consequences to our strategic decisions. For example, when the U.S. sought to compel the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, its assured and bolstered the mujaheddin that would become Al-Qaeda that attacked the U.S. on 9/11. The point is, in the selection of how they seek to influence will what affects one actor may influence another actor in an unexpected way. The second major shortcoming, is that this is perhaps an overly simplistic model that does not take into account may of the important nuances of strategic and operational art. The third major shortcoming is that military thinkers are continually coming up with different ways to use force. Therefore, there may be some options that could be better represented in a different way. Despite these shortcoming, this model provides one way to look at what the military can linked with political ends.

Conclusion

In the development of this model, I am certain that there are options that I have missed. I would love to hear from anyone any feedback on the additions or changes that they would recommend. Simply, this model provides a basic start point for a conversation on the options the military provides; it is intended to expand, not limit, thinking on the subject.