A Story of Pirates and Populism

In 2008, the Icelandic economy collapsed. Years of economic liberalization implemented by the right-wing Independence Party and its coalition partners had created a dangerously over-inflated bubble economy. The three biggest private banks in Iceland, having enticed foreign investment through unusually high interest rates, had grown to be, together, ten times larger than Iceland’s gross domestic product. When the crisis hit, Iceland experienced the worst financial collapse relative to the size of the economy in world history.

In response to the crisis, citizens organized a political movement, the scale of which was never before seen in Iceland. In the space of less than a year, popular anger compelled the government to dissolve, snap elections were held, and, for the first time in decades, a left-wing coalition assumed power. Over the next nine years, this movement grew and shifted, spawning numerous radical reformist parties. In 2015–16, one party in particular — the Pirate Party — became the de facto symbol of the popular opposition, skyrocketing in public opinion polling until it was by far the most popular party in Iceland. It proceeded to win 10 seats out of 63 in Parliament in the October 2013 elections, becoming the third largest party. Measuring “success” primarily on the metrics of popular opinion and parliamentary seats won, the Icelandic Pirate Party has found more political success than many other populist[1] parties and every other Pirate Party throughout the world.

This paper explains the character and rise of this Icelandic populist movement and why, in the past three years, it has largely consolidated in support of the Pirate Party. I argue four main points: first, the specific nature of modern Icelandic populism has roots in the historical tension between liberal and conservative individualism in Iceland; second, the transformation of the parties initially into catch-all parties and then into a political cartel created a hegemonic political center; third, the economic crisis of 2008 caused a revolt against the Independence Party and catch-all and cartel politics[2]; fourth, the Pirate Party emerged as the political leader of the populist movement because Pirate rhetoric, action, and organization specifically oppose the political system and support a radical integrationist form of politics.

The Origins of Iceland’s Political Divides

The first permanent settlements in Iceland were founded on the rocky, volcanic, and cold island in about 800–900 A.D. by Vikings traveling from Norway.[3] Across the land, these Vikings created farms and small communities led by chieftains. The communities varied in size, but each was its own sovereign entity. During this time, called the Settlement Age, no chieftain consolidated power as a king, and the island remained without a single leader.[4]

Around 930 AD, these chieftains and their constituents realized that, as in any place where multiple bodies politic interact, Iceland needed some sort of cooperation mechanism. To prevent obliteration through war of the fragile settlements that had been scratched out of the volcanic dirt, the early communities had to find a way for peaceful conflict resolution and law enforcement. In this year, at Þingvellir, Icelanders came together for the first general assembly of the chieftains, called the Alþingi. Any free Icelandic man was permitted to attend, and the chieftains relied on winning their support for greater influence in the assembly. The Alþingi retained ultimate legislative and judicial power in Iceland until the Icelanders voluntarily ceded control to the Norwegian monarchy to regain stability during a time of chaotic conflict.[5]

Following the transfer of Iceland from Norway to Denmark in 1380, the Danish crown gradually increased its power over Iceland. Full consolidation occurred in 1662, but until 1800 the Alþingi remained active in some form, albeit with limited power.[6] For Icelanders, the Alþingi was a constant reminder of their deep history of parliamentary self-determination. Yet until the nineteenth century, Icelanders were generally complacent and apathetic subjects to Danish rule, much due to the country’s destitution, low population, and the King’s inability or lack of desire to exert strict control over it.[7] Icelanders did have a near-universal appreciation for political autonomy, even if this did not manifest in agitation for independence until much later.[8] At this time, the social order was dominated by the landed elite who governed the peasant class — and they, not surprisingly, wished to retain the status quo and use the “social controls” to keep them on their land and to keep the peasants complacent.[9]

Two events occurred in close succession, however, that kickstarted the push for independence from the Danish crown. From 1783 to 1784, the Laki fissure erupted and covered the country in ash, subsequently killing upwards of 60 percent of livestock and causing a famine that killed up to 25 percent of the entire population of Iceland.[10] Danish assistance was paltry and delayed.[11] Then, in 1800, the Alþingi was finally abolished for the first time since its founding.[12] By the 1830s, the large communities of Icelandic academics studying in Denmark, influenced by Romanticism and political radicalism, began formulating ideas of Icelandic sovereignty and national identity. Responding to the precipitous decrease in Icelandic fortunes at the end of the eighteenth century, Icelandic writers and academics experienced an abrupt about-face: where only decades before had many praised the Danish king, in the 1830s the fault was shifted onto the foreign ruler: “World history has clearly proved that every nation has prospered the most when it has taken care of its own government,” nationalist Jón Sigurðsson declared in 1841, criticizing the elimination of the Alþingi in 1800.[13]

Representative of the unique nature of the nationalist movement in Iceland, the jockeying for independence rarely, if ever, escalated into verbal attacks, and never manifested in violence. No disruptive, violent revolution appeared in Iceland; what grew instead was a consistent moderate nationalism that came to dominate politics. Even Sigurðsson himself, who became the leader of the movement, declined to endorse political revolt, in stark contrast to other continental European movements of the same time: “Let no one incite you to dishonor your officials, or to show them improper resistance; remember that officials are assigned to uphold the laws, and the one who shows them disrespect when they act in the name of the laws, disrespects the laws, but with laws the land shall be built up and by lawlessness, destroyed.”[14] Instead, Icelanders fought through peaceful means: through assembly, organization, and nationalistic writing. Icelandic nationalism advanced not so much as an overthrow of the Danish order but as an “organized retreat” by crown authorities.[15] Further, the landed elite often expressed dissatisfaction with Danish absolutism, but nonetheless looked to the state for stability and security, thus also preventing more revolutionary tactics from arising in the country.[16]

The peasantry at this time was split between support for the nationalist conservatives on the one hand — the landed elite who wished to keep the social order as it was — and the national liberals, the intelligentsia who advocated for an upheaval of the status quo. As Magnússon explains, although the peasants were denied political power, they were nonetheless “passive participants” who

followed the debate with interest and the promises it made led them to view their lives in a new light. The instructional and didactic literature that encouraged people to better themselves and represented ‘the normative aspirations’ of society went hand in hand with the political developments and was widely read and thoroughly discussed in the cold, isolated farmsteads of Iceland.[17]

This debate is characteristic of Icelandic politics because it rests upon a fundamental respect for the individual character of Iceland about which neither the conservatives nor the liberals disagreed. Both wanted “full and unconditional independence” following the turn of the century, and the solution for issues such as Iceland’s rural poverty was a clean break from the Danish monarchy. But the internal debate over what form this independence should take played a role in preventing the movement from turning radical.[18] As a result, it took a century for the movement to succeed, but Iceland eventually received independence in 1944 without blood being shed.

The nationalistic period in Iceland, coupled with the long-held democratic vision that began in 930 with the founding of the Alþingi, illustrates a duality within Icelandic culture that exists to this day. On the one hand is a strong conservative individualism based largely on the agrarian roots of Icelandic society, linked to skepticism toward radical change and general apathy toward political participation.[19] On the other is liberal individualism and the expectation that Icelandic government is, in some way, a reflection of all of the people who live there, and that every Icelander has a say in the shape their government takes. Although there is overlap between the two sides, the schism often appears in Icelandic political discourse, as demonstrated during the nationalistic period. Although both the conservatives and the liberals were pro-independence, to the liberals it was seen as a way to push forward progress on social issues, and to advocate for universal human rights. To conservatives, independence was a means to shore up the foundations of the old order and ensure that feudal ideas of discipline and labor remained. Although they espoused individual liberty, it was in a conservative sense: inherent and universal rights were seen as dangerous and threatening to a stable society.[20]

In the twentieth and the first few years of the twenty-first century, this social division appeared strongly within the voting patterns in parliamentary elections. Following the 1944 declaration of independence, the Alþingi became the governing body of the country and was formed as a proportionally representative parliament, meaning that political parties gain seats in parliament roughly relative to the percentage of the vote that they receive. As a result, many different political parties have vied for power in elections. For most of its history, the four major parties have been (in order from right- to left-wing) Independence, Progressive, Social Democratic Alliance, and Socialist/People’s Alliance. However, in spite of the array of parties that run in elections, Independence has dominated for most of the time since 1944, usually holding close to 40 percent of the seats in parliament. Its sustained success reveals the way that the Icelandic populace leans: it has generally had strong support across demographics, including both wealthy businesspeople and poorer, working-class citizens.[21] The next-largest party, the Progressive Party, has often formed coalitions with Independence to govern Iceland. The Progressive base has generally been centered in rural communities, and its political ideology is usually centrist or slightly right-wing. Ever since the late twentieth century, Progressives’ share of the electorate has shrunk as electoral rules have shifted to better reflect continuing urbanization. The Progressives subsequently attempted to win over urban voters, partly with an appeal to policies that mirror Independence’s, and in more recent years even shifted toward right-wing populism to differentiate themselves when Independence’s popularity fell.[22]

The Hegemony of the Independence Party

The latent nationalism that pervaded throughout Icelandic culture merged with its tradition of conservatism helped bring about the monolithic strength of Independence. Individualism came to have significant influence over society, as the country’s rapid rise out of poverty following World War II gave people strong senses of their own capabilities. This manifested in both a desire to see Iceland recognized as a legitimate global player, as well as a belief in the power of the individual in the economy. Capitalizing on this fierce individualism, Independence’s conservative-nationalist ideology aimed to preserve the capitalist social order and to prevent turmoil.

Independence’s rapid transformation into a catch-all party was the determining factor in its ascension to political dominance. Political scientist Otto Kirchheimer first theorized that the shift in Western European political parties beginning in the mid-twentieth century was driven by a shift in strategy and ideology. Before World War II, he argues, there existed myriad parties with inherently limited goals, such as “class-mass” parties that appeal to one particular class, or single-issue parties.[23] But in the years immediately preceding and especially those following the war, political leaders happened upon a strategy that greatly increased electoral success: transforming into a generalist, catch-all party meant to capture the widest swath of voters possible. This meant rendering the political goals of the party less ambitious, more limited, and more shallow. Kirchheimer argues,

Abandonding attempts at the intellectual and moral encadrement of the masses, it is turning more fully to the electoral scene, trying to exchange effectiveness in depth for a wider audience and more immediate electoral success. The narrower political task and the immediate electoral goal differ sharply from the former all-embracing concerns; today the latter are seen as counter-productive since they deter segments of a potential nationwide clientele.[24]

Parties transformed as they found that there were ways to appeal to multiple groups who do not exist in direct conflict with one another. A bourgeoisie-capitalist political party and a proletarian-socialist party are, of course, at inherent odds with one another, but the underlying groups — white-collar workers and manual laborers, in this case — might not have impassable differences. “Minor differences between group claims… might be smoothed over by vigorous emphasis on programs which benefit both sections alike, for example, some cushioning the shocks of automation,” Kirchheimer writes.

In Iceland, electoral evidence from the years preceding the declaration of independence from Denmark show that Independence’s strength relies primarily on an alliance not between manual laborers and capitalists, but between farmers and capitalists. These groups found a shared desire to preserve the class structure and resist the elevation of manual labor. In an attempt to explain this phenomenon, Svanur Kristjánsson suggests, “Perhaps the farmers’ notions of ‘freedom’ and ‘individuality’ predisposed them to take a stand against such ‘impersonal’ and ‘equalizing’ measures [proposed by left-wing parties] as a standard hourly wage or paying the lazy worker as much as the industrious one.”[25] The alliance of farmers and capitalists was, to an extent, ideological. But for the party itself, the underlying force that drove growth was its pursuit of electoral success. For example, in 1929, the Liberal Party and Conservative Party merged and assumed the name “Independence” specifically to avoid connotations of partisanship associated with “conservative” and to evoke connections to the independence movement.[26] The foundation of the party, in virtually every sense, was designed to appeal to the largest number of voters possible as opposed to standing for a specific ideology. It was often described as a party of “pragmatic politics.”[27] Kristjánsson even points out that Independence’s closest European analogues are the Christian Democratic Union in Germany and the Conservative Party in Britain, and Kirchheimer highlights the CDU specifically as a main example of a catch-all party.[28]

As Mark Blyth and Richard Katz find, large catch-all parties began transforming again in the latter half of the twentieth century. Due to pressures from globalization and the diminishing returns of the catch-all strategy, these large parties began to “cartelize.” This was marked in particular by the adoption of neoliberalism by these parties, nominally in response to the demands of international trade. As Blyth and Katz reason, these parties found that they needed to rein in policy commitments that had grown far too large as a result of their transformation into catch-all parties. As a result, they found it advantageous to adopt economic liberalism, which offloads the production of certain public goods to the free market:

The deployment of such a discursive strategy got states ‘off the hook’ for the production of such goods in the first place. While parties of the right with all their traditional distrust of the state had never been too comfortable with the production of public goods on an ever-broadening basis and had simply jumped on the ‘neo-liberal’ bandwagon for ideological reasons, parties of the nominal left needed a justification for doing the same thing. Thus, in order to survive in a post-catch-all environment the rhetoric of globalisation and various ‘third ways’ were employed.[29]

In this context, the rise of the Icelandic neoliberal state in the latter half of the twentieth century is not as surprising as it might seem in the face of the growth of Scandinavian social welfare states and Independence’s own expansion of Iceland’s welfare in the years following 1944.[30] One of the main differences of a broad, catch-all party as compared with other types of parties is that its political leadership has less power in relation to the “functional powerholders” in society — the elites of the army, bureaucracy, industry, and labor.[31] Moreover, due to a catch-all party’s flexibility, it is particularly vulnerable to changing attitudes: “the voters may, by their shifting moods and their apathy, transform the sensitive instrument of the catch-all party into something too blunt to serve as a link with the functional powerholders of society.”[32] This included those interest groups that had an outsized “vote” in the form of capital — the wealthiest elite — who became closely associated with the Independence Party leadership. In response to this group’s pressure and Iceland’s own rising economy, alongside an ideological attraction to theories of liberal economics, a group of Independence politicians began implementing neoliberal reforms. Their ideas caught on because they spoke to the conservative individualism of their base and managed to concurrently appease “the Octopus,” a group of hyper-wealthy families in Iceland who had made money by controlling transport routes prior to the economic changes.[33]

Between 1991 and 2005, two leaders of the Independence Party — first Davíð Oddsson, then Geir Haarde — pushed forward sweeping changes to the Icelandic economy. Oddsson and Haarde deregulated and privatized large parts of the economy, instituting significant reform in the banking system and allowing banks and individuals both to participate much more heavily in foreign transactions and investment. Oddsson and Independence privatized banks and dramatically decreased loan regulation, which allowed banks to give generous terms on mortgages and loans.[34] Oddsson and Haarde’s economic agenda corresponded with several other changes that indicate that Independence and the other large political parties in Iceland were experiencing cartelization. The Progressive Party and the Social-Democratic Alliance, motivated by the successes of Independence, began moving more centrist and adopting into their platforms adherence to a philosophy of economic liberalism. In spite of its agrarian roots, the Progressive Party governed in coalition with Independence from 1995–2007, supporting Independence’s economic policies.[35] The Social Democratic Alliance, too, shifted away from its original socialist roots and adopted a platform based on Tony Blair’s neoliberal New Labour policies in the late 90s.[36] The SDA and Independence coalition is the best example of the movement to the center that the parties were undergoing; the two parties, so long at odds with one another, formed a “grand coalition” that was dedicated to “unleash[ing] the power of private initiative so that the full potential of expertise and knowhow can be realised in overseas expansion by energy companies.”[37] These transformations closely parallel the theory of cartelization laid out by Katz. Over the years, often galvanized by the successes of the liberalization of Iceland’s economy, the Progressives, Independence, and Social-Democratic Alliance came to resemble one another. The policy debates moved to toward the center, and economic policy was replaced by policy on the EU or national security as the main points of contention.[38] In a measure of cartelization done by Amir Abedi, Iceland had one of the highest scores of cartelization in Europe and consistently low voting support for anti-establishment parties prior to the turn of the century.[39]

By 2008, then, the Icelandic political landscape was composed of a powerful centrist bloc of parties that had cartelized, leading to a parliament dominated by neoliberal politics. Economic liberalism ruled Icelandic politics, and the hegemony of the catch-all Independence Party had been cemented by cartel-like collusion with both the Progressives and the Social Democrats. The Octopus grew stronger, inequality increased and became more apparent, and Iceland’s GDP spiked dramatically.[40] If something were to break, Iceland would be fertile ground for a revolt against the elite.

The 2008 Financial Crash

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, Iceland experienced a prosperity that took its citizens and the world by surprise. Its stock market performed the best of any Western market from 2001–2005, and its local economy exploded in newfound wealth and new ability to indulge in material comforts. But Icelanders did not find much wrong with appreciating this sudden catapulting growth, even if it was not distributed as equally as they were otherwise accustomed to. As reporter Heather Timmons wrote in the New York Times in April, 2006, “It didn’t take long for the 300,000 residents on this windswept fishing island to adjust to their mini-titan economy, where boutiques now sell Dior cosmetics and Gucci handbags and the flow of international money has been fueling a red-hot housing market and a crop of wealthy entrepreneurs.”[41]

Kaupþing, Landsbanki, and Glitnir, the three largest banks in Iceland, galvanized by the neoliberal policies set in place by Independence and the Progressives, began offering high interest rates to foreign investors — significantly higher than their home countries could offer. What followed, then, was a surge in foreign investment into Iceland. Foreign money flowed in at a rate both unbelievable and seemingly unstoppable to Icelanders.[42] In perhaps the most overt and ostentatious display of wealth, Björgólfur Guðmundsson, the chairman of Landsbanki and the second Icelandic billionaire businessman (the first being his son), purchased the English football team West Ham United with an Icelandic consortium.[43] The Icelandic economy was soaring and gaining international attention, both good and bad. Journalists and analysts began questioning the long-term survivability of the Icelandic economic miracle, with Timmons writing in 2006 that “some hedge funds and other global investors in the last several months have been concerned that the economy has overheated, and so they have withdrawn money from Icelandic markets.”[44] But still others — especially in Iceland, where the lucrative business done by the banks suppressed criticism — saw the Icelandic model as one worth exporting elsewhere. And in peak irony, supply-side economist Arthur Laffer declared in an article titled “Overheating Is Not Dangerous,” “Iceland should be a model to the world.”[45] The Icesave accounts, as the high-interest accounts with Landsbanki were called, were bringing the country more attention and more money than in its entire history.

But, as is clear now, Iceland was experiencing a quintessential bubble economy, and it became one of the first victims in the global financial crash of 2008. It is a testament to the heights of the pre-crisis neoliberal economy that Iceland was also the biggest victim of the crash. Not long after New Year’s Day in 2008, foreign investors began wondering if the sky-high interest rates promised by the banks on the Icesave accounts would be paid back. Would the Icelandic banks, which had ballooned to several magnitudes bigger than the entire Icelandic economy, be able to make good on the loans? Due to this uncertainy, the krona started falling — and with it, any confidence in the banks or in the Icelandic government’s ability to keep the vastly oversized economy afloat.[46] An economy with a GDP of only $21 billion could not sustain an external debt of $50 billion when investors came calling. Iceland’s government — under the authority of Geir Haarde and the Independence Party, the original chief architects of the liberalization of the economy — had essentially no other choice but to let the banks collapse. “Iceland’s banks were too-big-not-to-fail,” Matt O’Brien writes in The Washington Post.[47] This was made possible by Icelandic law, which stipulated that only domestic investment would be protected in the case of bank failure. The banks defaulted on foreign investment, causing a panic in Europe, especially in the United Kingdom. The UK was even forced to implement an anti-terror law that allowed the government to freeze the assets of Landsbanki in an effort to recoup losses from the default on the Icesave accounts.[48]

With the banks went the days of surplus wealth, and the economy and currency dropped precipitously. In the course of a few months, Iceland lost its status as a world economic leader and turned inward as the government reversed course and implemented emergency protectionist measures to keep the country afloat. The International Monetary Fund actually had to bail out the government, which had struggled under the weight of assuming the debts and assets of the failed banks. On October 24, 2008, the IMF authorized a $2.1 billion bailout for Iceland. But the crisis would continue for several more years, with capital controls only being lifted in early 2017.[49]

Such a dramatic and, for the citizens of Iceland, unexpected turn of fortune shocked the system and shook institutions to their core. A country that had experienced 60 years of relatively peaceful and stable independence now faced the worst economic crisis in world history. The stable conservative bloc that had voted Independence or the Progressives into power for so many years now had to face the disastrous effects of the neoliberal policies implemented by Haarde and his colleagues.

It was a quesiton that plagued Icelanders and caused them to reassess their country and their identity. As a developed, extremely wealthy country, how does it face years of downturn? How do citizens deal with a crisis that leaves people unable to buy homes and unable to afford the homes they are living in? In March 2009, in the midst of the crisis, Ian Parker of the New Yorker found that Icelanders were asking the simple question, “What happens next?”[50]

These were not easy questions to answer. As Smári McCarthy, co-founder of the Pirate Party and a member of Parliament, said in an interview, “Everybody saw [the crisis] coming, yet nobody was completely prepared to face the truth when it happened.”[51] The conclusion that many people like McCarthy came to was that there was something fundamentally broken within the Icelandic system that led to this. To these Icelanders, politicians had betrayed the people and sold the country out for quick money. The Independence Party was the symbol of all that was wrong with the country, so they took to the streets.

For a country with strong democratic institutions and an egalitarian streak, Iceland nonetheless does not have a significant history of political mobilization. As previously explained, the cultural history of the country suggests that political apathy is the norm and mass politics the exception. The most extreme cases of political mobilization that arose during the independence movement did not come close to the disruption or violence of protests that have occurred in most other countries, even advanced democracies. The only significant demonstrations of the post-war era occurred in 1949, when the question of NATO membership sparked controversy. However, in 2009, frustration finally gained critical mass to incite Icelanders to organization and demonstration. It was a revolutionary break from their social past, that corresponded with a catastrophic break from the economic past. As Parker writes,

Iceland was having a revolutionary moment, if of a sometimes hesitant and self-mocking sort. ‘We’ve never done this before,’ Hildur Margrétardóttir, an artist and protester, said. She was carrying, at the end of a long pole, a papier-mâché model of a bloody horse’s head, which referred to a medieval Icelandic method of upsetting one’s neighbors. ‘We’re not the protesting kind. We’d rather stay at home and have things cozy. We don’t even know how to dress in cold weather. We’re really sofa people.’[52]

At first, these protests were little more than small gatherings of protestors expressing dissatisfaction with the state of the country; but as the crisis deepened, and the culprits had not yet been held responsible, more and more people joined in. In January 2009, the energy rushed out in a huge, thousands-strong demonstration with Icelanders pounding on kitchenware. It was a movement defined by its decentralization; although small anarchist groups provided valuable experience for a country that had little protesting experience, no hierarchy ever arose within it. It was entirely a horizontally coordinated movement,[53] evoking values similar to both the liberal nationalists who pushed forward the independence movement in the nineteenth century, and the Pirate Party that would arise out of the protests.

The Pots and Pans Revolution, as it would become known, culminated in the resignation of Haarde (for unrelated health reasons) and the declaration that special elections would be held in the spring of 2009. Within days, the coalition government of Independence and the Social Democratic Party broke down. The last holdout — Davíð Oddsson, the governor of the Central Bank, and the man many held as the architect the neoliberal policies that caused the crisis — finally resigned in February 2009.[54]

Elections of 2009

A full fifty of the sixty-three seats in the Alþingi were occupied by parties with declared neoliberal policies after the elections of 2007; the Left-Green Party was the only left-wing party with representation, occupying nine seats. But when special elections were scheduled for April 2009, it quickly became clear that something was going to change. Independence, which had been in government since 1991, could not sufficiently quell popular resentment and backlash toward its policies that had sent the country’s economy into meltdown.[55] Icelanders would not forgive Independence, especially not those associated with Geir Haarde or Davíð Oddsson, and protestors during the Pots and Pans Revolution could even be seen burning effigies of Haarde.[56] The Social-Democratic Alliance, Independence’s coalition partner in government, grew concerned that the anger toward IP would turn toward it next. Indeed, as the spring wore on, this worry came true. Public opinion on the SDA plummeted, while it stayed high for the protests. Simultaneously, opinion shifted far to the left, consolidating in part behind the minority Left-Greens.[57] Once Haarde resigned, the government dissolved and the SDA created a ruling coalition with the Left-Greens to govern until new elections could take place. Although the new provisional government attempted to pass popular reforms during this period, such as opening the path for a new constitution and establishing a constituent assembly, Independence was still strong enough to block these measures, and the country went to election in April 2009 without meaningful policy change.[58]

The election results marked a historic shift in Icelandic society. The Independence Party, which had near-hegemonic control over Icelandic government essentially since its founding, took a massive hit, gaining only 36.6 percent of the vote — the most of any party, but a decrease of 13 percent and a dramatic departure from historical tradition. The SDA increased their vote share by 3 percent, and the Left Greens by 7 percent, capitalizing on anti-right wing sentiment in Iceland. The Progressives, who had ran a new, younger leader in order to embrace some of the anti-establishment fervor, gained 3 percent to win 9 seats in parliament.[59]

But the reality is not that the country necessarily swung to the left and that the growth of the SDA and Left-Greens were inevitable results of that. Rather, Iceland experienced a surge in anti-establishment populism specifically, which manifested in a precipitous fall in support for Independence and a corresponding increase in support for non-Independence parties. If Iceland truly had swung left, it would follow that support would probably have solidified even more behind the Left-Greens. Although they had certainly the highest total increase in support, this is likely due mostly to their position as the only “true” outsider party. Electoral data shows that support diffused relatively equally away from the IP; most defected and supported the SDA, but a substantial number also backed the Left-Greens and the Progressives. The Left-Greens gained most from the SDA.[60]

Foreshadowing later developments in Icelandic politics, one of the most surprising results of the election was that the Citizens’ Movement won four seats in Parliament. The brand-new political party associated itself directly with the Pots and Pans Revolution, and many of its founding members and supporters participated in the protests. It could claim that it was the only true outsider party in the election, as it was led by newcomers to politics and had never existed before 2009. It supported radical change, and positioned itself in direct opposition to ruling interests and the political elite.[61] The Icelandic English-language newspaper, The Grapevine, asked Citizens’ Movement representatives what their platform was before the elections. The party responded simply, “Let’s bring the people to parliament.” And when asked who was at fault for the crisis, they replied, “The system, politicians, and banksters.”[62] The four seats won by the Citizens’ Movement were occupied by a film director, an economist, an editor, and a poet. This was the first political experience for the poet, Birgitta Jónsdóttir, who would later become one of the main faces of Icelandic populism as the founder and leader of the Pirate Party.

To co-opt terminology from Kirchheimer, the Citizens’ Movement is the first example in Iceland of a “radical integrationist” party. Although catch-all parties arose out of a result of attempting to integrate more people into the political process, they did so by exchanging greater breadth for less ideological depth, and thus less commitment.[63] This shallowness of ideology remained in Iceland throughout the cartelization of the parties, as well, as shown by the implicit acceptance of neoliberalism among the three centrist parties. The Citizens’ Movement, on the other hand, espoused an ideology of integration, with the end-goal not being electoral success but simply popular representation in government. The party’s declared antagonism toward the political elite — including the system — and its desire to “bring the people to parliament” are narrow political goals marking a deep ideology that is antithetical to the ways of the catch-all party.

Other indications that this was a populist revolution and not just a left-wing revolution come from public opinion polling and the results of municipal elections that followed. According to data gathered by the Icelandic National Election Study, trust in political officials dropped dramatically. In 2007, 18 percent of respondents expressed trust in only “few” politicians and 3.7 percent expressed trust in “none”, while 77 percent expressed trust in “some” politicians, “many” politicians, or politicians “in general”. In 2009, the number of “few” respondents grew to 33.4 percent, and the number of “none” respondents increased to 7.3 percent. However, the political spectrum of voters only shifted slightly: those who identified left-of-center in 2007 amounted to 24 percent of respondents, which grew to 28.9 in 2009. A “shift left” clearly does not explain the political sentiment of the Icelandic electorate at this time, as the left-wing parties gained a disproportionate number of seats to the percentage of new left-wing voters.[64]

By November 2009, another new political party was created as a result of this wave of populism. Jón Gnarr, a well-known actor and comedian, founded the Best Party as a satirical take on perceived corruption and political elitism in Iceland. Gnarr had started the Best Party as a joke, originally not intending to actually run a political party at all. But it started gaining attention and Gnarr decided to run for municipal elections in Reykjavík in 2010, on a platform that was mostly satirical. It advertised it as a ten-point plan (it actually had thirteen points), with policy proposals such as free towels in every spa and cancelling all debt.[65] Surprising many in Iceland and generating international headlines such as “The Joker: Jón Gnarr, the Comedian Who Became Mayor” and “Have You Heard the One About Jon Gnarr, the Comedian Who Saved Iceland From Political and Financial Catastrophe?” Gnarr and the Best Party won a plurality of votes, coming in slightly ahead of the IP. They took six of fifteen seats on the city council, and Gnarr became mayor of Reykjavík and thus a third of the entire population of the country. [66] It was another massive shock to the previously stable system, and it led Prime Minister Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir to speculate that it was the “beginning of the end” of four party-dominant politics in Iceland.[67]

Gnarr’s antics and the Best Party’s motto of “humanity, culture, and peace” marked the beginning of a newfound antiestablishment identity in Icelandic politics. Gnarr himself lit upon a fundamental aspect of this growing populism when he said, at a budget proposal presentation in late 2010, “We [the Best Party] do not share a predetermined, mutual ideology. We are neither left nor right. We are both. We don’t even think it matters… We often say that we aren’t doing what we want to do, but what needs to be done.”[68] As the elections of 2009 showed, the Icelandic populist impulse was not inherently leftist in identity, although the politics that came out of it were left-wing. The Best Party seems to have resonated in part because it presented itself as being anti-doctrine and anti-partisan. Gnarr was compelled to actually begin governing, but as Icelandic researchers found, he relied on authenticity instead of ideology to govern — becoming popular as a humanist and egalitarian, supporting LGBTQ rights and enacting policy such as green-lighting the construction of Iceland’s first purpose-built mosque.[69] Likely because of Gnarr’s popularity, the Best Party and its later iteration, Bright Future, would have some electoral success at the national level, including forming a coalition government with the Independence and Reform Parties after the 2016 election.

The Pirate Movement

What would soon come to overshadow the Best Party and Gnarr’s satirical take on comedy, however, was a movement that took inspiration from Sweden. The Pirate Party of Sweden was founded in 2006 by Rick Falkvinge in direct response to Swedish debate on copyright law, which, in his view, was not getting sufficient attention from politicians. Frustrated with this lack of interest, he started the Pirate Party in order to “bypass the politicians entirely and aim for their power base.”[70] Following raids in 2006 on the Pirate Bay, the popular torrenting site, interest in reforming copyright law and the perils of prosecuting internet pirates surged. Falkvinge, as the leader of the Pirate Party — unrelated to the Pirate Bay, but nonetheless in the conversation as an anti-copyright law activist party — was thrust into the spotlight.[71] As Icelandic Pirate MP Björn Leví Gunnarsson explained, “The basic policy of the Pirates is [that] you can’t go chasing individual people for downloading copyrighted material, because that will only reach to a breach of privacy. The methods that people use are broad, and they will catch people that are doing legal things in their net as well. On that premise [the Pirate policy is] basically, ‘Sorry, you can’t use these methods that are a breach of privacy.’”[72]

Although it did not win any seats in Swedish Parliament in 2007, the Swedish PP remained well known and Falkvinge became an evangelist of sorts for the Pirate movement internationally. Encouraged by the popularity of the party, activists in other European countries set up their own Pirate Parties and began cooperating to compete for seats in the European Parliament. In 2009, capitalizing on the raids on the Pirate Bay, the Swedish Pirates won two seats at the European Parliament. At its height in 2009–10, the party had close to 50,000 members, making it the third-largest party by membership in Sweden. Its youth organization was the largest political youth group in the country.[73]

Until 2016, the German Pirate Party had the most successful Pirate branch in terms of representation in government. In the Berlin state parliament elections of 2011, it won nine percent of the vote, securing it fifteen seats. Richard Falkvinge and many Pirates across the world saw this as the beginning of a global Pirate revolution. “It will inspire people with a passion for civil liberties and the right to share and speak, all over the world, to stand up and claim their rights,” he wrote on September 18, 2011.[74] The successes came during a time of high dissatisfaction with the political establishment in large part due to its handling of the Eurozone crisis.[75] The election of the German Pirates was very much a protest vote; the Pirates were avowedly inexperienced in politics, and in fact positioned their political ignorance as an advantage.[76] However, the party was soon after marred by public relations issues, including infighting and disorganization. Its steadfast inclusivity to all political views — a staple of Pirate ideology — ended up harming its reputation, as the leadership refused to prohibit extremist opinions.[77] Their public infighting, insistence on focusing on out-of-date topics based on their narrow platform, and continual quirky antics further eroded support for the Pirates.[78] In September 2016, the Pirate Party was voted out of Berlin state parliament and member of parliament Gerwald Claus-Brunner killed himself and a colleague, marking a tragic and high-profile conclusion to the party’s collapse.[79]

Irrespective of their struggles, early Pirate Parties generally shared a common trait: they arose in political environments dominated by catch-all and cartelized parties that were experiencing a surge in anti-establishment sentiment and were affected by the rapid proliferation of technology and Internet culture. Especially in Sweden and Germany where the Pirates were strongest, but also in Austria, Great Britain, and the Czech Republic, large centrist parties had held power often for decades. The Christian-Democratic Union in Germany, the Social Democratic Party in Sweden, both the Conservative and Labour Parties in Britain, the Social Democratic Party in the Czech Republic, and the Social Democratic and People’s Parties in Austria all exhibit similar characteristics to Iceland’s Independence Party.[80] Within this political context, the Pirate movement arose at least in part as a revolt against the cartelization of the hegemonic catch-all parties. Falkvinge’s “Pirate Wheel,” the political bible of sorts for Pirate Parties internationally, is evidence that the movement sets itself up in direct opposition to cartelized party politics. Even the existence of a set of philosophies governing Pirate politics differentiates them from the de-ideoligization and pragmatism found in catch-all and cartelized parties. The Pirate movement is a substantially developed manifestation of radical integration party politics: first and foremost on the Pirate Wheel is the movement’s foundational value — empowerment — described as “Everybody has a voice. Assume Good Faith.” The wheel also lays out transparency, freedom of information, humanism, diversity, and swarm economics[81] as principles.[82] Cartelization entrenched the dominant political parties into solidified, rarely moved centrist coalitions, one result of which was the rise of neoliberalism. Pirate ideology specifically takes aim at that centralization and at the systems that give rise to it.

In Iceland in 2012, a group of political activists, computer scientists, and others came together over a common goal: change the political system in Iceland to be more diverse and more democratic. One of the members of this small group was Birgitta Jónsdóttir, MP for the Citizens’ Movement; another was Smári McCarthy, an internet activist with a technical background who had gained attention for formulating technology-based proposals for political participation. Even years after the financial crisis, these activists felt that there had not been enough meaningful change in government. As McCarthy explained, “It was about five years after the collapse, we’d seen a government waddle through — it did a lot of good things, fixed a lot of problems, but also just didn’t really have a particularly coherent vision for what to do.”[83]

Although some of them had been associated with antiestablishment parties in the past, they felt that nothing that had come before was sufficient. There needed to be something more, a party working for public representation and personal liberty above everything else — because the group saw these issues as the biggest issues facing Icelanders. Halldóra Morgensen, a current Pirate MP, emphasized the anger at the system that had produced the crash and resisted any meaningful change: “After the collapse happened… it was a little bit of a wakeup call. I just got very angry, and realized that this wasn’t right. Any of this. I just kind of felt like this entire way of life was a little bit fucked up, and so that’s when I really started following politics kind of properly.”[84]

These Internet activists and radical decentralists looked across the Atlantic at continental Europe and saw the Pirate Parties gaining traction. They saw a movement dedicated first and foremost to the essential assurance of individual liberty in a world both increasingly digital and cartelized. It was a movement with a lot of potential for them to build upon, but the founders had seen the failures of Pirate Parties elsewhere, especially in Germany. The extremely narrow focus of these other Pirate Parties, combined with their political inexperience and over-the-top antics, eventually harmed their ability to succeed in elections.[85] “[We] got together and said, okay, we’ve seen this Pirate Party idea abroad, and insofar as it is a political movement representing the ideologies of the internet, roughly, capturing a lot of the ideologies that one sees in the internet, it’s a good thing,” McCarthy said, “but we also recognize that the big failure of the Pirate Parties elsewhere has been that they don’t practice any kind of political holism.”[86] What McCarthy, Jónsdóttir, Morgensen, and the others realized was that an Icelandic Pirate Party needed a specifically Icelandic flavor. It was not enough to simply echo the broad goals of ensuring privacy and liberty:

They just work on the basis of focusing on privacy and access to information and all these things that I was initially drawn into politics by, but aren’t thinking about things like healthcare, education, natural resource rights, housing. All these things that kind of are really important to the general public in any society, and to a much greater degree than erudite details of copyright law, really hold society together.[87]

McCarthy and the founding members of the Pirates realized that for a political party to succeed, it needs to grow its base, appeal to a wider audience, and address specific, local issues. In essence, the party began to broaden its scope while retaining a strong ideological base. The Pirates recognized that it was not enough to be a brand-new, niche party; it also needed a party strategy. In this case, the founders wanted to create something upon which to construct a truly competitive party: “We said we were going to expand the model and instead of just focusing on these issues, we’d say, ‘let’s take that as a basis, create some kind of ideological foundation, and use that to construct a comprehensive philosophy of politics.’”[88] In other words, the Pirates asked themselves, “What happens when you take the political philosophy of the internet and apply it to the real world? Does it just create an infinite field full of kittens? Or do you actually get something less cute but more meaningful?”[89] Their grand political goal, therefore, was to expand the ideology of the Internet, with its emphasis on decentralization, transparency, and equality, and merge it with Icelandic politics.

When the elections of 2013 approached, however, the Pirates were trying to break through the noise of a huge number of new parties. On their website from February 2013, the Pirates only had four main points of their platform: transparency, responsibility, privacy, and direct democracy.[90] And in the earliest profiles of the Pirate Party, journalists pushed forward an image not of a well-rounded, competitive organization, but of an eclectic band of internet activists with the behavioral traits of computer scientists, not of politicians. For example, in a profile for New Statesman, Laurie Penny writes, “Of these newcomers, the Pirates — a disparate group of hackers, anarchists and digital rights campaigners — are by far the most interesting.”[91]

This is a characterization that the Pirates certainly do not shy away from, and in fact embrace to a certain extent still to this day. “For example, the Independence Party, they’re legal nerds, so they’re basically lawyers,” Björn Leví Gunnarsson said. “A couple of business graduates of one sort or another. But basically lawyers. We’re the counter of that. We’re more in the technocrat direction, where our background isn’t law, but programming or other kinds of activism.”[92] But there was also a need to rise above the characterization of the Pirate Party as simply Internet pirates. Although the name of the party is attention-grabbing and eccentric, many of the Pirates recognize that it also requires them to prove themselves as legitimate contenders. But this pivot to a broader platform and loftier goals would come after the elections of 2013.

In 2013, the Pirates gained their first three seats in Parliament — but could only watch as the left-wing coalition collapsed and the Independence Party and Progressive Party took back control over the government. The Icelandic populist impulse diffused too broadly out among the myriad parties that had appeared prior to the election. Sixteen different parties ran in the election. Unfortunately for these parties, Icelandic political tradition caught up: the monolithic voting blocs behind the Progressives and Independence could only decrease so far; the new parties stole from each other and from the center, not from the right-wing.[93]

But why were Icelanders so willing to re-elect the same parties that caused the financial crisis? Why did they swing back from such a hard shift to the left? Partly it was due to the nature of the “swing left,” which, as was shown earlier, was not actually a leftist surge but rather a specifically anti-establishment surge that happened to focus on the left-wing. The number of voters identifying as right-of-center did not decrease much between 2007 and 2009. However, it is worth noting that the number of left-of-center votes stayed pretty much consistent between 2009 and 2013 — indicating that not much shifting was happening on the political spectrum.[94]

It nonetheless seems incongruous that Icelanders would vote the culprits of the 2008 economic crisis back into power. As Indridi Indridason et al. find, the 2009 election punished the incumbent party as a result of the crisis, as is expected; but the 2013 election — in spite of clearly improving economic conditions — also punished the incumbents. This happened because the opposition parties were able to link the SDA and the Left-Greens to continuing economic struggles while promising better and different actions, which the ruling coalition could not defend against because of their role in government: “In the 2013 election in Iceland the opposition, in particular the Progressive Party, managed to capitalize on and gain credibility by taking position on issues rendered salient by the state of the economy, which the government parties could not credible counter due to their inaction on the issues as incumbents.”[95]

In essence, the election of 2013 was also an expression of discontent with the government and the ruling political parties, whom Icelanders saw as unable to sufficiently deal with the massive amount of housing debt owed by citizens.[96] This discontent is shown first by the precipitous fall in the opinion polls of Independence, which lost over fifteen percent in the weeks leading up to the election, second by the rise of new parties, which collectively gained 25 percent of the vote — equaling the vote ultimately won by Independence and the Progressives, and third by the total turnout, which was the lowest since Iceland gained its independence.[97]

In addition to these markers, Icelanders indicated a continuing high level of distrust of politicians and a belief that the system was not working properly. Data from the National Election Study shows that 54.2 percent of Icelanders believed that corruption was “very widespread” or “quite widespread” among politicians, significantly down from 72.6 percent in 2009, but nonetheless still a majority. Close to thirty percent of Icelanders still trusted few or no politicians in 2013.[98] Although the populace clearly did not feel as frustrated or disenchanted with politics as in 2009, the data nonetheless shows that a significant dissatisfaction with the establishment remained. There was room for another Best Party to rise and consolidate antiestablishment sentiment, but that alternative would need to do something more than simply pose as an outsider.

Following the election, the Pirates, began working within the Alþingi to bring attention to issues of transparency and liberty. Previously, in the years following the financial crash, McCarthy and Jónsdóttir had worked closely with Julian Assange and WikiLeaks to pass strong whistleblower protections and laws upholding journalistic freedom. They managed to create the Iceland Modern Media Initiative, which was passed through Parliament unanimously in 2010 and put in place significant protections for journalists and whistleblowers.[99] From the onset, Jonsdótttir and the other Pirate MPs were closely associated with transparency and WikiLeaks — and they continued to push strongly for freedom of information in the new parliamentary term. One of their first high-profile efforts in 2013 was to formulate a plan to grant National Security Agency whistleblower Edward Snowden asylum in Iceland. McCarthy and Jónsdóttir’s statement explaining this action declares, “Whereas IMMI is based in Iceland, and has worked on protections of privacy, furtherance of government transparency, and the protection of whistleblowers, we feel it is our duty to offer to assist and advise Mr. Snowden to the greatest of our ability.”[100]

The Pirates fully embraced the fight for implementing a new constitution in Iceland, one that would dramatically restructure the way government works to allow for greater public participation. Proposed in 2010, the new constitution would let coalitions of citizens band together to petition to pull certain laws out of parliament and force a referendum, and it would also allow for “citizens’ initiatives” that let large enough groups submit documents to parliament that MPs must debate.[101] But in spite of popular support for a new constitution, it was killed by the Independence-Progressive coalition after the 2013 election. The Pirates, who had run on a platform of decentralizing government, continued to push for dramatic reforms to the political system, even as the best chance for achieving that goal was stifled by the government. In June 2013, Jónsdóttir told Huffington Post, “We have to nationalize the banks. We have to get rid of the government. We need to have access to the internet seen as a human right. We need to have a new Constitution.”[102]

For two years, the Pirates had moderate support in the populace, consistently sitting at around ten percent. But toward the end of 2014 and into 2015, something began to shift in public opinion. Both Independence and Progressive began losing support in the latter half of 2014, with the Progressives dramatically decreasing in popularity, from a high of 20 percent in mid-2014 to a low of 5 percent in mid-2015. Most other parties experienced a similar decline, although less significant than the Progressives. The only party to experience a meaningful increase in public opinion was the Pirate Party — and meaningful is an understatement. Polls started trending up in Fall 2014, and then spiked upwards in 2015. In the space of about 8 months, the Pirates had gone from the second-least popular to the most popular party, a surge of 25 percent. In May 2015, they crossed the 30 percent support threshold — meaning that, if elections had been held then, the Pirates would have emerged with by far the most number of seats in parliament. For comparison, Independence was the second-most popular party at this time, with support in the low 20s, one of the few times in Icelandic history that Independence was not the most popular party. Also of note, the Pirates were pulling support from every other party.[103]

This abrupt and unexpected surge drove domestic and international attention on the Pirates. Suddenly they were de facto opposition leaders, in spite of only having three MPs in parliament. Popular opposition to the establishment consolidated rapidly behind the Pirates, whereas for years before it had remained diffused throughout the multitude of other parties.[104] The Pirates had emerged as the face of Icelandic populism.

Convergence of the Populist Impulse

Why did the populist movement so quickly and dramatically gather in support of the Pirate Party? Pirates at the time struggled to explain it. Jónsdóttir said in March 2015, soon after the Pirates had surpassed Independence in the polls, “To be completely honest: I don’t know why we enjoy so much trust, we are all just as surprised, thankful, and take this as a sign of mistrust towards conventional politics.”[105]

But for the Pirates to become so popular, something had to have fundamentally changed within at least a large segment of the population. Iceland, as has been shown, is a country that has traditionally modified its institutions slowly, and the populace historically did not widely support revolutionary movements. Even the independence movement was framed as a return to sovereignty and Icelandic institutionalism that had existed before. And, as the elections of 2013 showed, the anger that Icelanders felt after 2009 softened slightly, and many people returned to their old voting habits.

But the Independence-Progressive coalition made several moves in their policymaking and rhetoric in the years after 2013 that dramatically affected their ability to project legitimacy and trustworthiness to portions of the populace. The first was that the Progressives had embraced a right-wing populist platform, constructing a party identity based on Icelandic isolationist nationalism. In an attempt to consolidate rural support as well as to win over some of the more disillusioned urban voters who perceived Left Green-SDA policy toward repayment of Icesave accounts as tantamount to capitulation, a young, new leadership of the Progressives pushed the party to the right. Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson, the leader of the Progressives, began this swing toward nationalist populism with InDefence, an organization dedicated to resisting the anti-terror measures taken by Britain against Icesave accounts and Icelandic banks. As has already been seen, the Progressives and Independence played up this perception of Left Green-SDA weakness toward Britain in order to consolidate support for their own campaigns in the run-up to 2013. In rhetoric evocative of right-wing populism elsewhere, Gunnlaugsson said in 2009 that Prime Minister Jóhanna Sigurðadóttir was “humiliating the nation” by “forcing her nation to pay the Icesave debt burden.”[106]

In addition, Gunnlaugsson and the Progressive leaders increased their party’s suspicion and skepticism toward immigration and refugee resettlement, for instance expressing a desire to keep specific track of crime committed by foreigners in an inquiry submitted to the Alþingi.[107] Although, as academic Eiríkur Bergmann notes, the Progressives did not go nearly as far in embracing anti-immigrant stances as other right-wing populist parties like the AfD in Germany or the National Front in France, Gunnlaugsson nonetheless refused to condemn anti-Muslim statements made by members of the Progressive Party.[108]

This shift toward the right in rhetoric did not change after 2013, when Independence and the Progressives formed a government. More Progressive MPs began expressing anti-Muslim beliefs on Facebook and in interviews, and a few Independence MPs followed suit. However, although they found some support in their voting bases, Independence and the Progressives were harshly criticized for fomenting fear toward immigrants and Muslims.[109]

When in government, however, it became clear that the embrace of populism and a critique of perceived Left Green-SDA anti-nationalism led the coalition into a bind. They were voted in by a bloc who felt that they presented a way out of the possibility of Iceland having to repay the Icesave debts and a way to alleviate the massive mortgage burdens that many Icelanders found themselves saddled with following the financial crisis.[110] In November 2014, the government presented its plan for significant relief for household debt, which had ballooned due to rapid inflation of the Icelandic króna. It would spend 80 billion ISK from the Treasury, and tax incentives would be put in place to encourage spending of pension funds to pay down the debt. The government claimed that 69,000 homeowners would benefit directly.[111]

However, the government’s pre-election promise to forgive household debt was much more sweeping and ambitious, to the extent that it was unclear if it was even possible to fulfill. As Grapevine writer Haukur Helgason wrote, “During the Progressive party’s 2013 campaign, members and supporters of most other parties condemned the proposal as populist and unrealistic, a promise that would either not be fulfilled or drastically upset economic stability and the Treasury.”[112] The Progressives, specifically, had talked themselves into a corner: either attempt to forgive most or all of the household debt, as was promised, and risk upending the fragile recovery that the economy was undergoing under the Left Green-SDA coalition; or scale back their promises and anger all of the people with significant debt but who would be ineligible for relief. The Progressives were initially suggesting a 300 billion ISK relief package essentially up to the elections of 2013, but once in government, they were convinced to compromise with Independence, which was much less enthusiastic about a straightforward relief program.[113] The compromise shut a lot of people out of relief, including, most significantly, renters and those with student loans. An NPR report from December 2014 with two Icelanders reveals some of the dissatisfaction felt toward the policy. Heiða Jónsdóttir had a mortgage that spiked 30 percent following the crisis, and she was entitled to $12,000. But she nonetheless had mixed feelings, saying that the relief program denied a lot of Icelanders much-needed assistance for other debt besides mortgages. In addition, Baldur Hedinsson expressed discontentment because his own student loans had swollen, but the government was providing no relief to him.[114]

The Progressive-Independence coalition most dramatically fueled a political insurgency against it when it dealt with two particularly high-profile issues: constitutional reform and accession into the European Union. The new constitution, the development of which had been undertaken by a constituent assembly of 950 Icelanders chosen by lottery, received over 65 percent support in a new referendum.[115] In spite of its popularity, the Left Green-SDA coalition did not move forward with the bill swiftly enough before the 2013 elections, and afterward, the new coalition immediately ended all debate and refused to address a new constitution for the rest of its term.[116]

The question of European Union membership has been one of the most controversial issues in Iceland since the post-crisis government filed an application in July 2009. The SDA was the main force of pro-Europeanism in the Alþingi and provided most of the impetus to start negotiations; the Left Greens, Independence, and the Progressives all opposed it. Public opinion was mixed to negative on the question, but a large majority generally supported holding a public referendum and continuing negotiations on EU membership.[117] The Pirate Party has managed to capitalize by applying its radical integrationist ideology to discussions about the EU, which allow it to remain both neutral and anti-establishment: it is neither pro- nor anti-EU, but rather pro-referendum. In the campaign leading up to the 2013 elections, Independence and Progressive both promised to hold a referendum on EU membership, indicating the strength of public interest in participation that the two main Eurosceptic parties would pledge to hold a referendum on it. The official platform of the Independence Party even declared, “The people will take the decision on EU accession by public referendum during the election term.”[118]

But upon forming a government, the coalition began acting with hesitation and reluctance to move forward with the referendum. In May 2013, soon after becoming Prime Minister, Gunnlaugsson announced that the government had suspended accession talks with the EU.[119] Then, in February 2014, the coalition put forth a resolution to parliament to formally withdraw from negotiations. This kickstarted a wave of opposition and activism that centered on the government attempting to withdraw without putting the question to a vote. In February and March, around 4000 people protested in front of the Alþingi, while over 50,000 people signed a petition calling for the government to hold a referendum on EU membership.[120] The protests continued for several weeks, even as Independence and Progressive officials began saying that they would not hold a referendum, after all. In early March 2014, while protests carried on outside of the parliament building, Foreign Minister Bragi Sveinsson said that a referendum was “out of the question”[121] and Independence Party Chairperson Bjarni Benediktsson called it “unrealistic.”[122]

In the most definitive act regarding the EU membership issue, in March 2015 Sveinsson sent a letter to EU leadership declaring that the Icelandic government had withdrawn from negotiations. “The Icelandic Government wishes to clarify further its intentions,” he wrote. “The Government of Iceland has no intentions to resume accession talks. Furthermore, any commitments made by the previous Government in the accession talks are superseded by the present policy.”[123] Although Sveinsson and the coalition viewed this as a legitimate and official withdrawal, neither he nor any other coalition representative had notified or conversed with Parliament first. Many in the opposition were deeply upset at this decision and believed that it violated a clause in Iceland’s ministerial law that requires ministers to notify the Alþingi before making major decisions.[124] This decision sparked protests that drew 7000 people.[125]

The Progressive Party had begun falling in the polls in early 2014, likely due to a result of its failures to make good on all its economic promises. But the letter from Sveinsson roughly equates to the time that the popularity for the Independence Party also began tumbling. At the same time, the Pirates started rising fast. Pirate MP Björn Leví Gunnarsson said in an email in April 2017 that he identified Sveinsson’s letter as the pivotal moment in the Pirates’ rise to prominence, and analysis of Pirate rhetoric about Sveinsson’s letter shows that the Pirates were echoing the deep current of anger toward governmental actions. For example, Birgitta Jónsdóttir declared at the time that this was a surprising break from democratic principles: “This is a huge issue that the government made a decision without any consultation and by disconnecting the parliament… This is the beginning of the end of this government… First, the nation wants to see this process complete. The people want to go to a referendum.”[126] In this passage, the roots of Pirate ideology are evident: a supreme focus on promoting the voices of the people, and a distrust of the government. In other words, the Pirate Party was the voice in the Alþingi for the protestors who gathered outside.

The climax of the Progressives’ political missteps came in March 2016, when a massive trove of financial documents dubbed the “Panama Papers” was published, linking dozens of politicians worldwide to offshore bank accounts. Some of these accounts were legal, others were outright illegal. In Iceland, it was revealed that Prime Minister Gunnlaugsson and his wife kept wealth and shares in a company in an offshore account in the British Virgin Islands. The Panama Papers also showed that his wife’s company had millions of dollars in stock in some of the banks that had failed during the crisis. 22,000 people — around 6 percent of the entire population of the country — came out to protest and demand Gunnlaugsson’s resignation. The Prime Minister, facing a vote of no confidence, attempted to dissolve parliament and call snap elections, but was refused by the President. This caused an even greater loss in confidence, and Gunnlaugsson was forced to resign that spring.[127] The Pirates gained even more support as a result of popular backlash against the Progressive Party, and Jónsdóttir hammered home the points that had caused the Pirates to become so popular: “It was so clear at the national meeting. It was so clear how the public wanted to see themselves in the wake of the collapse. What should reflect the nation in its resurrection from a disastrous period are the things most spoken at the meeting: Integrity, transparency, responsibility. Are we seeing this government respond in some way? No.”[128]

Much of the Pirates’ rapid rise in the polls owes itself to the governing coalition’s attempts at unilateral withdrawal from the EU. But it was in fact a culmination of factors that led to popular support consolidating behind the Pirates in response to the government’s unpopular decisions.

First, even though they had only three members of Parliament, the Pirates established themselves early on as the antithesis to the establishment politicians in power. They strongly critiqued the actions of the governing coalition, with Pirate MPs arguing that any sort of assistance program needed to be much more universal to sufficiently deal with the effects of the crash. MP Jón Ólafsson, for example, said that “The expectations they built up could NOT be delivered… 300 billion ISK went down to 80 billion.”[129] And Reykjavík municipal city councilman Halldór Svansson stated that it was “Meaningless to talk about how exactly the debt relief will affect the worst off amongst homeowners when the worst off group [of all], renters, are left trapped in poverty.”[130] The Pirates wanted it known that, in spite of the populist swell that ushered the Progressives and Independence into power, Icelanders still should not trust the establishment politicians to make these decisions. The Progressives and Independence remained members of a political cartel.

In line with their radical integrationist philosophies, The Pirates also assumed constitutional reform as one of the most important policy proposals to advocate for, and they had credibility as Jónsdóttir, McCarthy, and several other Pirates strongly supported the constitutional process from the beginning. McCarthy, for instance, wrote in 2011 while the process was still underway, “What’s been made and adopted so far is phenomenal, in my opinion, and shows a very clear progression towards what is probably not the best possible constitution, but very likely the best constitution ever made.” What struck McCarthy as so important about this constitution, moreover, was that it was done by the people — both the randomly-selected, initial brainstorming group, and the council of 25 representatives (who were appointed, but had initially been elected until the Icelandic courts ruled the election results invalid).[131]

Moreover, they had acquired credibility by steadfastly assuming a stance of neutrality toward the EU referendum, while every other party leant toward either Euroscepticism or pro-Europeanism. The Pirate Party’s website from 2013 declares, “Pirates stand for transparency and direct democracy, so we think the entire dialogue process should be open and all information should be on the table. The public must then give a well-informed decision in a binding referendum. It is not the role of political parties to agree or oppose membership but, on the contrary, they should be prepared for each outcome.”[132] The Pirate Party was neutral, but it was not passive — which gave it a significant advantage in winning over public opinion. Because its ideology is based on decentralization and integration, it was not forced to take a stance in support or opposition of the EU issue. It could, instead, push hard for moving the decision-making authority out of Parliament, fulfilling its campaign promises, further establishing itself in opposition to hegemonic catch-all and cartel politics, and gaining popular goodwill.

Finally, the Pirates presented a legitimate alternative to traditional politics because they unashamedly expressed their intentions to dramatically change the political dynamic, allow for much greater democratic participation, and eventually to make a centralized, representative parliament unnecessary.[133] It is a utopian vision, but one that nonetheless helped the Pirates become the most popular party in Iceland. Birgitta Jónsdóttir described the goal as a “rEvolution” — that is, revolutionary political change through systemic overhaul.[134] If this could be achieved, “maybe in the next 50–100 years, we can offload all of the core functions of democracy to the people,” McCarthy said.[135] As a result of its integrationist, decentralist ideology, the Pirates became anti-corruption leaders in Iceland almost unintentionally, occupying a niche that no other party could credibly occupy due to their prior associations and platforms. “I think that wasn’t something we were necessarily intending to become,” McCarthy said. “It was more like reality just forced us in that direction because nobody else was picking up that pattern.”[136] The Pirates wanted to break the cartelization of the system which had manifested in Iceland having a particularly high level of clientelism in politics.[137] Their declared desire to implement direct democratic practices and legislate for greater transparency led them, almost by default, to oppose corruption, because corruption was innate in the system that they wished to upend. “In essence, we’re a system-changing party,” Gunnarsson explained. “[The Pirates] presented that case very strongly and very clearly. And all of the other parties were somehow involved in the process, either before the collapse or then after the collapse. And it was basically only us [outside of it].”[138]

Jakob Axelsson, an activist involved in the Pirates’ youth organization, Ungir Píratar, reflected this perception of the party when he was discussing his own personal reasons for joining. His explanation of his attraction to the Pirate Party rests on an appreciation of the party’s uniqueness, its status as an outsider party, and its vision of a different form of Icelandic politics: “Instead of saying whether we should raise or lower taxes, [the Pirates say,] ‘Let’s get things straight. Let’s get the politics to a good start first…’ Why not fix a broken system? Why not fix the system before deciding whether to raise or lower taxes… [I] saw they were regular people and were in no way above me.”[139]

The actions of the Pirates in government, their rhetoric in campaigns, and the reasons why people joined them indicate that the party is anti-system, not just anti-establishment. It is the difference between running to try to break the influence of a political elite, and running to try to reform the way that elections are held, the way that parliament is structured, or the level of control that citizens can legally exert over the government. The Pirates fought to undermine the power of the Independence and Progressive parties, but they also called strongly for the overhaul of the perceived issues that, they argued, were inherent in the status quo electoral and democratic system. This is evidenced by the campaign platform for the 2016 elections, which has, as its very first item, constitutional reform: “The Pirate Party will bring power to the people and respond to the requirement for a new social contract which emerged following the economic collapse of 2008. The Pirate Party also wants the provisions that were promised to the people since the foundation of the Republic in 1944, for a new constitution that will take into account changing governance in Iceland.”[140] In essence, the more radical, utopian goals of the Pirate Party call for a re-founding of the country based on dramatically increased public participation in government and greater protections against corruption. But many of them recognize that such a utopian system is a long way off and subject to change; Jónsdóttir’s concept of a “rEvolution” — a revolution brought about by systemic change — shows a more moderated version of their goals. McCarthy himself acknowledged that the Pirates attempted too much, too fast regarding the constitutional debate: “What I’m interested in is trying to make iterative improvements, because one of the things that have bit us pretty hard in the whole constitutional debate was this distinction between doing the desirable thing, versus doing the thing that society is ready for.”[141]

Nonetheless, the Pirates successfully channeled anti-establishment and anti-system sentiment into public support in 2015–2016, and they took on the role of checking government overreach and being the whistleblower party in Parliament. But it is exceedingly rare for an anti-establishment party to continue to grow after already having representatives elected; as one study of right-wing populist parties found,

[They] are faced with a particular dilemma in this regard — they highlight themes of grassroots democracy and popular sovereignty. These themes play an important role in attracting and binding members and supporters. At the same time, the success of these parties strongly depends on the personality and skills of their leaders. Thus, democracy-seeking goals are much more part of their populist rhetoric than of their actual behaviour. There is no obvious way out of the tension between populist stances and a highly centralised organisational reality. This is likely to create disappointment and massive internal strife.[142]

In addition to the organizational difficulties that anti-political and anti-establishment goals seem to pose for parties, other studies have found that goals of increasing democratic participation and overhauling systems are not as important for winning over voters as goals of simply doing the politician’s job better. The rise of populism over the past few years has given academics a lot of evidence for the fragility of populist rhetoric and the difficulty that parties face balancing personality-driven politics on the one hand with grand promises of change on the other.[143] Converting populist interest into consistent gains is something that even the Pirate Parties worldwide have struggled to do. Richard Falkvinge, on the night of the October 2016 Icelandic parliamentary elections, exclaimed that it was a great night for the Pirate movement because, for the first time, Pirates had been reelected — and, in fact, it was the first time that any had dramatically grown their share of seats in a parliament.[144]

Icelandic populism has deviated from the trend in other populist movements. Many Icelandic people want something more than just honest politicians: they want a change in the system, and something to break the cycle of Independence-Progressive hegemony that has lasted so long. There is a reason why, as of February 2017, Icelanders are only concerned about healthcare more than corruption in finance and politics.[145] They feel not only that the performance of politicians is poor, but also that the system itself is broken. And by establishing itself as a radical integrationist party and by incorporating into its internal structure a desire for greater participation, it contradicts previous studies of populist parties. This partly has to do with the Pirates’ own consistency: their platform calls for instituting direct democracy, and they themselves use direct democratic voting for internal decision-making. They have avoided the tension between high organization and their populist stances by not actually strictly organizing their party; instead, they have embraced decentralization and a plurality of views. As Halldóra Morgensen said, “The Pirates aren’t receptive to anything as a whole.”[146] However, that has benefited them more than hurt them, because the Icelandic Pirate Party in particular, as opposed to other Pirate Parties worldwide, has adopted a well-defined ideology based on decentralism. Although McCarthy explained that the core of the party “has been shifting a little” due to a large number of new members joining in recent months, the crowd-determined, decentralist platform in conjunction with its established platform nonetheless provide greater stability and longevity than other populist parties.

The consolidation of anti-establishment sentiment decreased to a certain extent during the 2016 elections, but the Pirates still won 15 percent of the vote and 10 seats in the Alþingi. The decrease was expected by the Pirates — it was inevitable that some of the fervor and anger directed at the ruling coalition would diffuse and distribute among the other new parties and the Left Greens. By all accounts, it was still a huge win for the Pirates, and they went into the new term in 2017 with a desire to push forward ambitious anti-corruption legislation and to make good on some of the lapsed initiatives, like constitutional reform and the EU referendum.[147] In opinion polls done after the election, the Pirates have shown continued consistency in their support base, polling at 13–15 percent.[148]

Although the Pirates have enjoyed success in terms of popularity and growth of parliamentary representation, they have not managed to achieve most of their goals yet. The new coalition government is composed of Bright Future — an offshoot of the Best Party — Reform, and Independence, and thus the hegemonic party is in power once again. For the Pirates and their supporters, the primary goal is to somehow break the bloc of voters that has always faithfully voted for Independence. “That’s a change that I want to see,” Young Pirates activist Jakob Axelsson said. “I want people to take informative decisions and [not to] follow a party like a football team. That’s just wrong… You should be open to change and discussion and follow the ones that have the ideas you really agree with.”[149]

To achieve this goal, the Pirates are focusing on the issues that they perceive impact people the most and are going under-addressed. For example, they are attempting to push forward potential solutions for the housing crisis, which is caused by a huge buildup of hotels in Reykjavík and a distinct lack of affordable housing. They are also calling for another EU referendum and to restart discussions for the new constitution. Further, Morgensen said that they will be introducing legislation to attempt to force politicians to speak the truth and to disclose important information to the public. “The political landscape right now would make it very difficult for the government not to support it,” she said. “So if they don’t support it, it’s going to be costly.”[150]

But while many of the Pirates are surely concerned with the next elections in 2020, others are more focused on simply attempting to start serious conversations about the state of the political system in Iceland and how to improve it. “It’s just about changing the conversation and planting seeds, and whether we carry on or not as a Pirate Party I don’t think matters,” Morgensen said.[151] Many voters have taken to the authenticity presented by such declarations, and the Pirate Party finds itself now in a decent position to continue to make gains in the coming years.

A sharp increase in the popularity of the Left Greens has presented them an opportunity, as well: as the most left-wing party in Iceland, the Left Greens are less establishment than the other major parties, and they appeal to a similar demographic as the Pirates.[152] The coalition led by Independence is already facing a precipitous fall in polling numbers. Perhaps the Pirates can find allies in the Left Green Movement and work with them to further their anti-establishment, reformist agenda.

Even though they did not fulfill expectations in the 2016 parliamentary elections, the Pirate Party nonetheless still remains the voice of anti-corruption in parliament — and as such, it will continue to have power for the foreseeable future. It has successfully built up legitimacy and credibility as a political party through a consistency in its rhetoric and efforts that traces all the way back to the financial crisis. In addition, it practices what it preaches in a way that neither hard right or hard left populist parties can do: as a non-doctrinal party that creates its platforms through crowdsourcing and consensus using direct democracy, the Pirates avoid the pitfalls of other populist parties that must, at some point, sacrifice promises of greater participation for the continuation of the ideology, or vise versa. The Pirates’ ideology is democratic participation. It is avowedly nonpartisan, and rejects labels of left or right (although, if one had to place them, they would certainly be toward the left). As McCarthy wrote in 2012, soon after the founding of the party, “Left and right stop making sense in the networked age. The generation of people engaged in so-called ‘information politics’ come from an ideology which rejects individualism and socialism as opposites, but rather acknowledge that there is no society without individuals, and without a society, the individual is meaningless.”[153] The Pirates’ efforts since McCarthy wrote this reflect his belief. They oppose neither the right nor the left, but the hegemonic center that has risen as a result of catch-all and cartel politics. They advance a liberal-individualist platform that might be called individualistic socialism: it calls for protection and expansion of the safety net, opposition to corporate consolidation, encouragement of popular innovation and entrepreneurship, and above all popular control of the government.[154]

Conclusion

The rise of Icelandic populism and the Pirate Party is thus a story of centuries of tension between conservative and liberal individualism. In feudal Iceland, a cleavage emerged between proponents and opponents of the social order. For most of Iceland’s history, the conservatives have dominated society — except for two significant historical moments. First, the liberals successfully secured an egalitarian independence in the early twentieth century; second, the Pots and Pans Revolution after the financial crisis of 2008 toppled the conservative government. During most of the twentieth century, Icelanders valued democratic participation and political autonomy, but cast suspicion on dramatic structural change and revolution. Its historical poverty, isolation, and obsession with world events created a culture of fierce individualism, a desire to see Iceland succeed, but also a fear of turmoil.

The one example of Icelandic agitation comes from the independence movement of the nineteenth century, wherein Icelanders were faced with obvious shortcomings of the Danish regime in its responses to Icelandic crises. Coupled with increased Danish hegemony, this helped Icelandic intelligentsia convince Icelanders that political autonomy was in their best interest, and independence was the only way to regain full autonomy. They were placed in a situation where everyone’s individualism — both personal and national — was under threat, and so it superseded the conservative impulse.

The next time that this sort of activism was meaningfully engaged for a long period of time was 2008 when decades of Independence Party power and political cartelization had created a powerful center which helped institute a full suite of neoliberal policies in the 1990s and early 2000s. At first, these policies gave Iceland almost miraculous riches, then the bubble burst and sent the country into a massive tailspin. The economic crisis of 2008 awakened a resistance in Icelandic society. Although the special elections of 2009 brought left-wing parties to power, leftism did not suddenly mobilize. Rather, a nonpartisan, and in many cases non-ideological populism emerged that was based first and foremost on holding the cartel system, and especially Independence, accountable. The elections of several MPs of the Citizens’ Movement and councilpeople of the Best Party, both running on platforms of radical change rather than detailed policy proposals, showed the nature of the vehement frustration of Iceland: they wanted sincerity and change, but most of all, they wanted to register their overwhelming anger toward a system that let politicians institute policies that brought about the crash.

The Pirate Party is a focused, defined, and developed product of this initial anger after the crisis. It is a radical integrationist party that rose to prominence because Iceland’s populism was at its core a revolt against a system that resulted in political hegemony. The Pirate Party came to represent radical change with a specific, directed purpose: to institute democratic reforms to bring the individual voice into power. When Sigmundur Gunnlaugsson and the Progressive-Independence coalition killed constitutional reform and then unilaterally withdrew from EU accession talks from 2013–2015, it was the final proof that many Icelanders needed that the system was rotten, and it needed to go. But all other parties were somehow connected, either historically or by proxy. Only the Pirate Party had the credibility as a true anti-establishment, anti-center party. It was the only party espousing the kind of hegemony of the individual over the political that many Icelanders craved. And so, in 2015–2016, the Pirate Party became the most popular party in Iceland, and in October 2016 it won ten seats in Parliament, more than tripling its previous total.

It remains to be seen whether the Pirates can continue to gain influence in Iceland and eventually implement their goals, or whether they will remain as a minority party, vocal but relatively powerless. In any case, the Pirate Party remains as a unique example of a relatively successful populist party, one that did not rely on any ideology except that of decentralization and individualism. The Pirates set out to apply the philosophy of the Internet to politics, but they found success by expanding to reflecting the spirit of the Internet, such as egalitarianism and equality of opportunity. Whereas other Pirate Parties faltered due to political incoherence and inexperience, the Icelandic Pirate Party grew and survived because it centered its platform on a utopian vision of decentralized government coupled with a more grounded form of liberal individualism and incremental systemic change.

Iceland’s Pirate Party stands in stark contrast to the strong, hard-right movements posing significant challenges to the establishment in other European countries. Further study might focus on the resistance of Iceland’s culture and political system to right-wing nativist populism. Although the Progressives adopted some nativist rhetoric in the 2013 campaign, they nonetheless stopped short of transforming into a right-wing populist party like Germany’s AfD or France’s National Front. A hard-right nationalist party, the Icelandic National Front, was founded in 2016 specifically to support Christian culture and oppose greater immigration. However, the party failed to make much of an impact in the 2016 elections, as it was not able to get on the ballot in four electoral regions. Further research might investigate whether Iceland is vulnerable to a consolidated, nativist movement in the future, as Smári McCarthy believes it is: “I think we dodged a bullet this time, and I don’t see them coming back any time soon. But the next populist in the deceptive and mean way, we might not dodge them.”[155] Ultimately, Iceland’s populist impulse found a much different outlet in the liberal individualism and radical decentralism of the Pirate Party. Time will tell if it will remain that way.

[1] I use a broad conception of populism in this paper, one that includes both left- and right-wing populist parties, loosely based on Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell’s definition: “an ideology which pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice.” From “The Sceptre and the Spectre,” Twenty-First Century Populism, London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008.

[2] I use Otto Kirchheimer’s definition of “catch-all party” as one that “abandon[s] attempts at the intellectual and moral encadrement of the masses… [and] turn[s] more fully to the electoral scene, trying to exchange effectiveness in depth for a wider audience and more immediate electoral success.” From Otto Kirchheimer, “The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems,” Political Parties and Political Development, ed. Myron Weiner and Joseph LaPalombara, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015. I further use Richard Katz’s definition of cartel parties: “The cartel party thesis holds that political parties increasingly function like cartels, employing the resources of the state to limit political com petition and ensure their own electoral success.” From Richard Katz and Peter Mair, “The Cartel Party Thesis: A Restatement,” Perspectives on Politics, 7(4), December 2009, 753.

[3] The Árni Magnússon Institute for Icelandic Studies

[4] Sigurður Gylfi Magnússon, Wasteland with Words, London: Reaktion Books, 2010, 154

[5] Magnússon 155

[6] Guðmundur Hálfdanarson, Old Provinces, Modern Nations, Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1991, 88.

[7] Hálfdanarson., 89; Magnússon 48

[8] Magnússon 36

[9] Ibid., 37

[10] Erik Klemetti, “Local and Global Impacts of the 1783–84 Laki Eruption in Iceland, Wired, June 7, 2013.

[11] Tom de Castella, “The Eruption that Changed Iceland Forever,” BBC, April 16, 2010.

[12] Hálfdanarson, 91

[13] Ibid., 90–91.

[14] Hálfdanarson., 94.

[15] Ibid., 95.

[16] Ibid., 97.

[17] Magnússon, 38

[18] Ibid., 39

[19] Önnudottir, “The Pots and Pans Protests and Requirements for Responsiveness of the Authorities,” Icelandic Review of Politics and Administration 12(2), 2016, 196.

[20] Magnússon, 39

[21] Indriði Indriðason, “Re-electing the Culprits of the Crisis?” Scandinavian Political Studies, September 2016, 8.

[22] Indriðason, 11; Guðmundur Oddsson, “Neoliberal Globalization and Heightened Perceptions of Class Division in Iceland,” The Sociological Quarterly, 57, 2016, 469.

[23] Kirchheimer, 183–184.

[24] Ibid., 184–185.

[25] Svanur Kristjánsson, “The Electoral Basis of the Icelandic Independence Party, 1929–1944,” Scandinavian Political Studies, 1979.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Kristjánsson.

[28] Ibid.; Kirchheimer, 187.

[29] Mark Blyth and Richard Katz, “From Catch-all Politics to Cartelisation: The Political Economy of the Cartel Party,” West European Politics 28(1), January 2005, 42.

[30] Richard Tomasson, Iceland: The First New Society, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980, 42.

[31] Kirchheimer, 199.

[32] Ibid., 200.

[33] Robert Wade and Silla Sigurgeirsdóttir, “Iceland’s Rise, Fall, Stabilisation and Beyond,” Cambridge Journal of Economics, 36(1), 2013, 132–133; Roger Boyes, Meltdown Iceland, London: Bloomsbury, 2009.

[34] Wade, 135.

[35] Martin Hart-Landsberg, “Lessons from Iceland,” Monthly Review, 65(5), October 2013.

[36] Guðni Jóhannesson, The History of Iceland, Santa Barbara: Greenwood, 2013, 143.

[37] “Policy Statement of the Government of the Independence Party and the Social Democratic 2007,” Government Offices of Iceland, May 23, 2007.

[38] Torbjörn Bergman, Europeanization and Icelandic Political Parties, May 2007.

[39] Amir Abedi, Anti-political Establishment Parties: A Comparative Analysis, New York: Routledge, 2004, 30–99.

[40] Wade, 135.

[41] Heather Timmons, “Iceland’s Fizzy Economy Faces a Test,” The New York Times, April 18, 2006.

[42] Matt O’Brien, “The Miraculous Story of Iceland,” The Washington Post, June 17, 2015.

[43] “West Ham Accept £85m Takeover Bid,” BBC, November 21, 2006.

[44] Timmons, New York Times.

[45] Wade, 128.

[46] Mark Lander, “Iceland, a Tiny Dynamo, Loses Steam,” New York Times, April 18, 2008.

[47] Matt O’Brien, “The Miraculous Story of Iceland,” The Washington Post, June 17, 2008.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Liz Alderman, “Iceland, Symbol of Financial Crisis, Finally Lifts Capital Controls,” The New York Times, March 14, 2017.

[50] Ian Parker, “Lost,” New Yorker, March 9, 2009.

[51] Smári McCarthy, interview with author, recording, Reykjavík, Iceland, February 7, 2017.

[52] Parker, New Yorker.

[53] Donatella Della Porta et al., Late Neoliberalism and Its Discontents in the Economic Crisis, Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, 47

[54] Parker, New Yorker.

[55] Ólafur Harðarson, “The Parliamentary Election in Iceland, April 2009,” Electoral Studies 29(3), September 2010, 523.

[56] Valur Gunnarsson, “Icelandic PM Becomes World’s First Leader to Step Down Over Banking System Crisis,” The Guardian, January 26, 2009.

[57] Harðarson, 523.

[58] Ibid., 525.

[59] Harðarson, 526.

[60] Ibid., 527.

[61] Harðarson, 526.

[62] Haukur Magnússon, “The Citizen Movement,” The Grapevine, April 3, 2009.

[63] Kirchheimer, 190–195.

[64] Icelandic National Election Survey (ICENES), The Social Science Research Institute, 2007–9.

[65] Dominic Boyer, “Simply the best: Parody and political sincerity in Iceland,” American Ethnologist 40(2), 2013, 278.

[66] Boyer., 280.

[67] Ibid., 280.

[68] Ibid., 281.

[69] John Rentoul, “Have You Heard the One About Jon Gnarr, the Comedian Who Saved Iceland From Political and Financial Catastrophe?” The Independent, September 13, 2014; Chris Irvine, “Reykjavik Mayor Proposes Cutting Ties With Moscow Over Gay Law,” The Telegraph, July 15, 2013.

[70] Nate Anderson, “Political Pirates: A History of Sweden’s Piratpartiet,” ArsTechnica, February 26, 2009.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Björn Leví Gunnarsson, interview with author, recording, Reykjavík, Iceland, February 10, 2017.

[73] “Gratisgenerationen ger sig in i politiken,” Dagens Nyheter, June 7, 2009.

[74] Richard Falkvinge, “Pirate Party of Berlin Wins, Enters Parliament,” falkvinge.net, September 18, 2011.

[75] Kate Connolly, “German General Election 2013: An Open Race in an Open Field,” The Guardian, September 20, 2012.

[76] Eric Westervelt, “A Party on the Rise, Germany’s Pirates Come Ashore,” NPR, June 6, 2012.

[77] Josephine Huetlin, “The Rise and Fall of the Pirate Party,” New Republic, September 29, 2016.

[78] Annett Meiritz and Fabian Reinbold, “Germany’s Struggling Pirate Party,” Spiegel Online, September 19, 2013.

[79] Philip Oltermann, “German Pirate Party Politician ‘Confessed to Murder Before Suicide,’” The Guardian, September 22, 2016.

[80] Wolfram Nordsieck, Parties and Elections Database, http://www.parties-and-elections.eu.

[81] Swarm economics is a decentralized economic theory that the Pirate Wheel defines as “Citizens, not corporations, mak[ing] the economy. Volunteer work is valued.” It is an anti-corporatocratic, post-industrial form of economics that Falkvinge envisions as ushering in the end of fixed work times and workplaces and the growth of laborers holding five to ten paid jobs at once. Such an economy requires Universal Basic Income to work. Richard Falkvinge, “More Thoughts on the Coming Swarm Economy,” Falkvinge on Liberty, August 31, 2013.

[82] Richard Falkvinge, “Philosophies and Policies of the Pirate Wheel,” Falkvinge on Liberty.

[83] McCarthy, interview with author.

[84] Halldóra Morgensen, interview with author, recording, Reykjavík, Iceland, February 7, 2017.

[85] Huetlin, The New Republic.

[86] McCarthy, interview with author.

[87] Ibid.

[88] McCarthy, interview with author.

[89] Ibid.

[90] Piratar.is, February 2013, accessed using Wayback Machine.

[91] Laurie Penny, “Laurie Penny on Iceland’s Elections: A Shattered Fairy Tale,” New Statesman, May 8, 2013.

[92] Gunnarsson, interview with author.

[93] “Right Back,” The Economist, May 4, 2013; Tom Peck, “Vote for Us — the Politicians Who Bankrupted Iceland!” Independent, April 26, 2013.

[94] ICENES, 2007, 2009, 2013

[95] Indridi Indridason, “Re-Electing the Culprits of the Crisis? Elections in the Aftermath of a Recession,” Scandinavian Political Studies, September 2016, 24.

[96] Ibid.

[97] “Lokatölur og Þingmenn,” RÚV, April 28, 2013. http://www.ruv.is/frett/lokatolur-og-thingmenn

[98] ICENES 2013.

[99] “Iceland to Become International Transparency Haven,” International Modern Media Institute.

[100] Andy Greenberg, “Icelandic Legislator: I’m Ready to Help NSA Whistleblower Edward Snowden Seek Asylum,” Forbes, June 9, 2013.

[101] McCarthy, interview with author.

[102] C. Robert Gibson, “5 Ways the U.S. Can Have an Icelandic Revolution,” Huffington Post, June 5, 2013.

[103] Public opinion polling graph from: “Iceland Parliamentary Election, 2016,” Wikipedia.

[104] Wikipedia tabulation of public opinion polls from Gallup, University of Iceland, MMR, Fréttablaðið;

[105] The Pirate Party Is Now Measured as the Biggest Political Party in Iceland,” Vísir, March 19, 2015.

[106] Eiríkur Bergmann, “Populism in Iceland: Has the Progressive Party Turned Populist?” Icelandic Review of Politics and Administration 11(1), June 2015, 45–46.

[107] Alþingi website, 2011.

[108] Bergmann, 49.

[109] Ibid., 50.

[110] Indridason, 23–24.

[111] Haukur Már Helgason, “This Is the Correction,” Reykjavík Grapevine, November 11, 2014.

[112] Ibid.

[113] Olafur Margeirsson, “The Icelandic Debt Relief,” Icelandic Economics, December 2, 2013.

[114] David Kestenbaum, “Iceland Experiments With A Jubilee Of Debt Forgiveness,” NPR, December 11, 2014.

[115] Robert Robertsson, “Voters in Iceland Back New Constitution, More Resource Control,” Reuters, October 21, 2012.

[116] Leo Mirani, “Iceland’s Experiment With Crowd-Sourcing Its Constitution Just Died,” Quartz, March 29, 2013.

[117] Wikipedia tabulation of public opinion polls from Gallup, University of Iceland, MMR, Fréttablaðið.

[118] Paul Fontaine, “Nearly 40,000 Sign Petition On EU Referendum, Reykjavík Grapevine, February 28, 2014.

[119] Richard Milne, “Iceland’s New Coalition Government Suspends EU Accession Talks,” Financial Times, May 22, 2013.

[120] Fontaine, February 28, 2014.

[121] Paul Fontaine, “Overwhelming Majority Want Referendum, Foreign Minister Says ‘Out of the Question’,” Reykjavík Grapevine, March 3, 2014.

[122] Paul Fontaine, “Conservative Chair: Referendum ‘Unrealistic’,” Reykjavík Grapevine, March 5, 2014.

[123] “Við teljum að þessu máli sé lokið,” RÚV, March 12, 2015.

[124] Nanna Árnadottir, “Foreign Minister Drops Iceland EU Bid, Doesn’t Run It Past Parliament First,” Reykjavík Grapevine, March 13, 2015.

[125] Jón Benediktsson, “In Pictures: 7,000 Protest Breaking EU Talks,” Reykjavík Grapevine, March 15, 2015.

[126] “The Beginning of the End of the Government,” RUV, March 12, 2015.

[127] Thorgils Jonsson, “Arctic Mutiny,” Foreign Affairs, April 11, 2016.

[128] Birgitta Jónsdóttir, Speech to Alþingi, April 8, 2016.

[129] José Tirado, “Pirates Causing Trouble in Iceland,” Counter Punch, May 19, 2015.

[130] Paul Fontaine, “What About the Renters?” Reykjavík Grapevine, November 10, 2014.

[131] Smári McCarthy, “The Constitution So Far,” Smári McCarthy, June 13, 2011.

[132] Piratar.is.

[133] Smári McCarthy, “The Pirates of Enlightenment,” Smári McCarthy, June 6, 2012;

[134] Steve Rushton, “Anarchist and Parliamentarian, Iceland’s Birgitta Jónsdóttir Talks Big E-Revolution,” Occupy, April 1, 2014.

[135] McCarthy, interview with author.

[136] Ibid.

[137] Bergmann, 2007.

[138] Gunnarsson, interview with author.

[139] Jakob Axelsson, interview with author, recording, Reykjavík, Iceland, February 6, 2017.

[140] Icelandic: “Píratar vilja færa valdið til fólksins og verða við kröfunni um nýjan samfélagssáttmála, sem fram kom í kjölfar efnahagshrunsins 2008. Þar með vilja Píratar einnig efna það loforð sem þjóðinni hefur verið gefið allt frá lýðveldisstofnun árið 1944, um nýja stjórnarskrá sem tekur mið af breyttum stjórnarháttum á Íslandi.” From www.piratar.is.

[141] McCarthy, interview with author.

[142] Amir Abedi and Thomas Lundberg, “Doomed to Failure?” Parliamentary Affairs, 62(1), October 3, 2008, 72–87.

[143] Nick Clarke et al., “Anti-Politics and the Left,” Renewal: A Journal of Labour Politics, 2016.

[144] Richard Falkvinge, “Reykjavik: Icelandic Pirates Triple Result, But Not Largest Party,” Falkvinge on Liberty, October 30, 2016.

[145] Paul Fontaine, “Icelanders Nearly As Concerned About Corruption As They Are About Health Care,” Reykjavík Grapevine, February 15, 2017.

[146] Morgensen, interview with author.

[147] “General Elections 2016 in Iceland,” Iceland Monitor, October 30, 2016; Nanna Árnadóttir, “Pirate Party Want Referendum to Restart EU Talks,” Grapevine, March 30, 2017.

[148] “Stuðningur við Ríkisstjórnina,” MMR.

[149] Axelsson, interview with author.

[150] Morgensen, interview with author.

[151] Morgensen, interview with author.

[152] “Support for Center Right Coalition Crumbles, Large Shift to Left in Latest Poll,” Iceland Magazine, March 23, 2017.

[153] Smári McCarthy, “The Pirates of Enlightenment,” Smári McCarthy, June 26, 2012.

[154] McCarthy, interview with author; piratar.is.

[155] McCarthy, interview with author.