Naval Chokepoints: The Chinese Conundrum
The standoff between the China and the East Asian countries in the East- and the South China Sea logical from an economic and security point of view.
China has, in the recent years, been more aggressive in the East- and the South China Sea. The reason for this the fact that China is a massive exporter who is utterly dependent on its trade lanes. The neighbors in the region (Japan, Vietnam, Philippines, Taiwan etc.) has been alarming about this issue. The response has been increased military cooperation as well as joint naval exercises. Additionally, The Communist Party has invested in island building in the South China Sea as potential airbases and increased exclusive economic zone.
The US, who dominates all global oceans, rejects this island building and evokes the freedom of navigation. The Americans then sent a carrier battle group for this reason. China must, therefore, assume that a war is coming within one or both naval theaters. A strong navy is, unsurprisingly, a national interest for the Communist Party’s survival.
The Chinese have no naval capability that can challenge the United States. Even if Beijing invest in U-boats, Aircraft Carriers and Destroyers there is the problem with the education of Admirals and Navy officers takes decades to pass down experience to challenge the cultural oceanic United States (or even Japan). The Communist Party understands this and they are slowly trying to push the naval boundaries to the chokepoints without the displeasure from Washington.
If that’s true: Where are the chokepoints? As you can see from the map below. Taiwan is a central piece that, can, in theory, block movement between the East- and the South China Sea. The strait between the island and the mainland is fairly narrow and this force Chinese movement to pass on the outside where they come in conflict with the Philippines and Japanese coast guard and navy. Movement between the two Chinese Seas is, therefore, difficult for Beijing.
Furthermore, the East China Sea is in essence blocked by the South Koreans, Japan, and Taiwan. The Ryukyu Islands are a central part were missiles or land-based aircraft can be stationed.
The South China Sea is equally difficult. The Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia blocks the narrow straits and denies ocean access to the south. The ocean between the island is filled with small islands and reefs that make it even harder to pass the straits. Additionally, even the South China Sea is filled with these small islands as the Spratly Islands, Paracel islands and the island of Natuna. The drops of land are large enough to house rockets or airstrips. The great city-state of Singapore is another force in the region against Beijing’s plans. The region is therefore filled with obstacles for the Chinese navy.
This is a huge long-term problem for the Chinese trade and security that makes them utterly dependent on the Americans and their alliance structure. (The Russians have a similar conundrum on the European peninsula with EU and NATO.) The United States fleets can choose to deny oil and gas shipments to China and this would immediately cause a depression and capital flight to Europe and America. As a trading power; President Xi Jinping knows his country’s dependence on energy and raw material imports and manufactured product exports due to the lack of internal consumption. Guaranteed passage to the world ocean is, therefore, a key issue.
The question of the Spratly- and Paracel islands is the first step to hinder direct attacks to their east coast by land- and sea-based missiles. This could lead to a freedom of movement that also could lead to deterrent from a blockade in the first place. However, if a hostile power controls the islands, then the plan falls like a house of cards. The island building in the South China Sea and harassment of local coastguards by Chinese fishing boats makes sense due to their narrow selection of good choices. The same is true in the East China Sea with the Ryukyu Islands, however, they belong to Japan who is not a small country to push around.
We, therefore, come back to the most crucial country, Taiwan. If mainland China could hold the island then the two oceans would be safer for movement and a large air force could be based on the island as well as a naval base. The chokepoint of the Taiwan strait would also be a memory of the past and the two naval regions could unite. The Chinese obsession with Taiwan resembles the United States obsession with Cuba.
What could China do in the meantime until they acquire a navy that could match the American Navy?
In my opinion, they would continue to push for economic incentives and trade deals with their neighbors and make them dependent on Chinese exports as well as loans and FDI.
China could also invest in missile systems on land that could go far enough to the gaps to threaten American ships. The US Navy could defend itself against a limited number of missiles, however, Beijing could overwhelm the system with brute force.
Furthermore, China could continue to invest in new land-based infrastructure to Europe with the New Silk Road. A land-based trading network is not dependent on the US navy, however, this is an expensive chose due to the balance of transport.
China could also invest in small insurgency forces in the small gap countries. The political shifts that could emerge could align with the Chinese system and interest in the wider region and the ring would then be broken. Still, the US navy would be present in the region, however, with a greater burden on the Americans due to their strategic interest to dominate all global oceans.
Conclusively, the conflicts in the South- and the East China Sea are logical from my point of view and America will continue to invest in the region with arms- and trade deals to hold the ring around China. In the end, Beijing’s problem are geographical and the reality of hostile island nations along the coast is a problem that requires a diverse skill set to break through.
