Earlier today, Al Hayat’s Jamal Khashoggi reported that Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri sent messages to all of the group’s affiliates freeing them of their obligations to adhere to AQ core’s guidance and generally spelling out the end of the terrorist organization as we know it. The report was sourced through an unnamed senior member of Syrian jihadist rebel group Ahrar al-Sham: especially given the coordination between Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar, it’s conceivable that an Ahrar al-Sham field commander would hear of any impending split, so chalk one up for the plausible column. Though anonymous sourcing makes my OSINT senses tingle, I can understand the necessity here: naming your high-ranking jihadist sources who are in the middle of a war zone is a good way to no longer have high-ranking jihadist sources. Khashoggi has an AQ reporting pedigree for sure: he interviewed bin Laden back when UBL was coming into his own fighting the Saudis. If this were another source, I’d be doubting this a lot, but Khashoggi’s history and access make me think twice.

Another interesting point, as the Brookings Institution’s J.M. Berger pointed out (while responsibly caveating the whole affair), is that Somalia’s al-Shabaab is supposedly no longer AQ affiliated. There’s that word again: supposedly. Al-Shabaab have been wracked with internal disputes, some violent, and to pretend there’s anything near a group consensus, especially in the wake of Ahmed Abdi Godane’s death by drone strike, should give pause. Even if al-Shabaab leaving AQ is true, it’s unclear whether it would be a significant enough indicator of Khasoggi’s report’s veracity: there’s no polite way to put it, but al-Shabaab are the red-headed stepchildren of the jihadi community. They’re brutal and apply swarm tactics to great effect, but their inability to hold territory recently, as well as rampant factionalism, are far from the hallmarks of a professional AQ affiliate: even Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, when faced with the sedition of Mokhtar Belmokhtar, kept its own house clean and managed to stay adaptive and resilient (albiet operationally restricted) in the wake of Operation Serval. This, along with general dismissiveness in public statements from AQ Core, lends the impression that al-Shabaab isn’t high on the agenda for the group, if even a concern at all.

So where does this leave us? Khashoggi’s report is interesting and unconfirmed, and the al-Shabaab rumor is a strange coincidence that could be completely unrelated. But for the matter of academic interest, let’s examine what the impact of an al-Qaeda collapse would be on AQAP, AQIM, and JN, which are the three with arguably the closest ties to AQ core.

1. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: This stands as the biggest puzzle for me. AQAP’s just seen a huge infusion of manpower with the prison break in Yemen and is presented with the perfect power vacuum in Yemen. The group’s bombmaking skills, tactical maneuvers (I’d recommend reading their small unit tactics manual and watching their “From the Field” series), and publicity (delicious cupcake debacle aside) are top notch among the affiliates. Nasir al-Wuhayshi is also a charismatic and dynamic leader, better than can be said for Zawahiri in fact: his history of service in Afghanistan aside UBL gives him substantial pedigree, and he’s orchestrated the expansion of AQAP into a regional player. In many ways, AQAP has assumed the functions of a besieged AQ core, which has been unable to operate securely much under constant pressure, both from heavy SIGINT collection and kinetic action. So why Zawahiri isn’t just handing the reins off to Wuhayshi is unknown and frankly a bit strange, as he’d be the natural choice. Regardless, if this is actually real, I’d expect AQAP to take some sort of interim leadership role, as they have been in the loose coordination framework that’s been around for AQ since the mid-2000s. No immediate change, then, but I see their making a long-term impact as difficult to near impossible: a crowded Yemeni battlespace will force the group to divert most of its efforts towards the home front, stretching already thin resources on the transnational front to the breaking point. It’s the classic AQIM locality problem.
2. Jabhat al-Nusra: This one’s fairly easy, as it’s outlined in Khashoggi’s article. JN will distance itself from AQ as per Zawahiri’s directive and form its own separate organization. JN already has deep ties in the Syrian jihadist community and a solid organizational structure, so their ability to fight Assad won’t be impacted. The biggest change might (emphasis on the might) be a merger with Ahrar al-Sham: I know the phrase “Ahrar al-Sham absorbs you!” can be a bit of an in-joke amongst those studying the Syrian Civil War, but it’s been a very effective unification tactic here for them that we could see in play again.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Is completely screwed if this is real. They’ve already got a strong ISIS presence in their backyard stealing away recruits and competing for the same weapons, etc. The fact that ISIS and not AQIM was claiming credit for the attack on the Bardo Museum is telling, though likely a blessing for AQIM, which couldn’t have survived the still-to-come levels of crackdown North African countries will be looking to levy. The group’s been hurting since Operation Serval in northern Mali, the French are starting a drone base in Niger to declare open season on them along their smuggling routes, Algeria’s been doing great interdiction work, and Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s al-Mourabitoun seem to be doing just fine on their own. With the lack of a central AQ narrative and partnership with JN, which will be far more focused on its own affairs now, to sustain it in the face of a growing ISIS in the region, AQIM is at serious risk of folding within the next half-decade should AQ core go too.