A common flaw in intelligence analysis holds that analytical judgements can be skewed by past experience and over-relying on a limited knowledge of events’ context. To a certain extent, in a field that relies upon informed conjecture on good days and blind faith on bad, this is inevitable; however, it caused a massive miscalculation as to the intents and penetration of the Islamic State (IS) into North Africa when it first emerged. Instead of being affected by the internecine jihadist squabbles in Syria that have so far proven to be overblown, recent developments in the region demonstrate that IS and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) local affiliates place far more value on coordination than their peers in the Levant.

It was tempting to look at news of an AQIM-sponsored conference in Benghazi, hosted by the local Ansar al-Sharia Libya (AAS-L) chapter, as the foundational evidence of such a split. Reports of an AQIM emissary dispatched by the group’s emir, Abdelmalek Droukdel, discussing the commitment of North African foreign fighters to the Syrian conflict with a representative of the Nusrah Front (JN) stood out at the time, as JN and IS have a history of clashing. The Tunisian issue was also quite salient, as, being the largest foreign nationality represented in jihadist ranks in Syria, AQIM’s request that they be redeployed back to North Africa in order to bolster the group’s domestic position in the wake of France’s devastating Operation Serval had significant impact at home and abroad.

Enter the Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade. Prevailing wisdom (nay, rumor) held that Droukdel tapped an Algerian chemistry student and bombmaker named Khaled Hamadi Chayeb (a.k.a. Lokman Abu Sakhr) to head a merger of Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia (AAS-T) in the wake of AAS-T head Abu Iyadh’s December 2013 arrest in Misrata, Libya. Numerous other factors, including a reported meeting between former AQIM bigwig Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who still swears allegiance to AQ chief Ayman al-Zawahiri, lent this credence: combined with the inter-rebel fighting in Syria, a September pledge of bayat to IS via a sketchy-looking Facebook missive were largely disregarded as the work of an internal splinter. Additionally, the lack of detail in mentioning Tunisia when IS released its batch of North African bayat pledges furthered the confirmation bias. Algeria’s Soldiers of the Caliphate were mentioned by name, and Libya’s wilayats released triumphant photosets soon afterwards: Tunisia stood as the notable absence.

But the question remains: did it really matter? In the wake of the Bardo Museum attacks, the answer to that question looks like a resounding no. The Okba Ibn Nafaa is under credible-to-confirmed scrutiny for the attack, yet IS claimed credit as well. This isn’t inconceivable. AAS-L, which has experienced heavy losses from a protracted urban fight with forces loyal to Gen. Khalifa Haftar in Benghazi and seen the recent death its chief Mohamed al-Zahawi, appears to be closer than ever to a merger with IS’ burgeoning Barqa wilayat. Given the high likelihood of cross-pollination of fighters from AAS-L’s most hardline chapter, Sufian Bin Qhumu’s Derna chapter, the operational-level ties have probably existed from the beginning.

Additionally, North Africa seems to be a great equalizer when it comes to placing trans-national and local goals on the same plane: Belmokhtar split from AQIM over his belief that Droukdel focused the jihad too much on his Maghrebi locales, whereas Belmokhtar sought to spread it throughout North Africa and the Sahel in accordance with AQ core’s directives. The same erosion of trans-national goals that AQIM experienced and Belmokhtar railed against seems just as plausible over a thousand miles removed from the Levant.