Will the ELN and the Colombian Government enter into formal peace negotiations? Both parties have been in direct contact for fifteen months and have not been able to finish the exploratory phase intended to design the process for dialogue and negotiations, agree upon an agenda and the steps to move forward. This is much more than the six months that it took the Government and the FARC to come to an agreement to the process underway.

Both parties, the Juan Manuel Santos Government and the ELN have repeatedly made declarations of wanting to make progress in a negotiation for the “peace objective,” but there have been more than a few difficulties in establishing a public table and to progress in the construction of an agreement. There are now new hurdles to what originally appeared to be the main two hurdles: the size of the agenda and participation from society. There are now two more of immense difficulty: the subject of weapons and the question of when an agreement can be signed, whether before settling on the agreed transformations or if the agreed transformations are to begin after the putting down of arms and signing the peace agreement.

Given these circumstances, the Government and the ELN appear to be in a critical moment in trying to achieve the peace table which would indicate the possible end of the armed conflict with both insurgent parties that remained in arms after the constituent process of 1991.

It is difficult to imagine, and little desirable, that a peace process not be achieved between President Juan Manuel Santos and the ELN.

While the attention is focused on the agenda and the logic of the negotiation, the heart of the problem may not be so much in the content of the very negotiation agenda, but rather in the strategic decision of the ELN in terms of its real willingness and interest in coming to a peace accord with this government.

Some months back we explained the delay in the negotiations were due to the very high price this guerrilla group was placing on peace — higher than the FARC — when in return the Government was willing to pay less than it was negotiation with the FARC. In fact, the ELN has sought to harden and deepen the preliminary discussions to obtain an agenda proper for granting its broad transformations, while it has continued to strengthen its forces. The result has been that today they have greater military capacity than they did ten years ago when they were severely weakened by the military action of the combined paramilitary and national armed forces between 1995–2003. Put differently, the ELN had set as its objective to pressure the Government to come with more strength to the negotiating table.

Today this assessment can be made in a more nuanced fashion, the ELN has strategic aims which make it very challenging to progress in the resolution of the armed conflict, based on its interest in exploring the path of negotiation while maintaining its strategy of increasing its military strength. Both are part of its strategy which supports the position of those that state that there is not a clear conviction on behalf of the ELN for a the politics of negotiation. Nonetheless, their distrust combined with their judgement that it can and should keep up the armed resistance has meant they do not commit to either scenario. While they continue to be interested and committed to peace negotiations and seeking the political support, the ELN maintains an interest in strengthening its armed resistance. It plays on both fields, simultaneously, and this explains the difficulties in taking steps forward with the government.

At first glance this strategy resembling that of the FARC in el Caguán appears very risky, but this gamble has its own logic and does not necessarily go against the interests of the guerrilla..

There are two parts to the argument in favor, one strategic and the other cultural.

The ELN has repeatedly stated it. A peace which does not profoundly change the country and Colombian society is not a true peace, and they are not prepared to compromise and betray their positions. They make claims for a peace process as transformative as possible, but seem to have come to the conclusion that they will not be able to obtain much from a process with the current government. This has left them willing to continue up in arms for as long as necessary, until they judge that they can be the protagonist and a process fitting their expectations of large transformations, ensuring its fulfillment through a low intensity armed resistance. This is a very risky bet which may very well not result in a negotiation in the foreseable future.

The newest argument however is value based and related to recognition. The ELN has always resented being considered a guerrilla group of lesser importance than the FARC (the younger brother syndrome), and has thus always wanted its own peace process which takes into consideration not ony its historical and ideological idiosyncrasies but that also considers it a respectable and important guerrilla group. And its opportunity is now in sight. If the FARC sign a peace accord and demobilize, while the ELN decide to continue in its armed uprising, they would be the last guerrilla group in Latin America — allowing them to remain in the revolutionary imagination as the last and true revolutionary guerrilla which has not betrayed its ideals, following the steps of Che or Camilo Torres. This may be very attractive for the leaders willing to die as revolutionary martyr-heroes. This would be a nefarious bet for a country which deeply yearns for an end to the armed conflict and would place the possibilities for a territorial peace in dire straits.

One alternative for the ELN is to lengthen the conversations with the current Government. They could continue the process of strengthening their military force in a moderate scale, without constituting a significant threat, but persisting in a strategy of disturbing the energy-mining infrastructure and attacking the national forces in the old style of bite and withdraw, achieving permanence and visibility in the national public opinion. Their desire to move past the armed confrontation would be frustrated, strengthening its rejection, by those that insist in the exercise of political action with weapons.

Such a strategy evidently has its risks, but looking at its cost vs benefits, it is a calculated risk.

First taking a look at the military angle. If the ELN do not sign a peace agreement and the FARC transform into a political force, it is likely that part of the combatants of the FARC end up in the ranks of the ELN since there already ties between them. They know each other from operating in conjunction in several regions of the country, and before the uncertainty that the post-demobilization period entails, guerrillas from the FARC may have the temptation to stay in armed rebellion — either due to ideological motivations or avaricious calculations, or a mix of the two — resulting in joining the ELN.

Once the peace agreement has been signed with the FARC, it is true that the Government will be able to focus its armed operations against the ELN, but this guerrilla is tried and tested, and calculates that its defeat will not be around the corner — able to adjust its operation and action within parameters which will make military confrontation difficult.

It can easily lean on a calculated dissolution among the population, making it extremely complicated for the State to confront them and aggravating situations of human rights. In other words, the ELN has many more possibilities to remain in the medium time horizon and make life difficult for the State which has confronted it for more than five decades.

In the end, the ELN will not necessarily win militarily, but it will also not be defeated by the Armed Forces in the short term. The relative armed forces will remain similar to what currently exists, with the significant difference that the ELN will have succeeded in being the center of attention and having its own peace process.

From the political vantage point, the balance could be neutral. The ELN may not necessarily obtain more concessions from a future Government, but they will be able to ride the waves of the difficulties that always form part of the implementation of peace agreements. They will be able to take the position of political protest and make claims to justify the need for more profound changes and thereby reinforce their discourse as the real revolutionaries that fought on behalf of the Colombian people.

From a judicial and personal perspective, the leaders of the ELN will also be able to evaluate what has happened with their FARC peers, and determine whether it is feasible to not spend a day in jail, and their political viability in elections.

Before such a strategy, the Government is in a very difficult position: First, because even if they decide that the peace process with the ELN is not going anywhere, bringing an end to the conversations is not so easy.

Therefore the option that remains is for the Government to cede to the ELN demands: expand the agenda, broaden participation, and leave the discussion of the weapons until the transformations have been realized. But this is very different from the process progressing with the FARC, which could be derailed. The Government knows that the process with the ELN cannot be the same as that underway with the FARC, but it also cannot be that different, which means that this option is not viable.

In conclusion, the Government may have more to lose than the ELN. Not only would a peace without the ELN be an incomplete peace, but it may also complicate the implementation of future agreements with the FARC and the post-conflict in general, postponing the definitive end of the Colombian armed conflict. The ELN knows this, and that’s why they keep the rope tight. We shall see if the two parties are able to find a shared path, but it does not look easy.

This article was originally published by El Espectador as ‘La encrucijada de una paz sin el ELN’ on March 31st, 2015 by Frédéric Massé (Universidad Externado de Colombia) and Luis Eduardo Celis (Fundación Paz y Reconciliación; @luchoceliscnai). Translation by Michael Soto (@misoca).