Deception: The Oldest Trick in the Spy Book — How Japan’s Surrender Was Exploited for Korea’s Division through Double Dealing
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The United States naively placed its trust in Stalin. At the Tehran Conference, Franklin D. Roosevelt extended an invitation to Stalin to assist in the Asian theater, a decision that would later have significant ramifications. FDR’s intention was to have Stalin’s support in the liberation of Manchuria, with the understanding that the region would subsequently be handed over to the legitimate government of China, led by the Kuomintang (KMT) Republic of China (ROC). However, the outcome diverged drastically from the initial plan.
Instead of adhering to the agreed-upon conditions, Stalin handed over control of Manchuria to Mao Zedong’s Communist Party of China (CCP) guerilla forces. In a further display of geopolitical maneuvering, Stalin occupied Korea, positioning the Soviet-educated Kim Il-sung as a puppet leader in Pyongyang.
This trust in Stalin’s intentions echoed the broader pattern of international politics. In 1941, Russia and Japan had signed a Neutrality Treaty, introducing an aura of ambiguity to the global stage. During World War II, the United States found itself confronting Japan without direct assistance. The tide turned notably after the fall of Saipan in the summer of 1944. Following this pivotal moment, Japan’s trajectory began to shift.
The resignation of Tojo on July 2nd, 1944, marked a turning point, leading to the establishment of a new war council that would guide Japan’s path over the next 13 months. As February 1945 approached, this war council found itself gripped by anxiety. While they desired a peaceful surrender, their fear of the Americans loomed large. Internal deliberations showcased a divide among Japanese generals. One urged the Emperor to reach out to the Americans, while another held that the United States would not entertain any proposal short of Japan’s complete devastation.
Ironically, this perspective was inverted. Reaching out to the US could have paved the way for a reasonable treaty. In February 1945, the Yalta Agreement was concluded between the US and Russia. This pivotal agreement, following Germany’s defeat, incentivized Russia to enter the war against Japan. Stalin’s personal antipathy toward Japan was a driving force behind this decision. He conveyed to the US ambassador that Russia’s interests aligned with defeating Japan due to historical animosity.
As outlined in the Yalta Agreement, Russia’s ambitions to regain lost territories from Japan, including Southern Manchuria, required action prior to Japan’s surrender. Failure to initiate this action before Japan’s surrender would remove these territories from the negotiation table. Thus, had Japan surrendered to the US, the need for Russia to invade Korea might have been obviated.
April 1945 saw Hitler’s suicide followed by Germany’s surrender in May. In a state of desperation and fearing the United States, Japan reached out to Russia, presenting offers that included ports with fishing rights, Manchurian railroads, and other territories. However, Russia’s response was characterized by delay and a lack of genuine interest throughout June, underscoring their desire to witness Japan’s decline before any substantive negotiations took place. Stalin’s approach reflected a desire to relish in the downfall of Japan while meticulously preparing for a significant assault on Manchuria.
The 8th of August, 1945, marked a critical juncture with Russia’s declaration of war on Japan following the atomic bombing of Nagasaki. Launching a robust offensive with a substantial force of 1.5 million Soviet Russian troops and 5,500 T-34 tanks, Russia rapidly advanced through Manchuria, reaching Pyongyang by August 24th. This marked the inception of the division of Korea.
Japan projected its own fears and potential actions onto America, envisioning the erasure of their national identity, violation of their women, forced migration to an American colony, and widespread ravaging of their homeland. These apprehensions, however, were not realized. On July 26, 1945, a mere two weeks before the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the US announced the Potsdam Treaty. To Japan’s astonishment, the treaty allowed for the preservation of their national identity, a functioning government structure, and economic sovereignty. The primary objective of the Allies was to guide Japan away from militarism. In essence, why they didn’t surrender earlier or last minute is the same answer on why they attacked Pearl Harbor. Japanese megalomania.
In a broader context, Stalin’s inclination towards orchestrating covert operations through double-dealing extended beyond the Asian theater. Just as he did in Eastern Europe, he displayed a propensity for weaving intricate webs of betrayal and manipulation. This behavior became notably pronounced after the Allies had provided support to the USSR against the Nazis through lend-lease programs. Though never openly admitted, Khrushchev, Stalin’s successor, later revealed that Stalin had underscored the critical significance of lend-lease aid to the Soviet war effort. This acknowledgment tacitly conceded that without this assistance, the USSR might have faced defeat.
Trusting Stalin had far-reaching consequences. The reliance placed on him by FDR resulted in the eventual establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). My next article will delve further into the sophistication of Soviet espionage that played a pivotal role in triggering the Korean War, as well as its connection to the emergence of reactionary right-wing child soldiers.
References:
1. Tucker, R. (2012). Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928–1941. W. W. Norton & Company.
2. Chang, G. H. (2005). Mao: The Unknown Story. Knopf.
3. Westad, O. A. (2012). Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750. Basic Books.
4. Lend-Lease and Military Aid to the Allies in the Early Years of World War II. Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State.
