Free Trade vs. Protectionism: A Third Way for American Civilization
There are two reasons I believe Donald Trump enjoyed significant success in 2016: Firstly, our broken electoral system, which favors backwards, sparsely-populated states in the Midwest. Secondly, there is, in all honesty, some truth to the notion that globalization, as advocated for by the administrations of Reagan, Bush Sr., and Clinton for well over two decades, has played a role in America’s detrimental deindustrialization. The resurgence of protectionism in the American consciousness, beginning with Obama, has reignited the centuries-long debate between isolationists and proponents of globalization, often referred to as “globalists.” This debate can be traced back to the foundation of this country — born in a multiracial struggle against the British Empire — and was characterized by the contrasting views of liberal-minded Thomas Jefferson and the mercantile-focused Alexander Hamilton. While acknowledging that some of their grievances hold merit, I believe the Midwest’s dissatisfaction can be seen as subversive in some respects.
The primary issue with the “protectionism versus globalism” debate — or, more accurately, the conflict between those advocating for American isolation and proponents of the “Empire of Liberty” — is that neither embodies the diversity and complexity of American civilization as a whole. Before I proceed, I wish to clarify my stance as a nationalist — or perhaps a post-nationalist depending on one’s perspective, owing to my patriotism for America as a civilization state. Therefore, my foreign policy, as I will explain below, is, out of necessity, centered on maximizing power for myself and my in-group, which comprises the productive Americans who actively contribute to the progress of our civilization.
The Necessity of the American Empire
To argue for the necessity of empire, I will be drawing from Aleksandr Dugin’s magnum opus “Foundations of Geopolitics” and Richard Heathen’s article “Heartland Theory: The Duality of Landpower vs Seapower” [sic].
In the fourth chapter of his book, Dugin provides a summary of Alfred Mahan’s analysis of geopolitics. According to Mahan, the primary instruments of American geopolitics are trade and naval dominance. He attributes this to several factors: The geographical position of the United States; the cost-effectiveness of establishing ports and ships for commercial purposes; the country’s accessibility to both the Atlantic and Pacific; its large population size; a government committed to maintaining a strong military; and the populace’s inclination towards trade. Mahan then argues that America constitutes a “maritime power” (which I will herein call a “sea power”). What guarantees America’s dominance as a nation-state, according to Mahan, is its ability to exploit the human and natural resources of South America, Asia, and Europe. This is why he was not only a radical advocate of the Monroe Doctrine, but also suppressing Japanese hegemony in the Pacific, undermining Germany’s overseas foreign policy, aiding Europe in colonizing Asia, and bolstering America’s alliance with Great Britain (pages 51–55).
Complimenting Mahan’s writings is Peter Zeihan’s “The Accidental Superpower: The Next Generation of American Preeminence and the Coming Global Disorder” who argues that American geography favors both free trade and relative self-sufficiency. He highlights the significance of America’s internal waterways, particularly the Mississippi River and the Intercoastal system, which enhance national unity by facilitating trade among diverse ethnic groups within the United States. These waterways enable coast-to-coast trade, further facilitating dominance over the Atlantic and Pacific oceans through the unrestricted flow of goods. Additionally, they provide the capability to counteract any emerging hegemon in either ocean. Unlike Great Britain and other historical maritime powers, America possesses access to extensive stretches of land and natural resources, acquired through initiatives such as the Louisiana Purchase (pages 46–78).
While Mahan undoubtedly viewed this pursuit of global hegemony as the logical, spiritual culmination of Manifest Destiny, there exists a pragmatic or “realist” rationale for amassing as much geopolitical power as possible as a sea power: the existence of land-based rival civilizations (“land powers”) and Heartland Theory.
Heartland Theory originates from the writings of the British politician Halford J. Mackinder. Per Heathen:
According to Mackinder, the interconnected continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa, made up what he called the World-Island. In Mackinder’s view of geopolitics, central to control of the World-Island was control of what he called the Heartland, the vast section of Eurasia, particularly Russia, that was out of range of sea power. According to Mackinder, whichever power controls the World-Island was the predominant power of the entire globe…
Mackinder believed that if all Eurasian powers united as an empire or alliance, they would possess the resources and military capability to dominate the entire planet. These countries are not only diverse in terms of geography and intellect, but if they pooled their considerable power, they would naturally ascend to the top of the international system. Unlike sea powers like Great Britain (which Mackinder defended as an imperialist), a united Eurasia could be entirely autarkic and capable of projecting both hard and soft power, in equal measure, against other countries and continents. With the United States being apart of that “World-Island”, and having similar incentives to amass naval and commercial power, it becomes axiomatic why an American would also oppose a Eurasian hegemon.
Land powers like Russia, and to a lesser extent China, lack the geographic advantage to amass geopolitical power solely through naval and trade dominance. Their primary means of exerting influence is through sheer military strength and conquest (hard power). Unlike maritime powers, land powers have access to vast expanses of land and natural resources but are often confronted with threats from neighboring states. Consequently, they must continuously bolster their military capabilities to safeguard their nation’s security and interests. As Henry Kissinger observed, China has historically found itself surrounded by adversaries such as India, Pakistan, Vietnam, Russia, Japan, and other hostile nations. Chinese foreign policy not only acknowledges this reality, but adopts a pessimistic outlook, recognizing that resolving one foreign issue may lead to the emergence of new challenges, perpetuating a never-ending cycle of land-based competition.
This is why, as Dugin noted on pages 54–55 of his book, Mahan wanted to inhibit the rise of a Eurasian hegemony or alliance.
Independently of Mackinder, Mahan came to the same conclusions regarding the main danger to “maritime civili[z]ation”. This danger is the continental states of Eurasia, firstly Russia and China, and secondly Germany. Fighting Russia, that ’continuous continental mass of [the] Russian empire stretching from western Asia Minor to the Japanese meridian in the East’, was a major long-term strategic objective for the Maritime Force.
Confirming Mahan’s sober analysis is the anti-liberal traditionalist Karl Haushofer:
The day the Germans, Japanese and Russians unite will be the last day of Anglo-Saxon [and American] hegemony.
The existence of other civilizational rivals, particularly formidable land powers like Russia and China, necessitates the presence of the American Empire. The imperative of this empire, and the sometimes ruthless methods needed to sustain it, embodies a Machiavellian approach at its core. This is why President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was not only entirely justified in “warmongering” against Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, but America was also justified in every action it took during the Cold War to undermine the Soviet Union (and, for a brief period, China). Yes, I would even include the Vietnam War in that. From the resource-rich Myanmar (which I humorously refer to as the “Greenland of Asia”) to the rich farmlands of China, to the oil-based powerhouse that is Russia — if a Eurasian empire were to emerge, it would spell the demise of American civilization forever. America must therefore accrue as much geopolitical power as possible — with the goal of world governance — even if it means compromising its soul in the long run. (A Faustian gamble, indeed.)
As Mahan correctly observed, aside from maintaining a robust military prepared to exert force when necessary, the optimal strategy for the American Empire to flourish involves not only upholding the balance of power in Eurasia but also adopting a mercantilist approach to trade. This translates to advocating for “free trade” with weaker nations, albeit with acknowledgment of the evident power dynamics between impoverished and affluent nations leading to “dubious consent.” However, what of the arguments both for and against free trade?
I will focus on two arguments that I believe encapsulate the essence of the free trade debate — presenting one in favor and one against — as I consider them to be the most compelling.
The Best Argument Against Free Trade
Perhaps the best argument against free trade is that America’s long-term dependency on other nations for certain commodities is a national security risk. Often this is accompanied by arguments for autarky. As Peter Zeihan himself believes, once globalization collapses, America will come out on top because of the unique geography discussed earlier (pages 348–350). Oil markets collapse? We have enough oil of our own to process! There is currently a prevailing sense of paranoia regarding China potentially invading Taiwan, which is fuelled by our reliance on the latter for computer chips. Why be dependent on foreign nations when it minimizes our sovereignty and we can produce much of that ourselves?
There are a few problems with this:
- A Eurasian empire or alliance would still pose a serious threat to American sovereignty, even if the United States pursued a policy of autarky, just due to mathematics alone. This relates to the balance of power. If Russia successfully conquered or achieved hegemony over all of Eurasia, from Spain to Indonesia, it would have enough resources to economically pressure America to do its bidding.
- Pursuing entirely autarkic measures makes little geopolitical, let alone economic, sense. Consider oil, for instance. As Dean Foreman noted in 2018, if Americans attempted to achieve total autarky in oil by decreasing both imports and exports, oil would become exorbitantly pricey, leading to a significant economic downturn and diminishing America’s geopolitical position. This confirms that maximizing America’s access to the global oil supply is a legitimate national security objective.
- As evidenced by Nazi Germany — in which they resorted to invading other countries due to their reactionary fetish for petit-bourgeois agrarianism — a policy of autarky would likely result in a foreign policy resembling my own, if not more aggressive. Autarkic policies inevitably lead to a decreased standard of living that is not only politically unfeasible to sustain, even in a dictatorship, but also requires the direct annexation of additional territory to maintain public support for the government.
While it is indeed true that we can strive for greater self-sufficiency, particularly in critical sectors of the economy vital from a national security standpoint (e.g., computer chips and military weaponry), the notion of total autarky is unrealistic. Pursuing such a goal would only weaken America’s security and prosperity in the long-term. I believe that there is a third way between autarky and absolute free trade, as I will advocate for later.
The Worst Argument Against Free Trade
A critique of free trade I often come across is that, by facilitating access to inexpensive labor worldwide, exploited countries may enhance their own productive capacities, leading to the gradual elimination of cheap labor. Consequently, trading with these nations could become prohibitively expensive. I call this the “Cheap Labor Paradox’’ or CLP. Ian Fletcher, in his book “Free Trade Doesn’t Work: What Should Replace It and Why”, echoes the CLP. Specifically, he highlights how Italian dress shoes, after World War II, were remarkably cheap in the 1950s due to the war-torn country’s reliance on low-wage labor. But as Italy progressively integrated into the European trade system and witnessed a gradual improvement in living standards, the cost of producing those shoes surged dramatically. What were once affordable commodities even the poorest of the poor could purchase with pennies have now become luxuries for most Americans today (page 115).
In pages 146–147 of his book, he quotes ambassador Kenichi Otabe:
If the theory of international trade were pursued to its ultimate conclusion, the United States would specialize in the production of automobiles and Japan in the production of tuna… Such a division of labor does not take place…because [sic] each government encourages and protects those industries which it believes are important for reasons of national policy.
Mr. Fletcher further contends that Japanese industrial policy is the primary factor preventing Japan consisting entirely of fisheries, which would be a natural outcome of countries exploiting their comparative advantage in this sector. By subsidizing vital industries and imposing tariffs on commodities deemed strategically significant, Japan attained a level of autonomy comparable only to contemporary China. If Japan had adhered strictly to its comparative advantage, dictated by geography vis a vis David Ricardo, it would have found itself in a neo-colonial predicament, with the world’s dominant nations ruthlessly exploiting it for low-priced fish.
Ironically, Mr. Fletcher inadvertently undermines the CLP. On page 158, he seeks to discredit the notion that free trade results in third-world nations achieving a higher standard of living — a viewpoint, in fairness, commonly advocated for by neoliberals (though easily debunked).
Senegal experienced large job losses following [trade] liberalization in the late 1980s; by the early 1990s, employment cuts had eliminated one-third of all manufacturing jobs. The chemical, textile, shoe, and automobile assembly industries were abruptly lowered by 40 percent in 1986. Similar problems have plagued [trade] liberalization in Nigeria. In Sierra Leone, Zambia, Zaire, Uganda, Tanzania, and the Sudan, [trade] liberalization in the 1980s [under Reagan and Thatcher] brought a tremendous surge in consumer imports and sharp cutbacks in foreign exchange available for purchases of intermediate inputs and capital goods, with devastating effects on industrial output and employment. [Emphasis added.] In Ghana, [trade] liberalization caused industrial sector employment to plunge from 78,700 in 1987 to 28,000 in 1993.
Mr. Fletcher refers to this phenomenon as the Vanek-Reinert effect, wherein free trade agreements, instead of fostering prosperity in third-world nations, condemns them to enduring poverty. Lacking a protectionist or industrial policy, they become import-dependent economies from the outset, thereby unable to attain meaningful sovereignty. This is the basis of his argument for why Japan managed to evade becoming a neo-colonial entity: Their industrial policies played a crucial role in securing their long-term independence. (A common Hamiltonian argument I might add.) How does this undermine his argument?
As long as America continues to actively sabotage the economic development of foreign nations, it will always maintain the ability, fueled by its Will to Power, to ensure compliance from the local populace to the demands of the American people. If it had the determination to perpetuate Italy’s chronic state of instability (e.g., initiating the Years of Lead sooner), Italian dress shoes would undoubtedly be cheap today. Unless nations like Uganda, Zaire, and Ghana can break free from dependency on us and develop their own productive capacities in a manner that secures their sovereignty, they will never reach the level of autonomy achieved by Japan.
Even if it were the case that these nations became import-based like western nations overtime — which could potentially signify progress — I fail to see the harm. For as long as they lack the industrial prerequisites necessary for full autonomy, they will remain compelled to supply their specialized goods at affordable prices dictated by natural factors. Labor rights in these countries, therefore, will be naturally suppressed.
America’s Ideal Trade Policy
In my opinion, a trade policy which serves America’s civilizational interests is an export-oriented economy. This entails avoiding tariffs on one hand while also fostering relative self-sufficiency in key industries on the other. Achieving this requires meticulous economic planning: Encompassing contracts, mandates, and tax incentives. This approach allows for reaping the benefits of free trade, such as leveraging surplus value in other countries for the mutual benefit of domestic workers and businesses, while simultaneously ensuring the ability to safeguard its own interests in times of crisis (as exemplified by the Covid-19 pandemic).
Therefore, I advocate for the promotion of free trade agreements coupled with an industrial policy, while also adopting various successful strategies from China’s implementation of central planning. This should align with strengthening America’s alliance with Europe, even if concessions must be occasionally made, to counteract Russia’s influence in the region. America must also treat China as an existential threat to be destroyed by any means necessary. To enhance our trade advantage against China, which aims to access the resource-rich Myanmar, America should consider annexing Greenland and eventually merging with Canada, peacefully or otherwise.
Moving towards an export-oriented economy while undermining at every turn Russia and China will have three positive consequences:
- First, it will secure American hegemony, especially over South America, Africa, and, to a lesser extent, Southeast Asia.
- Second, it will generate millions of high-paying, unionized jobs — including in the deindustrialized Midwest — fostering increased urbanization and raising living standards.
- Last but not least, it will help keep prices for essentials, particularly food and clothing, affordable, thereby mitigating inflationary pressures.
Certainly, such a policy regime poses significant challenges. While President Biden’s industrial policy undoubtedly represents a positive step forward, America’s descent into isolationist decadence continues. Moreover, the challenges posed by liberal democracy, characterized by humanitarian universalism and a tendency towards cowardly pacifism, will complicate the task of sustaining the American Empire. (I attribute this, at least in part, to our failures in Vietnam and Afghanistan; and I intend to explore those two justified conflicts in the near future.) This also tragically implies that certain actions America must undertake to uphold the aforementioned dominance over weaker nations — such as deploying troops to quell a rebellion seeking to overthrow a puppet state in a foreign land, contrary to the approach taken by the weakling President Carter with Iran — will be a challenge to justify politically, even if wholly righteous.
To preserve the American Empire and rekindle the prosperity reminiscent of the 1980s and 90s — characterized by unipolarity — the American people must demonstrate a patriotic, progressive Will to Power: A sentiment not witnessed since World War II or perhaps the aftermath of 9/11. Only time will tell if this happens. But while the American Empire — once it rightfully reigns supreme atop the international system for centuries — will inevitably face decline vis a vis Oswald Spengler, it remains imperative to safeguard the American people in the short-to-medium term.
