The World After Sputnik and China’s Celestial Empire
A Brief History of Space Politics, Part II
This is the fourth installment of a series publishing a final year 1st Class dissertation finished in 2015 after some people expressed interest. The following is the second section looking at multiple ways in which outer space has been used for political means throughout its relatively short history.
Blue Streak, Britain, France and Europe
In Europe the reaction was not one of a “sputnik shock”, but as Krige (2002, p. 292) writes, one of “euphoria”. British scientists previously “sceptical about earth satellites ever appearing” (Krige, 2002, p. 293) were stunned. The European public did not have the same fear of Soviet victory as in the U.S — For the French public, Le Monde said of Le Spoutnik that it “can be seen as purely scientific” (Krige, 2002, p. 291). For the British, as Krige writes the complaints about the second Soviet satellite were directed primarily to the Royal Society for the Protection of Cruelty to Animals. Militarily, Sputnik reminded the U.S it was not indomitable “Breathing new life into the faltering Anglo-American “Special relationship”” (Krige, 2002, p. 292).
For the British, “at the end of the 1950’s space was not a domain of military importance” (Krige, 2002, p. 293). British rocketry had largely been limited to sounding rockets. The Blue Streak IRBM had the potential to be fitted with U.S warheads, however it is significant in British efforts in space not for its military application, but for the value which the British government placed on the effort as a matter of prestige. As Krige writes, there was a sense among many such as Jodrell Bank director Bernard Lovell, that the lack of a space program would leave Britain “classed as an underdeveloped country” (Krige, 2002, p. 294). Rocket Scientist Harrie Massey noted the importance of creating a “thoroughgoing British enterprise” (Krige, 2002, p. 297). Massey’s planned adaption of the Blue Streak and Black Knight missiles into a satellite launch capable vehicle — while failing — was done not for military aspirations, but so Britain “would confirm, to herself and to others, that she was still a major power to be reckoned with” (Krige, 2002, p. 299).
As British plans faltered, Europe became, as French president De Gaulle admitted in 1961, an attractive candidate for “the third space power” (Krige, 2002, p. 304). Bloomfield noted in 1965 that Western Europe “resumes its place on the world scene” (1965, p. 604) with the formation of the European Launcher Development Organisation (ELDO) and the European Space Research Organisation (ESRO). McDougall (1985b, p. 426) notes the creation of the lobby of aerospace industrialists EUROSPACE as an active force in pushing the development of European space technology. The earliest European steps in space, like that of the U.S and the Soviet Union were fostered in the pursuit of prestige and security. It was not only the case for the French, as McDougall writes, but the multitude of European states that cooperated that space was a means to restore “greatness through technology, not empire” (1985a, p. 179). Despite this, the commercial and intergovernmental nature of these European projects — and the political significance which those in government placed on them characterise a distinctly European approach to space — as one British official’s suggestion that membership of ESRO and ELDO “must be read in the context of our negotiations with the EEC” shows (Godwin, 2007, p. 75).
Sino-Soviet Space Co-operation and the Celestial Empire
The Chinese, as some have highlighted, have “a longer tradition in rocketry than any other nation” -stemming back over a thousand years (Kingwell, 1994, p. 188). The space programs of the People’s Republic of China are, typically, rooted in the military application of missiles. Before the Chinese Communist Party came to power in 1949, the extent to which China could have developed any kind of rocket program was limited by the lack of industrialisation and occupation by the Empire of Japan (Moltz, 2011a, p. 74). Even at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, founded in 1949, access to “resources remained minimal” (Moltz, 2011a, p. 74). However, during the 50’s Chinese scientists such as Dr. Qian Xuesen (Moltz, 2011a, p. 74), Chien Wei-Chang and Chien Hsue-Shen returned to Communist China, China saw significant cooperation with the Soviet government and the launch of Sputnik further motivated the development of a Chinese satellite (Sheehan M. , The International Politics of Space, 2007, p. 160).
The nature of the Chinese space program has to a large extent been an exercise in propaganda and national pride in the face of European and Japanese colonial humiliation — the rebuilding of the prestige of the ancient Chinese “Celestial Empire”. The Chinese space program weathered the difficult relationship between China and the Soviet Union in the 60’s by turning to reverse engineering V-2’s and it survived the political upheavals of the Cultural Revolution by virtue of the political and military value of rocket technology. As Sheehan writes, for China, threatened by nuclear strikes against Japan and interventions in Korea and the Taiwan Straits, as well as the now hostile Soviet Union, rocket technology would be a valuable military asset — and was considered a valuable sign of prestige by those such as Mao Zedong or Zhou Enlai (Sheehan M. , The International Politics of Space, 2007, p. 160). The first Chinese satellite launch in 1970 was an attempt to realise the Chinese dream of national pride and success. Couched in Chinese nationalisms, the Dong Fang Hong-1 launched on a Long March 1 rocket and beeped the tune of “The East is Red” for twenty-eight days. (Moltz, 2011a, p. 74)
After Sputnik: Propaganda and Politics
In October 1959 Luna 3 — launched on the anniversary of Sputnik I — produced images from the far side of the moon. In August 1959 Sputnik 5 launched and safely returned yet more dogs from orbit. The first manned space mission on April 12th in 1961 by Soviet Cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin was again a blow to U.S ambition. Continuing “the triumph of the command economy” (McDougall, p. 248, 1985) and the “Soviet claim to scientific leadership” (McDougall, p. 246, 1985), spaceflight created the vision of an “official but publicly embraced cult of science which viewed technology as the solution to all social and economic problems” (Kohonen, 2009, p. 119). The varied nature of the Soviet space missions reflected a desire by propagandists to create a sense of progress. Aimed at Western Europe as well as the Soviet population, the “press agents dream come true” (McDougall, 1985, p. 237) had by 1960 convinced 59% to 15% of British people that “The soviets were judged superior in military strength to the United States” (McDougall, 1985, p. 240). Soviet missions benefited from secrecy and exaggeration — to the disadvantage of the U.S competition.
With Eisenhower’s seemingly faltering direction of NASA, “Talk of space gaps soon complemented Kennedy’s campaign themes regarding economic growth, education, social welfare, and military missile gaps” (McQuaid, 2007, p. 387). As Van Dyke writes, the “missile gap was the issue of the hour” in the early 1960’s — something which Kennedy successfully exploited as the cause of “of eight years of Republican failures” (Dyke, 2002, p. 388). In 1961 Kennedy announced in his inaugural address: “Let both sides seek to invoke the wonders of science instead of its terrors. Together let us explore the stars” (Kennedy, 1961). Whether the U.S offer of cooperation was yet another propaganda ploy, or a genuine offer is debateable — McDougall claims “Most NASA officials, not to mention the Pentagon, probably sighed at relief” (p. 351, 1985) when the Soviets refused. Four months later Kennedy announced a manned lunar mission within the 1960’s. Both the U.S and the USSR were keen that it be their allies that followed in the wake of the still accelerating space race — and at times work together to construct signs of a budding relationship. 1969 saw the U.S land on the moon — effectively ending the space race. The USSR undertook several missions launching communist allies or other states in diplomatic attempts at space prestige. As well as launching cosmonauts from constituent countries such as Ukraine, what was then Czechoslovakia and Vietnam, the USSR made deliberate attempts to highlight cultural imperialism in the U.S space programs. The launching of the first woman in space and the first black man into space — Cuban Arnaldo Tamayo Mendez — were significant, given the huge populations unrepresented in the U.S space program. Missions much as the “Apollo-Soyuz Test Project” or “handshake in space” (Battaglia, 2012), and Shuttle/Mir program (Oberg, 1998) characterised growing cooperative détente between the two powers. As one reporter wrote of the launch of the Columbia shuttle, “The second space age is about to begin.” (Gore, 1981)
