The underlying models here are great but we’re missing clarity on where it goes from here and have some major stumbling blocks. A couple of the most difficult issues for scaling commons governance are:

1. Iteration speed: In markets where speed of iteration matters more than quality of consensus (especially in these frothy early stages), governance structures that rely on too much consensus can be perilously slow-moving, opening their ecosystems to disruption by new entrants, eg. BTC >> ETH >> EOS (or whatever example you’d choose).

2. Enforcement mechanisms: Elinor’s 5th and 6th principle for commons design are the ability to sanction member sufficiently to disincentivize poor behavior and also cheap and easy means for individuals to seek redress. Both of these are problematic in token systems which have too much anonymity (low sanction threat to an individual) or only incentivize the community to react to large-scale problems (eg major heists requiring rewriting history), allowing a large surface of small problems to fall through the cracks and breaking trust in the platform.

Some tokens do this differently, but as an ecosystem there’s still a lot of ground to cover before we’re fully “Elinor Compliant”.