INTRODUCTION
The specter of insurgency has been prevalent in India’s Northeast Region. From Arunachal to Tripura, the entire region (except for Sikkim) has witnessed insurgency in varied intensity over the past seven decades and since 1992 more than 21,000 people have been reportedly killed. Precedent suggests that a plethora of insurgent movements have been capitalizing on the perceived sense of marginalization and neglect experienced by locals of this culturally diverse region. Meghalaya has faced insurgency since 1992 and has resulted in deaths of more than 700 people, of which about 245 people were killed between 2011–15 alone. In this regard, the latest killing of Garo National Liberation Army’s (GNLA) ‘commander in chief’ Sohan D Shira on February 24 in East Garo Hills marked a significant milestone in the state’s history of countering separatist movement and is expected to significantly minimize insurgent violence in the region.
THE ISSUE
GNLA, a separatist militant group which has been demanding a separate ‘Garo land’ in western Meghalaya, comprising the Garo Hills region (East, West, South, South West and West Garo Hills Districts) has been the most violent in the state. The group was formed in November 2009 by a former Deputy Superintendent of Police Pakchara R. Sangma alias Champion and Sohan D Shira who was formerly part of now disbanded Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC). GNLA also is known to have extensive linkages with Independent faction of United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA-I).
OPERATIONAL HISTORY
In the latest incident of violence attributed to GNLA, four people including a candidate contesting for the State Assembly elections (which was held on November 27), three civilians and unspecified number of security personnel were killed in an IED attack. Since it became operational in November 2009, the group has been responsible for 190 fatalities (77 civilians, 30 SF personnel, and 83 militants) in Meghalaya out of total of 334 insurgency related fatalities (126 civilians, 36 SFs and 172 militants). GNLA has been operational in the Garo Hills Region which comprise of 8,000 square kilometres. Garo Hills has also been the hot bed of operations for 11 militant organizations based in the state. Moreover, according to an annual report of Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), command structures of Isaak-Muivah faction of National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM), ULFA-I also existed in the region. GNLA’s operational capability saw a steady rise from 2010–12 resulting in a steady increase in civilian, militant and security forces casualties.
OPERATION HILL STORM
As the militancy related fatalities peaked in 2014, the Meghalaya Police Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams along with Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA) commandos of Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) launched Operation Hill Storm from July 2014 in four phases. The primary aim of the operation was to deny militants safe haven and at the same time establish a permanent Police presence in the affected regions.
The first phase continued from July 11 to December 31, 2014 in which 16 militants were killed and at least 24 were wounded. Of the 16 militants killed at least seven were confirmed to be GNLA militants. The second phase of the operation continued from April 2015 to June 2015 during which at least 17 militants (including seven GNLA militants) were killed. The third phase or (OHS-3) was launched for about six months in February 2016 and the fourth phase was launched in September 22, 2016. The sustained operation (in 2015 alone there were 301 counterinsurgency (COIN) operations) spearheaded by the Police forces resulted in significantly hampering the capabilities as well as the support infrastructure of the GNLA militants in the Garo Hills region. This view is further bolstered by the systematic rise in number of surrendered militants between 2014–16.
*In 2014, about 748 militants of Achik National Volunteer Council and Breakaway faction of ANVC (ANVC-B disbanded on December 2014.
* *2018 data till March 4, 2018
Additionally, according to a GNLA militant who surrendered on February 16, the militant group was operating in two separate groups under ‘commander in chief’ Sohan D Shira in South Garo Hills District and under Drishti Rajkhowa , the ‘second in command’ of ULFA-I. Thus the cadre strength of GNLA which numbered at about 300 in 2012 is currently estimated to be below 20. Finally, according to unconfirmed reports, after the death of GNLA chief Sohan D Shira, Drishti Rajhkowa of ULFA-I was reportedly attempting to revive the militant outfit by adding ULFA-I cadres from Bangladesh and Assam. However, although there were reports indicating of Drishti being the likely leader of GNLA, the issue continues to be unconfirmed.
CONCLUSION
Meghalaya is on the cusp of becoming a success story of Indian Counterinsurgency (COIN) involving Police, the indigenous force of the state. The two state in Northeastern India which have managed to rusticate themselves out of the insurgent vortex are Tripura and Mizoram. This can primarily be attributed to the fact that the indigenous force (in this case the Police) spearheaded the campaign instead of an outside entity (like the Army which is not indigenous to the state or region). Despite the difficult terrain and other operational challenges that are typically witnessed in such locations, Police were able to generate tactically actionable intelligence based on which they could mount targeted intelligence based operations instead of CASO (cordon and search operations) which is more likely to alienate local population and are thus highly unpopular. Moreover, Police force are relatively better poised to generate Human Intelligence (HUMINT), especially in areas within the insurgents strongholds.
Additionally the situation presents itself as an interesting case study on relevance of forming a dedicated force (in this case formation of SF-10 the Commando force of the Police) for anti-militancy operation can deliver result in a rather short span of time.
That being said, while the aforementioned successes can at best be classified as tactical operational gains, the need to execute efficient governance aimed at alleviating the grievance of local population continues to be an essential element of the larger strategy for the regional security.
Contributor: M.A. Athul is a Research Assistant with New Delhi based think tank South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP)
