Was the Falklands Conflict of 1982 Caused by Political Miscalculation?

We were defending our honour as a nation, and principles of fundamental importance to the whole world — above all, that aggressors should never succeed and that international law should prevail over the use of force. The war was very sudden. No one predicted the Argentine invasion more than a few hours in advance, though many predicted it in retrospect. When I became Prime Minister I never thought that I would have to order British troops into combat and I do not think I have ever lived so tensely or intensely as during the whole of that time.
The significance of the Falklands War was enormous, both for Britain’s self-confidence and for our standing in the world.( Margaret Thatcher)
Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm Sea Harrier FRS1 (Wikipedia)

Argentine during the 70th decades was consecutively controlled by the military junta administration obtained by the military coup de’tat. The transfer of power from General Jorge Videla to General Roberto Viola, and then taken over by General Leopoldo Galtieri in December 1981, provides not so good image either internationally or domestically in Argentine itself.

It can be stated that commencing from 1976, the popularity of the Argentinean military authoritative government administration has drastically dropped. It is worsened by the decreasing economic condition. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell by 5%, and business investment by 20% over the weakened levels of 1981, and a great number of unemployment accumulates. Such condition is really worrying for a developing country.

The domestic condition of Argentine under the military junta was not free from a resistance. Opposition was conducted by labor groups, united their power under a labor organization “Las Madres de Mayo”, and indicating its closeness to the other opposition leaders and to the group of suppressed people. For them, the government administration of the military junta did not provide a hope to meet the people’s demand for “exploitation abolition” in Falkland Islands and South Georgia from British. For the whole Argentinean people, the Falkland Islands or “Islas Malvinas” always becomes the focus their not yet settled national unity.

The hand-over of sovereignty of Islas Malvinas from British to Argentine becomes one of their national goals. The Government administration of military junta saw the Falklands affair could be used to increase its popularity.

What Galtieri needed was something that would unite the country behind him, take the sting out of the calls for reform and play on the traditional patriotism of the Argentinean people. The ownership of the Falkland Islands had always been an issue in Argentina — a successful taking of the islands would, so Galtieri gambled, unite and rally everyone behind him. So it proved to be.

However, because it was carried out in improper time and unsuitable situation, politically the Argentinean military junta government administration as if were opening a nightmare.

The facts indicated that the Falklands conflict occurred due to the consecutive political miscalculations.The first miscalculation was made by the British Authority in Falklands.The problem was actually fairly simple.

In September 1979, an Argentinean businessman named Constantio Davidoff bought an abattoir for whales in South Georgia from Christian Salvensen, an English businessman from Edinburgh. Davidoff planned to dismantle this abattoir building and sell it in Argentine as scrapped irons. For this purpose, Davidoff conveyed a request to Falkland Governor to obtain the dismantling permit and assistance to use the British ship, HMS Endurance, in order to transport these scrapped irons to Argentine. The request to use the HMS Endurance for such transportation was rejected.

Two years afterwards, Davidoff informed the British officer that he would dismantle and lift the scrapped iron from South Georgia to Argentine by using the Argentinean Naval Ship which was willing to assist him. Davidoff took along with him 41 Argentinean workers and arrived in South Georgia in March 1982, by using the “Bahia Nuen Suceso” belonging to the Argentinean Navy.

Not long after the Argentinean workers arrived in South Georgia, the residents of South Georgia made a protest to the Falkland Governor, because nearby the job site an Argentinean flag was raised. The Falklands Governor sent HMS Endurance to give a warning and to drive out the Argentinean Naval Ship from the said island.

Map outlining the British recapture of the islands(Wikipedia)

The government administration of the Argentinean military junta reacted by sending the Naval transport ship “Bahia Paraiso” to South Georgia to settle the problem peacefully. Temporarily, the dispute related to the Davidoff’s business activities was deemed settled by British. But not for the Argentine, it was treated on the contrary. The case of Davidoff was used as an excuse to accelerate the Argentine’s plan related to Falklands.

It should be noted that commencing from the moment when holding the leadership of the military junta government administration in December 1981, General Leopoldo Galtieri together with the command holders of Argentinean military had already planned the possibility to carry out the military invasion into the Falklands. Galtieri thought that military power was the only way to accelerate the negotiation process with the British.

ARA General Belgrano underway (Wikipedia)
The sinking of the Belgrano became a cause célèbre for anti-war campaigners in Britain. This was for a variety of reasons, including the ship being well outside the 200 mile (320 kilometre) Total Exclusion Zone that the British had declared around the Falklands, because the ship was on a westerly heading at the time it was attacked, and because a Peruvian peace proposal was still on the table at the time of the attack.(The sinking of the Belgrano )

The invasion plan to enter the Falklands had been orderly organized, however it was not accomplished properly. The chaos due to the domestic political situation forced the military junta to accelerate its invasion plan, four months earlier than the original schedule. In March 1982, demonstration and protests against the government became bigger and bigger.

This was a warning for the military junta upon its legitimacy in the eyes of the Argentinean people. The case of Davidoff’s dispute with HMS and endurance in South Georgia made the situation hotter. The Argentinean military junta did not see any other alternative; and it even considered the Davidoff’s dispute as a strong excuse for the plan that had already been prepared before.

This subject was proven by a document of conversation recorded between General Galtieri and President Ronald Reagan one afternoon before the Argentinean military invasion into the Falklands.

“Mr. Reagan, the official said, was appealing to General Galtieri not to invade the islands and to avoid a conflict. Without explicitly offering to mediate, Mr. Reagan said he was ready to act to promote Argentine-British negotiations to demonstrate his friendship with both countries.

The American official said General Galtieri replied that he appreciated Mr. Reagan’s concern but that for 149 years the British had not relinquished sovereignty over the islands, and that ‘time has run out.’ He said the United States appeal was overtaken by events. “

Galtieri said, “Great Britain has threatened Argentine citizens that were legally working in the South Georgias and my government’s duty is to protect them.” But by the time Reagan spoke to Galtieri, Argentine ships were already on their way to the Falklands and the invasion began on April 2, 1982.

In the two months of fighting that followed, 255 British and about 650 Argentine servicemen were killed, along with three Falklands civilians, before Argentine forces surrendered. Argentina still claims sovereignty over the islands, which it calls Las Malvinas.

The Greatest British Maritime Campaign Independently in History.

Although in the end the Argentinean fighter planes caused a great deal of victims and big loss to British, tens of them also became victims. Obviously, on paper, the Argentinean fighter planes were more superior that those possessed by British, however Argentine got no opportunity to demonstrate their superiority due to the factor of the abrupt changes in strategy and tactics. In another word, Argentine was not capable in utilizing the opportunity of its geographical advantageous factor.

A single Argentine Exocet missile was enough to wreck the Atlantic Conveyor

1982: Dozens killed as Argentines hit British ships
Dozens of men are feared dead in the seas around the Falkland Islands after the container ship Atlantic Conveyor and the destroyer HMS Coventry were hit by Argentine missiles.
HMS Coventry managed to destroy two Argentine Skyhawk planes with Sea Dart missiles. Another wave of Skyhawks hit her four times with 1,000 bombs. She capsized, losing 21 of her crew.(Atlantic Conveyor)

In addition, the moral advantageous factor was not materialized either as expected. It was true that the effort to seize back the Falklands for the Argentinean people became one of the national goals and died in “Islas Malvinas” was a heroic action. However, the public opinion upon the government administration of the Argentinean military junta was so bad in such a way, that from the moral point of view the Argentinean people gave less support.

On the contrary for British, the moral factor was even built up and materialized and became a very determining power. The mobilization of British military power to Falklands at a distance of approximately 8000 miles from their homeland, including the execution of direct air raid “Black Buck Operation” classified as being too determined, was a very brave decision in a critical condition.
 
This is in line with the Sub Tzu’s teaching, “In critical time, a troop leader shall act just like a man climbing a certain peak by using a ladder, and then kicking his ladder backward down”. This was the thing that motivated the British combating spirit in Falklands, and brought them into a victory after a 74-day battle.

Source:

The book ‘Lessons of the Falklands War’, by Gatot Soedarto, CreateSpace, 2013.