THE ENIGMA OF AUTOCRACY:
A BRIEF LOOK AT RUSSIAN POLITICAL CULTURE
It was said of Russia by Winston Churchill, “It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” I am not inclined to disagree. Research has aided in uncovering, and at least partially solving, the riddle and mystery that is Russia, however, its enigmatic character persists. The idea of Russia as an enigma speaks volumes of its political culture, especially from the eyes of a “westerner.” Being born and raised in the United States is a significant hindrance to explaining the political culture of Russia, as Russia is one of those few places where you just could not possibly understand unless you were in fact, Russian. To augment this inherent ignorance, political socialization in the United States has done a great deal in coloring Russia as this otherworldly place that we as Americans by all means should avoid emulating in any way. These inherent biases notwithstanding, there are a handful of institutions and regimes that can help explain the developments and character of post-Soviet Russia, or the Russian Federation. Specifically, why it is we see a largely western style regime with a near autocrat leading it, and negligible resistance against him.
Stephen Orvis and Carol Ann Drogus (2015) describe fascism as an ideology that perceives “society being akin to a living organism rather than a set of disparate groups and individuals (p. 119).” Ironically, this is an incredibly apt description of Russian political culture. Russian nationalist identity is thoroughly entrenched and highly tenacious. What is best for the Russian nation is best for Russians. However, unlike fascism — whose most critical unit is the state — it is the Russian nation that takes precedence. This point is illustrated by the religious restrictions of the Muscovite and Imperial eras of Russia. During this time, Russian nationals were by decree made to adopt Orthodoxy as their religion, while foreigners were granted religious freedom (Caridi, 2007). The elites of Russian past were not concerned about how inferior non-nationals chose to be, as long as they paid taxes. But if you were a Russian national, you were not granted this luxury because to be Russian is to be Orthodox, and one’s status as a Russian informed their entire existence.
The Third Rome
This ostensible deference to authority has been a running theme throughout Russian history. Even today, while Russia has instituted separations of power, Vladimir Putin wields tremendous power and influence, and has held onto incredibly high approval ratings since his ascension to the presidency (“Vladimir Putin’s Unshakable Popularity,” 2016). Even Joseph Stalin is seen in a more or less positive light in Russia (Gugushvili & Kabachnik, 2015). This almost inherent appeal to authority can surely be explained in countless ways, but one of the most critical factors for this appeal is the Russian nation’s adoption of Orthodoxy. A little over a millennium ago, Vladimir the Great adopted Orthodoxy for his Kievan Rus empire after hearing the accounts of his envoys once they returned from Constantinople. Since then, Orthodoxy has become inextricably linked with Russia and has thoroughly informed its subjects in all facets of life. With the adoption of Orthodoxy came an alternative form of autocracy in the way of the patriarch. Thus, the Rus adhered to autocratic rule not only in their political and civic lives under the Tsar, but also in their spiritual lives by the Patriarch of Constantinople and later of Moscow. This point is augmented by Ivan the Terrible, whom in effect said a state system where the rulers do not rule can only exist where the people are godless (Filatov & Vorontsova, 1999). So in the eyes of Ivan the Terrible, it is precisely due to the Russians’ piousness that they are able to be ruled over by the Tsar.
Moreover, Orthodoxy took on a more extraordinary role, both in the spiritual and political nature of Russia, in 1453 when Constantinople finally fell to the Ottomans. With the fall of the Byzantine Empire, the Grand Prince of Moscow, Ivan III, took it upon himself to carry the torch of Christendom and the title of autocrator: the Third Rome was born (Laats, 2009). Thus, this deference to authority should not be seen as an act of submission on the part of Russian nationals. The newly consolidated lands of the Rus by Ivan III were carrying on the remarkable legacy of Rome, and the Tsar (Caesar) was the grand defender of this tradition. So no, it was not submission. Autocracy was a mark of pride. Russian nationals were the living and breathing continuity of the greatest civilization the Western World has ever known.
The Cult of Stalin
The idea of a grand defender took a stark turn after 1917 and the rise of the Bolsheviks. No longer was the Tsar the defender of Christianity, and in turn Russians. Now it was the Communist Party that was the defender of the Russian nation. While Lenin is indispensable when talking about modern Russian history, it is the cult of Stalin that best explains Russia’s modern view of autocracy. With the advantage of hindsight, it is clear that Stalin was nothing less than a tyrant. However, during his reign, Stalin made masterful work of the Soviet Union’s propaganda machine to cultivate an image of a caring but strong father to the Russian people.
The Communist Party outlawed religion in the country, and for all intents and purposes, transferred those traditional religious symbols and language to its leaders, namely Joseph Stalin (Bonnell, 1999). Starting in the mid-1930’s, the phrase, “Thank you, Comrade Stalin, for a Happy Childhood” was popularized throughout Soviet society, “emblazoned over the doorways of nurseries, orphanages, and schools, pinned up on walls, printed on book and magazine covers, and chanted by children at festivals (Kelly, 2005, p. 207–08).” Stalin further integrated this idea of “father to his constituents” in the command economy that defined Soviet rule. Jeffrey Brooks (2003) framed this integration poignantly by stating the Stalin government attempted to “legitimate themselves and motivate workers by turning economic relationships into moral relationships. Treating goods and services as benefits dispensed from above rather than as normal objects of economic transactions served to obligate the population, since all gift-giving implies reciprocity (p. 49)…” Once again, we see a balancing act between submission to the autocrat and a legitimate desire to perform for the nation in general, and the autocrat in particular.
For the better part of the 20th century, it was Stalin’s sweeping education reforms that buttressed the Soviet ideology. Indeed, one of the few policy positions Stalin could be praised for was his incredible emphasis on literacy and education. To be sure, this emphasis was part of the long term plan of consolidating and sustaining power for the Communist Party, but there’s something to be said about the cultivation of a fully literate population being a primary goal of a dictator. Stalin centralized every aspect of education in the Soviet Union, making every school in every province uniform down to the “timetable of every grade” (Cox, 2011, p.35–36). This ultra uniform and politicized school system persisted all the way until the fall of the Soviet Union, despite efforts at reform in the mid-eighties. As a result, there is only one generation of Russians who are divorced from the Soviet education system. However, the removal of Soviet policies in education have left a vacuum in the educational system that has proved troublesome for Russia ever since (Cox, 2011).
Post-Soviet Confusion
The following, while slightly anecdotal, is a perfect illustration of the residual effect of Soviet era ideologies and education on the citizens of the Russian Federation today:
Ideally, parties would advocate the interests of one segment of society. If a party works with pensioners, for example, let it focus on pensioners and not divert its attention to anything else — whether anglers or space travelers. Leave anglers to the angler’s party and children to the children’s party. In general, if we had a multiparty system in which parties worked honestly, it would be better if each had its narrowly defined mission, if they improved our lives and made them easier (Kertman, 2008, p. 27).
This quote comes from a 34 year old male, who resides in St. Petersburg, that was participating in a survey conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation in 2006. The point of this survey was to find out Russians’ opinions on the mission and roles of political parties in Russia. What is significant about this quote and the rest of the results of the survey is the reinterpretation of parties in order to fit the Russian view of politics and civics. What this man prescribed as an ideal multi-party system sounds very similar to the independent agencies, committees, and commissions here in the U.S., such as the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Small Business Administration, or Environmental Protection Agency. In essence, this Russian citizen suggested that the government bureaucracy should take care of them and make their lives easier. Which is not the worst idea in the world. However, the point is that the theoretical function of a political party is completely dismissed. What’s more, another respondent, aged 28, gave an almost identical explanation as to how a multi-party system should work. As Kertman (2008) states in his analysis of this study, “these young men — whose decisive stage of socialization, let us note, took place in the post-Soviet period — understand a “multiparty system” in purely traditionalist terms, ascribing state functions to parties (p. 30)…” He goes on to say that this traditionalist interpretation of the purpose of political parties was common throughout the survey.
Another interesting aspect of the study showed that of the segment of people who advocated for a two party system, only 48 percent agreed that competition between parties is beneficial on the whole; that percentage increases to only 67 percent for those that responded 3 or more parties would be ideal (Kertman, 2008). So here too we see that fundamental functions of political parties aren’t taken into account. Furthermore, this tells us that uniformity of ideas and values seem to either be important to the respondents or they are overly optimistic of the levels of compromise political parties are capable of. The analysis provided by Kertman and the aforementioned points above clearly show that between the Tsar, the patriarch, and most recently, the Communist Party, paternalism is deeply embedded in Russian political culture.
Conclusion
Here in the West, and most markedly the U.S., autocracy is simply the antithesis of most everything we believe in. Or, that is what we like to believe at least. While we don’t defer to a single ruler, we too like the state to take care of us. This is exemplified by Europe and Canada’s socialistic regimes, and by the U.S.’s unforgivably low voter turnout rates. Notably, this last presidential election was treated as if we were voting in the next autocrat, whether it was Clinton, Trump, or Sanders. As a nation we looked to these three candidates as if all the other centuries old institutions were trivial compared to one of these three people. Is Russia an enigma solely because autocracy is viewed as a legitimate form of governance there? Because they are not ashamed to admit that they would rather get along in their lives and let the Kremlin deal with politics? Whatever the case, Russia’s political culture is a rich one. One that is justifiably held in high regard by its nationals. Russian’s may never have tasted freedom to the extent the West has, but if there’s one thing Russians have never lacked, it is character.
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