The Arbitrariness, and Hope, of National Identity
There is nothing so humanly constructed as national identity yet nothing so important to humanity.
At its heart, becoming a citizen of a nation is the same as being allowed to join a club. The members of the club set certain rules of membership and if you satisfy them you are allowed to join. By definition, this splits the world into two groups; those in the club and those not in the club. We accept that division on the basis that it is the defining nature of a club, as it is a nation, that it can decide who should be admitted into it. If the club doesn’t have that power it can hardly be called a club; the same is true for a nation.
And so clubs develop rules which lay out the system by which a person gains membership. Those rules could be virtuous or capricious, economic-based or hate-based. They are solely at the whim of the members and as such are inherently arbitrary. And indeed those rules were themselves created by members who were granted membership only because they satisfied a similarly arbitrary set of rules that existed at the time of their joining. And so stretches back the chain of members and arbitrary rules until the founding of the club.
Such founders no doubt laid down a vision for the club and perhaps a set of membership criteria, but do these truly have a different quality than those rules established later? They were similarly established by a group particular views, and are therefore are, again, arbitrary by definition.
It is true of course that there are religious groups and others (natural lawyers for example) who reach out to a transcendental set of rules to underpin their club’s rules and in doing so elevate them from the arbitrary to the immovable. To such a view there are three arguments I’d make.
First, any rule that limits the ability of future members to decide who may join the club strips such future members, and indeed the club itself, of the defining power of being in a club, that of being able to determine its membership. And therefore any such rule can never said to be a true limit on that club.
Second, such a view presupposes a preeminence of the founders to have entirely understood their transcendental underpinning such that it could be put into perfect language; and that such understanding would not require amendment as both the club, and indeed all of humanity, evolves. To make such a claim seems folly.
But third, and most importantly (and independent of the two prior claims), there is the question of what would happen to the club with such a rule if all of its members decided to reject that rule? Could it be truly said that such a decision by all of the members could be overridden by rules written by a long deceased founder? More fundamentally, in doing so, does it not demonstrate that there was never a true “ identity” to the group at all based on that rule, but rather a series (albeit potentially a long series) of arbitrary decisions to admit members only in compliance with such a rule?
“A document cannot bind a people who in sufficient number no longer wish to be bound.”
That is to say that being part of the club doesn’t create any identity other than being a member of a club with certain rules. It isn’t wedded to a deeper purpose, it can’t be, being as it is the result of the compliance with arbitrary rules.
And so let us return to nationality, for the same reason it too is arbitrary. And in the setting of citizenship such arbitrariness is thrown into yet starker relief which typically arises by the dual lottery of birth; location and parentage.
Upon recognizing the arbitrary, binary, nature of nationality, there appear two courses. The first is to reject the concept of nationhood and seek to establish a global citizenry. Despite the attractiveness of such a course it would seem that constraints of resources, speed of travel and convention, and cultural and religious ties, amongst other reasons, render such a concept unattainable in our life time.
If we cannot reject such a concept then the only option is to accept the arbitrariness of our construct. And in doing so we are not limited but rather we are empowered. For by accepting the construct of a nation as arbitrary we can reject a concept of nationality bound by racial, historical or cultural ties, because the nation is instead constituted solely by its current citizens not by those who came before us, or their actions.
This provides the citizens today, regardless of the basis of that citizenship or their lineage, equal ownership of a nation that is defined by their ambitions and beliefs. In so doing a nation can be defined both by the pursuit of prosperity within but also, if the citizens so desire, the improvement of life for those who are not citizens; indeed international action can become a defining aspect of nationality rather than being in conflict with it.
That is not to say that nationality so defined will always be virtuous. By deriving its meaning from the mob it is no more virtuous than the mob itself. But nationality as currently constructed from history and quasi-racial overtones has not prevented such mob rule in the past and may indeed encourage it, particularly when used to sow division among citizens of a nation.
As long as we require nation states, we will require nationality. Recognizing its arbitrariness, and its relationship to the current composition of our national group, frees nationality from being a racially or culturally tainted beast and allows it instead to be turned to the more product end of binding citizens to help their nations prosper.
Endnote: Whilst this article focuses upon citizenship, the same arguments made herein are generally applicable to immigration. Second, this chapter does not, generally, consider the situation of refugees who represent an entirely separate concern. To sketch out an argument, the acceptance of refugees would be the decision of the citizens, who I hope would be persuaded of the virtue of aiding refugees on the basis of either maxi-min arguments, compassion or pragmatic realities of long term security.
