Thinking About Thinking
Following these remarks on the general understanding of a ‘concept’ in the previous post, we will now look at how a concept can be determined in pure thinking (thinking about thinking) according to the so-called ‘mathesis principle’.
Using the concept of ‘experience’ as an example, three main elements emerge on which the concept of experience is universally based.
1) The object (the ‘what’) that is experienced.
2) The subject (the ‘who’) that experiences the object.
3) The instrument of experience (the ‘how’) used by the subject.
If we go one step further and, for the sake of simplicity, draw a comparison with a camera, further fundamental elements emerge.
For example, the necessity of a representative within the subject — bits/bytes in the case of a camera’s images — as well as an instance that enables the reproduction of the representative — mediator/medium.
In addition, a kind of ‘quality control’ is probably also required, which determines the correspondence between the object outside and the representative of the object — calibration.
The ‘actual’ pure thinking would now consist of observing this process of ideal determination — here using the example of the term ‘experience’ — within the world of thought.
Specifically, this means focusing attention on how, i.e. according to which laws, thinking attempts to find the mathesian concepts by linking thoughts together.
Irrespective of this, after applying mathesis to the example of the concept of ‘experience, it ultimately becomes clear that this has a pronounced clarity or transparency that is located in a purely ideal sphere.
It follows that no material representation is required in order to grasp the concept of experience.
The ‘idea’ — in the Goethian sense¹ — therefore already exists without material representation, i.e. the idea comes first or stands above it.
Consequently, the idea can only be recognised in the material representation, but under no circumstances can it be derived from it.
This is only possible in thinking or within the unified world of thoughts/ideas, because this is where all ideal determinants can be found.
Man learns to grasp these little by little by exploring and developing his thinking further and further.
The principle of experience discussed in “Experience — First Element of Knowledge”, which enables us to experience the external world in its various, unrelated details, also applies in the same way to our inner life.
This is because thoughts and feelings² also appear as facts of experience and can therefore also be experienced as pure experience.
When this happens, it becomes possible to explore reality, i.e. the actual core of what is experienced, and to bring it to light.
Thus, in the experience of thinking, the lawful connection is immediately present as an experience, i.e. at the first occurrence, and does not have to be sought out first, as is otherwise the case.
For, unlike the experience of the external world, the lawful connection is not given without the activity of thinking.
Thinking thus occupies a special position and makes it possible to base epistemology on the justified scientific claim of the principle of experience.
This purely methodological principle says nothing about the content of experience, i.e. it makes no judgement as to whether the content is sensual or ideal.
It is merely based on leaving the objects of reality in the first form of their appearance and only in this way making them the object of science.
Conversely, this means that a purely materialistic scientist, who accepts only the experience of the senses as the subject of science, should not rely on the principle of experience.
This is because he too uses thought to explain the experiences of the senses.
The principle of experience consequently requires that the objects of reality already have a form that satisfies scientific endeavour, which — without the aid of thought — is not the case with sensory experience alone.
It is only in thinking that this is the case.
In other words, only thinking can fulfil the principle of experience in the strictest sense.
Goethe was a famous representative who always took the principle of experience into account consistently and with the greatest care.
For him, all higher views of nature could appear to him as nothing other than experience, as ‘higher nature in nature’, so to speak.
This ‘pure phenomenalism’, which Goethe repeatedly and emphatically called for, consists specifically in understanding phenomena purely, i.e. as they manifest themselves to the senses, whether through observation or experiment.
All possible hypotheses about the phenomenal course of an observation should be withheld, so that each phenomenon speaks purely for itself, so to speak.
The starting point must therefore always be an unbiased observation, in order to penetrate to the core.
In addition — as illustrated, for example, in Goethe’s Theory of Colours — appropriate experiments can be carried out that correspond to the natural conditions of the object of study, so that the resulting interactions make the laws appear by themselves.
If this method is applied to the investigation of thought, its claim can only be fulfilled in pure thought, i.e. in the way in which thoughts relate to each other, whereby their content plays no role.
In practical discussions, for example, the following can be observed:
1) An immediate, schematic representation of the thought (imagination).
2) An analysis of the thought process in which a continuous differentiation (decomposition) and at the same time composition takes place in thinking.
3) A synthesis (completion) of the thoughts, i.e. meaningful or lawful connections are made with existing thoughts.
4) A logical examination of the thought to determine whether it is valid in itself.
5) A ‘judgement formation’, i.e. when a subject is linked to a predicate, such as “The dog is running”, then a link takes place, a so-called thought judgement. The image of the idea of the subject is no longer in the foreground, as it would be if the subject were only thought for itself, i.e. only “The dog”.
6) An addition of thoughts arising from the imagination.
7) etc.
Furthermore, it can be seen that regardless of which different thoughts arise at the same time, they are at the same time endeavouring to enter into a relationship with each other, so that they come into harmony and harmony in thinking is created.
In short, there is a constant striving for unity in thinking.
A thought that cannot be immediately categorised conceptually fills one with an uncomfortable feeling that only disappears when it can be brought into harmony or clarity.
These observations make it clear that thinking is both an organ of experience and an organ of creation, i.e. it is not empty of content itself, as nominalism claims.³
The search for regularities, to which every science aspires and by which it receives its justification, is thus, from the perspective of epistemology, directly given in the pure experience of thinking.
This opens the way to the knowledge of laws in all sciences.
Because on the basis of a science of knowledge, every human being receives the scientific confirmation that he is capable of exploring the inner connections and laws in his direct experience.
[1] “The idea is eternal and unique; that we also need the plural is not well done. Everything that we become aware of and can speak of are only manifestations of the idea; we express concepts, and in this respect the idea itself is a concept.” Source: Goethe, Maximen und Reflexionen. Aphorismen und Aufzeichnungen. Nach den Handschriften des Goethe- und Schiller-Archivs hg. von Max Hecker, 1907. Aus: Kunst und Altertum, 5. Bandes 3. Heft. 1826, Einzelnes.
[2] At first glance, feeling seems to behave in the same way as thinking. However, there is a serious difference in how it arises and how it occurs. Although in both cases, for example, an external object provides the impetus that gives rise to the feeling of joy on the one hand and leads to the formation of concepts in thinking on the other, only the latter can be said with any certainty to arise from its own activity. For the occurrence of a feeling is no different from an externally occurring process that can be observed as usual. Thus, a feeling corresponds to the effect that a experience of something triggers in us, which characterises the relationship of ourselves to the corresponding thing. Feeling therefore always involves a self-reference through which we learn something about ourselves in relation to the world (> subjectivity). This is in complete contrast to thinking, which, when forming concepts during the observation of a process, says nothing about itself, as the observer’s attention is completely focussed on the thing being observed and one forgets one’s own thinking activity (> objectivity). This can also be seen in everyday language, for example, when looking at a flower you would not say “I am thinking of a flower”, but “This is a flower”. In the case of emotional expressions, on the other hand, you would say, for example, “I am happy about this flower” and thus relate the flower to yourself. This is why the way to the heart is always through the head or thinking, because this is the prerequisite for recognising feelings. For example, the feeling of compassion only arises when, for example, the idea of a compassionate person appears in one’s own consciousness. Love — unless it is simply an expression of the sex drive — is also based on ideas we form about the person we love. And the more idealistic these ideas are, the more blissful love is. This is why it is often said that love blinds us to the flaws of the person we love. But you can also look at it the other way round and say that love opens your eyes to the advantages of the person you love. Because most people pass by other people’s good qualities without noticing them. But whoever sees them, love awakens in their heart. They have done nothing other than form an idea of what most others have no idea of. In short, they have no love because they lack imagination. This makes it clear that all questions about man’s inner life and feelings always presuppose another question, namely that of the origin of thinking.
[3] Read about nominalism in “Biggest Prejudice About Thinking”.
Note: This text was originally written in German and translated into English using Deepl, because I am a native German speaker.
Follow me on: https://twitter.com/HeimatloserM
