Complex Coordinated Attacks Part One: An Introduction and Why We Should Care
This is the first article of a four part series that will focus holistically on complex coordinated attacks. As with any writing project, it is important to recognize the intended audience. Unfortunately, this subject and this attack style will affect everyone. So in the essence of space and time, the primary audience includes professionals within the homeland security enterprise (fire, EMS, police, emergency management, hospital, etc.). This article, and those that follow, represent an extension of my research and thesis completed at the Naval Postgraduate School, Center for Homeland Defense & Security entitled: Prospective Vigilance: Assessing Complex Coordinated Attack Preparedness Programs. While writing these short articles, my goal is simple — to bring light to an emerging, low frequency yet high risk and effective attack cycle.
Introduction
State and local first responders in the United States lack a common strategic approach to prepare for complex coordinated attacks (CCAs). The National Counterterrorism Center, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) define a complex coordinated attack (CCA) as a:
“coordinated assault on one or more locations in close succession, initiated after little or no warning, employing one or more of the following: firearms, explosives, and arson.”
However, domestically, scholarly research, analysis, and shared best practices — essential pillars for first responders to better prepare and increase resiliency — are mostly absent from domestic strategic CCA preparedness plans and guidance. This issue is not new and was acknowledged in a 2003 federal report by the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (also known as the Gilmore Commission), which, after September 11, 2001 they found:
“a lack of clear strategic guidance from the Federal level about the definition and objectives of preparedness and how States and localities will be evaluated in meeting those objectives.”
And in 2015, the National Preparedness Goal (NPG) highlights five core mission areas that, once achieved, should result in preparedness for any hazard in the United States. But the lack of strategic CCA guidance impedes proper or full achievement of those goals by state and local first responders.
Inconsistent terminology complicates the discussion of CCAs. The media, public safety, and the armed forces have used the term CCA, as well as “complex attack” or “coordinated attack,” to describe a variety of attacks. However, in many examples, a simple attack with conventional weapons, such as an active-shooter event, is categorized as complex and coordinated. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), for example, defines a CCA as an act of terrorism that may:
“involve synchronized and independent team(s) at multiple locations sequentially or in close succession, initiated with little or no warning, and employing one or more weapon systems: firearms, explosives, fire as a weapon, and other non-traditional attack methodologies which are intended to result in scores of casualties.”
Regardless of the tactics involved―whether the use of fire, shooting, or a vehicle attack―a CCA is particularly destructive if the attack cycle occurs at multiple locations and in close succession. The response to a CCA would likely outpace the availability of first- responder resources and capabilities. The need to manage multiple hazards, threats, and action plans would be challenging. To be clear, however, tactics used within a CCA can include a wide array of weapons, including tools that would not raise suspicion. This includes fuel, edged weapons, propane tanks, chemical or biological properties, rental vehicles, and more. To this point, however, the tactic does not matter unless this information is being deployed as a precursor to an attack. Instead, first responders can use this information to prepare for the variety of injuries that may be present.
Why We Should Care
Three main points link implications for state and local governments. First, the United States has not experienced a CCA like those in Mumbai or Paris; this renders the threat low probability, if high consequence, and thus low priority. This may explain why it has been difficult to establish a national CCA policy and get first responders and public safety leaders to fully embrace, fund, and accept CCA preparedness.
Second, and perhaps as a direct consequence of the first point, preparedness funding in the United States is declining across the board; only high-priority and high-probability events receive necessary funding and attention. For example, since 2008, federal funds to support state and local response efforts have decreased by $662 million. Further, the White House’s 2019 fiscal year budget calls for a $568 million reduction in key Homeland Security programs. Should this reduction occur, such programs as the newly formed Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks program and the Countering Violent Extremist Grant would be eliminated.
Finally, if a CCA were to occur today in a major city or town without a unified plan, first responders would respond to, manage, and mitigate the incident. They would attempt to bring order to chaos in any fashion, just as the first responders did on 9/11. However, if guidance related to preparedness and baseline capabilities is weak or non-existent among state and local public safety disciplines, the response to a multi-site terrorist attack could be disastrous. In the Mumbai and Paris CCAs, local agencies faced significant challenges with incident command, strategic communication, and information management; limitations in both training and equipment; and inadequate response protocols. During the Mumbai CCA, fire and emergency services assets were uncoordinated with local law enforcement, which resulted in a delay of life-saving equipment. The Paris incident uncovered problems with law enforcement due in part to a disconnected centralized command between local and federal police assets. In sum, these challenges added to the confusion and delayed resources during an unfolding multi-site attack scenario.
My assumption is that state and local first responders are in fact preparing to respond to a CCA, but measuring preparedness is difficult because no national plan or standardized benchmarks exist. As a result, emergency response disciplines such as fire and rescue, law enforcement, and emergency medical services may either improvise a strategy to manage an unfamiliar or emerging threat―which has been demonstrated to have downright damaging effects―or fail to implement current plans due to the complex and chaotic atmosphere.
In my second article, I will unpack this problem space even more and highlight known domestic first responder challenges, barriers, and some potential opportunities to become more prepared as well as resilient prior to a CCA, or even a CCA-like incident.
