Complex Coordinated Attacks Part Three: The Whole of Community

Introduction
Our community, in the most basic sense, is where we live and maybe where we serve. More than likely your community is different from mine, and equally for your coworkers or extended family. To be sure, we can’t really explain it but the community in which we live means something special, perhaps because we have a vested interest in helping our neighbors. Maybe there are other influences and perspectives about what community means to you personally. Regardless, the community in which you live is its own ecosystem where you can borrow a cup of sugar, help someone rebuild a shed, or it could be your faith-based institution. The reality is, you are a part of many communities according to Social Identity Theory.
In the homeland security project, we can pull from numerous examples of where the community comes together or supports each other during times of despair and repair or recovery. The fires in California today and last few years come to mind as fresh examples. However, the epitome of the community was exemplified shortly after the 9/11/01 attacks in New York City. People converged en mass to help with the basic essentials for their community; food, water, clothing, labor, money, shelter, hugs, and so much more. No one asked them to do that, perhaps they just felt compelled to help out another human in need. That’s community, or at least this is what I view through the lens of others.
Fast forward almost two decades and the community mantra, I would argue, has not drastically changed. So within the homeland security ecosystem, as we begin to use terms like “whole of the community,” frame it as New York City, 9/11/01 at noon and beyond. Reflect on the leading picture for this article and imagine what parts of a community are affected by two towers falling after a terrorist attack. Where is the ‘line of demarcation’ that separates the affected by those not affected? How do we know and says who?
To make this clear, and attempt to inject food into homeland security, let’s consider the “whole of community” in the sense that it is the sum of its parts, or maybe like a pizza pie. The slices represent geographical areas, districts, jurisdictions, etc. The toppings are individual businesses, public safety, government, citizens, and the like. You get the point…
Complex Coordinated Attack Planning Guidance
In the second article of this series, I challenged you to write down those stakeholders who are, and who are not, regularly at the table to talk about these types of threats. Chances are that your local police, fire & rescue department, emergency management, and medical professionals are the pillars sitting at the table. This is a good thing. But what about the other community businesses and private sector leaders? I encourage you to share your list in the comment box.
To be fair, those in public safety who have not experienced a complex campaign may not recognize the value of public and private partnerships until something bad happens. Some public safety agencies or political officials may want to play the odds of occurrence and gamble with the chance. However, in today’s world, there is no excuse for not engaging as we have plenty of impactful examples over the years to motivate us to collaborate. The good part about this problem is that communities want to help, and have helped immensely, during complex emergencies. Perhaps the challenge is practicality, and understanding the battle space.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency, in its “A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management” document, defines the whole of the community as;
“[A] means by which residents, emergency management practitioners, organizational and community leaders, and government officials can collectively understand and assess the needs of their respective communities and determine the best ways to organize and strengthen their assets, capacities, and interests. By doing so, a more effective path to societal security and resilience is built.”
In my own words, this is a game of what I can do for you, and what you can do for me. This is not quid pro quo. It is bringing the non-traditional into the unified circle of trust. It is sharing limitations, vulnerabilities, and challenges. Three big words that get in the way of ego, but only before being exploited by a wicked event.
Within this document, FEMA provides sound guidance and a path forward to developing a strong and resilient community before an emergency. Much of the emphasis is placed upon the pre-disaster through relationship building and understanding of needs. Recommendations on how to understand the community needs and share public safety challenges are tantamount throughout the document. These tasks are critical and are the foundation for emergencies that involve widespread violence. For example, on page 71 of the Boston Bombing after-action report, developing and maintaining pre-existing professional relationships is listed as “Best Practice 1.1”:
“Pre-existing professional relationships among key leadership and front-line personnel, developed through years of planning for the Marathon and other special events, training and exercising together, and experience with prior large-scale incidents, proved to be critically important throughout the incidents that week. These relationships built the trust and rapport that allowed for Unified Command (UC) to come together organically and quickly and supported timely, effective, and collaborative decision making. These relationships also allowed leadership to call for resources, task missions, mobilize mutual aid, and coordinate communications effectively. It took just a few calls or personal conversations among senior leadership to obtain approval and arrange assistance for many aspects of the response. The relationships also supported the coordination of providing assistance for runners, provided confidence in capabilities, and eased the sharing of information among city, regional, state and federal organizations.”
And as I was writing this article, FEMA released it’s newest CCA planning document entitled “Planning Considerations: Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks.” Within the document, FEMA outlines six steps to consider when planning for a CCA. Without surprise, step one recommends forming a collaborative planning team.

Certainly, the pillars (core team) are present within step one for CCA planning, and so are many other community leaders such as those within the education system (local and academia), nongovernmental organizations (civic, social, and faith-based), and the private sector. FEMA provides a comprehensive list and they are all critical additions to the planning team. The October 1 Las Vegas shooting after action report agrees. Since 2005, Las Vegas area public safety has made many “preparedness investments.” Of those investments, integrating public and private partnerships into a unified approach during emergency incidents has proven successful and valuable. This works well when bad things happen, we just have to invest in the process.
So What?
My hope is that you are not asking this question right now. But if you are, here is my guidance. These events, like a CCA or another 9/11, will require the collaboration and coordination with many people and institutions. These events will influence policy, change laws, and affect the private sector. These events will require the participation of the community, whether its something that public safety is requiring or requesting (remember the Cajun navy?). And, perhaps most importantly, the push to collaborate and develop the core or planning team sooner rather than later resonates as just good practice. A unified (community) response to an event that has pre-existing relationships, without having institutional knowledge, just seems right. Inviting the community into your “community” before a complex event costs you nothing, as you are investing in community preparedness. The opposite is true as well, as the risk for economic gain and scarce expertise increases. This was the case shortly after hurricane Katrina. A myriad of community members (police, fire, medical professionals, etc.) opted to relocate their families outside of the strike zone where services were available. We should anticipate this.
Post-thought
The 9/11 commission report has one passage that, in my opinion, sums up this problem space:
“Private-sector preparedness is not a luxury; it is a cost of doing business in the post-9/11 world. It is ignored at a tremendous potential cost in lives, money and national security.”
Please look for the fourth and final article which will discuss challenges associated with CCA preparedness and resiliency.
