Predicting a Trump Win.

I recently wrote an article looking at polling data for both the American presidential election and the British EU referendum. The crux of the article was that polling data two and a half months away from the election does not guarantee a Clinton victory. In fact, there may be similarities between both sets of polls — the election and referendum. The stronger Clinton appears in the polls, much like the remain campaign in the EU referendum, the greater the risk that Clinton voters won’t bother turning out to vote, especially 18–24s and progressives. In any case, there is unlikely to be a great deal of enthusiasm for her. Conversely, right wingers are enthused, authoritarian and will generally fall in line.

Moreover, the Libertarians and Greens are unlikely to enjoy the gains current polling suggests; their lack of presence on mainstream media and the debates will not do them any favours. Just as Ralph Nader was not responsible for Bush’s 2000 win the same will be true of Johnson and Stein in 2016. When push comes to shove most voters stick to the two-party system.

There is also the issue of the 10% or so of undecided voters, who may well decide on election day, voting with their gut. I can’t help but think this benefits Trump because it means they haven’t shut the door on the idea of voting for him. The debates will be his best chance to convince them. Finally, there is my theory that there are plenty of secret Trump supporters — within the context of Brexit polling being, on average wide of the mark, the idea that people are unwilling to reveal their true intentions is plausible.

A Reuters August poll featured 7.9% of respondents who refused to answer. A general trend to note is that in late July when refusals rose Trump’s support fell and Clinton’s increased. On 21 August Clinton had a high of 44.6%, Trump was on 32.8% and refusals were at their highest at 11.1%. Since then numbers of Clinton supporters and refusals have fallen while Trump’s have increased. Of course, this does not mean there is a definite correlation but it is something to be worried about — the potential number of secret Trump supporters who will not be accurately represented in polling data.

Why Trump still has a shot: Economic Struggle

Trump’s rise can be attributed to his anti-globalisation, economic nationalism and protectionism. Amazingly, in the richest country in the world, 46 million people are on food stamps, 35% receive some form of government assistance, and the hidden unemployment rate is probably at least 12%. Clearly, economic insecurity and a lack of social mobility has left many turning to his populism, just like many turned to Sanders.

The failure of neoliberalism, as implemented by every American president and British prime minister since Reagan and Thatcher, is best surmised by Martin Jacques:

The depression-era system of bank regulation was dismantled…thereby creating the conditions for the 2008 crisis. Equality was scorned, the idea of trickle-down economics lauded, government condemned as a fetter on the market and duly downsized, immigration encouraged, regulation cut to a minimum, taxes reduced and a blind eye turned to corporate evasion.

The shocking outcome?

The most dynamic period of postwar western growth was that between the end of the war and the early 70s, the era of welfare capitalism and Keynesianism, when the growth rate was double that of the neoliberal period from 1980 to the present.

Even the IMF’s research arm now admits the benefits of neoliberalism have been over sold.

The argument, as presented by Gallup, that Trump supporters are driven by their lower than average social well-being (i.e. their longevity and inter-generational mobility) and not economic difficulty is, by its nature, merely an extension of the economic argument above. Economic status plays a fundamental part of social well-being.

After concluding that ‘there appears to be no link whatsoever between exposure to trade competition and support for nationalist policies’ the author admits:

[i]t may be the case that material circumstances caused by economic shocks manifest themselves in depression, disappointment, and ill-health….[o]r, it may be that material well-being and health are undermined by a cultural or psychological failure to adjust and adapt to a changing world.

Their social failure and fear for their children is therefore linked to the state of the economy since 1980 as a whole. While most of those that lost their jobs in industry post de-industrialisation would have found other jobs, incomes have stagnated. Since 1980, capital has been the biggest winner, clearly at the expense of labour. The nature of these low-paid jobs, weakened unions and labour laws ultimately result in a more unstable life.

As Sherry Linkon points out in Salon:

The half-life of deindustrialization plays out socially, too. The social networks that developed around industrial work have fragmented….Over time, communities internalized these losses…to wrestle not only with the loss of their economic base but also with a loss of civic identity….For some, decades of economic struggle and the deterioration of community have brought a sense of isolation….the displacement of deindustrialization is now surfacing in the form of anger and resentment.

Culture and race are merely off shoots of this economic struggle — in decades past, the white non-college educated working class had a higher share of national wealth than they do now. Regardless of how comparatively poor they were they at least knew other racial or social groups were below them in the (social) pecking order. This included African-Americans, Latinos, gays and women. In 2016, they can’t say the same (even if the median wealth of a white family is 10 times higher than a Latino household and 13 times than a black household). This is why Trump has targeted these groups — rightly or wrongly, his base thinks it has been surpassed by ethnic or social minorities.

A Pew Research poll found that 52% of Americans viewed the wealth inequality gap as a very big problem, followed by race relations at 48%, terrorism at 46%, crime at 45%, immigration at 38% and the availability of good-paying jobs at 38%. The strategy of drawing on Nixon’s silent majority, especially in relation to race relations, crime and terrorism, may not be the mistake that many are predicting. Indeed, his 6% bounce after the Republican convention highlights this.

In addition, that polling data shows there is an audience for Trump’s protectionism and anti-trade deal approach. He’ll have to link Clinton to Bill’s policies, from NAFTA to the repeal of Glass-Steagall, and present her as the establishment candidate.

If this presidential election is going to be another Brexit, it will depend upon the number of people and communities who have struggled or are worried about the employment prospects of their children. Ignoring race, the proportion of working class and lower middle class Americans is between 60 to 75%, with equal share between the two. I’m inclined to believe that there are sufficient numbers who want to send a big ‘fuck you’ to the establishment and upper middle class, especially if Pew Research is correct that 52% view inequality and 38% the availability of good-paying jobs as very big problems.

They don’t necessarily have to like Trump or understand what kind of president he will be; they don’t have to be cognisant of the increase in debt or worsening inequality his tax plans would cause. The same was true of Brexit. Plenty of people did not understand the finer points to the European Union nor think that Brexit was the likely outcome. They believed the false promises of the leave campaign — for example, a £350m per week increase in NHS (National Health Service) spending. To some it was a protest vote they would later come to regret.

The key will clearly be whether enough of them go to the polling station on 8th November. The fact that 14.8% of eligible voters turned out to vote in the Republican primaries, higher than the 11.6% in 1980, suggests a degree of enthusiasm, both for and against Trump. Meanwhile, the fall in Democratic Party turnout to 14.4%, below the 19.5% of 2008, indicates a reduced enthusiasm for Clinton. The more Clinton moves to the right to capture Republicans who don’t wish to vote for Trump the higher the chances she alienates left wingers. In such a polarised political landscape it will be virtually impossible to appease both sides sufficiently. At the same time, turnout for the incumbent party generally falls while the opposition’s rises. However, this does not necessarily translate to victory.

If Trump is to win on the back of this economic argument/issue he will only do so if he wins most of Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Florida, North Carolina, Iowa and Nevada.

Ohio, Pennsylvania and Florida are the states the Trump camp is focusing on. In Florida, Ohio and North Carolina, Trump and Clinton are neck and neck, while Clinton leads in Pennsylvania. Clinton is not running away with it. The debates will provide Trump the opportunity to make his economic case and to attack Clinton and her legacy. A more competent campaign would be doing much better; and yet, for all his mistakes he’s still in the game.

Part Three to follow — the importance of the debates in exploiting the economic issues he has consistently raised throughout his campaign. Plus, the impact of Stephen Bannon and Roger Ailes.