Will Russia (officially) Invade Ukraine?
With no end in sight to the Ukrainian war will Putin use the distraction of the Olympics to launch an official war against Ukraine? To do so, however, he will need to have justification by way of provoking Ukraine into taking direct military action.
After months of escalation in the Ukraine-Russia proxy war there now appears to be growing evidence for the view that what is about to follow is, at the very least, a significant escalation in the conflict. The fundamental problem, despite the Minsk II agreement, is that there does not appear to be an end in sight for the war, which suggests significant scope for further tensions. The movement of Ukrainian tanks towards the Crimean border confirms this.
Recent Russian force projection has increased the threat posed to Ukraine and its government, forcing it to divide its attention and military forces between the south and east. A best case scenario for Ukraine is that Russia is only seeking to project its power and threaten Kiev by attempting to strengthen its negotiating position, undermine the Ukrainian economy and weaken the Poroshenko government. However, even if this is the objective the division of Ukrainian military capability increases the likelihood of further advances by Russian backed separatists in the south-east.
However, considering earlier Russian action in Ukraine, Crimea and Georgia it is now reasonable to argue that…
Russia will invade Ukraine by the end of September.
Here are the four reasons Russia will invade Ukraine:
1. Escalation…all it takes is a little push
Russia has been, since May 2016, increasing troop numbers on the Russian-Ukrainian border, carrying out training exercises across Ukraine’s western flank, performing naval manoeuvres in the Black Sea and escalating the deployment of military hardware, from the installation of surface to air missiles in Crimea to the arrival of additional naval units.
Furthermore, there are reports of additional deployments of up to 5,000 soldiers near Donetsk, Ukraine in order to strengthen the separatist’s control over the south-east Donbass region.
The recent increase in activity stems from the arrest of Ukrainian special forces in Crimea, with weapons and explosives, accused of seeking to launch sabotage attacks within Crimea. Knowing exactly who and what to believe is difficult; most reports are unconfirmed or unsubstantiated, while various intelligence agencies continue to carry out clandestine operations.
However, in 2008 Russia accused Georgia of a troop build-up in the upper Kodori Gorge, with the intention of invading Abkhazia, setting off a summer of increased escalation between the two nations. May 16th 2008 saw reports that Russia’s FSB agency had arrested a supposed Chechen spy working for the Georgian equivalent, the GIS, with instructions to establish contacts with militants in the North Caucasus (Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia etc) in order for Georgia to finance their conflict with the Russians. Moreover, claims were levelled at Georgia that it was building up its military presence near Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia then invaded, citing Georgian provocation.
The Crimean escalation seems to fit this pattern. Now, either the recent arrests were part of a false flag by Russia or Ukraine did indeed send them into Crimea with the objective of causing damage. Either way, Russia is using it as justification to increase its military presence. Both sides, at least from their own perspectives, have legitimate grievances. Both also have their own objectives and foreign policy aims, so it is always difficult to apportion blame, or for that matter, to determine the extent of Putin’s own belligerence.
Putin’s policy since 2008 has centred on countering NATO expansion, which Russia has always viewed as an existential threat, with expansionist policies of his own. Crimea and any future escalation is a continuation of this strategy. However, the further he goes the more the west views his actions as akin to Nazi Germany’s annexation of Austria and the Sudetenland. It’s a vicious cycle.
In any case, the rapid escalation post 7th August does mean there is now a significant risk of further conflict. A worst-case scenario may feature a Russian-Ukrainian conflict on the Crimean border and Russian invasion to push back the Ukrainian army, before eventually negotiating a withdrawal.
2. Historic Patterns
While most Europeans go on holiday in August Vladimir Putin invades countries. This is admittedly an oversimplification but there is an Olympics and late summer pattern of invasion or escalation. This includes the invasion of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in August 2008 during Beijing 2008, the post-Sochi Winter Olympics annexation of Crimea on 18th March 2014 as well as the August 2014 convoy deployment into Ukraine and the September 2015 bombing campaign in Syria.
Admittedly, the longer the situation continues in 2016 without escalating into a full-scale war and the closer we get to winter the lower the chances of such an outcome.
However, the Crimean annexation may not have been planned in advance, but instead used as a diversion tactic, away from the corruption allegations after the Sochi Winter Olympics. Putin may wish to distract from a struggling economy or he may opt for building up jingoistic sentiment in the run up to September’s Duma elections.
3. Time to flex those muscles
A leaked report suggests the British military has concluded that Russian military capability is superior to the United Kingdom’s. Russia’s battlefield capacity, such as increasingly advanced air defence systems, rocket launchers, cyber warfare and electronic warfare, has surpassed Britain’s. If this assessment is correct, combined with its tank superiority, Russia poses an increased threat to Ukraine and Europe as a whole. While western states have spent the last decade fighting guerrilla warfare, Russia has taken the lead in 21st century ‘hybrid warfare’.
Clearly, the Europe Union and the United States hold the economic and combined military upper hand, but these two parties will not engage directly with Russia, which provides Putin with the opportunity to fight Ukraine. Indeed, picking a fight with Ukraine is less of a risk than taking action against NATO expansion in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
However, a caveat is the timing of the leak; it may have been intentional for two reasons. Firstly, by highlighting Russian superiority, Putin becomes more dangerous — a belligerent foreign policy and a superior military. If one of the two most powerful European militaries — alongside France — is deemed to be outmatched by the Russian Federation, there has to be increased NATO cooperation and US involvement to counter Putin.
Secondly, it may be an attempt to justify increased military spending, such as the just announced £800 million fund for next-gen weapons and 2015’s 7% increase in the defence equipment budget. Indeed, a Conservative Party government is likely to divert a considerable amount of the UK’s £8.5 billion ‘net contribution’ to the European Union towards other key areas, especially defence.
4. Everyone is distracted
The United States is in the middle of a presidential election that seems to take up more and more media attention. Beyond that, the Obama administration is involved in Syria and countless other war zones or political hot-spots. Europe is weakened, from terrorist attacks, the cost of the refugee crisis, the rise of the far right across the continent to the coming negotiations over Brexit.
Britain’s absence from the European Union will likely strengthen Putin’s hand, seeing as David Cameron had been the leading proponent for sanctions against Russia’s economy and Putin’s inner circle. This was a result of both independent British foreign policy and pressure from the United States. Those sanctions were extended for six months in July 2016, but economic interests and a waning resolve over non-EU matters may well lead to those sanctions not being renewed past January 2017.
Of course, a Russia-Ukraine conflict would guarantee the extension of sanctions, especially if Russia were to occupy even more Ukrainian territory. In this scenario, not even Russian ‘friendly’ Member States, such as Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and Austria, would be willing or able to give Moscow a free pass. However, the Russian-Georgian war and de facto annexation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia did not result in any long term sanctions or repercussions for Putin.
While NATO is almost certainly not going to engage with Russia directly over Ukraine, the resistance offered by the EU will be diminished in the medium term. Economic problems and the threat of contagion are the EU’s biggest concerns.
These include the economic impact and contagion effect of Brexit; Greece’s continuing collapse; the threat of Quitaly (Italian banks have huge toxic assets and bad debts, a stagnating economy, and the threat of a failed referendum over constitutional reform); an increase in public debt in Portugal; signs of a housing bubble in Ireland; and the truly worrying state of Deutsche Bank.
Meanwhile, after Erdogan’s St Petersburg visit Russia and Turkey are now moving towards rapprochement and normalising relations following the 2015 downing of a Russian jet by the Turkish air force. This is one less distraction and worry for Putin. One positive following the reconciliation is the the development of the previously scrapped Turkish Stream project, which would see a gas pipeline linking Russia and Turkey via the Black Sea, before entering Greece, the Balkans and the European Union. Bypassing the Soyuz and Bratstvo pipelines running through Ukraine would further reduce the barriers to conflict in the long term.
With the upcoming talks on Ukraine just a few weeks away Putin has raised the stakes and issued a warning that he’s willing to go to war. In return for calming the situation he’ll expect concessions, whether that involves the implementation of Minsk II or the removal of EU sanctions. There remains the strong possibility that tensions could worsen; any aggressive action by Ukraine may well be seized upon as justification for military assault. Putin is highly unlikely to launch the attack without any such provocation, so the immediate future of the conflict rests in Kiev’s hands.
