The Experiments of Doctor Z

Personal Identity and Survival

I have been captured by the evil supervillain scientist Dr. Z and taken to her secret laboratory. With no hope for rescue or escape, Dr. Z informs me that she will submit me to one of her latest terrible experiments. Fortunately, Dr. Z grants me the opportunity to choose which experiment I will undergo. Unfortunately, I must choose one of her experiments or Dr. Z will send her army of malformed, inhuman aberrations — victims of previous experiments gone wrong — to harm all of my loved ones. Hence I must choose to undergo one of her four procedures.

Over the course of this paper — the final artifact produced by my unaffected self — I will explain the process behind the greatest decision of my life. I will outline the details of each of the four options; I will rationally deliberate the goods and harms of each option; I will attempt to anticipate any pitfalls of each option; I will ground my deliberation in the works of relevant philosophers; I will choose and I will defend my choice.

Option I: I defiantly tell Dr. Z to do her worst — confident that nothing she can do to my body, brain, or mind will make any difference to the survival of my immaterial, immortal soul. All to happy to oblige, Dr. Z methodically warps my body, brain, and mind until nothing recognizable remains and I become one of there twisted, inhuman aberrations.

Essentially, Option I best adheres to the Soul Theory, the view that sameness of persons across time is a matter of sameness of immaterial souls across time. The Soul Theory has a number of key strengths in my current situation.

First, persons at different times are numerically identical. According to the Soul Theory I am my soul and my soul is me. Assuming that there is only one of me, it follows that there is only one of my soul. This means that even if my brain and body are destroyed and my soul continues, there will only be one of me. The pre-operation John Hydrisko would be numerically identical to the post-operation John Hydrisko. Perhaps that seems like a small comfort, but the notion that there might be two (or more) of me at once is a great discomfort.

Second, the earlier person genuinely survives as the later person, at least assuming that the soul is immaterial (and assuming that the soul exists). Bodies are material things that die for material reasons, but if a soul is immaterial it might not die for material reasons. If the Soul Theory holds true, Dr. Z can warp my body, brain, and mind as methodically as she’d like — my soul is immaterial and she cannot harm it through material means. As long as Dr. Z doesn’t moonlight as a voodoo doctor, I should be alright.

Unfortunately, the most obvious downside is also the most threatening. Compared to any other theory, the Soul Theory requires what I can only call a leap of faith. I have never seen my soul. I have never heard it. I have never touched it. I have no empirical evidence that my soul exists — no sensory experiences pointing me towards the existence of my soul. Now, almost any religion in the world will tell me I have a soul in someway or another, but they say a lot of things. The Soul Theory would explain why who I was yesterday and who I am today and who I will be tomorrow are all the same person. Even better, the Soul Theory would let the metaphysical core of my being avoid impending doom, now and forever. But I just don’t know if I have a soul.

Option II: My memories of my past thoughts and experiences will be completely erased beyond any possible recovery. Dr. Z promises that my body will be otherwise unaffected, though any of my memories, beliefs, desires, feelings, convictions, and personality traits that depend on memories of my past thoughts and experiences will be altered in ways that cannot be predicted in advance.

Essentially, Option II best adheres to the Body Theory, the view that sameness of persons across time is a matter of sameness of living human bodies across time. The Body Theory has a number of key strengths in my current situation.

First, persons at different times are numerically identical. The pre-operation John Hydrisko would be numerically identical to the post-operation John Hydrisko. In this situation, my past thoughts and experiences would be completely erased beyond recovery, and all dependent aspects of my psychology and personality would be altered in ways that cannot be predicted in advance. While in many (very important) ways, the pre-operation John Hydrisko would not be identical to the post-operation John Hydrisko, I can still find comfort in knowing that there is but one John Hydrisko.

Second, the earlier person genuinely survives as the later person, at least in a biological sense. While my personhood would be radically changed (i.e. the aforementioned erasure of my thoughts and experiences and the subsequent alteration of my psychology and personality), at least the organism which I am (or was) remains. According to the Body Theory, there is — between pre-operation John Hydrisko and post-operation John Hydrisko — an uninterrupted, constant personhood without any gaps.

Third, the earlier person and the later person are easily identifiable as the same individual, because their personhood is intrinsically tied to a tangible object, which is there body. If I were to select this option, my psychology and personality would be radically altered, but I would at least look the same to my family and friends. While amnesic and strange, I would at least be recognizable to those who knew pre-operation John Hydrisko. I might be a very different person, but the way society treats me would be largely the same. A term for this strength is Conventionalism, the view that sameness of persons across time is partly a matter of whether society decides there is sameness of persons across time, especially in problem cases. In short, I wouldn’t be able to remember my name (let alone my Social Security Number), but at least I wouldn’t need to retake my passport photo.

Unfortunately, the most obvious downside is also the most threatening. I consider the most important about myself to not be my (often goofy, generally lanky, and always diabetic) body, but my psychology and personality and the thoughts and experiences that shaped them. If someone told you that they were only dating you for your body — with no mention of your complex, vibrant, and unique interior life — you would probably consider that person simple and shallow. So it is, I’m afraid, with survival.

Option III: My brain will be transplanted into a healthy new body (human or otherwise) of my choosing. However, as a side-effect of the procedure many, but not all, of my memories, beliefs, desires, feelings, convictions, and personality traits will be altered in ways that cannot be predicted in advance.

Essentially, Option III best adheres to the Brain Theory, the view that sameness of persons across time is a matter of sameness of living, functioning brains across time. The Brain Theory has a number of key strengths in my current situation. These key strengths lie in one argument.

The argument is known as the Thinking Brain Argument. This argument is comprised of three premises and one conclusion. (P1) I have a living, functioning brain. (P2) My living, functioning brain thinks my thoughts in the strictest sense. (P3) I think my thoughts in the strictest sense. © I am my living, functioning brain. According to the Thinking Brain Argument, it follows that if my brain dies, I die. Conversely, if my brain lives, I live. This option, it seems, might give me the greatest chance of genuine survival, because it would keep my brain alive throughout the operation before transplanting it into a healthy new body that would continue to keep my brain alive.

Unfortunately, the Thinking Brain Argument is opposed by the Living Brain Argument. The argument is comprised of two premises and one conclusion. (P1) When a biological animal (such as myself) undergoes biological death, the neurons in their brain do not undergo biological death. (P2) When our living human bodies (such as mine) undergo biological death, we undergo biological death. (C) We are not our living, functioning brains. According to the Living Brain Argument, it follows that I am not my brain. Therefore, the survival of my brain does not necessitate the survival of myself. The Living Brain Argument undoes much of the confidence achieved by the Thinking Brain Argument. And, of course, the side effect of this particular operation is quite significant; I would strongly prefer that none of my memories, beliefs, desires, feelings, convictions, and personality traits be altered in ways that cannot be predicted. This operation does show some promise in the parenthetical caveat — that I might choose a non-human body. I imagine I’d have to choose a non-human body with a similar cranial capacity. In that case, I’d like to be a porpoise.

Option IV: After being rendered fully unconscious, my mind will be scanned and complete information about my memories, beliefs, desires, feelings, convictions, and personality traits will be uploaded into a supercomputer. My body and brain will then be dissected and used for spare parts for other experiments. However, the information about my psychology and personality will be downloaded, without alteration, into a new clone body and brain (just like my original ones) who will awaken thinking it is me.

Essentially, Option IV best adheres to the Program Theory, the view that sameness of persons across time is a matter of sameness of the right kind of computer program across time. The Program Theory has a number of key strengths in my current situation.

First, this option seems to ensure my genuine survival. As far as I can tell, pre-operation John Hydrisko and post-operation John Hydrisko would be the same person. The body would be indistinguishable. The brain would be indistinguishable. (I make the point of saying “indistinguishable” instead of “identical”, because there would be two different bodies, two different brains.) As for the mind, it is difficult to say. At the very least, I will have all my precious memories, beliefs, desires, feelings, convictions, and personality traits, which — if you could not tell — matter quite a bit to me.

Second, my retention of all of these intangible aspects of myself would make it correct for pre-operation John Hydrisko to anticipate having the experiences of post-operation John Hydrisko and for post-operation John Hydrisko to be responsible for the deeds of pre-operation John Hydrisko. With my memories intact, I could feel pride for the time I won a spelling bee or guilt for the time I cheated in the same spelling bee. With my thoughts intact, I could look forward to winning and cheating another spelling bee in the future. At the very least, I would feel like the same person. And that’s something.

Unfortunately, this option has one glaring issue. I cannot be sure of the numerical identity of pre-operation John Hydrisko and post-operation John Hydrisko. Let’s say that Dr. Z downloads a copy of the computer file into a body [A = B]. But then, the next day, she downloads another copy into another body, from the same computer file [A = C]. By the transitive property, it would hold that the two copies are identical [B = C]. But how can this make any sense? How can John Hydrisko enjoy his life with the possibility that somewhere else another John Hydrisko is enjoying another life? It’s paradoxical. It’s convoluted. Two versions of myself, walking this other, neither with a better claim to being me.

My decision was not an easy one. I was tempted to roll the dice and pray for my soul (namely its existence). I was tempted to walk the world with the same looks and different thoughts. I was tempted, at times, to become a porpoise. In the end, I have decided on Option IV. Simply put, I believe it offers me the best chance of genuine survival. Option IV will allow me to keep my body and brain and, most importantly, the intangible aspects of my psychology and personality. I do not know if this is the right decision. I know that I will come through to the other side as John Hydrisko, at least until I meet another John Hydrisko. Maybe he will kill me. Maybe I will kill him. In either case, I wonder if the survivor would be tried for homicide or suicide.

But that’s enough worrying for now.

Let’s get on with it.