Refocusing the Ethiopia conflict: grave doubts about the narratives of ‘humanitarian blockade’ and ‘Tigray genocide’
November 15, 2021
Jon Abbink
In the current conflict in Ethiopia between the insurgent movement Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Ethiopian federal government, the propaganda and cyber-space war develop in tandem with the actual fighting on the ground. The second one is tragic for Ethiopian citizens, grossly targeted and victimized; the first one produces poisoned discourse and wilful disinformation, notably from the side of the TPLF ‘news’ media and pro-TPLF supporters in Ethiopia and abroad. Many global media, certain US ‘experts’ and — very puzzlingly — certain Western academics and ‘think tanks’ abandoning reason and decency, chose the side of the TPLF, which was designed on 1 May 2021 as ‘terrorist’ by the Ethiopian parliament. Key in the ongoing debates in cyber-space is a recurring focus on two tropes: ‘famine in Tigray and humanitarian blockade of the region’, and ‘Tigray genocide’. Both are incorrect and do great damage to resolving the conflict.
As it happens, in the past few weeks four reports by different organizations were published on human rights abuses in this conflict. None offer clear evidence of a systematic ‘humanitarian blockade of Tigray’ so as to produce famine, nor of a ’genocide’. All reports are sad reading and tend to show that all sides have perpetrated abuse, although clearly the TPLF is leading here, apparently as a war policy. No one from the TPLF was was ever called to account, in contrast to Ethiopian federal army soldiers and Eritrean soldiers — who were indicted by the Ethiopian Attorney General (now the Ministry of Justice). This process will continue. Reactions to the reports have been various, but that terrible and un acceptable things have occurred — as in any war — is clear.
But what of the labels and the facts? First the ‘genocide’ meme. The term is not used appropriately, but only for shock-effect to impress gullible and historically ignorant people. A funny fact is that already one day after the eruption of the conflict on 4 November 2021 a pro-TPLF social media account posted: ‘Tigray genocide’: when few if any TPLF soldiers (and not civilians) were killed. This agitprop use of the label was advised by a TPLF document. Its use also flouted the international law definition of genocide. According to the definition in the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1951), the claim does not qualify when we look at the figures and the nature of the armed confrontations. People were killed in the battles, including civilians in the cross-fire and in some abusive actions. But of ‘intent to destroy’ a people or nation — needed according to the definition — there was no evidence. I.e., no preconceived plan. The ‘dehumanization’ of a people/group — usually a part of the (preparatory stages of) genocide — was not the case in Ethiopia’s approach to the Tigray people either. The Ethiopian government and the people at large do not bear the Tigray people any ill-will and see them as part of Ethiopia. The problem is with the authoritarian TPLF. Until the last moment before the war started in the night of 4 November 2020, Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed was negotiating with leaders of the TPLF in Meqele to amicably settle outstanding disputes, up until a phone conversation on 3 November. To no avail. The loose use of the G word to qualify the current conflict is also an insult to the victims and the tragedy of real genocides, like that of the Armenians in WW-I (1915), the Herero in Namibia (1904–08), the Jews in WW-II and of Rwandans in 1994.
On the ‘humanitarian blockade of Tigray’ and ‘famine’ we know the following: since the start of the conflict the food economy of Tigray was hit. From day one, however, the federal government allowed and even sent in humanitarian aid to the Region — although never enough. Later, food aid trucks under WFP auspices had to be checked for arms and equipment smuggling (instances of UN people aiding and abetting TPLF are known). For many months the federal government even procured ca. 70% of the aid to Tigray. On 28 June 2021, the TPLF, in a puzzling move, did not accept a ceasefire offer of the federal government that could have stepped up the aid delivery to ‘their’ Region. Instead, they expanded their war, endangering supply routes and even confiscating WPF and other NGO food aid trucks for troop transport — there was no effort to protect the aid convoys. So TPLF tactics looked more like intensifying war: they instrumentalized the dire food scarcity situation as blackmail mechanism and label the federal government as the sole evil-doer. There have been several deaths of hunger, but until this day there was no mass starvation famine.
Implications of all this for the international community, notably USA and EU: there is a need to redefine current policies, marked by non-starter initiatives like sanctions and boycotts, notably of the federal government. These will not help but do the opposite. Critical engagement with the federal government is much more promising than putting hope in the main culprit in this conflict: the TPLF. In fact, their response to human rights reports and the mediation mission by AU special envoy, veteran Nigerian politician Olusegun Obasanjo, was very lukewarm. In the past weeks Obasanjo visited both TPLF leaders in Meqele and the federal government and made an honest effort. But he was disowned by the TPLF afterwards, though cautiously accepted by the federal government. In response, Ethiopia on 11 November 2021 set out its conditions for a process of rapprochement and possible negotiations. It will be an awkward and difficult process under any circumstances as long as cyber-war disinformation and actual fighting fuelled by TPLF will not diminish.
