4th Generation Defensive Warfare: of Memes and Machines.

A.l.
9 min readJan 12, 2018

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4th Generation Warfare and Why it’s Hard to Defend:

4th generation warfare and memetic warfare (a subset of 4th gen warfare) especially defensive warfare can be described by two characteristics asymptomatic and asymmetric. What most fail to realize is that 4th generation warfare is a hybrid integrated style of warfare. Requiring social media and weapons. This article will discuss both sides, however, many if not all concepts apply to both sides.

First, if you are operating a defensive campaign there are some factors you likely:

  • Occupy the high ground.
  • Own or employ a large amount of infrastructure and personnel.
  • Are considered by many to be the legitimate overdog.

These are some crucial factors that’ll be discussed below:

Asymmetric is another word for unbalanced. People who talk and write about 4th Generation warfare often refer to this. Non-uniformed groups or individuals with far fewer resources fight against established powers or entrenched forces. The Vietnam war is the classic example. With the “War on Terror”, including the rise of ISIS (also known as ISIL or Daesh) being the second. Guerrilla forces often have an advantage over entrenched opponents.

Rebel forces often create propaganda and disinformation campaigns against a much large opponent. This is to build a narrative against the larger opponent. Thus using public opinion for recruitment, and as a weapon. Established forces often have better production values and access to widespread mainstream dispersal networks. Both sides are more evenly matched on this front.

Asymptomatic is generally used as a medical term, which simply means showing no symptoms. However, it should now come into the lexicon of generals, tacticians, and fighters. 4th Generation warfare is often an insurgent war, a guerrilla war. So how do you know if you have been infiltrated by rebels or who are planning an attack or spreading what is now called “Fake News”?

You don’t.

An Invisible War:

A city infiltrated by insurgents looks, and acts like the same city without. There are no obvious tanks rolling down main street, a change of the flag or even shift in the news cycle. Social media operates the same as well, with insurgents being able to hide in plain sight. Social media creates communities each with their own acronyms, jargon and slang. Those “radicalized” sometimes doesn’t even post their views especially given today’s climate of unease. Things can go one for weeks, months, or years in this dormant state.

We must view defense in this manner. To fight an invisible war you must prepare early. For you will not see your attacker coming. You cannot spend funds after an attack, or harden defenses. Defense has again become similar to the wild west, or feudal age where the town or village is fixed, while the opposing force is mobile and cunning.

It is hard to defend against any attacker in 4th generation warfare because you as an establishment are entrenched. As the legitimate overdog, you have the resources, reputation, and responsibility. In short, you have more to lose, and are less mobile. Mobility, but more specifically flexibility is key in 4th Generation Warfare. Infrastructure becomes prime targets for commando raids, while reputation and culture are targets for psychological campaigns (PsyOps.).

It is easy to threaten mass invasion, or martial law with boots on the ground, however, this is a fool hearty mistake. As the legitimate overdog, you cannot be seen using a disproportionate response. Putting troops in a town where you believe insurgents are, but are unseen to the general populace is a media nightmare. You will easily be portrayed as a bully or tyrant. Something that erodes trust but more important than that reputation. The quote: “…it takes ten years to build, but ten minutes to ruin” should be heeded.

Money as an Auxiliary, not the Hammer:

In 3rd Generation warfare campaigns and defense, money was the primary driver. The person or nation with the greatest amount of weapon systems: tanks, planes, guns, bombs, nukes, radar, AA etc. won. As such nation-states build vast infrastructures to facilitate this kind of war. But when you can destroy a tank with a rocket launcher, or an F35 with a bird/drone, and improvised explosives (IEDs) can stop a convoys… The cost ratio is massive. When a social media account is free and a picture is worth a thousand words; it can turn the tide of battle more than another battalion. Money plays less of a role in 4th Generation warfare. This is not to say money is not useful just that there are fewer uses for it.

So what does this have to do with defence? Well, I needed to set the table to show you why the current way of thinking doesn’t work.

Your infrastructure will be used against you. With all the money spent on current warfare methods and technology lead to what economists call the “sunk cost fallacy.” In short money will makes adaptation to this new warfare much more difficult. Bureaucracy, rules, systems can all be weaponized. As you will follow protocol while the enemy is flexible.

Any defense spending should be aimed at flexibility. An aircraft carrier is not flexible, by it’s nature it is limited to one place. Its area of effectiveness is limited, unlike Cyberwar. Effectively cyberwar creates an environment where everyone can be attacked. Range and distance know no bounds. Switzerland can just as easily be attacked as Venezuela. Effective cyber defense is a must for any country, corporation, or organization.

Defence at Home:

Physically we cannot do much. Adding barbed wire, tank traps, and checkpoints will make any nation feel more unwelcoming, which kills moral.

Even the addition of smaller devices such as cameras has a negative moral impact on the general populace. The addition of cameras also increases the observer effect, which is something that should not be increased, especially if security is your concern.

While lawmakers and social media companies will tell you they will stop the spread of certain accounts, they are lying. If anyone can make an account within a few minutes and begin sharing videos and pictures to any page or person. There will be no stopping the spread of memes and propaganda. Plus any censorship on social media will kill its network effects making people leave the platform and you back at square one.

In short Memetic warfare will always be effective.

Even if social media became Orwellian enough to stop the spread of memes and propaganda, other websites would pop up. The media will cover any scrap of information seen as rebellious. Evidenced by the tapes released by Osama Bin Ladin when he headed Al-Qaeda and more recent ISIS propaganda videos. The phrase “if it bleeds, it leads” will likely always apply.

These messages target institutions, but more specifically culture. They attack the culture and values of the people. With images, phrases, slogans etc. If these are attacked and damaged sufficiently a single bullet may never be fired while revolution occurs.

So What can we do Against a Negative Denigration Campaign?

First assume they cannot be stopped. Assume that the faucet will always flow, if so what would you do instead? This sounds ridiculous, as no one has unlimited resources. However with 4th Generation warfare people often fighting because of a weaponized idea, and ideas are hard to kill. To defend against an idea radically different approaches must be taken.

While money cannot be used for an absolute advantage it can provide an edge. This may include, but is not limited to more information, more researchers, better computers, sound equipment, audio visual programs, and the create of a repository.

Three things to Counter a Denigration Campaign:

First people must believe the speaker is not credible. If the organization or nation in question can target the speaker’s credibility then the public will be less affected by what they say. Remember we give weight to threats we focus on and believe are credible. Osama Bin Ladin and Al-Qaeda were only credible because of the terror attacks on 9/11. Otherwise the threats would have been deemed just another crackpot in a cave.

Second would be the bolstering of values, culture, and institutions. Strong cultures and values that are instilled in people are more unshakeable when faced with adversity. Especially when compared to cultures and values that groups do not have consensus on. Reinforce the values, ideas, and traditions that the country or organization was founded on. What unites must be stronger than what divides.

By doing this you make the people more resilient to attacks both memetically and from terror attacks. The phrase that has now been bastardized of “Keep Calm and Carry on” is a great example of this bolstering technique.

The “Russian’s Hacking” the 2016 Presidential election is now a meme. Even if the Russian didn’t do any such thing people now believe that American Democracy (also a meme) is compromised. The seed of doubt has been sowed. This is now a denigration campaign. One far more effective and deadly then people realize.

Every actor State, and Non-State needs to publicly declare and harden infrastructure and systems to prevent cyber intrusion or attacks. Even if the system is hardened already security reviews and sweeps must be done. Public military parades are not done just to show military might, but rather boost national pride.

Third would be to limit or cut off the propaganda at its source. As previously discussed censoring social media is not an option. The only other option is to remove the ability for the opponent to make effective memetic warfare. This can be done in a number of ways, large-scale jammers around enemy bases, or through assassination of those involved.

4th Generation Warfare Defence: Terror Cells.

Given that a real 4th Generation war requires little money it may be difficult to root out individuals. The IRA, the FLQ, and the Viet Kong provide many examples across many countries on how it they handled. Generally poorly.

Especially with the rise of new technologies such as drones, it may make fewer people more potent. Large standing armies are likly the thing of the past. While wanting regulations such as pilot licenses for drones may sound like a good idea in theory, like guns they will always be used illegally.

The rise of “Lone Wolves” is a grave concern for many Nation-States; as it should as individuals radicalized by an idea are difficult to find and predict. While blaming lone wolves on paper for other terror cell attacks sounds good on paper, if exposed the loss of credibility is enormous.

For drones, it is recommended that signal jammers be placed at high-value targets, with many installed at major public centres, which are always off and only activated in an emergency.

The Need for Covert Defense:

Overt defense will look to many to be a new form of McCarthyism or Stalin’s Purges. The recent militarization of police makes them more look like an occupying force then a law enforcement agency. Both of which undermine the credibility of institutions. Something that as previously discussed is counter to the goal of defense.

So what can be done?

Any defensive measure taken should not be visible unless a treat is imminent. The public will not believe that terror is at home unless terrorist attacks occur frequently. Another “Red Scare” is not what any institution or government wants.

Begin the process of compartmentalization. Departments should only be given what they need to know. Departments and agencies should also share information, when possible. Infrastructure should be used to the advantage of who built it.

Occasionally compartmentalized departments should be given varied information. This information should often be minor. Discrepancies in counterintelligence should be noted. Leaks should be treated with the utmost importance.

Rules, regulations, and standardized playbooks should all be restricted access and updated. Strict regulation following leaves organizations vulnerable to exploitation. If rules are well known then their vulnerabilities are also well known. The classic example of Blue Helmets in Rwanda being the most horrific case of this. By making responses varied it makes it more difficult for enemy combatants to formulate a counter-response.

Generals should look at the Homefront as the new battlefield, and take a page from Urban Planning via “Hostile Architecture” or programmers with Defensive design. Secretly concealed design choices hidden in plain sight that steer people from or toward certain activities. By doing this you limit the number of targets unconsciously to ones more manageable.

Conclusion:

Defense has become much harder than offense currently. This is by no means a comprehensive list of physical or memetic defenses. It is just the beginning. The practices and theories will only expand. I hope this offered a brief insight into the current and upcoming generation of warfare.

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