Daughter’s Right under Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005
Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ‘Vineeta Sharma Vs. Rakesh Sharma & Ors.’ have delivered one important judgment on the interpretation of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act (HSA) affirming the equal rights of daughters to coparcenary property. Now the question arises here if there is already amended Act of 2005, so what is the actual role of this judgment?
Let’s get into the matter started with a married daughter, Vineeta Sharma who has filed a suit for partition asking for her share as a coparcener against her brothers and mother in respect of property purchased and build up by her father who died on December, 1999. There is no dispute if the father passes away after 09.09.2005 (the date of enforcement of Amendment Act, 2005), whether a suit is pending or not, the daughter is entitled to a share in the joint family property. But the issue involved in this matter was- If a father died before 2005 can a daughter still claim her share in the coparcenary property? And what if there was an oral partition subsequent to the death of father before 2005? Would that deprive the daughter of her right in the property?
Various High Courts had also dealt with ancillary issues concerning the aforesaid question. The matter came up before the larger Bench of the Apex Court primarily in the context of conflicting decisions in Prakash Vs. Phulavati (2016) 2 SCC 36 and Danamma Vs. Amar (2018) 3 SCC 343 concerning the retrospective applicability of Section 6 of Hindu Succession Amendment Act, 2005.
- In Phulavati’s case in 2016 it had ruled that the amendments to the Hindu Succession Act (2005) applied only to women whose parents were alive on September 9, 2005. That means if a daughter made a claim for partition of joint family property, her father ought to be alive as of 09.09.2005 and if not, she was not entitled to any share in the coparcenary property.
- On the other hand, in Danamma case, the Apex Court had held that Section 6 would apply retrospectively. It inferred that coparcenary rights were birth rights. The Court granted the rights in a coparcenary to a daughter of a coparcener who had passed away prior to 09.09.2005 and if there is a prior suit pending by a male coparcener for partition, the female coparceners will be entitled to a share in the partition.
Accordingly, in this present case of Vineeta Sharma Vs. Rakesh Sharma, the three Judges Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court has overruled contrary observations made in case Prakash Vs. Phulavati. While pronouncing the judgment, Justice Mishra remarked: “Once a daughter, always a daughter, son is a son only till he is married.” Justice Mishra added that daughters must be given equal rights as a son and a daughter will remain a coparcener throughout life, irrespective of whether her father is alive or not. A daughter will remain a loving daughter throughout life. In the judgement the Supreme Court bench observed that:
· The court held that the daughter of a coparcener shall have the same rights and liabilities as she would have been a son.
· All daughters would be entitled to coparcenary rights irrespective of their marital status, even in those states which had state amendments to the contrary.
· The Bench proceeded to hold the right of the daughters under the Amending Act of 2005 to be retroactive rather prospective. The operation of retroactive statute is based upon the character or status that arose earlier.
· Amendment of 2005 dealt with major controversy with respect to the rights of daughters in the property i.e., Whether it is essential for father to be alive on 09.09.2005? Here, it is significant to note that the right which is recognised under Section 6 is the right by birth and so it is an unobstructed heritage. Hence, it is not the obstructed heritage, depending upon the owner’s death. The Supreme Court has correctly held that since the 2005 amendment accorded daughters a coparcenary right by birth, it is unobstructed heritage and so the existence of the father at the time of the 2005 amendment is irrelevant.
· Furthermore, the so-called oral partition cannot be a ground to deprive the daughter from her part of share in the property.
· The Supreme Court applied the principle that partition is not complete with passing of a preliminary decree and attains finality only with the passing of the final decree. The Supreme Court held that although the suit was filed in the year 2002, the preliminary decree was passed in the year 2007 and therefore, the daughters were entitled to the benefit of the Amendment Act.
Conclusion- Now, how do you look at the judgment in Vineeta Sharma in the light of the court’s overall jurisprudence on gender equality? Can we say the judgment in Vineeta Sharma Vs. Rakesh Sharma has ended years of uncertainty over the correct interpretation of Section 6 of HSA 1956? Yes, we can say so. The judgment delivered by the Supreme Court is praiseworthy simply for reiterating the idea that women are born as equals and that it is the patriarchal mindset and customary practices that accord them an inferior status. It is gratifying that constitutional principles of equality are being applied to the Hindu law of inheritance. These amendments can empower women both economically and socially. Rights in coparcenary property and the dwelling house also provide social protection to women facing spousal violence or marital breakdown. However, there are significant cultural, religious, educational barriers and caste and class inequalities that require a massive overhauling of social attitudes to overcome. So even as we welcome the court decision, we remain sceptical about its implementation and its actual benefits to women.
Note: You can read my previous article on ‘Daughter’s Right under Hindu Succession Act, 1956' here.
