GETTING INSIDE: ARSENAL’S INTERIORS

Lorcan
10 min readSep 12, 2023

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“I have begun to think of life as a series of ripples widening out from an original centre.” - Seamus Heaney

THE MIDDLE OF THE PITCH

In a sport whose rules encourage a myriad of different playing styles and philosophies, and whose geographical and cultural reach allow for countless interpretations of the rules, access to the middle of the football pitch still reigns supreme.

Now, that might sound crude. And I don’t want to mislead. In fact, one of the notable trends of Arsenal’s nascent campaign is the tendency of its pivot players to abandon central areas of the pitch and join the backline/wide areas. So what, exactly, am I talking about?

In the spirit of saving time, I am going to cheat and call upon the father of positional play, Josep Guardiola.

Both interviews above are transcribed by @JimenaJuani, who has kindly allowed for their usage in this article and who can be found on Patreon and Twitter.

In both clips, Guardiola outlines the importance of having players in the middle of the pitch, even going as far as to state that that is where “the best players should play.” Guardiola draws reference to a number of different superiorities that are engendered by the occupation of central zones, both defensively and offensively, but both stemming from a common fact: the proximity of (multiple) passing options.

On the flanks, this isn’t the case. As Guardiola points out, “the sideline… is the best defender” — the geometric finitude of a football pitch means that the wide player has less angles at their disposal. In central zones, there are more angles and where there are more angles, there are more workable solutions for the player who has the ball. In short, there are more choices.

A team’s collective ability to access the middle is, therefore, inarguably important. Not only is the middle where potentiality is more abundant but it is also, as you get further up the pitch, where the highest quality chances come from. The penalty spot is in the centre, rather than to one side, because the former yields a higher quality scoring opportunity for the kick-taker.

SO WHAT DOES THIS HAVE TO DO WITH ARSENAL?

We’ll get there — I promise. Now, we’ve established that there are superiorities that come by way of having the ball in central areas. But what do these superiorities rely upon? Why doesn’t every team just play through the middle a bit more?

In a word, the players who occupy these central zones have to be able to have a base skillset, which, interestingly enough Guardiola makes sure to underline, “can be taught to any player.”

I’ve categorised the pertinent qualities as follows (with the important caveat that though this applies to “central players” generally, I am thinking of interiors — that is to say, the advanced #8/#10 types — given the focus of this article):

  • The player must have a good gauge of space and time: This has to do with a player’s temperament and game intelligence. In Guardiola’s words, when you are in the middle, “they attack you from all sides”. The ability to gauge space and time where there is less of it is vital in order to retain the ball.
  • The ability to receive the ball: This might sound like a moot point but where there is less space and time, players must be able to receive so as to set up their next action well. They have to be, to some degree, mobile and/or nimble. Body control must marry temperamental quality.
  • The ability to turn with the ball: Players in the middle will normally be receiving with their back to goal. They must sometimes turn to face it, upon reception. In order to do that, they must be able to turn with the ball.
  • The ability to pass the ball: The proximity of players will help but players must have a base level of “technical empathy” given that the recipient of their pass might well also have limited space and time at their disposal.
  • The ability to manipulate the ball: To what extent can the player in question, when asked to, manipulate the ball so as to disguise their next action?

“Passing the ball is communicating with another person; it’s being in the service of another person. It’s crucial. For the pass to be a good one, the player has to put himself in the position of the person who’s going to receive it. It’s an act of intelligence and generosity, what I call technical empathy.” — Arsène Wenger.

THE ARSENAL OF LAST SEASON: ØDEGAARD AND XHAKA

So, let’s have a very brief look at the interiors that Arsenal used last season and how their skillsets fare, starting with their weaknesses.

Ødegaard:

He’s hilariously one-footed, which impacts how he can receive the ball and where he can pass/move it with it, after reception (something we often refer to as angle bias). He’s also not a good shielder of the ball. Given that he has such a pronounced angle bias, and can’t reliably use his frame to protect the ball upon reception in these central, congested areas, his retention capacity when he is static in these zones is more limited. He makes up for it with an extremely good gauge of space and time (like I’m talking near best in the world). He’s impossibly good at finding the spaces in the pockets and regularly alters his step and stride length in order to receive optimally in these tighter areas of the pitch. I’ve personally never seen anyone work around such an obvious flaw in their skillset (one-footedness/angle bias) as creatively and efficiently as Ødegaard.

Xhaka:

This was the first full season that Xhaka had ever played between the lines for Arsenal. Xhaka is relatively broad and stodgy for an advanced player. He’s not as nimble as your Pedri’s or even your Gündogan’s of the world, which hampered his capacity to turn and face play. Still yet, his ball manipulation was solid enough to remain ‘unpredictable’ and like Ødegaard, his gauge of space and time was excellent. So often we’d see him play quick wall passes out wide upon reception, perfectly aware that he couldn’t stop and start on a dime like other advanced #8s.

So, we get a glimpse at the self-awareness of these players. Their qualities are as much about the recognition of their relative weaknesses in a tactically demanding area of the pitch, as they are about their inherent strengths. The larger point I am making is that the team and coaching staff also acknowledged these weaknesses and adapted the playing style, accordingly. Whereas there were times last season where Arsenal’s lack of collective ability to generate chances in the advanced half-spaces held them back (Newcastle (H) springs to mind), the team made adjustments to remain potent offensively. Arteta made affordances to highlight the strengths of Arsenal’s interiors and limit the opportunities for their weaknesses to be conspicuous. Besides, that is essentially what tactics is.

TACTICAL ACCOMMODATIONS

One of the first things you might have noticed was Arsenal’s tendency to have their interiors shuttle out to wider areas. I compared this to City’s box-midfield structure here, but essentially, Ødegaard and Xhaka’s pinning responsibilities were situational more than they were absolute. Receiving outside of the block allowed the player in question to have more space and time compared to if they were to have receive inside of it.

Ødegaard getting ready to receive the ball outside of the opposite block. Both games (City, Community Shield; Forest, Premier League) are of this season, showing that this is, unsurprisingly, a continuing theme.

And it goes without saying that these patterns shouldn’t be conceived of in isolation. As one or both of Arsenal’s inteiors vacated their zone to receive out wide, Arsenal’s #9, most often Gabriel Jesus, could drop deep into said zone to connect play.

Viz #1: Arsenal’s passing network from the Manchester United game (H) this season. Neither Havertz (deep) and Ødegaard (wide) received most of their passes in central areas in a way you might expect other interiors to have done. Note the accessibility of Nketiah by way of the positioning of Arsenal’s midfielders. Viz #2: Most of Arsenal’s final third passes were from in-to-out, into the path of wingers, or sometimes one of Havertz or Ødegaard. There were little forward passes from the pivots into the advanced midfielders, demonstrated by the scarcity of arrows just outside the penalty box.

Arsenal also built quickly, launching transitions where apposite. Guardiola talks below of the superiorities a team is granted in defensive transition when that team builds through the third incrementally, as a collective. That might be true but the point is that there was less incentive for Arsenal to always do that because of the profiles of its interiors — specifically, their lack of ability to command superiorities in the advanced half-sapces. Building quickly would grant Arsenal access to its interiors in central areas with more space and time.

All of the above are situations where Arsenal eschew incremental progression in favour of finding their interiors (top two, Ødegaard; bottom two, Xhaka) while they have space ahead of them. It’s worth mentioning that Xhaka’s superior running power made him a better off-ball threat, hence Zinchenko and Partey looking to pick out depth runs.

Interestingly enough, this phenomenon has been tangentially referenced by several members of the Arsenal squad when talking to the media. Here, Arsenal winger Reiss Nelson talks about the “basketball rule”, where transitions are sought out when Arsenal recover the ball.

And this partially explains Ramsdale’s tactical instruction to kick long into the feet/chest of one of Arsenal’s front three, whereafter passes could be cushioned into the path of an on-running midfielder.

As the above graph shows, Ramsdale would often kick long to kick-start attacks.

Not only did Arsenal’s interiors enjoy more space and time on the ball when Arsenal built quickly, but they were also afforded a lot of diagonal passes, which are much easier to receive. I’ll let the big boys do the explaining as to why exactly that is more effective. It is of course worth pointing out that both Guardiola and Arteta are talking about passes into the feet of wingers from full-backs, however, this remains just as true as passes into the feet of advanced midfielders. Diagonal passes allowed Arsenal’s interiors to receive the ball in dynamic game-environments. I have hopefully already conveyed why neither Ødegaard nor Xhaka could receive optimally with their back faced to goal. Well, this was an another consideration.

Guardiola talking about the diagonal pass from the full-back to the winger that is granted because of the advanced midfielders, when they pin inside the block.
Diagonal passes into Arsenal’s interiors of last season, that they can get ready to receive in their path.

The trade-off, as I’m sure you’ve already figured out by now, was less security in defensive transition moments. The truth is that this was a price that Arteta was more than willing to pay (so long as we understand the consequent tweaks that were made to the rest defence structure, which incidentally includes the recruitment of Declan Rice).

Again, Guardiola talking about how it is easier for teams to defend transition situations when they are more measured and less direct in their attacking play.

THE ARSENAL OF THIS SEASON

I’ve so far avoided talk of Arsenal this season. I have, however, included screenshots and data visuals from this season in the understanding that Arsenal are still bound to, or embrace (I suppose it depends how you view it) much of the same dynamics with regard to interior play.

The tactical accommodations that were made brought about a collective identity. A young, energetic, dynamic and (literally) forward-thinking football team. Arsenal were relentless when they wanted to be. And despite the relative flaws in the skillsets of their interiors, Arsenal actually could break teams down in settled attacking play. They might not have been City-level at it (who is?) but there were a number of times where we saw passes from the first or second line into the feet of Arsenal’s advanced midfielders, where the latter could turn and create.

Arsenal’s third game of the 23/24 season, against Fulham (H). A forward pass is achieved into the feet of Ødegaard by Saliba, possible because of Saliba’s deception and Ødegaard’s capacity to find space in the pockets.

With that being said, the identity that Arteta and Arsenal managed to cultivate was a big part of their success in the 22/23 campaign. And, though I won’t get into the particulars of this season all of four league games in, a lot of those conditions detailed in the ‘TACTICAL ACCOMMODATIONS’ section have been harder to find.

Arsenal’s recruitment, though impressive, did not address the lack of qualitative superiority in advanced half-spaces (the in-house options of Fabio Vieira and Emile Smith-Rowe should probably be noted though the latter is still yet to feature in the league this season.) Havertz, for reasons I won’t go into, is no better than Xhaka in those areas. The same hurdle must therefore be navigated and that has, so far, been difficult to do. Part of that has been the integration of new players and the other new dynamics that have been incorporated. And another part of that has been the deliberate efforts of opposition sides to take away the very game-environments that empowered Arsenal’s interiors.

Now, again, I am going to refrain from trying to delve into the specifics but a simple look at the at the Field Tilt (broadly, a metric that measures a team’s territory control) reveals that Arsenal have almost 10% more than last season. The eye test supports that data point; no team in the league this season has significantly challenged Arsenal’s build-up, presumably because of how acutely Arsenal manipulated space openings for their interiors last season. Play has therefore been concentrated down the wide channels (incidentally, Arsenal have also struggled to get their wingers closer to the goal) and access into the middle has been difficult to achieve.

Arsenal are good again. Seriously good. But that means that teams are affording them that more respect, more readily acquiescing territory out of possession. The new season brings new challenges, Arsenal will have to kick it up a level. But hey…

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