MPPJ Burnt Ends

In the religion of barbeque, burnt ends are Elysian. The charred end pieces of a smoked brisket often, taken together, are more potent than the brisket itself.

One of the many benefits to being on the MPPJ team is that we come across these burnt ends in the form of ideas, questions and experiences offered from leaders in the field. Often a sentence or paragraph in a larger note, these offered ideas are evocative and taken together, provide you, the reader, compelling perspectives to consider. Below are excerpts from recent conversations with leaders from across the regiment. Spanning rank, position, topic and location, below are quotes from your peers as they consider different aspects of our profession.

On transitioning from Soldier to civilian (from a 1LT that separated)
“In my first three weeks here, I created a standardized way to brief information in meetings (CONOPs), reporting procedures for all security personnel (5Ws 2.0) and eliminated a serious vulnerability in our visitor badge policy. I’m going to suggest that we plan events at least six weeks in advance, and have periodic follow-ups on the progress of the planning (Glidepath/IPRs) Over the next year I will be working to integrate the ICS model into our emergency response procedures while liaising with local fire and police who already follow ICS (Integrated Policing). I am working on dividing the campus into areas of operation and organize the 200+ security officers into teams. As it stands now, officers have no idea where or when they will be working from week to week which contributes to a culture of individualism. We have ACPs, mobile patrols, static patrols, bike patrols, and have the same problems MPs have with complacency, patrols falling asleep in their vehicles, etc. We currently don’t have any measures of performance or effectiveness, and don’t collect any data to support this. Lastly, we need a Security Officer Training Seminar (SOTS aka LETS, ha!), to improve baseline security fundamentals — because there is currently no training program…no SOPs…no TACSOP… 
As I’ve been making suggestions here, people look at me like I’m some kind of wizard. It really is funny how things work out. I’m quite literally doing the same work — just in a different environment. And I have begun to see how the things I learned in the Army proved to be way more useful than I thought they would be. I wish I could speak to those junior officers who doubt the importance of what they are doing as I once did.”

On MP unit performance at NTC, JRTC and JMRC (from a CPT):
“The narrative is that, “[BCTs] don’t know how to use us” and consequently JRTC/NTC rotations have no role for MP. The responsibility is on us — we are not stepping to the plate as pitches come by. It is important I think for us to recognize that difference. It is easy to lament the poor, stupid BCTs that don’t know how to use us. It is much harder to look in the mirror and realize we aren’t trained to take advantage of opportunities right in front of us. I personally believe that MP Utilization changes are more closely tied to the performance of MP, than on the BCT’s (or BEB’s) decision to employ/not employ. MP must create value to the BCT through demonstrated proficiency and application of our Technical Capabilities and Tactical Tasks. This process must begin at home station. The training management (or the lack of operationalization at home-station) is not preparing Military Police formations to succeed at enabling combat power for decisive action.”

On Captain Halsey’s 1933 Senior Class Thesis:

On how to standardize MP Brigade effort across the regiment so effort is synchronized, goals are achieved and progress isn’t personality dependent (from a MAJ):
“The huge elephant in the room is that as a Regiment, we don’t actually have a Commanding General. So, each Brigade commander is beholden to the rater and senior rater they work for. Most of them toe the party line, but when it comes down to it, these guys work for their senior raters. This relationship is repeated all the way down to the Battalion level. Having two masters will always place MP leaders (at every level) with one foot in the door and the other out.

Until we have an MP command, where the Brigade commanders are senior rated by THE PMG as the MP Commanding General, I truly don’t think that we are ever going to holistically achieve what we collectively want. There will be individual Brigades and Battalions, for 2–4 years depending on the leadership, which will be successful and will push the Regiment in the right direction. But until we get strategic guidance from the CSA that directs the MP Corps to do something, I think that we will always maintain the status quo.

It’s interesting that you asked if our MP generation had a Tet. I think that if there were any event, the second Fort Hood shooting should’ve been our “Tet” moment. The Army clearly looked to the Regiment (CID and CS) to take away all of the lessons learned from FH2 and make the changes required. And yet we still don’t have standardized LE equipment across the force. We still don’t have standardized DES/PM relationships…and so on…Why? Because each brigade commander will continue to row their own boat their own way, toward the direction of the Corps commander, or TSC commander, or DIV commander they work for. Until we are all sitting in the same boat, rowing the same cadence, we won’t change course as a Regiment.”

On the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units and USARAF’s mobile forensic labs: “USARAF’s deployable mobile forensic labs can handle just about anything a crime scene investigation lab deals with in the United States,” said Gallegos.”

On whether to backstop or confront leader weaknesses (from a 1LT):
“On a philosophical note though, I recognize the call to continue moving the company forward, and the opportunity that falls to 1SG, OPS, and myself to carry the guidon; however, why as leaders do we allow that to happen? I understand that this sets you and I on a loop in our conversation, but if we all work to cover down on a leader’s deltas (and likewise others to cover our own), this leader will advance and continue to impact more and more Soldiers with their deltas, correct? So we recognize large holes in leadership, do a good job on covering down in those holes, and carry the company for 18 months. Won’t he/ she go on to possibly command a battalion? If this leader fails to recognize their deltas and if other leaders do not hold them accountable to change, their scope of impact will continue to grow. I suppose it could be viewed as a darker version of the “pay it forward” concept.

Am I becoming utilitarian in wanting to hold leaders accountable to change when glaring issues are identified? These conversations may very well happen at a higher level, it would be out of my visibility if they did. At a lower level though, it is difficult to imagine that they are happening, or at least being perceived by this particular leader, due to a lack of change in behavior.”

On the Commandant’s initial thoughts. The commandant recently published his 90–120 Day Assessment and several points are worth further discussion. In this document, he outlined a SWOT (Strength, Weakness, Opportunity, Threat) assessment as seen from the field and from his own perspective. The Commandant assessed, “Integration of CID and MP Organization (Training Opportunities)” as a weakness. He assessed, “Increased cross leveling of 31B in our corrections formations” and “integration of 31Z MOS across the regiment” as opportunities. The field assessed, “Policing Accreditation” and “Standardization of LE Equipment” as USAMPS opportunities. The field assessed, “Uncertainty over the future of the MP Corps” as a USAMPS threat.

On the perceived stigma of spending time in CID (from a LTC):
“Until I saw CID folks being successful after their time in CID, I didn’t believe they would be. Now that I see them being successful and the focus on diversity within the Corps I’m a believer. We as a Corps need to see our Leaders from CID come in and out and be successful…… Once that happens the stigma dissipates.”

On the cost of dual-hatting (from a LTC): One of the groups at the 42d MP BDE Solarium took note that the battalion commander was not dual-hatted as the Provost Marshal, observed resultant impacts to mission command and policing unity of effort and recommended to the brigade commander that the battalion commander dual-hat as the provost marshal. The brigade commander commented that, “CSLs (Centralized Selection Lists — the process by which a board chooses battalion commanders) don’t select provost marshals. They select battalion commanders.” A striking comment to those in the room, the brigade commander elaborated that focusing on provost marshal requirements would distract the commander from traditional battalion command responsibilities. Reaching out to a dual-hatted battalion commander for thoughts, the person offered the below. 
“I came into these jobs with a full head of steam and very passionate about being both (PM and BC) at the same time. I think it is possible to be effective in both at the same time. However, there are variables in play outside your control that can temper that wildly based on where you go and what your seniors’ priorities are.

Within about 90 days of taking on these roles, I began to seriously change my inward thoughts about it. I realized that I had spent 10 consecutive years as a staff officer, waiting and dreaming for the opportunity to command again. And now that I am in command, I find that the bulk of my time is consumed with my secondary staff officer role. It makes me bitter and angry.

So, at this point I concur with the notion that the Army didn’t centrally select me to be a Garrison Staff Officer. They selected me to command. It is a daily battle to make sure I don’t end up treating the BN as an extra duty, when most of my daily interaction with my superiors all point to the PM role. Yesterday was the fourth time in 7 months that I was able to go out to the field for an extended amount of time and spend time with one of my companies in GREEN Cycle. Am not terribly proud of that.

I hope whatever the MP Corps is doing, they make a decision and stick to it long term. If this whole dual hat thing is a relatively temporary experiment then this becomes even more frustrating.”

On, “The Evolving Art of Training Management” : “Senior leaders have two choices. They can either reinforce the refrain that young leaders do not know how to train, or they can proactively educate and, in some cases, simply introduce young leaders to the basic tools of training management.”

Every so often, we’ll publish these gathered ends of food for thought. Please share your thoughts, replies and ideas below or to https://www.facebook.com/Military-Police-Project-Junto-243296519169708/.