The NATO security guarantee that may not come

While Baltic states have showed concern for Russian intentions for about as long as we can remember, the Western Transatlantic community was always (understandably) quick to hand them a paper bag and tell them to take a few deep breaths. Lithuania has now demonstrated that they really, truly, like seriously guys, are worried about Russia. Are you a male between the ages of 19 and 26? Then it’s time to be all that you can be! With that, the small Baltic nation has reintroduced conscription. Eastern European states cannot be blamed for feeling worried given recent events, or, well, history in general. In the case of the Baltics, the concern is mostly centered around the possibility of Russian “little green men” fomenting an uprising in ethnic Russian regions. This is also a nice symbolic gesture even though Russian forces would likely overwhelm the country’s defenses in short order.

The bigger question, however, is whether NATO would invoke Article V of the Washington Treaty and actually respond militarily if such an event were to occur. Sure, US military units parading near the Russian border as part of Estonian independence day may prove a small point. EUCOM chief Gen. Philip Breedlove also stated, as part of the most recent theater posture statement, that the current system of rotating temporary units to the continent doesn’t replace the impact of permanent forces. But can we really take too much from that other than it being a usual complaint from a COCOM commander that Congress isn’t giving his part of the world enough cheese?

My experience—and everyone else’s conventional wisdom, to be frank—doesn’t make me so optimistic that Article V commitments would actually hold in the event of conflict. Eastern European states don’t really have the luxury of waiting on their Western neighbors to find a solution to the current impasse (for a proposed solution, see here). Fortunately, you don’t have to ask them twice to begin preparing for the unthinkable.

That also raises the question of how likely such a conflict is in the first place. Two years ago such conflicts would seem incredibly unlikely outside of the minds of “just-in-case” contingency planners, but the events of the last year make it hard to pin down what the Kremlin will do next. Is there any rationality left in the Russian calculus? Eastern Europe is holding its breath for an answer, and this time they have good reason to do so.