How to Build a Borough: Waltham Forest (2/3)
The transformation of Waltham Forest from a sleepy suburb into London’s fastest-growing local economy offers a real-time lesson in twenty-first century place-making. But is it an example that other places should emulate or eschew? You can read part one of this essay here.
How the borough was transformed — 2003 to 2023
In part two of this three-part essay, I explain how the borough leadership in Waltham Forest built on the modernisation of governance within the Town Hall to institute a process of radical and rapid change on the ground. In the two decades from 2003 to 2023, the area has been transformed from an under-performing backwater into the fastest-growing borough in London.
I start by exploring the new leadership’s theory of the case as to why Waltham Forest was being held back. I then explain how the council jump-started the borough’s economy through action in three areas:
· Repositioning.
· Regenerating.
· Rebranding.
I refer regularly to the ‘borough leadership’. Clearly, over two decades, the individuals who make up that leadership changed. I use the phrase as a general term to describe the senior officers and elected leaders who, over that period, pursued a broadly consistent approach to growth.
In the third and final part of this essay, I will analyse what this rapid growth has meant for residents, and answer the overall exam question: is the transformation of Waltham Forest an example that other places should emulate or eschew?
Theory of the case
The new post-2003 leadership had a clear theory of the case. They were convinced, correctly, that the borough had huge but hitherto untapped potential for growth. The London economy was growing faster than it had for decades, and Waltham Forest was supremely-well positioned to take advantage of that expansion.
The capital’s overheated property market was forcing more and more households and businesses out of the centre and into less expensive areas of outer London. During the 1990s, people priced out of Zone 1 had moved into Zone 2 boroughs like Hackney. By the 2000s, Zone 2 was becoming unaffordable and people were looking to move further out again.
This is the point at which Waltham Forest’s location became a major asset. The borough was well-connected to the centre of London, via the Central and Victoria tube lines and stations on what became the London Overground.
There were good quality Victorian, Edwardian and inter-war homes in the borough albeit not in great numbers, as we’ll shortly explore. Departing and declining industries were also leaving behind warehouses and workshops that, with a bit of resourceful retro-fitting, could be turned into flexible maker-spaces beloved of the new economy.
God’s Own Junkyard is a “funky art store featuring colourful neon & lightbulb signs & other eclectic pieces”. It’s late founder, Chris Bracey, was an expert in neon signage, starting his career with adult entertainment venues in Soho.
His fame grew to such an extent that he supplied specialist lighting props to film directors like Tim Burton and Christopher Nolan. The core business remains lighting, but the store now has its own café and gallery and is part of a cluster of venues including a gin joint and a micro-brewery.
Before it opened, the site was an empty warehouse on a semi-vacant industrial estate. The launch of God’s Own Junkyard predates the period we are examining, but it provided a template that many others have sought to replicate.
The borough also had the raw materials for an appealing culture offer, with venues like the William Morris gallery and connections to other famous offspring like Alfred Hitchcock. And it was blessed with large amounts of greenspace, especially in the north. According to a 2009 borough strategy, it contained 49 parks, from small ‘pocket parks’ to the vast Lee Valley Regional Park.
However, the potential offered by all these strengths and assets would remain unfulfilled, unless the borough leadership could tackle three interconnected problems.
A small and misaligned local economy. As already observed, the local economy in the early 2000s was the smallest in London. Part of the reason for the low rate of growth was that the local economy was not aligned with the wider economic geography of the capital.
The borough had been losing jobs in declining industries and creating few vacancies in the high-skilled, high-wage parts of the new economy. Between 1997 and 2008, for example, the number of people employed in manufacturing halved, while employment in construction decreased by a fifth. Many of the new jobs that were being created were insecure and part-time roles in sectors like retail, hospitality, and social care.
As observed in part one, previous administrations had deliberately oriented the local economy away from inner London and toward Essex and the Thames estuary. That made some sense while London was in decline but, by the 2000s, was entirely self-defeating. London was booming even before it won the 2012 Olympic Games. So the task was to re-orient the borough economy a full 180 degrees, from east to west, to focus first and foremost on the capital.
Poor-quality physical and social infrastructure. The borough needed to build more and better homes, and complement these with higher-quality public services, especially schools.
In blunt terms, many parts of the old Waltham Forest didn’t offer people a very appealing quality of life. As noted earlier, the old Victorian, Edwardian, and inter-war homes were popular. Much of the rest of the stock, however, was a mixture of low-quality private rented accommodation and disinvested social housing that contained concentrations of severe deprivation.
A place that offers few decent jobs and overcrowded, underfunded homes is not going to attract and retain households with choice over where they live. As the 2008 Housing Strategy noted, “a disproportionate number of higher income earners are choosing to leave the borough”. Larger families were also being pushed out as 80% of the total housing stock consisted of smaller units in the form of flats and terraced houses.
Of course, people want access to services and facilities as well as a place to live. As reflected in the Comprehensive Area Assessment, local services were often poor quality. This was a serious problem for a borough that wanted to reverse the exodus of higher-income households for whom proximity to good services, especially schools, is a paramount consideration.
In May 2000, the Office for Standards in Education had carried out an inspection of the Local Education Authority (LEA). Its findings were bleak. Overall, strategic management of education was “weak” and most schools had justifiably little faith in the LEA. The number of secondary school that were a cause of concern was “worryingly high” and the LEA was not meeting its statutory requirements in some areas.
As well as re-orienting the economy, core services in the borough also had to be turned around.
A weak brand. It’s worth explaining my terms here, as the concept of ‘brand’ is often misunderstood and misused. By brand, I mean the feelings and associations that are conjured by coming into contact with a person, organisation, or in this case, a place.
This is sometimes referred to as the ‘emotional aftertaste’. What are you left thinking and feeling after you have come into contact with Amazon through its website? With your bank after using its app? Or with your local high street after going to buy some basics? Satisfied or frutrated? Impressed or annoyed?
The brand is different from the brand-ing, which is the logo, font, and colour scheme. So when I say that Waltham Forest had a weak brand, I’m not complaining about the typeface used on its street signs.
The problems were deeper than that. As already noted, Waltham Forest was not well known as a place. Most people outside the borough hadn’t heard of it, and many people inside did not have a strong association with it.
The constituent parts of the borough were better known, but not always for positive reasons. Chingford was associated with Margaret Thatcher’s chief lieutenant Normal Tebbit. A man once described as a “semi-house-trained pole cat” would be few people’s ideal brand ambassador.
The lack of attention given to branding was reflected in a far more visible and immediate problem. Parts of the borough looked and felt scruffy and neglected. As an independent report by the consultancy Renaisi put it in 2007:
“Waltham Forest’s main routes do not project an attractive streetscape. Thoroughfares such as Lea Bridge Rd, Leyton High Rd, Leytonstone High Rd, Hoe St, Forest Rd, Wood Street and Chingford Mount, project a poor image because of urban decay including low quality shop frontages, poor street furniture, narrow pavement areas and inappropriate car parking arrangements on roadsides.”
All in all, the council had a lot of work to do. From the macro-level, with an economy looking the wrong way, to the micro-level, with shop frontages that nobody wanted to look at.
In response, the borough leadership pursued a three-pronged strategy: repositioning; regenerating; and rebranding.
Repositioning
The borough repositioned the local economy in three ways:
· Integrating the borough with pan-London strategies and initiatives.
· Extending and upgrading the borough’s transport infrastructure.
· Re-organising the relevant parts of the council to focus “solely on growth”.
These attempts were broadly integrated and coordinated, in so far as integration is possible in a council facing multiple demands and regular changes in political leadership.
Integration with pan-London strategies
The council started at the macro-level, by stitching the borough into pan-London, cross-boundary projects.
The Lee Valley Opportunity Area, designated in 2004, is a priority growth zone in the London Plan. It has the potential to create 21,000 new homes and 13,000 new jobs by 2041. It includes parts of Waltham Forest, as well as Enfield, Hackney and Haringey.
The council has been an enthusiastic participant in the initiative since its inception. Within the plans for the area, Blackhorse Lane was designated as a new neighbourhood centre and Walthamstow Wetlands as a major regeneration scheme for residential development. The Wetlands was opened in 2017 as an “internationally important nature reserve” that also provides water for 3.5 million Londoners.
The most significant example of the council re-orienting the borough toward London was, of course, the Olympics. Only one small part of the borough was in the Olympic zone, a toe on the edge of the diving board. But it was enough to make Waltham Forest a host borough.
Eton Manor was the venue for aquatics events and wheelchair tennis as well training pools and other practice and changing facilities. As Time Out noted, this was “perhaps the lowest profile” of all the Olympic venues, but it gave Waltham Forest a seat around the table; perfectly in line with the strategic imperative of stitching the borough into major pan-London plans.
Transport infrastructure
The council and Transport for London (TfL) have overseen an expansion and upgrading of the transport network in Waltham Forest since 2003.
TfL launched the London Overground in 2007. The service integrated a range of smaller, older networks serving parts of north and west London into a “fully orbital network”. The old train fleets were replaced by new stock and 55 stations were refurbished and integrated into the Oyster payment system. Over time, the service has expanded to cover 112 stations across six routes, stretching from Richmond in West London to Barking Riverside in the east. Waltham Forest is served by two lines and multiple stops on the Overground.
Lea Bridge station was re-opened in May 2016 while the Victoria Line has been upgraded with improved signalling and new rolling stock. TfL now operates 36 trains per hour on the line in each direction. As we’ll explore shortly, the council has also pursued a sustainable travel campaign known as ‘Mini Holland’.
Focusing “solely on growth”
The focus on aggressive economic expansion as the borough’s core strategy was confirmed by the findings of the aptly-named independent Growth Commission.
The purpose of the Commission was to develop “an economic blueprint for the next five years and beyond”. The four commissioners, led by Prof. Tony Travers of the LSE, met seven times between September 2013 and January 2014 and produced the final report in April of that year.
The very existence of the Commission was a marker of the council’s maturity. Inviting a panel of outsiders to ask searching questions was a sign of confidence as well as ambition. It’s hard to imagine the old one-star borough inviting such scrutiny.
The confidence was well-founded. The borough had one of the fastest growing populations in London, driven by a “sharp increase in the proportion of ABC1 residents”. These were the higher-income residents that, as noted in the 2008 Housing Strategy, had previously been in a hurry to leave.
The report also provided a reminder of the challenges that remained. One of the themes that emerged from the consultation that informed the commissioners’ deliberations was the sense of “unrealised potential”. The report noted that Waltham Forest remained a moderate-sized economy in London terms.
There was also a stubborn level of dissatisfaction with the state of local high streets. This fed into a sense amongst the general public that the Waltham Forest economy was struggling, when the opposite was the case. The underlying economic indicators were very encouraging, but the vast majority of people were not reading those statistics; they were seeing another store closing down and their local high street looking sadder than ever.
In response to the report, the Chief Executive Martin Esom was clear that more growth was the answer and his colleagues would continue with an “unashamedly interventionist” approach. To that end, he announced a reorganisation of the council.
The environment and regeneration directorates were “slimmed down to focus solely on growth”. They would be led by a new Deputy Chief Executive and report to a new cabinet portfolio holder for economic growth and high streets.
Regenerating
Re-stitching the borough into the wider socio-economic geography of London was a smart and necessary move, but it needed to deliver tangible action on the ground. To that end, the borough focused on three areas that would demonstrate what the council’s “unashamedly interventionist” approach actually meant:
· Housing.
· Social amenities.
· High streets.
There was some activity in all these areas from the turning point of 2003, but the delivery phase started in 2010 and was further intensified after 2014; this was the year Labour won re-election as the majority party and the growth-focused re-organisation, described above, was implemented.
Housing
The most significant, difficult, and controversial aspect of the council’s regeneration programme related to housing. You can say that about almost any part of the UK but, as noted in the 2008 housing strategy, there were “relatively small amounts of land in Waltham Forest on which to build new homes”.
This presented the council with a dilemma. Building over greenfield land would be heinously unpopular, especially in the north of the borough. Demolishing and rebuilding estates and other areas of social housing at higher densities would also be controversial and invite accusations of gentrification.
The council opted for a blended strategy of: re-developing some council estates at higher densities and with a greater tenure mix, in partnership with commercial developers; smaller-scale developments delivered through a new council-owned housing development company called Sixty Bricks; and building new developments on vacant and under-used industrial estates.
The map of Waltham Forest became dotted with housing development and regeneration projects. In Wood Street, the ongoing Marlowe Estate regeneration programme will deliver a net gain in the number of new homes but, after changes to the original plan, the proportion of affordable homes has decreased.
Given its centrality, geographically and economically, Walthamstow has been the focus of most attention. The re-development of The Mall in the town centre will deliver 538 new units, including 99 homes at below-market rent levels. ‘The Chain’ is a new mixed-use development that will create 518 new homes, half of which will be affordable, as well as social facilities.
Bigger than both of those developments is Blackhorse Lane. As noted earlier, this is part of the Lee Valley Opportunity Area, with the potential to deliver 2,500 new homes as well as schools, shops, workspace, and community facilities.
The developments built through Sixty Bricks, the council-owned developer, are typically smaller. This is not surprising given that it is new and lacks the financial power of established developers. However, it has been able to deliver six new developments with a greater variety of housing types, such as larger homes for families.
The redevelopment of areas of concentrated social housing has been the most controversial. Critics argue that the focus “solely on growth” has mutated into growth-at-all-costs agenda. An approach that has scant regard for the social consequences of higher housing costs and exacerbates inequality. We will look more at the ‘two Waltham Forests’ scenario in part 3.
Social amenities
Waltham Forest was among the first wave of councils that took part in the Building Schools for the Future programme under the last Labour government. It received £320m for remodelling the existing school estate and building three new schools.
There are now around 80 mainstream primary and secondary schools in the borough, around half of which are academies. In the 2022 OFSTED ratings, 16 were ranked as ‘Outstanding’ and 57 as ‘Good’. Only half of schools are able to offer a place to every applicant. This is inevitably disappointing for the pupils who are rejected, but shows that many schools in the borough are sought after by pupils and their parents. The overall quality of the educational offer is one of the reasons that the borough has been able to attract and retain more households.
In addition to improvements to education, there is potential investment in local health services. As part of the post-2019 government’s new hospital building programme, there are plans to redevelop Whipps Cross hospital.
However, implementation of the plans has stalled repeatedly. Work was due to finish in 2026 but that has already been pushed back by at least two years. In January 2023, the director of redevelopment for the hospital explained that he and his team were “going [around] in a bit of a circle” with central government with regard to funding.
High streets
The third element of the regeneration programme was focused on high streets. In terms of scale, this part of the package was nowhere near the redevelopment of the housing stock. In terms of branding and presentation, however, it has been of major importance.
The 2007 Renaisi report, described earlier, was clear that despite all the progress being made in the borough, most visitors would leave with an impression of tattiness and grime. Fast forward ten years and, as we’re about to see, the borough was winning awards for the quality of its high streets.
From the publication of its first strategy ‘High Street Life’ in 2010, the council has honed and refined its approach. It has gone from a narrow focus on improving shop frontages to a more holistic and ambitious programme of improving the appeal, legibility, and economic viability of entire areas.
The testing ground for its high street regeneration programme was Wood Street. This small neighbourhood is near Walthamstow High Street but has a “distinct centre with its own unique character”. The council matched its own resources with a GLA Outer London Fund allocation to invest in business support, environmental enhancements, shop front improvements, establishment of a business forum, and eye-catching public art.
In 2017, Wood Street won the top honour in the Academy of Urbanism’s Great Street awards scheme. The Academy citation described it as an “exciting and inspiring street that shows what can be achieved in five years of collaboration”, highlighting the combination of council leadership and grassroots activism.
Buoyed by this award, the council has continued investing in waves of high street regeneration programmes in Leyton, Leytonstone, and Walthamstow.
Rebranding
The third part of the transformation programme was rebranding the borough. Over time, the council has developed and promoted a brand that is focused on aspiration, diversity, and continental modernity.
This was achieved in three steps:
· Strategic investment in culture.
· Spreading the word.
· Solidifying the new brand.
The purpose of the first step was to ensure that the borough had an offer worth shouting about. The focus of that offer was culture. The second step was to start shouting, so that people were aware of Waltham Forest and what it had to offer.
Having gained people’s attention, the third step was to solidify the new Waltham Forest brand around the idea of the borough as a ‘Mini Holland’.
Let’s look at each in turn.
Strategic investment in culture
Before the borough started shouting about itself, it needed something to shout about. For reasons already explored, it couldn’t boast about its housing or schools offer. It focused instead an area in which it was already fairly strong and could deliver further improvements within a reasonable timeframe: culture.
In 2009, the council released its new culture strategy. Its title was telling: ‘Taking Our Place in London’. The borough leadership was bored of sitting silently in the corner and was keen to start promoting its assets and amenities. Indeed, the foreword identified the need for “better communication and marketing of all that this borough has to offer”.
In the same spirit, ‘Ambition 1’ of the document was “Standing out from the crowd”. This was given practical expression in a programme of investment in existing and new cultural assets, including: library and leisure centre refurbishment; redevelopment of the William Morris Gallery; and a calendar of public events.
Spreading the word
‘Ambition 6’ of the strategy was “Spreading the word” through celebratory events aimed at residents and, arguably more importantly, outward promotion. In line with the overall attempt to re-orient the borough toward the capital, the council committed to working with Audiences London, Visit London, and neighbouring authorities to “promote Waltham Forest as an exciting place to be.”
The investment in that strategy paid off. In 2019, Waltham Forest was awarded the inaugural title of ‘Borough of Culture’. After decades of thinking of itself as assortment of parts that had no collective, coherent identity, it was the borough as a whole that won the award.
There was further evidence that newer generations of residents were starting to identify with Waltham Forest, and not just their neighbourhood. According to research commissioned by the council in 2019, 80% of residents were proud to live in Waltham Forest and 85% felt that they strongly belonged to the borough.
Solidifying the new brand
The third step was to hone and promote a new brand for the borough. The first two steps had introduced people to Waltham Forest. Step three was designed to build on that very first impression and present the best side of the borough to the world.
As discussed earlier, the council merged and refocused its regeneration and environment departments around the growth agenda in 2014. The new directorate was tasked with developing a new place brand. The eventual focus of that push was ‘Mini Holland’.
The Mini Holland concept was first introduced in Waltham Forest in 2013, when the borough secured £30m funding from Transport for London to encourage people to use more sustainable forms of transport. The money was used to introduce 29km of dedicated cycle lanes as well as 62 pedestrian crossings and to improve bus services.
Very quickly, however, it became much more than a transport scheme. It became the distillation of the new vision of Waltham Forest. A place that was safe, welcoming, and family-friendly, but also quirky. A place that was comfortable with diversity and difference. And a place that was green, boasting sustainable buildings surrounded by greenspace.
The new brand was driven by the borough, but partners have embraced it. In early 2022, the blogger ‘Poppy Loves’ went on a cycle tour of the borough with the housing association L&Q, which is a partner in The Chain development mentioned earlier.
Here is a snippet: “I want to toot about how brilliant a place Walthamstow is. It has the London bustle, a vibrant cultural scene, village life, an urban pulse, the foresty vibes, an extraordinary amount of excellent sourdough and some of the best coffee you’re likely to find in London town… it really does have everything.” The uncritical tone of the piece won’t be to everyone’s taste, but it fits with the Mini Holland brand: positive, optimistic, celebratory.
The other notable branding activity has been the ‘Awesomestow’ campaign. This was originally deployed sarcastically by local residents to highlight examples of grot and grime. In the same spirit as the ‘Walthamstow (unofficial) Tourist Board’ Abandoned Mattress Calendars. Over time, however, it was co-opted by businesses and local figures like the MP Stella Creasey to promote the best side of the borough.
The branding campaign has worked in terms of shifting the outside perception of the borough. In 2022, Time Out awarded Walthamstow the laurels for being “London’s coolest neighbourhood”, even though it “only” came 17th in its global poll. A year later, the borough was named the “best place in the UK to raise a family”.
The transformation of the borough has been rapid and dramatic. In the third and final part of this essay, I’ll look at what the changes have meant, especially for lower-income residents, and set out what other places can learn.
Thanks again to Andrew Stevens for much-valued input into earlier drafts and subsequent feedback.
