Eating Meat Is Ethical

We are morally justified in raising and killing animals for food but are ethically bound to uphold high animal welfare standards in the process.

There are typically three reasons why people believe eating meat is unethical:

1. Animal death — They claim that meat isn’t required for human health. Therefore, killing animals is immoral because it’s unnecessary and robs them of their desire to live.
2. Harm and suffering — They claim modern animal husbandry inflicts unnecessary harm and suffering on sentient beings. Therefore, supporting these industries is immoral.
3. The environment — They claim animal agriculture is negatively impacting the environment. Therefore, we shouldn’t continue supporting that source of pollution and greenhouse gas emissions.

The claim: if meat is unnecessary for human health, and if animal husbandry inflicts sentient beings with unnecessary harm and suffering, and if agricultural practices contribute to global climate change and related environmental concerns, then eating meat is unethical or immoral.

(Note: we know that humans are a type of animal, but for the sake of clarity, let’s use everyday language to describe human animals as humans and non-human animals as animals.)

Simply put for this article

1. Morals and ethics are closely related concepts.
2. Morals refer to guiding principles.
3. Ethics refer to specific rules, actions, or behaviors.

… but don’t get hung up on the terms. Here we’re simply talking about the actions and contemplations about what is “right” (permissible or good) vs what is “wrong” (impermissible or bad) in relationship to our society.

In the case of eating meat

1. Moral principle: It is morally justified to kill animals for food.
2. Ethical rules, actions, or behaviors: The proper way to raise and harvest these animals that is humane.

Simply put: We are morally justified in raising and killing animals for food but are ethically bound to uphold high animal welfare standards in the process.

Contents

1. Why we are justified in taking the life of an animal
2. Moral agents and moral patients
3. Moral interests supersede non-moral interests
4. “Why don’t you kick dogs?”
5. “Why treat farm animals well?”
6. Objections
7. Summary

Why we are justified in taking the life of an animal

1. Humans benefit greatly from animal products (especially for health reasons).
2. The human footprint impacts all animal life we come into contact with (often resulting in death, despite our best intentions).
3. It’s inevitable that many animals will die as a result of our food system (including crop production).
4. We must eat to survive.
5. Animals are neither moral agents nor moral patients.
6. Therefore, we are justified in eating animals.

Why is this topic important?

Good health contributes to human well-being. If consuming meat is a vital part of that, we should be sure our morals and ethics align with that consumption. If eating meat is immoral, we should be sure that is the case and adjust our moral standard accordingly.

Moral agents and moral patients

In order to determine what is moral and what isn’t, we must determine who is involved.

• Moral agents are beings that can reason about, and engage in, morality (ex: all humans).
• Moral patients are beings that can be morally considered (ex: children and physically or mentally impaired humans).
• Plants cannot reason nor engage in morality, so they are neither moral agents nor moral patients.
• Animals cannot reason nor engage in morality, so they are neither moral agents nor moral patients. Unlike impaired humans, no animal can ever possess the faculties necessary for reasoning about morality. We may choose to be kind to them. We may be ethically obligated to care for animals we manage, but we are not morally obligated to animals as a category of moral consideration (more on this later).
• Note: Some people classify animals as moral patients, but this is arbitrary because animals do not fit the qualifications of moral patients. Or in some cases, there may be confusion between moral duties towards moral patients and ethical duties towards animals (animal rights vs animal welfare).

Moral agents

• Moral agents have the capacity to conceptualize and externalize what are “good” actions in order to benefit the self and the group vs “bad” actions. — Moral agents must be able to understand, deliberate, choose, and act for the sake of the good within the community.
• A moral agent has to have a sense of what a “good self” or “good community” is to begin with. — Moral agents must be able to abstract that idea out to other beings like him and confirm in some way that they also have this sense of a “good self” in order for them to form a consensus of action towards a community goal or standard of behavior.
• The moral goal or standard of behavior is an abstraction unto itself. — That is to say, the standard of behavior is a conceptual, future model of what a better version of ourselves and our community will become. This conceptualized model of “good” has “right” and “wrong” actions that are understood between all parties: shared, clear understandings of conduct that can be penalized if violated.
• Animals do not appear to have any capacity to engage in anything similar to these conceptualized moral standards. — Within a moral framework are multiple cultural layers that must be understood between agents along with their clear boundaries and conceptualized models. Since animals show no evidence of this intricate level of cognitive and cultural reasoning, they are not moral agents.
• Moral principles require moral duties from moral agents. — In order for a moral standard to improve society, all members must perform their respective duties to each other: We have a moral duty to tell the truth even when it’s inconvenient to do so for the betterment of society. Animals have no concept of moral duties.

In summary, a moral agent must be able to critically reflect on their own actions, be able to understand the idea of having made a mistake, be able to improve their conduct for the right reasons, be able to grasp the impact those actions might have on their community, be able to understand why a “good” self or “good” community is “good” to begin with, and be able to propagate those virtues to others within the moral community.

Moral patients

• Children and temporarily impaired humans are moral patients because they have the capacity to reason about morality. — Even though they are not currently moral agents, we include them in our moral sphere as moral patients until they can engage in morality (“What about permanently impaired humans?” More on this later).
• Animals are not moral patients because they have no capacity to become moral agents. — Those who envelop animals into their moral sphere as moral patients are doing so arbitrarily, not because we are morally obligated to do so. Moral patients are a subset of moral agents. Animals are not and cannot ever be included in the sphere of moral agents, therefore they are not moral patients (“What if we choose to classify animals as moral patients?” More on this later).
• Animals do not have culture, language, nor the ability of conceptual abstraction or communication required for a moral framework. — Moral standards require culture, language, and cognitive abstraction, all of which are dependent on higher cognitive functions unavailable to even the most intelligent animals. Within each category are multiple layers of shared history and subtle inferences understood between moral agents within that culture.
• If animals do have a form of morality, it’s so far removed from any human sense of morality, that it’s ultimately incompatible and therefore firmly outside the sphere of human morality. — Ex: If humans consider killing an animal to be immoral, then a lion should be held responsible for killing the gazelle either by other lions or by us. Since lions don’t punish the act of killing amongst themselves, the lion is therefore not a moral agent because she cannot conceptualize nor engage with morality as we see it. Nor if we were to punish the lion, would the lion have any comprehension of any “wrong” doing, which is required to uphold a moral standard.
• Animals do not have the capacity to share human moral goals under any circumstance. — Unlike children or temporarily impaired humans who possess the capacity to reason about morality, even the most intelligent animals can never reach this level of cognitive ability.

Moral interests supersede non-moral interests

Before we can justify eating meat as a moral action, we need to understand why animals fall outside of moral consideration:

1. Moral interests take precedence over non-moral interests. — Moral interests by definition are in a privileged status and therefore take precedence over non-moral interests. In other words, when we decide that something is “moral,” it is placed in a category above or “better than” other categories. This category is separate from all other categories (non-moral categories). Therefore, anything that falls within the scope of moral actions or ideals is considered first and foremost above any other action or ideal that may conflict with it.
2. Moral communities are therefore categorically above non-moral communities. — To be part of a moral community (a moral agent or moral patient) means one has categorically placed their interests above non-moral agents (plants/animals). Therefore, the interests of moral communities supersede non-moral communities.

You may be thinking at this point: “This all sounds like you’re saying we can just go around harming and killing any animal as we please because we’re ‘morally justified’ in doing so.”

Not exactly…

“Why don’t you kick dogs?”

This is a common question from animal activists meant to illustrate that you wouldn’t arbitrarily go around kicking dogs because you like dogs and have empathy for them (or more directly, “Why don’t you kill dogs for ‘no reason?’”). Therefore, you shouldn’t arbitrarily harm any animal. In other words: you’re being inconsistent in treating dogs well but not cows, pigs, or chickens.

But this isn’t the right question to ask. It’s like asking, “Why don’t you burn down your house?” — Because there are good reasons not to burn down my house.

Let’s test this

The reason we don’t kick dogs is simply because there are good reasons not to kick dogs. — The harm is unnecessary and may have negative impacts on me or my moral community. It’s not wise or beneficial to me or my community to harm a dog for no reason.

Let’s assume I encounter a stray dog with no owner, and for whatever reason, it’s perfectly legal for me to kick this hypothetical dog. Even if the path is clear for me to kick the dog, I still have many good reasons not to kick the dog:

1. It disrupts or even destroys a relationship with dogs that is valuable to me and my moral community (companionship, security, work).
2. It’s a display of aggressive behavior and violence that indicates I may be aggressive towards other humans (which needs to be corrected socially or it will be destructive to my moral community).
3. It risks personal harm to me if the dog bites or scratches me in defense.
4. If there are other dogs in its pack, they might also attack me in retaliation to preserve one of their own.
5. It makes an animal more defensive and aggressive towards humans in general, which could result in harm against other humans (my moral community which I’m obligated to).
6. It diminishes my moral standing within the moral community because of the above reasons (“This person must be unwell or unwise if he’s going around kicking dogs for no reason. These are undesirable and destructive traits for a member of my community.”).
7. It expends unnecessary effort and energy for no gain (ex: animals don’t go out of their way to abuse other animals for no reason… because they have no direct need to do so).

(The same ramifications of aggressive behavior would still hold true if we simply walked up to the dog and shot it for “no reason.”)

Saying that there’s “no reason” in this hypothetical is nonsensical. All actions have a reason, even if that reason is pleasure, or to alleviate boredom, or to vent aggression. If these are our reasons, then we are exhibiting poor characteristics that could negatively affect my standing in the moral community and the moral community itself, and therefore need to be corrected.

That may sound like cold reasoning to not simply say, “We don’t kick/kill dogs because we have empathy for them,” but our brains have a reason for everything, even empathy. We choose empathy for a number of direct benefits to us and our moral community, including the reasons listed above.

We can test this against any other organism to see if it holds true

Let’s take the emotion of animal death out of the equation for a moment to see if this reasoning holds true for any organism on earth, like trees.

Imagine going into a forest and hacking down all the trees in an area, then just leaving. You’re not using the wood for fuel, nor to build anything, nor to clear the land for any development. You just cut them down for “no reason” and walked away.

Trees: It’s not wise or beneficial to me or my community to cut down trees for no reason because:

1. It wastes a valuable resource that may eventually come back to harm me and my fellow humans when we need it (my moral community).
2. It’s a display of aggressive behavior and violence that indicates I may be aggressive towards other humans (which needs to be corrected socially or it will be destructive to the moral community).
3. It diminishes my moral standing within the moral community because of the above reasons (“This person must be unwell or unwise if he’s going around chopping down valuable trees for no reason. These are undesirable and destructive traits for a member of my community.”).
4. It expends unnecessary effort and energy for no gain (ex: animals don’t go out of their way to destroy part of their habitat for no reason).

Let’s try this with pigs

Pigs: It’s not wise or beneficial to me or my community to harm a pig for no reason because:

1. It disrupts or even destroys a relationship with pigs that is valuable to me and my moral community (food, protein upcycling).
2. Having stress-free, non-aggressive pigs are easier to manage.
3. Stress- and injury-free animals produce more valuable food (no bruising, internal bleeding, or adrenaline from stress that inhibits lactic acid, which creates tough/ruined muscle tissue).
4. It’s a display of aggressive behavior and violence that indicates I may be aggressive towards other humans (which needs to be corrected socially or it will be destructive to the moral community).
5. It risks personal harm to me if the pig bites or charges me in defense.
6. Other pigs in its pack might also attack me in retaliation to preserve one of their own (and the pack).
7. It makes an animal more defensive and aggressive towards humans in general which could result in harm against other humans (my moral community).
8. It diminishes my moral standing within the moral community because of the above reasons (“This person must be unwell or unwise if he’s going around kicking pigs for no reason. These are undesirable and destructive traits for a member of my community.”).
9. It expends unnecessary effort and energy for no gain (ex: animals don’t go out of their way to abuse other animals for no reason).

What about animals we don’t like so much?

Snakes: It’s not wise or beneficial to me or my community to harm a snake for no reason because:

1. It’s a display of aggressive behavior and violence that indicates I may be aggressive towards other humans (which needs to be corrected socially or it will be destructive to the moral community).
2. It risks personal harm to me if the snake bites me in defense.
3. It makes an animal more defensive and aggressive towards humans in general which could result in harm against other humans (my moral community).
4. It may unbalance the local ecosystem in detrimental ways I can’t predict (disrupting keystone species that may ultimately harm my moral community [re: wolves])
5. It diminishes my moral standing within the moral community because of the above reasons (“This person must be unwell or unwise if he’s going around kicking snakes for no reason. These are undesirable and destructive traits for a member of my community.”).
6. It expends unnecessary effort and energy for no gain (ex: animals don’t go out of their way to abuse other animals for no reason).

(If the snake was a threat to me or my moral community [poisonous, disease-carrying], then we are morally justified in displacing or killing it. This holds true for any organism. There is therefore, “a reason” to harm the organism in these cases.)

You could continue this exercise with rats, rivers, or ravens. The point is: If we’re killing a cow, we do so because they are a valuable food source. If we chop down trees and use them for fuel or development, we do so because they are a valuable resource. If we don’t kick or kill dogs, we do so because dogs are more valuable to us alive than dead, and as companions rather than adversaries.

“Why don’t you eat your dog?”

The other erroneous conflation that often emerges in these conversations is “You wouldn’t kill your dog for food, would you? They’re just as intelligent as pigs. Therefore, you’re being inconsistent by killing some animals for food but loving and caring for other animals that you don’t eat.”

The reasons we don’t use dogs (or cats, or hamsters, or goldfish) for food are many:

• In many cultures, dogs are more useful alive than dead (security, companionship, innate abilities).
• Depending on the breed, dogs/cats don’t have much meat on them, making them a poor choice as a food source.
• Feeding and fattening immense packs of omnivorous dogs would be extremely expensive and resource intensive. They would be competing for human resources on a massive scale (Some say pet food already is. Imagine multiplying that thousands of times over.)
• Managing immense packs of dogs would be extremely labor intensive. Animals that run faster than humans, bark and can bite with lethal force, would require intensive training to become obedient and manageable, all for very little food-payoff.
• (There are some cultures that do eat dogs. It may be an unpleasant thought to many of us, but they are just as morally justified in doing so as we are for eating cows. Same justifications, different species [even though there are good reasons not to eat dogs, if we’re just exploring the moral question, the reasoning still holds]. However, we must still consider the ethics of how any animal in our care is raised and killed. And if those cultures are not caring for dogs in an ethical manner, this is not acceptable.)

Imagine cows on the other hand

(Not all cattle are cows but “cows” is the common term used for most bovine in everyday talk)

• Cows are not useful for security, companionship, or innate sensory abilities (There are obvious, practical reasons why a dog sleeps at the foot of your bed and not a 1500 lbs cow).
• Cows have much more meat per animals than a dog or cat would, making them a much wiser option to use for food (depending on the breed, there can be as much as 50 times more meat on one cow than one dog).
• Feeding and fattening cattle upcycles foods humans cannot eat. In most cases, cows are not competing for human food. They can convert unusable human plant matter into highly nutritious protein with little effort.
• Domesticated cows are docile, live comfortably close to others, are generally not dangerous to humans, and are easily managed from birth to death.

(Source) — Graphic by: SacredCow.info

Or pigs

Yes, pigs are just as intelligent as dogs, and some people even have small pigs as pets. Why use pigs for meat then?

• Depending on the breed, pigs can produce multiple times more meat per animal than a dog or cat.
• Omnivorous pigs can upcycle foods that are useless to humans very efficiently, creating highly nutritious meat.
• Domestic pigs don’t require any special obedience training to manage.
• Pigs are not useful for companionship, security, or innate abilities useful to humans.

It should be obvious from these examples why we eat cows/pigs and not dogs/cats. The practicalities of raising them from a cost and management perspective, coupled with the fact that these animals aren’t otherwise useful to humans, and because their meat-to-body ratio is much higher than dogs or cats, the domestic animals we use for food are used for practical reasons.

“What about factory farm settings where animals are abused?”

It’s true that many industrial meat producers are operating in conditions that are not optimal for animals. However, we need to be very careful about blanket assumptions about all animals in all circumstance (different species are raised differently for different reasons).

We also have to understand that eating meat from unsavory sources is not the only option. The “anti-meat” message usually depicts this as a binary choice: If animals are abused in the factory farm system, then we should stop eating meat in order to stop supporting their activities. This is a false choice.

The third option is more complex: animals that are pasture raised, or at least raised in ways that support the animal’s wellbeing, are not only possible but already practiced by many producers.

Even with the multitude of problems in the industrial meat system, many of those practices that may seem cruel might be taken out of context or are actually beneficial to the animals (we should be careful not to equate animal handling techniques with human needs and desires. Ex: humans don’t live outside, but many animals thrive outside. It might actually be cruel to keep some animal species indoors. The reflex is often to assume that what humans like and want is what animals like and want as well. So, when we see practices that don’t fit our model of comfort, we assume this must be true for animals as well.).

However, there are unfortunately individuals within these systems that are guilty of blatantly abusing animals. Those individuals need to be reprimanded or replaced by management. Proper animal stewardship benefits from decreasing mistreatment of animals, not increasing it. In other words, there are more benefits to treating animals well (according to their innate needs) rather than treating them bad. Therefore, despite their imperfection, large meat producers are actually attempting to cause less harm for a better bottom line (even though there is much room for improvement).

But there are exceptions

Chickens: Chickens raised for meat in the industrial system (referred to as “broilers”) often live under the worst conditions. They are genetically bred to grow faster and fatter than they would otherwise. This puts enormous strain on their bodies and creates an unhealthy bird. Chickens are also typically housed in tight quarters in a warehouse setting with no outdoor access and limited food choices (chickens are omnivores that thrive on a variety of foods).

Pigs: Pigs raised for meat in the industrial system share some of the same issues as chickens: crowded, warehouse-style “barns” with artificial floors and no outside access. Their diets are often devoid of variety as well.

Cows: Even with some legitimate issues, industrially-raised beef have the better lives of these three species. Contrary to popular belief, all cattle are born and raised on pastures (grass) for nearly two-thirds of their lives, typically consuming only mother’s milk, grass, and hay supplementation. They are then sent to a feedlot where they are fed grains and other upcycled materials inedible to humans in the final third of their lives. These feedlots are indeed poor conditions for a cow, but there are alternatives.

The typical path of beef. (Source) — Graphic by VOX

“Why treat farm animals well?”

The alternative to industrial meat production is “pasture-raised” meat. This is a term that is broad and not always well-defined, but the basics are:

• Animals raised in conditions that are species-specific and support better animal welfare standards.
• Not all “pasture-raised” meat live 100% of their lives outside or free from any soy or corn inputs, but the overall goal of these producers is essentially the same: animal husbandry in a setting more natural to an animal’s environment will produce healthier, happier animals, a healthier environment, and a higher quality meat.

There are good reasons to raise meat in better circumstances

Easier to manage

• A relationship with a cooperative animal is much better for both parties rather than an antagonistic one (which could result in danger to myself, other humans, or even other animals).
• Animals that are allowed to express their natural tendencies more freely are “happier” and less-stressed (and therefore easier to manage, making the human-animal relationship more pleasing to both parties).

Better meat

• Stress- and injury-free animals produce more valuable human food [no bruising, internal bleeding, or adrenaline from stress that inhibits lactic acid, which results in tough/ruined muscle tissue that can’t be sold and is therefore wasted [being irresponsible with a valuable human resource])

Social stability

• Animal abuse/cruelty is linked to human violence (domestic abuse, child neglect, assault, cruelty from children that may indicate abuse at home). It can desensitize humans which will negatively affect other humans.
• Raising and harvesting animals can be an integral part of community stability by working for, and sharing, a valuable resource.

Photo by Enrique

Objections

“What about animals that do ‘good’ things? Aren’t they exhibiting moral behavior?”

Many people witness empathetic or reciprocal behavior in animals and confuse this with moral behavior on the simplistic grounds that these actions appear to be “good.”

• The animals show care for others.
• They share food.
• They even assist others in need.

When humans exhibit these actions, we refer to it as a “moral compass” — A directional instinct to do “good” things rather than “bad” things.

While these are indeed positive actions among animals that benefit them, they are not moral actions: actions taken for future, conceptualized models of positive goals that have been pre-established by that group.

For example: Most human cultures value “telling the truth” as a highly moral principle. Lying can lead to terrible outcomes ranging from damaged interpersonal relationships, to bodily injury, to legal ramifications, or even death. It’s so valuable to us, that those caught lying are severely reprimanded, considered of very low character socially, and can be criminally punished.

In order for us to determine that telling the truth is a moral virtue (or any moral virtue/principle):

• We have to collectively agree to a future, conceptualized society that would benefit from this action and why that’s a “good” thing (and why lying is a “bad” thing).
• We need historical knowledge of how lying has the potential to negatively impact everyone in society.
• We need consensus from other moral agents (our human society) that this is the correct direction and correct reason we want to do this.
• We need language to communicate all of this, which requires a higher cognitive function than any animal possesses (not to mention all the conceptual nuances of everyday language that we take for granted [metaphors, similes, current and historical references, comparative “before and after” assumptions, etc.]).
• We need to establish clear boundaries for when lying is acceptable (for immediate, personal safety, for instance), and what the punishments are for violating this principle (from social shunning to legal penalties).

Animals do none of this.

Animals sharing food, defending their friends, or exhibiting reciprocal behaviors are indeed positive actions for immediate and even future benefits, but they are not done with any level of cognitive intent towards a moral framework as described above.

Many animal behaviorists will correctly remind us that just because we are an animal species, and because we share many characteristics with other animals, mapping human intentions on to animal intentions can be very misleading or incorrect.

Blind mole-rats and eagles both have eyes, yet their degree of function is vastly different. A dog and a human both have noses, but theirs is thousands of times stronger than ours. Shared anatomical structures do not share equal range of function.

Similarly, shared cognitive functions (functions of anatomically-comparable organs [brains]), like empathy or positive reciprocal behavior, do not necessarily share equal functioning between species, and shouldn’t be assumed to do so any more than assuming a blind mole-rat can see like an eagle, or that humans can track a person miles away by scent.

In other words, we have no idea what goes on in an animals brain as far as emotional intent is concerned (much less about any complex ideas such as morality), we can only guess. Equating animal cognitive characteristics as equals to ours based on some shared characteristics is anthropomorphization and likely to be incorrect based on all the knowledge we have of other distinctions between species.

As for the things we do know about animals, these are based on their observable actions. And if their actions do not demonstrate anything close to the moral conceptualizing described earlier, nor any understanding of what we would call morals (the lion killing the antelope example), then we absolutely cannot consider animals “moral agents.”

The animals may indeed, and probably are, doing “good” (positive) things for others or themselves, but as mentioned already, a beneficial action does not necessarily exhibit any of the qualities of a moral framework meant to further a shared societal goal of a better future.

The key issue here is the shared cognition with other humans: the ability to contemplate where we’ve been, where we are now, and where we want to go. Empathetic or reciprocal positive actions among animals may act as “rules” that mitigate conflict within their social groups, but these are not the shared, learned, or modified responses to the shaping of a larger culture. Much less, they are not morals as humans understand them.

“Humans and animals negotiate ‘conflict’ by fundamentally different means. ... Take his [Peterson’s] examples of ‘you scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours’ in the animal kingdom. Chimpanzees, for instance, spend an inordinate amount of time grooming each other because grooming serves an important social function in maintaining group ties, and strong chimpanzee communities increase the chance of individual members surviving.

… Human beings, however, negotiate conflict through socially created values and codes of conduct. We are able to behave morally because we are uniquely able to exert some self-control, reflect on our own behaviour, put ourselves in the shoes of other people and make judgements.” — Helene Guldberg, author of Just Another Ape?

“Humans shouldn’t use animals for their benefit”

There is a claim that humans immorally “use” animals for their benefit against their will. Indeed, humans do “use” (or manipulate the lives of) animals whether intentionally or not. This is unavoidable and necessary in some cases, but it is not necessarily immoral.

How we use animals or manipulate their lives for our benefit

• Pets: companionship, comfort, security
• Innate abilities: detection dogs, care animals, draft animals, security
• Pest control to protect human food: growth, harvest, transportation and storage
• Pest control and habitat destruction to protect human activities: development, transportation, human health
• Medical research: animal testing
• Wildlife: land and population management

Consider a dog, a cat, or a gerbil — We control every action of their lives:

• We force them to live where we want them to live, not necessarily where they want.
• We force them to eat what we determine they should.
• We prevent them from going where we don’t want them to go (by fences, walls, leashes, or verbal commands [that we force them to learn]).
• We sometimes choose to bring them into existence.
• We sometimes choose when and how they will die.

All of these things are and can be beneficial to domestic pets and their relationships with us. It is indeed perfectly moral to “keep” a pet for ours and their purposes, even if it’s technically “against their will” by human standards.

The emphasis here is that we can and do keep animals primarily for our purposes, not theirs. There often is a beneficial co-relationship to both beings, but human interests take precedent over non-human interests (a dog’s desire to run away from home is overruled by my desire to find and secure them once again in my home).

Animal and human interaction is inevitable. When those interests collide, our moral obligation is to our moral community first. Yes, we can and should find ways to reasonably minimize unnecessary animal destruction, but moral interests supersede non-moral interests categorically.

Ex: In 2021 the U.S. Wildlife Service killed 1.75M animals to protect human interests. Even if we make great efforts to reduce that number, it will never be zero: animals will unavoidably die if human interests are to be met. That doesn’t mean we shouldn’t try to reduce animal destruction where it’s reasonable to do so, it means some death is inevitable when any species collide and compete for resources.

“I didn’t intend for animals to get killed in crop production, therefore I’m not complicit in their deaths.”

If you eat the food where an animal has died for your benefit, you are complicit in that death. If the farmer kills pest animals that are competing for your vegetables, you are paying for that farmer to kill those animals. You are complicit.

Your intention was to gain food to continue your life. If you correctly accept that some death is inevitable in crop production, by definition you are accepting that some animals can be killed on your behalf.

Even if that number of deaths is “less than” that of animals killed for meat, the number is still “some,” which means that crop production is not death-free as often claimed (and if that’s the case, then you’re morally excluding some animals from your obligation, which undermines the idea of animals being moral patients).

“What about marginal cases?”

“Marginal cases” are instances where humans are permanently prevented from reasoning about morality: the mentally ill, senile, or those in a vegetative state. The claim is that, if we’re including those who can reason about morality in our moral sphere (including children and temporarily impaired humans who will have the capacity to reason about morality at some point), then we should be consistent and exclude the permanently impaired since they can never engage in morality. Therefore, since these marginal cases exist, it’s inconsistent to exclude animals as well from our moral sphere (therefore, we should include them). Otherwise, we would have to remove the permanently impaired humans from our moral sphere as well.

This is a reasonable question to ask, but the wrong category to frame it in. — Inclusion in the moral sphere of concern is not an individual-by-individual screening test.

• We are not looking at individuals with a checklist to determine individual inclusion. We are looking at species-wide characteristics that most beings possess in most cases within that species… which is the overwhelming majority of humans that exist or ever will.

“The capacity for moral judgment that distinguishes humans from animals is not a test to be administered to human beings one by one. Persons who are unable, because of some disability, to perform the full moral functions natural to human beings are certainly not for that reason ejected from the moral community. The issue is one of kind.” — Carl Cohen Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan

• If they are human, they are within our sphere of moral concern (either as agents or patients). Even though a small percentage can never engage in morality with the rest of society, they’re still included by the fact of being born human. They receive moral consideration by being part of a community, not because they are individuals with the correct checklist of properties. This would be like saying: “Each being is a blank slate when they are born with random, unique qualities of which we have no idea yet. Let’s run them through a battery of tests to determine their moral worth.” No, we have existing criteria of inclusion which does not require us to exclude them in order for the entire, societal moral framework to work.

We include all humans in our moral sphere based on the criteria of possessing a “primary” or “root” capacity to reason about morality. Since the Homo sapiens species possesses this primary capacity, they are included in the moral sphere of consideration. Animals do not possess this primary capacity (the criteria for inclusion), and therefore can’t be given moral status.

“Capacities originate from a nature or essence. Having a certain nature explains why a being has the capacities it has, their unity as capacities of a single individual, and allows us to identify what activities are proper to it (which gives us a basis to distinguish between what is normal and defective). Possession of a human nature is a sufficient condition for having the capacity for rational agency. All humans, including infants, the cognitively disabled, and those similarly situated possess the same set of root capacities. Although they may lack the manifestations of those capacities, the very concepts of immaturity, disability, and mental illness presuppose the existence of capacities whose manifestations are blocked or destroyed. That is, talk of such concepts presupposes a norm that individuals should be fulfilling. These norms exist only because of capacities directed toward certain end states. Thus, all human beings — including those disabled or diseased — have a root capacity for rationality.” — Timothy Hsiao, Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Humanities at the University of Arkansas Grantham

Put another way:

• The grounds for moral status is the possession of the root capacity for moral rational agency in a species (the ability to rationalize about morality).
• All humans have this capacity by fact of being born into the Homo sapiens species, which possesses the genetic makeup that allows for higher cognitive functions like moral reasoning.
• Those humans that are not able to express this capacity due to being underdeveloped or otherwise cognitively impaired (temporarily or permanently) still have this “primary capacity” by fact of being born human.
• Animals do not have this primary capacity, and therefore are not granted moral status by the fact that they do not and cannot ever possess this primary capacity.
• Therefore, if animals are not granted moral status, they cannot be moral agents nor moral patients by fact of them not possessing this primary capacity.

This is not circular reasoning:

We’re not saying that “humans have moral status because they are human.” That would be circular. We’re saying that humans have moral status because they possess a characteristic unique to humans and only humans: the primary capacity of species-wide moral reasoning. Marginal cases still possess that primary capacity even though it may be temporarily or permanently impaired. Therefore, all humans are either moral agents (able to engage in rational, moral actions) or moral patients (beings worthy of moral consideration by fact of having that primary capacity). We do not share this capacity with animals under any conditions, and this capacity is essential to moral status.

Even though there are no direct comparisons with a morally-reasoning species outside of humans, we can still provide a basic example to illustrate the point:

• Fish: A fish is included in the sphere of aquatic animals because it has the capacity to live underwater. The criteria for inclusion is the primary capacity of living underwater, which it does not share with terrestrial animals. Therefore, a fish is included in the sphere of aquatic animals, not simply because it’s a fish, but because it possesses the primary capacities necessary to be a fish (the ability to live underwater). If a fish were born or became permanently impaired in some way, it would still be a fish within the category of aquatic animals because it can be nothing else, much less a terrestrial animal (with the capacity to live on land) under any conceivable circumstance. If we were to include terrestrial animals in the category of aquatic animals, we would be doing so arbitrarily because terrestrial and aquatic animals, while they might share anatomical or functional similarities at some level, their primary capacities–when it comes to capacities necessary for life–are vastly different: the capacity to live on land vs in water.

Let’s swap fish for humans to see if this still holds:

• Human: A human is included in the sphere of moral beings because it has the capacity of rationality. The criteria for inclusion is the primary capacity of rationality, which it does not share with animals. Therefore, a human is included in the sphere of moral beings, not simply because it’s a human, but because it possesses the primary capacities necessary to be a human (the ability to reason). If a human were born or became permanently impaired in some way, it would still be a human within the category of moral beings because it can be nothing else, much less an animal (without the capacity to reason) under any conceivable circumstance. If we were to include animals in the category of moral beings, we would be doing so arbitrarily because animals and human, while they might share anatomical or functional similarities at some level, their primary capacities–when it comes to capacities to reason–are vastly different: the lack of capacity to reason vs the capacity to reason.

We have all the evidence we need to conclude that a human being is sufficient to meet the criteria of moral inclusion in every case that morally matters for the society (which is the crux of a moral framework).

• We can never say this is true for a cow. We do not need to test each individual cow that is born with a checklist to see if this one will finally possess the qualities of human moral cognitive abilities to include them in our moral consideration. No, we have all the evidence we need to conclude that every cow born will never have the capacity of moral cognitive reasoning and is permanently prevented from having so due to their species’ genetics.
• Individuals born within a species do not possess such drastic genetic variations that would suddenly allow them to contemplate the pros and cons of telling the truth as a moral virtue within a complex culture of multiple individuals. These are shared, species-wide characteristics that, even when hindered in individuals, are present in the majority: which are the relevant factors for moral reasoning.

Simply put, we include impaired humans in our moral sphere as moral patients due to their essential criteria of being human, which possesses the primary capacity for moral reasoning.

• Even if the smartest ape that was ever born could cognitively out-perform a human child (they can’t), they are not included in our moral consideration because they belong to a species that is otherwise unable to ever engage in morality due to their genetic limitations.
• We are not judging an individual ape for moral consideration like a test to join a club. No, we are judging an ape based on its inclusion in its species. And if that species has no moral framework (as already shown), it’s impossible for an individual ape to suddenly create one, much less have other similarly-capable apes to morally engage with.
• Moreover, the only reason moral concepts work at all is because they are a framework that can only be supported by a group (society/culture). In other words, morals don’t work with lone individuals outside of a group setting: fellow moral agents are a requirement of a moral framework.
• In the case of telling the truth, we accept that there are marginal cases that blur the lines, but we don’t throw out the entire moral principle just because there are marginal cases. Why? Because the principle is still immensely beneficial to humans in most cases most of the time, even if there are gray areas.

“Even if it’s arbitrary, I choose to classify animals as moral patients.”

Let’s assume we are vegan and examine the landscape:

• Despite my best intentions, some sentient animals will die as a result of my life (crop production, transportation, pest control, development, public safety, etc.)
• If that’s the case, then I accept that some death is required for me to live. If that’s the case, then I must conclude that some animals do not have equal worth to me morally. If they are indeed moral patients, then I’m obligated to not kill them. But since some must die, I cannot conclude they are moral patients nor have rights (a paradox).
• If sentient animals fall outside of my moral consideration in some cases (animal death in crop production), then I cannot make a sweeping claim that all sentient animals are moral patients. Otherwise, I would be obligated to spare their lives in every case, which is not possible.
• If I reject this and say that no death is acceptable, then I can no longer eat anything nor continue living, because human activity inevitably impacts animal life.
• I would then have to be inconsistent and say some animals deserve to live (cows, pigs, chickens) but others do not deserve to live (rodents, snakes, birds, beavers… all of which interfere with or whose death is a result of human crop production).

Therefore, animals cannot be morally considered as moral patients by obligation since I cannot fulfill that obligation. Including them is arbitrary.

“We don’t need meat to live, therefore this argument falls apart.”

No, the other premises still hold true even if eating meat is not involved.

If it were true that human populations could all thrive (not just survive) without animal-based products, the moral status of animals remains unchanged. We still interfere with their lives against their will for the sake of ours because we are still moral agents and they are not, regardless of us killing them for food or not.

(The nutritional value, sustainability, or necessity of meat is outside the scope of this article. Here are some related resources to explore.)

“Animals value their lives just as we do. That’s good enough reason not to kill and eat them.”

All organisms on this planet “value their lives.” That’s why they all have evolved mechanism to avoid death until they can reproduce their genes into the next generation.

All plants have chemical defenses against predators because they can’t run away. All prey have faculties allowing them to fight or flee when threatened.

If a “valued life” is sufficient reason not to harm an organism, then we must be consistent and never harm any organism. We cannot then harm a plant by ending its life in order to eat it. We must never pluck and onion from the ground. We must never cut down a tree to use it since these organisms “value their lives” by evidence of avoiding death.

“What about sentience?”

Sentience definition: Sentience is the property of being aware of oneself and others, and the ability to emote and respond to emotions of others to varying degrees, including feeling pain or pleasure. — Essentially: the ability to feel, perceive, be conscious, or to experience subjectivity.

While it’s important to recognize sentience in animals for the purposes of animal welfare, sentience is not a sufficient justification to include them in the sphere of moral consideration.

• In order to be included in the moral sphere, one must either be able to engage in morality (moral agents), otherwise have the capacity to do so if one’s faculties weren’t otherwise impaired (moral patients), or be part of the moral community by automatic inclusion (moral patients [marginal cases]).
• Sentience and moral status are not the same. — Sentience in humans is not the grounds for morality, it’s the fact of being human which entails the ability to engage in higher cognition (in the majority of cases) that allows for the formation of morals and the actions that support them.
• Sentient features are just features that aid in the survival of an organism. — Just like chemical reactions in plants, sentience is a set of tools that help an organism thrive in the world. While it’s true that the set of tools are quite different between plants and animals, the goals are the same: desire for food/energy, water, reproduction, and avoidance of harm. The capacity for a sentient animal to desire these things is no different from any organism seeking the same objectives.
• Whether these tools register as “feelings” in a brain or “chemical stimuli” in a plant, both are evolutionary developments that are beneficial to that organism. — If the end goals of these different tools are the same (survival and propagation), then we can’t draw a line dividing some organisms on one side (animals) and some organisms on the other (plants). Therefore, it’s erroneous to claim sentience is a significant factor in moral consideration.

For example, plants or fungi also have properties that fulfill the same needs as sentient properties:

• Awareness of other plants in their surroundings (“awareness” not meaning “cognition,” but a sensory stimulus analogous to cognition in sentient organisms).
• The ability to be distressed when threatened (“distressed” meaning a negative chemical stimulus when their bodily structures are threatened).
• A desire to acquire water/food/energy (“desire” meaning the genetically-driven process of acquiring and maintaining the inputs required for continued life).
• The ability to avoid harm to its body and a “will to live” until it can reproduce (toxic chemical defenses to demotivate or harm the animals and insects trying to consume them).

“Then why do people claim sentience as a deciding factor in moral consideration?”

“The question is not Can they reason? or Can they talk? but Can they suffer?” — 18th century philosopher Jeremy Bentham

The claim: Sentient beings have a will to live. If these beings have a will to live, and they have subjective experiences unique to them, and can feel pain, and can suffer (sentience), then we have no right to take their lives from them. We are “violating” their “right to life.”

As previously shown, while no one wants to cause animals to needlessly suffer, nor should we be killing animals for “no reason,” the characteristic of “sentience” is only different in appearance, not in function when comparing the survival-drives inherent in all organisms.

Is it possible we disproportionately place value on organisms that are more like us: Those that have a nervous system, are sentient, have eyes, ears, and limbs in similar configurations to us? Is this an emotional response or a reasoned response to moral claims? Perhaps this is a kind of speciesism unto itself.

“Defining morals this way is Speciesism.”

Definition of speciesism: Favoring your own species over another. The assumption of human superiority.

Favoring sentience is a kind of speciesism. It gives higher moral value to those with a nervous system than to organisms without (plants). Plants have sensory mechanisms geared toward survival as well. They’re just different.

• From this perspective, every organism, including humans, are speciesists: they favor their own species’ needs first over the needs of other species.
• Speciesism is necessary for a species to survive. Orca whales would not exist if they were first concerned about the seals they eat.

“I am a speciesist. Speciesism is not merely plausible; it is essential for right conduct, because those who will not make morally relevant distinctions among species are almost certain, in consequence, to misapprehend their true obligations … Every sensitive moral judgment requires that the differing natures of the beings to whom obligations are owed be considered.” — Carl Cohen Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan

“Speciesism is just like racism, sexism, or homophobia.”

No. Speciesism is not like racism, sexism, or homophobia. The analogy doesn’t work.

• In the case of sexism, men were wrong to assume that women were less intelligent or couldn’t hold certain positions in society. We eventually recognized that they were equal moral agents and were just as intelligent and capable as men. Even with subtle differences (reproductive functions, etc.), we are equal beings in all ways that matter for moral consideration.
• We cannot look at a cow and say, “I recognize you as an equal being. I was just mistaken that you were only a cow.” The cow can never be the same as a human, but a person of color, a female, or a homosexual is and always was morally equal to all other humans.
• With racism, sexism, or homophobia, humans are mistakenly denying the moral status of other humans based on skin color, sex, sexual orientation, or culture, which are very shallow differences between members of the same species that ultimately have no relevance.

Speciesism is not like slavery

Speciesism is not like slavery for similar reasons noted above. We mistakenly enslaved other humans because of a perceived gulf of cognitive abilities that was incorrect. We treated them as non-moral agents like we do with animals.

Once we realized slaves were indeed equal humans, we correctly included them in our moral sphere of obligation. Animals can never bridge that gap due to biological limitations in their cognitive abilities. In other words, animals do not and cannot possess the necessary faculties to engage in morality and can therefore never be moral agents.

• Ex: If speciesism is just like slavery, and we don’t tolerate slavery, then we should stop eating food altogether and cease our existence. There is inevitable animal death in food production and human existence. If we accept that this is inevitable for our survival, then we must accept that “some’’ death is tolerable. We cannot say that “some” slavery is tolerable, because there is no instance where slavery is vital to human existence (among many other reasons). Therefore, speciesism is not like slavery.

Slavery, sexism, and homophobia are wrong because there is no rational/true distinction between humans of other races, nor between sexes, nor sexual orientations. But when we compare humans with animals, the distinction is not merely of degrees, but by an enormous cognitive gulf.

This gulf of cognitive ability between humans and animals is immensely greater than that of skin color or sex, including our closest relatives: chimpanzees who we share 99% of our DNA with. What seems like a small mathematical difference actually encapsulates a vast gulf of cognitive abilities unavailable to any animal.

“Human animals — and no other — build fires and wheels, diagnose each other’s illnesses, communicate using symbols, navigate with maps, risk their lives for ideals, collaborate with each other, explain the world in terms of hypothetical causes, punish strangers for breaking rules, imagine impossible scenarios, and teach each other how to do all of the above.” — Derek Penn, the Cognitive Evolution Group at the University of Louisiana and the UCLA Reasoning Lab

The fact that this significant distinction between humans and animals exists at all is sufficient to exclude them from these erroneous comparisons.

Summary

Eating meat can be ethical and morally justified for the following reasons:

1. Humans benefit greatly from animal products (especially for health reasons).
2. The human footprint impacts all animal life we come into contact with (often resulting in death, despite our best intentions).
3. It’s inevitable that many animals will die as a result of our food system (including crop production).
4. We must eat to survive.
5. Animals are neither moral agents nor moral patients.
6. Therefore, we are justified in eating animals.

That being said, we are still ethically bound to treat animals in our care well. Even though we completely govern the lives of our cats and dogs, we treat them well under circumstances appropriate for their species. We should (and do in many cases) treat our food animals with equally species-specific welfare standards. In cases where we don’t, we should demand and support those that do hold higher welfare standards.

Moral agents, moral patients, and marginal cases

• Moral agents are beings that can reason about, and engage in, morality (ex: all humans). — Animals are not moral agents because they do not possess the cognitive capacity to engage in the complex concept of morality.
• Moral patients are beings that can be morally considered (ex: children and physically or mentally impaired humans). — Animals are not moral patients because they cannot reason nor engage in morality, so they are neither moral agents nor moral patients. Unlike impaired humans, no animal can ever possess the faculties necessary for reasoning about morality. We may choose to be kind to them, we may be ethically obligated to care for animals we manage, but we are not morally obligated to animals as a principle of moral consideration.
• Those who categorize animals as moral patients are doing so arbitrarily. — Since we must accept the reality that some animals are intentionally killed so that we can live, animals cannot be morally considered as moral patients by obligation since we cannot fulfill that obligation. Including them in our moral sphere is arbitrary and not obligated.
• Marginal cases are included in our sphere of moral concern based on their primary capacity inherent to Homo sapiens. — We include permanently impaired humans in our moral sphere based on their criteria of inclusion in the moral community, which is determined by the characteristic of being human, which entails the primary capacity of rationality — a species-wide characteristic — not by an individual-by-individual checklist of characteristics to determine if they’re in or out.

Moral interests supersede non-moral interests

• Moral interests take precedence over non-moral interests. — Moral communities are categorically above non-moral communities. By declaring a principle as “moral,” we are by definition elevating it above all other principles that are non-moral. Therefore, moral interests must take precedence over non-moral interests because they are “better than” or “valued higher” than non-moral interests.

Why we don’t kick (or eat) dogs, and why we eat cows instead

• The reason we don’t kick dogs is simply because there are good reasons not to kick dogs. — The harm is unnecessary and may have negative impacts on me or my moral community. It’s not wise or beneficial to me or my community to harm a dog for “no reason.”
• We don’t eat pets because they are more valuable to us alive than as food. — Domestic pets serve a number of functions useful to humans. They are a poor food choice due to a number of cost-benefit factors.
• We eat cows because they are more valuable as a food species, not as pets. — Cattle provide a higher value-on-return when considering cost, meat-to-body ratios, and management factors.

Sentience is not the deciding factor for moral consideration

• While it’s important to recognize sentience in animals for the purposes of animal welfare, sentience is not sufficient justification to include them in the sphere of moral consideration.
• Sentient features are just features that aid in the survival of an organism. Just like chemical reactions in plants, sentience is a set of tools that help an organism navigate the world (desire for food, water, reproduction, and avoidance of harm). These drives are the same whether it’s an animal, plant, or fungus.
• Therefore, sentience is not a sufficient characteristic to determine moral obligation.

Related concepts to consider

Animal rights vs animal welfare

• Animal rights is a philosophical stance that wants to end the use of animals by humans for any reason (food, labor, companionship, medical experiments, entertainment, etc.) and grant them legal personhood status. At a minimum, it’s the fundamental Right to Bodily Integrity, Bodily Liberty, and a Right to Life. Therefore, animals should not be harmed, imprisoned, or killed.
• Animal welfare refers to an animal’s quality of life and how well an animal is coping with their environment. Welfare serves to protect an animal’s wellbeing when it comes to nutrition, health, living conditions, and mental states.
• The main difference being: “Animal rights” strive to provide an enforceable, legal threshold for giving animals similar rights to life and liberty that humans have, where “animal welfare” acknowledges that, while animals do not have legal rights in the same way humans do, we are still obligated to treat them well because they are in our care.

Principle of least harm/suffering

Reducing harm and suffering is a good, general framework to start with when considering moral and ethical actions. However, it’s not a sufficient place to stop.

If we take a two-dimensional approach to simply “reducing harm and suffering,” then we immediately find ourselves in a dilemma: we are now obligated to end suffering everywhere and anywhere in the world.

The entire planet is a non-stop organism-consuming machine. In the wild, the majority of these organisms suffer in the process.

• Are we obligated to separate the predators from prey?
• Are we obligated to save animals that are in the process of natural death?
• Who defines harm and suffering?
• Are we to never grow crops, engage in transportation or any human development?

Net-reduction

Perhaps a more reasonable approach is to strive for “net-reduction” in harm and suffering. By acknowledging that some harm to some animals is necessary (because it’s inevitable an unavoidable) for the positive thriving of the moral community we’re obligated to (humans), we can strive to reduce the suffering of those animals that will inevitably die even though some momentary pain/discomfort will happen. In animal agriculture, this means treating animals in our care with high welfare standards, followed by a death free from as much fear and pain as reasonable (which we continually need to optimize).

A net-reduction acknowledges that some levels of suffering may unfortunately go up for the greater net-positive goal of overall reduced suffering.

For example: if we take the two-dimensional view, we should never take a child to the dentist to pull a bad tooth. Nor should we ever insist people work hard at their jobs. These may indeed cause harm and suffering, but the net-positive gain of a future with less harm and suffering is worth the temporary pain and discomfort.

Thought experiment

Let’s say John and Sarah become vegan. They seek out a small farm that they will source all of their vegetables from for a year. It’s unfortunate, but the farm has to kill some animals that are trying to eat their food. John, Sarah, and the farmer work together to do everything possible to deter the birds, rodents, deer, and other animals without harming them. But despite there best efforts, it’s not possible for every single animal to be unharmed. Some have to be killed in order to prevent them from eating or degrading their food. John and Sarah don’t like this, but they accept the reality of it.

When they do the calculations (let’s make the math easy), they are each responsible for 10 animal deaths each for that year: John is responsible for 10 total animal deaths, Sarah is responsible for 10 as well.

At the start of the next year, Sarah decides she wants to be an omnivore again. She acquires a cow that she can keep on the farm’s back pasture. The cow will graze, eat grass, and some crop residuals which humans can’t eat, which is more than sufficient for growing a healthy cow.

When it comes time for harvest, the cow is killed and butchered. Sarah’s plate is now half full of animal protein and half full of vegetables (she no longer needs as many calories from vegetables since she gets plenty from the meat).

John and Sarah do their calculations for this new year: John’s full plate of vegetables is still responsible for 10 animal deaths; Sarah’s plate of half vegetables and half meat is now responsible for only 6 animal deaths — 5 from her vegetables and 1 from the cow’s death. Is Sarah now a vegan? Is Sarah now “more ethical” than John? If our principle is to reduce harm, hasn’t Sarah reduced the most harm between them (6 vs 10)?

As you can see in this highly simplistic thought experiment, calculating numbers or blindly reducing harm without considering the larger picture, our two-dimensional approach to reducing harm isn’t very straight-forward after all.

And, we didn’t even factor in things like downstream pesticide affects from the farm, the natural carbon cycle the cow is participating in that would sequester more carbon than it omits, nutrient values and how we measure harm and suffering if we’re considering the harm and suffering done to humans consuming sub-optimal foods, etc.

The sentiment of “doing least harm” is perfectly noble and valid: it just can’t be a two-dimensional approach like a hammer that blindly sees everything as a nail.

What is harm?

• Harm is a damage or setback to one or more of an organism’s welfare conditions (properties they need to operate correctly). When you harm an organism, you damage or temporarily impede the welfare conditions it needs to properly operate (a broken leg impedes the ability of motion which may be vital to survival).

What is suffering?

• Suffering is the prolonged or repeated exposure to harm (a setback to one’s welfare condition of physical or mental wellbeing).

What is death?

• Death is the permanent cessation of life.
• Harm and suffering may indeed lead to death, but they are not synonymous. Harm does not always result in death, and suffering does not always result in death. They are not equivalents.
• Allowing or facilitating animal deaths is acceptable when humans greatly benefit from it, because moral welfare interests supersede non-moral interests (animals are not moral agents nor patients, therefore the welfare interests of moral agents takes precedence over non-moral agents). This does not mean we should do so without high welfare standards in place.

“What about harm, suffering, and death in animal agriculture?”

• We should demand better animal welfare standards from producers that have poor animal welfare practices. We can demand with industry policy upgrades and with our dollars by supporting high standard producers.
• Not all harm is bad. Some measures are done for the protection of the animals in a similar manner that we may force a child to go to the dentist. It may be unpleasant, but it’s necessary for overall well-being.
• For those practices that are causing unnecessary suffering, we can demand better, standardized policy… and many producers are already doing this voluntarily (infrared beak trimming, cow dehorning, cage-free chickens, Temple Grandin’s humane handling designs).

Harm, suffering, and death are important concepts to define properly because they are often used interchangeably when they are not synonymous.

Harm and suffering also come in degrees of intensity and duration. It’s often presented that farm animals are continuously being harmed and are constantly in a state of suffering. While it’s unfortunately true in some cases and in some aspects of industrial animal agriculture… it’s not always true, as is often misrepresented by animal rights activists. Even large producers like McDonald’s have independent audits to enforce higher animal welfare standards to meet financial and consumer demands.

Final thoughts

Morality and ethics are not easy topics to talk about in casual conversation. Many people simply accept whatever the prevailing moral framework may be in their immediate culture (or whatever “sounds right” at the moment), and never spend the time to fully contemplate whether these moral principles are worthy of our actions or not.

By engaging in thoughtful reflection, hopefully we can come to some consensus as to what our moral and ethical frameworks will be for a better future.

In the case of eating meat, while we should consider the sentient beings in our care, we ultimately must care for ourselves first and foremost. We can do so in an ethical manner, even if the details are not as clear-cut as we’d like them to be.