Money, Drugs, Guerrillas— A case study on FARC’s relationship with coca and cocaine from 1978–1999

Abstract

This investigation looks beyond the speculation surrounding Colombian politics’ historical connection to drug money to analyze the actual ties between Colombia’s largest communist guerrilla — FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) — and the narco-economy. Specifically, this article sets out to discover: How and why did FARC become involved with coca and cocaine from 1978 to 1999, and what were the implications of such involvements?

The scope of this article ranges from the early developments of narco-related policies, to when the quantitative implications of such policies could no longer be measured as the War on Drugs intensified in 2000. This investigation neither attempts to debate whether FARC’s attack during the War on Drugs was warranted, nor analyze FARC’s behavior during the apex of the War. Rather, this article undertakes a holistic evaluation of a variety of sources to discern the cause and effect of FARC’s narco-related policies in creating a force that was on track to seize the country by 1999.

In conclusion, we find FARC’s initial decision to address coca production was out of necessity to consolidate political support. However, FARC’s escalating involvement with the cocaine trade thereafter was more the product of the organization’s decentralized nature and a desire to benefit from the incredible profitability of the illicit trade. Although such involvement in the drug trade undermined its ideology and provided the base for its assault in the War on Drugs, FARC’s expansion up to 1999 was highly proportional to growing drug wealth. Thus, denial of involvements in the narco-economy and crop substitution programs on behalf of FARC were attempts to distract the public from policies towards coca and cocaine which from 1978 to 1999 were extremely successful in supporting FARC’s aims.

Introduction

Colombia’s history of political violence is a long and painful one, and in spite of the formation of a National Front in 1957, dissenting political organizations (particularly Communism ones) remained targets in the second half of the century. In 1964 the Colombian military, with the support of the American government, started a campaign to recapture and eliminate ‘independent communist republics’ in the countryside. Upon being displaced, the leaders of these communist strongholds would eventually found FARC in 1966[1]. FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia[2]) is a Marxist-Leninist insurgent group whose public aim has always been to seize state control via armed struggle, establish a socialist state, and enforce agrarian reform[3].

Although a relatively powerless organization since 2002, FARC remains of particular historical significance for being the longest lasting guerrilla group in Latin America[4]. Arguably of greater significance, is what journalist James Bargent calls FARC’s long-lasting “love/hate relationship with drugs”[5]. Indeed, a crucial factor in giving traction to FARC’s expansion of power during the 1980s and 1990s was its ability to benefit from Colombia’s most profitable products at the time: coca and cocaine. However, this drug-connection is also what earned FARC the ‘narco-guerilla[6]’ label that would justify its persecution during the War on Drugs by the Colombian government, financed by the Unites States.

Fundamentally, narcotics were central in deciding FARC’s course. Yet, of the few historical works that address the topic, most focus on FARC’s sporadic drug-trafficking fiascos from 2000 onwards or American Foreign Policy. None have solely analyzed FARC’s relationship with the narco-economy, including the incentives, developments, repercussions, and conflicting views over this relationship. Thus, this article seeks to answer: How and why did the FARC become involved with coca and cocaine from 1978 to 1999, and what were the implications of such involvements?

1. Forming policies towards coca

1.1 Incentives

To understand FARC’s complex relationship with coca and cocaine, one must first recognize its initial incentive for addressing coca crops[8]. Starting in 1978, Colombia began to experience a “coca boom”[9] for a multitude of reasons. “Economic liberalization”[10] left the agricultural sector in crisis, as food and cotton crops could no longer compete with imported goods and synthetic materials. Active prohibition of coca crops in Bolivia at the time meant the price of coca had increased, and growing demand for cocaine from the U.S. appeared to promise price stability[11]. Finally, as if in perfect timing, Colombian President Avala’s policy to crack down on marijuana production[12] in the 70s, motivated narco-traffickers to switch their focus to cocaine[13].

FARC initially resisted this increase in coca cultivation, because they viewed the subsequent rise in narco-trafficking as “the fruits of capitalist degeneration”[14]; traffickers exploited peasants by buying coca harvests at low prices to maximize drug baron profits. Even so, sustenance farming was less profitable than coca farming, and FARC’s anti-coca stance was unpopular amongst Colombia’s poor farmers[15]. Problematically, as Duke University professor Robin Kirk suggests, FARC maintained power in large expanses of jungle, inhabited only by poor farmers and physically ideal for coca cultivation[16]. Thus, it appears a political need to consolidate support from the peasants led FARC to compromise their ideology and address illicit coca crops to their own benefit. Indeed, FARC Front leaders in the provinces of Putumayo, Caquetá, and Guaviare (where coca cultivation was greatest) were enticed by coca’s profitability, and advocated that FARC employ coca in war financing[17].

1.2 Coca taxation schemes and implications

As a result, at the Seventh Guerilla Conference in 1982, FARC high command agreed to support coca production and protect farmers by regularizing taxes on coca sales to narco-traffickers[18]. FARC also decided to progress from its “defensive mode in guerrilla warfare”[19], and that coca profits would be necessary to buy armaments and fulfill this aim. Following the conference FARC established its first financial commission, which prescribed the level of funds each Front was expected to raise. FARC’s decentralized structure allowed some Fronts to decide to ban coca production entirely[20], although most adopted the taxation program to increase funds[21]. FARC set the price to be paid within its regions for each kilo of coca, and imposed a “revolutionary tax” (called “el gramaje”), worth between 7% and 15% of the farmer’s sale of coca[22]. This didn’t harm farmers, whose profits were “still sufficiently high” [23], and certainly higher than in traffickers’ zones. FARC also imposed ‘el gramaje’ on coca paste[24] made by farmers, or bought the paste at a set price before selling it to the traffickers at a higher price to keep the difference[25].

Although FARC never publicized the details of these taxation schemes, such information has been confirmed by multiple primary sources, including declassified DEA[26] and CIA[27] reports, which based their findings on information given by farmers and FARC deserters to the Colombian Government. Deserters often had written records of proof, however we must also consider that as FARC’s enemy, the Government may have occasionally exaggerated the levels of FARC’s taxation of coca. Regardless, by taxing farmers’ products and brokering between farmers and traffickers, FARC was already operating what appeared to be a centrally planned coca-economy, and more notably, had established itself at the start of a “chain of commodity circulation that ends in the U.S.” [28].

Short-term, these taxation schemes would have enormous benefits for FARC, as ensuring the profitability of coca won them significant political capital. FARC offered the only protection against traffickers’ exploitation of peasant produce, and when the government started enforcing areal fumigation against coca crops in the 1990s, FARC again provided the only protection by shooting down fumigation planes[29]. This brought more migrants to FARC controlled regions and reduced resistance of the peasants to pay revolutionary taxes[30]. In fact, FARC candidates won more elections in coca growing regions after 1982[31]. Political gains allowed for territorial expansion, and by 1990, “FARC had opened up nine Fronts specifically in the province of Meta, a major coca producing region”[32]. Historian Forrest Hylton even suggests that by 1998, 80% of all FARC controlled territory was covered in coca crops[33] (although this is likely just rational conjecture[34]).

These taxation programs also provided unprecedented profits. Berkeley scholar, Bruce Bagely, points out that thanks to FARC’s promotion of the crop, “between 1989 and 1998, Colombian coca leaf production increased by 140 percent, from 33, 900 to 81,400 metric tons”[35]. This made Colombia the world’s largest producer of coca, which coincided with mass tax revenues. A 1993 U.S. Embassy report from Bogotá asserted that FARC was successful in “generating considerable revenue (around $60 million a year[36]) for their war chests by taxing the coca industry”[37].

FARC invested some of its coca funds into education and healthcare[38], however poor transportation infrastructure in most Fronts meant that by the late 1990s coca remained the only profitable crop[39]. Perhaps this was a form of manipulation such that FARC could secure vast coca harvests it could continue taxing. Ultimately, FARC High Command’s decision to tax coca and coca paste, though contradictory to their original ideology, was strategically suited to the environment — physical, economic, and social — of Colombia, and very successful in fulfilling their 1982 aims.

2. Developments in cocaine related funding

After the taxation program began, FARC observed the growing affluence of Colombia’s drug cartels and desired more direct involvement in cocaine production and distribution[40]. This proved a riskier decision, although sociologist Alain Labrousse interprets FARC’s involvement with more advanced stages of cocaine trafficking as “logical” given their support of the illegal cultivation of coca. He suggests that if they abstained from furthering their involvement, only the peasants and not the wealthier traffickers would pay the burden of taxes, and they risked facilitating a fall in demand for their peasants’ coca by not allowing traffickers to operate on their land[41]. Although rational, self-interest and ambition were probably stronger motivators in such developments.

2.1 Earlier relationships with cartels and narco-traffickers

Starting in 1982, the financial commission demanded higher funds from Fronts in coca producing regions[42]. Some Fronts responded by establishing ties with the Medellín and Calí Cartels[43]; in early1984, they began supplying FARC with armaments in return for guarding their airstrips and drug processing plants in FARC territory[44]. However, relationships with the cartels soon broke down as FARC kept pushing for higher ‘protection fees’ and wages for coca farmers. By the end of 1984, most cartels had declared war on FARC over ideological tensions[45]. Nonetheless, in 1991 the Medellín Cartel still paid FARC’s Sixth Front to guard labs in southern Colombia[46]. According to the State Department, FARC earned about $1.6 million per month guarding a single “cocaine collection center” in the Sixth Front[47]. The nature of this source suggests this figure may be inflated, as the State Department typically amplified the involvement of FARC in drug trafficking to help justify its attack in the War on Drugs. Nevertheless, FARC became far more closely associated with narco-operations in the early 1990s, when the relative demise of the Medellín and Calí Cartels[48] formed a power vacuum, resulting in the rise of “numerous, smaller trafficking networks, often lacking their own extensive resources.”[49]

2.2 Security contracts and cocaine related funding

FARC brilliantly exploited the weakness of these new trafficking networks. First, they expanded into new regions and temporarily evicted the smaller networks by forcing them to pay higher fees for coca until they left[50]. The new FARC Fronts then imposed their hegemony by setting the price for coca and coca paste and forcing peasants to sell only to FARC[51]. Peasants did not welcome FARC’s monopoly over their products in these regions, but FARC used this dominance to return much of Colombia’s cocaine trafficking scene to FARC territory so it could be taxed[52].

Indeed, FARC then taxed these smaller traffickers in what DEA reports refer to as ‘service contracts’[53]. In exchange for money or weapons, FARC insurgents would “provide security for illicit crops, cocaine laboratories, and clandestine airstrips”[54] owned and built by traffickers in FARC territory. If traffickers didn’t agree, they had to pay even more to guard facilities themselves, and would not be allowed to operate on, or buy products from FARC’s ever expanding territory[55]. Specific to processing labs, during the 1980s FARC charged a 10% tax on the selling price of the cocaine or coca paste made whilst the lab was under FARC security[56]. Although there is debate over whether FARC had its own refineries, the most likely answer is no. As scholar Lee Rensselaer suggests, FARC fundamentally remained a guerrilla force, and owning such a facility would give them a responsibility they couldn’t afford, given that “mobility was essential to their security”[57]. Nonetheless, other scholars, including counter-terrorism analyst Thomas Cook, insist that FARC built refineries using coca tax revenues that they would either sell or rent to the new trafficking networks[58] — however, no current evidence proves this allegation.

By 1999, FARC arranged a fixed set of fees for all its services in the cocaine trade, and over one-third of all Fronts collected funds from such services. A trafficker was charged $15.70 for every kilo of coca paste and $52.60 for every kilo of cocaine made on FARC territory, and faced a tax of 20% of the shipment value for transporting chemicals on a river through FARC territory[59]. They also taxed cocaine flying out; a guarded domestic flight from a FARC airstrip cost $2,631, whilst a guarded international flight cost $5,263[60]. These services alone seem to validate General Fernando’s Tapia[61] claim; “I do not believe that anyone can doubt the links between drug trafficking and the rebel groups…”[62]

2.3 Later relationships with cartels and narco-traffickers

However, it appears FARC became too enchanted with drug money to limit itself to tactical taxation, and eventually allowed self-interest to draw it closer to drug-trafficking. In 1998, FARC began overtaking Colombian middlemen. They bought products made on their territory, including coca paste, cocaine base[63], and perhaps even cocaine, and sold it directly to international distribution networks — particularly Mexican drug cartels[64]. Vanda Felbab-Brown argues that by 1999, the Tijuana cartel acquired as much as “55% of the cocaine shipped to the United States directly from FARC”[65]. As senior fellow of the security program at the Brookings Institute, Felbab-Brown supposedly amassed a variety of primary sources that support this claim, although lack of declassified information makes it difficult to corroborate. However, a Mexican Government investigation confirmed that FARC formed such relationships in order to receive “cash and arms”[66]. Strong supporting evidence rests with the capture of a Mexican boat in 1998, carrying 10 tons of armaments and headed directly towards a FARC coastal Front[67].

Yet, such relationships figured small compared to the cocaine operations being run in the late 90s by the leader of the 16th Front, Tomás Molina. American Attorney General John Ashcroft claimed: “the 16th Front processed cocaine, collected cocaine from other FARC fronts, and sold it to international drug traffickers for payment in currency, weapons and equipment”[68]. This speech was made in the context of a legal case against Molina, and there is no evidence the 16th Front processed cocaine. However, Colombian intelligence reports and captured FARC documents confirm Molina collected cocaine from five other Fronts, and sold it directly to Brazilian narco-traffickers. These operations were so extensive, the 16th Front may have collected as much as $15 million from 1996 to 1998, making it the greatest financial contributor to FARC at the time[69].

However, there is no definite knowledge about these relationships other than that they existed, and they were all tactical, planned, and extremely profitable. Furthermore, they do not reflect FARC operations as a whole, for unlike taxation schemes, only a small fraction of Fronts actually engaged in ‘cocaine for cash & arms’ relationships, and without any direct coordination with the Secretariat or Financial Commission[70]. Though these incidents prove FARC’s clear involvement in trafficking, they do not mean that FARC itself was a cartel, because from 1978 to 1999 there is no evidence FARC directly produced cocaine or laundered funds abroad[71].

3. Narco-economics in promoting FARC growth

The best way to evaluate FARC’s significant involvement in the narco-economy is to analyze how it correlated with the growth of the organization. In the 1970s FARC maintained no relationship with the narco-economy, and was merely surviving in terms of political and military strength; it had never organized an offense with over 50 insurgents. By the mid 1990’s however, as much as 65% of the FARC’s funds came from drug related policies[72], and Colombian Government reports claim that by 1999, FARC was making anywhere between $400 million to $3.5 billion a year through the drug trade[73]. Since the Colombian Government persecuted FARC, these figures are likely inflated for political purposes. However even very modest estimates such as Felbab-Brown’s, that FARC was making between $60 and $100 million a year on the drug trade during the 90s[74], still emphasize how immensely profitable FARC’s policies were.

FARC used these profits “to further their political objectives”[75]. After 1982, FARC used coca-tax profits to invest in local infrastructure, political campaigns, and persistently defend coca crops against military assaults. A subsequent increase in social-political capital meant FARC could more easily expand into new territories, as peasants were increasingly willing to trade security for taxes. Territorial growth led to economic growth, which led to military and political growth, which led back to territorial growth[76]. In this way, FARC went from having limited presence in eight municipalities in 1979, to controlling 622 municipalities, or 61% of all Colombian municipalities by 1998[77]. Thanks to pro-coca policies, FARC was often popularly accepted as the authority in those municipalities — an incredible feat for a radical guerrilla movement.

Territorial growth also resulted in growing profits from policies towards coca and cocaine, and growing power — providing the leverage necessary to become more involved with cocaine trafficking. This clear progression enabled FARC’s exploding profits during the 1990’s from a cumulative set of taxation schemes, security contracts, and trade agreements with cartels. FARC used these profits during the 1990’s to purchase “up-to-date military equipment”[78], pay their soldiers three times more than national government soldiers, and even send their soldiers to train abroad in Vietnam in guerrilla tactics[79]. This significantly improved FARC’s militaristic capability, which is why Cook asserts: “FARC’s rapid expansion in the 1990s was fuelled by their increasing involvement in the narcotics trade”[80]. Through this cycle, FARC expanded from nine Fronts in 1979, to its peak of 60 Fronts in 1995[81] — complemented by an increase in membership from 3,000 to 20,000.

The benefits of involvement in the narco-economy were most evident in 1998, when President Pastrana attempted to address FARC’s threatening expansion by granting it a demilitarized zone that covered 40% of Colombia’s national territory[82]. Pastrana hoped that by demonstrating such trust towards FARC, they might be willing to initiate peace talks[83]. The talks failed, but fundamentally, it was the ‘intimidating’ power that FARC acquired largely through cocaine and coca related funding that gave it the upper hand in government concessions. Not only had FARC secured more territory, it now stood a serious chance of seizing the country. Ironically, FARC also used the demilitarized zone (‘Farclandia’), for coca cultivation[84].

Fundamentally, involvement with coca and cocaine contributed to FARC’s economic self-sufficiency, which meant it couldn’t be “forced to the bargaining table and subsequently withered”[85]. Unlike other left-wing guerillas in Colombia (which depended on crumbling Soviet support), FARC grew after 1980. Clearly, involvement with coca and cocaine was a brilliant financial strategy with very positive short-term implications. Growth of the organization was highly proportional to growing involvement in the narco-economy, and other factors staying the same, it seems unlikely FARC could have grown as it did without embracing narcotics.

4. Negative implications

Ironically, FARC never took over the country, in part due to the negative implications of the same involvements with coca and cocaine that promoted FARC’s growth. An obvious problem was that such involvements were all illegal; so in addition to being an ideological enemy to the right-wing government, FARC deliberately also became a criminal enemy. However, FARC was a criminal enemy to the government for many reasons. A far more serious implication was that FARC’s involvement with narcotics was used to justify its attack in the ‘War on Drugs’, starting in the 1980s.

After the DEA discovered evidence of FARC insurgents guarding a processing lab in 1984, U.S. Ambassador Lewis Tambs came up with the term ‘narco-guerilla’ to describe FARC[86]. Then, in 1997 the U.S. State Department registered FARC as a terrorist organization participating in (amongst other things[87]) narcoterrorism[88], which was manipulatively defined to apply to FARC even if they didn’t produce cocaine[89]. The U.S. was also frustrated that money laundered in the country was being used to pay FARC, and that FARC was occasionally at the beginning of the production chain of cocaine flooding U.S. markets[90]. This, and the sensationalized ‘narcoguerilla’ and ‘narcoterrorist’ labels helped to justify the Colombian government’s official statement in 1990 that any military aid received from the U.S. would be used to persecute FARC[91]. Thereupon, the War on Drugs weakened FARC and killed many of its leaders by 1999. Yet, the ELN (another left-wing Colombian insurgent group) was also persecuted by the government with U.S. backing, although it was never involved with coca or cocaine. One could argue then, that in the case of FARC a “war on subversion had melded into the war on drugs”[92]. Thus, the true negative implication of FARC’s involvement with coca and cocaine was that it formed a fault and point of manipulation that helped justify its attack by its political enemies.

Involvement with coca and cocaine also brought about negative implications in that it undermined the political integrity and ideology of FARC. In response to FARC’s escalating involvement with cocaine trafficking, the popular consensus in urban areas in the 1990s was reflected in Colombian President Gaviria’s claim: “FARC have abandoned all ideological and political justification and want to convert themselves into the new drug barons.”[93] Trust that FARC might be loyal to communism or become a viable political alternative in Colombia was hampered by media’s portrayal of FARC as another criminalized and drug-profit-crazed organization[94]. Such “capitalistic” ambition was everything FARC rallied against, and it thus found itself in an awkward situation, where the means to its political ends undercut its political credibility. This battle of reputation made it increasingly difficult to honestly succeed in elections and national politics during the 90s[95]. The drug trade also had a real “corrosive and corrupting”[96] effect on FARC — especially evident in the personal fortunes of Thomas Molina[97] — which further undermined FARC’s communist identity.

5. FARC perspective and crop substitution programs

In all statements, interviews, and manuscripts published by their official press, FARC consistently denied taxing coca paste produced by peasants — let alone cooperating with drug-traffickers[98]. They only ever admitted to taxing coca crops for the purpose of funding their ‘ideologically honorable’ revolution[99]. Although involvement with coca and cocaine had many positive implications, denial can be interpreted as an attempt to minimize the negative implications. By denying affiliation with cocaine, FARC tried to disassociate its image from criminality and uphold the respectability of its ideological aims. Perhaps it was also trying to minimize the threat of its accusatory political enemies.

Interestingly, during the 1980s and 1990s FARC also proposed several multimillion-dollar crop substitution programs to reduce “illegal” coca cultivation[100]. There are different ways to interpret such proposals. Perhaps FARC genuinely wanted to help the farmers by having them grow food crops that fumigating planes and traffickers could not destroy or exploit. Such proposals were popular amongst peasants, and may have been a political bargaining tool. However, FARC’s crop substitution plans were so costly and utopian that they were never actually implemented on a significant scale. Felbab-Brown argues that by proposing programs too extravagant to be realized, FARC could prevent the eradication of coca crops it taxed, whilst simultaneously taking the “politically correct position” and effectively “denying its participation in the drug trade”[101]. This appears to be another technique of reducing the negative implications of involvement with the drug trade, whilst benefiting from the positive ones.

Conclusion

Although FARC’s involvement with the narco-economy remains highly politicized, it appears to have followed a clear progression. Conditions out of FARC’s control encouraged a surge in coca’s popularity in the late 1970s. A need to consolidate political support prompted FARC to start supporting coca cultivation in 1982 by taxing and regulating various aspects of the coca economy. As a result, FARC grew in wealth, political support, and territory.

This success motivated political opportunism within FARC to benefit from the far more lucrative cocaine trade. FARC’s decentralized structure meant that Fronts had much freedom to decide how to do so, and also meant that Fronts could engage in illegal activity without involving the central authority — which supposedly would keep FARC authority ‘unstained’. Starting in 1984, numerous Fronts undertook a variety of ‘service contracts’ and trade agreements with Latin American Cartels & narco-traffickers, and made millions of dollars through their escalating involvement in the cocaine trade. From 1978 to 1999, FARC’s growth was largely proportional and dependent on this growing involvement in the narco-economy. In fact, the incredible extent of FARC’s territorial expansion by 1990 could not have been possible without the political, financial, and militaristic gains provided by their cumulative set of policies towards coca and cocaine.

Although these polices were tactically developed, they undermined FARC’s ideology and provided the impetus for its assault and eventual ruin through the War on Drugs. FARC’s denial of involvement in the narco-economy and proposed crop substitution programs can thus be understood as a form of self-defense to distract the public from its involvement in the narco-economy. Ultimately, involvement with coca and cocaine from 1978 to 1999 proved to be FARC’s poisoned chalice: it allowed for its incredible rise in power, but also brought about its demise.

Appendix A

Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha and the Paramilitaries

The Medellín Cartel’s relationship with FARC in 1984 was in fact quite significant, and merits more elaborate explanation. Although FARC maintained a stable relationship with Pablo Escobar (the head of the Medellín Cartel), they had a famously destructive relationship with Escobar’s associate, Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, who operated in Southern Colombia. Initially, Gacha paid FARC to guard his cocaine laboratories, and in accordance with FARC rules, he also agreed to pay higher prices for cocaine paste made by farmers in FARC territory[102]. However, Gacha soon asked FARC if he could build an airstrip and move some of his operations under the cover of FARC’s headquarters in La Uribe. FARC was not willing to take such a risk; if Colombian Officials found out, than their headquarters would be targeted. Arguments between FARC and Gacha escalated to the point that FARC abandoned contact with Gacha, and retaliated by raiding some of his property[103]. Gacha responded by organizing Colombia’s first paramilitary groups and ordering them to exterminate FARC strongholds. His paramilitaries were so effective, that they pushed FARC out of the middle Magdalena area where FARC traditionally held power and killed many guerilla fighters[104]. Although the paramilitaries would eventually become independent of Gacha, FARC remained threatened by the paramilitaries in 1999 and beyond.

It’s worth nothing that although the argument sources from a ‘business deal’, the unofficial war between FARC and the paramilitaries can be interpreted as a war on ideology over how to address the narco-economy. The paramilitaries represented the traffickers, who wanted to buy land and evict peasants to mass-produce coca and pay cheap prices for cocaine-products. FARC on the other hand, prioritized farmers ownership of coca crops and their being paid fair prices, which subjected them to constant attack by traffickers and paramilitaries.

Appendix B

The Tranquilandia Incident, Lewis Tambs, and the Narcoguerilla thesis

The incident that led US Ambassador Lewis Tambs to come up with his ‘narco-guerilla thesis’ about FARC, is known as the Tranquilandia incident. In March 1984, the Colombian government and the DEA raided an enormous cocaine laboratory called Tranquilandia. During the raid, officials where shot at by snipers hiding in the jungle, which without evidence, they started to assume was FARC because there was a FARC base not very far away. Inside the lab, authorities collected obscure information that potentially suggested FARC involvement with the lab’s operations[105]. Colombian Police would, several years later, declare there was in fact no evidence of FARC presence at Tranquilandia[106], but at the time U.S. and Colombian officials used the ‘first evidence’ that FARC was working with traffickers to criminalize them. Tambs interpreted the assumptions at Tranquilandia as “evidence FARC is actively engaging in illicit drug production”[107]. Although today Tamb’s narco-guerilla allegations are controversial because of the basis off which they were made, the thesis was adopted and trusted by the Regan Administration (1980–88)[108], which used it to further action against FARC.

Although more reliable evidence would be collected in the 1990s that proved FARC’s collaboration with traffickers, the fact is that to this day no one knows if FARC was involved in Tranquilandia. Thus, the incident serves as an example of how eagerly the U.S. was ready to accuse FARC of involvement in drug trafficking, regardless of the reliability of information or how deeply involved FARC was with trafficking. As long as FARC had some potential involvement with narcotics, FARC’s political enemies would use that as a reason to condemn them.

[1] Hylton, Forrest. Evil Hour in Colombia. London: Verso, 2006, 56.

[2] This translates to: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

[3] Salgari, Emilio. Marulanda and the FARC for Beginners. FARC-EP Educational Material, 2011, 7.

[4] Lee, Rensselaer W. The White Labyrinth: Cocaine and Political Power. New Brunswick, U.S.A.: Transaction, 1989, 146.

[5] Bargent, James. “Golden Opportunity as Colombia Peace Talks Turn to Drug Trade.” InSight Crime, 2013.

[6] It was American Ambassador to Bogotá who first came up with the term ‘narco-guerilla’ to describe the FARC in 1982 (Scott, Peter Dale., and Jonathan Marshall. Cocaine Politics: Drugs, Armies, and the CIA in Central America. Berkeley: U of California, 1991, 98.)

[7] Kalin, Stephen. “Insight: War Turns Syria into Major Amphetamines Producer, Consumer.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 12 Jan. 2014. Web. 19 Oct. 2014.

[8] Coca is used to make coca paste, which is then refined into cocaine. Apart from traditional consumption by indigenous populations, coca has few other uses other than being used to produce cocaine.

[9] Weinstein, Jeremy M. Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. Cambridge UP 2007, 290.

[10] Ibid, 290.

[11] Ibid, 290.

[12] Cocaine, unlike marijuana, has no smell, is far more compact, and more profitable — thus, largely preferred by traffickers. Keefe, Patrick Radden. “Cocaine Incorporated.” The New York Times. The New York Times, 16 June 2012.

[13] Cook, Thomas R. “The Financial Arm Of The FARC: A Threat Finance Perspective.” Journal of Strategic Security 4. 2011, 21.

[14] Labrousse, Alain. “The FARC and the Taliban’s Connection to Drugs.” The Journal of Drug Issues. Sage Publications, 01 Jan. 2005, 172.

[15] Weinstein, 293.

[16] Kirk, Robin. More Terrible than Death: Violence, Drugs, and America’s War in Colombia. New York: PublicAffairs, 2004, 101.

[17] Cook, 21.

[18] “Drugs and Kidnappings.” Crisis Group Multimedia: The FARC. International Crisis Group. Web. 02 May 2014.

[19] Cook, 22.

[20] Stokes, Doug. America’s Other War: Terrorizing Colombia. London: Zed, 2004. Print., 102

[21] Ibid, 102.

[22] Labrousse, 172.

[23] Marcy, William L. The Politics of Cocaine: How U.S. Foreign Policy Has Created a Thriving Drug Industry in Central and South America. Chicago, IL: Lawrence Hill, 2010, 192.

[24] Coca paste is an intermediate product of cocaine — it is crude cocaine.

[25] Leech, Garry M. Beyond Bogotá: Diary of a Drug War Journalist in Colombia. Boston: Beacon, 2009, 222.

[26] United States. DEA. Intelligence Division. Insurgent Involvement in the Colombian Drug Trade. DEA, 1994. The National Security Archives, 7.
DEA stands for: Drug Enforcement Administration

[27] United States. Central Intelligence Agency. DCI Counternarcotics Center. Narco-Insurgent Links in the Andes. CIA, 1992. The National Security Archives, 2.

[28] Hylton, 101.

[29] Vargas, Ricardo. “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Illicit Drug Trade.” Drugs and Democracy. Transnational Institute, 7 June 1999.

[30] Marcy, 79.

[31] Cook, 22.

[32] Ibid, 25.

[33] Hylton, 85.

[34] Coca crops are very easily hidden under a jungle canopy!

[35] Bagely, Dr. Bruce Michael. “Drug Trafficking, Political Violence and U.S. Policy in Colombia in the 1990s.” Bruce Bagley Working Paper. Clasarchive.berkeley.edu, 07 Feb. 2001.

[36] Weinstein, 291.

[37] Marcy, 369.

[38] Cook, 24.

[39] Hylton, 55. This is also because coca leaf takes longer to spoil than fruits and vegetables for example.

[40] Cook, 25.

[41] Labrousse, 177.

[42] Ibid, 177.

[43] Medellín and Calí formed the two largest cartels in Colombia at the time.

[44] Felbab-Brown,Vanda. Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2010, 81. See Appendix A.

[45] Most drug lords were passionate capitalist businessmen. Starting in 1984 there were aggressive confrontations between FARC and the Cartels over wages for coca farmers, payment levels, and land ownership. The Cartels used their drug proceeds to buy enormous plots before evicting peasants who originally lived there to use the land for coca cultivation — this infuriated FARC.

[46] Marcy, 191.

[47] Ibid, 192.

[48] The Medellín Cartel more or less fell apart in 1993 when Escobar (the head of the Cartel) was killed, and Calí Cartel started falling apart in 1994.

[49] Cook, 29

[50] Felbab-Brown, 98.

[51] Ibid, 98.

[52] Holmberg, John. “Narcoterrorism.” Student Paper.11 May 2009. Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center. School of Public Policy, George Mason University. Web. 16 July 2014, 3.

[53] United States. DEA, 10.

[54] Ibid, 7.

[55] Peña, Alfonso Evaluating the War on Drugs: US and Colombian Interdiction Efforts. Thesis. Naval PostGraduate School, Monterey, CA., 1994, 43.

[56] Castillo, Fabio. Colombia: The Cocaine Cowboys. Arlington, VA: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1988, Chapter 10.

[57] Castillo, Chapter 10.

[58] Cook, 25

[59] Steinitz, Mark S. “The Terrorism and Drug Connection in Latin America’s Andean Region.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. CSIS, c. 2002, 11.

[60] Ibid, 11.

Medina, Juan Guillermo Ferro. “La FARC Y Su Relación Con La Economía De La Coca En El Sur De Colombia_testimonios.” Mama Coca, 2002.

[61] He was Commander of the Colombian Armed Forces from 1998–2002.

[62] Bagely.

[63] Cocaine base is further refined into pure cocaine — it is the last intermediate product in the cocaine production chain.

[64] Steinitz, 12–13.

[65] Felbab-Brown, 80.

[66] Steinitz, 12.

[67] Ibid, 4.

[68] Ashcroft, John. “Attorney General Transcript, News Conference — FARC.” Department of Justice, Conference Center, Washington, D.C. March 18, 2002.

[69] Steinitz, 13.

[70] Bargent.

[71] These are the basic criteria to be a cartel. Cook, 28

[72] Harper, Liz. “Colombia’s Civil War — Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).” Cocaine.org, 2003.

[73] Holmberg, 5.

[74] Felbab-Brown, 81.

[75] Cook, 24

[76] Ibid, 26. Medina.

[77] Felbab-Brown, 82.

[78] Felbab-Brown, 82.

[79] Cook, 26

[80] Ibid, 31

[81] Vargas.

[82] Priest, Dana. “Covert Action in Colombia.” Washington Post. 21 Dec. 2013.

[83] Cook, 31

[84] Rochlin, James Francis. Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003, 135.

[85] Ibid, 100.

[86] Kirk, 227. Also see Appendix B

[87] FARC was involved in other illegal activity such as kidnapping and extortion.

[88] United States of America. Department of State. Bureau of Counterterrorism. Country Reports on Terrorism 2013. United States Department of State Publication., 213.

DEA Public Affairs. “United States Charges 50 Leaders Of Narco-Terrorist FARC In Colombia With Supplying More Than Half Of The World’s Cocaine.” Drug Enforcement Administration, 22 Mar. 2006.

[89] The DEA defines narcoterrorism as “the participation of groups or associated individuals in taxing, providing security for, otherwise aiding or abetting drug trafficking endeavors in an effort to further, or fund, terrorist activities”. Holmberg, 1.

[90] As aforementioned on page 7

[91] Kirk, 241.

[92] Kirk, 241.

[93] Marcy, 192.

[94] Steinitz, 14.

[95] Hylton, 84

[96] Bargent.

[97] Recall Molina was the leader of the 16th Front.

[98] Villa, Laura. “Interview with Laura Villa about anti-drug policy.” Interview. Farc-epeace.org. FARC-EP, 11 Feb. 2014.

“Drug Trafficking, A Pandora’s Box.” Farc-epeace.org. FARC-EP, 28 Nov. 2013.

[99] Salgari, 8.

[100] Labrousse, 175.

Other documents that support this claim:

“Vision FARC-EP on a solution to the problem of illicit drugs.” Http://farc-epeace.org.:

FARC-EP, 29 Nov. 2013 FARC-EP. “Minimum Proposals of the Peace Delegation of the FARC-EP, Fourth Item of the Agenda, Third in Discussion: “Solution to the Problem of Illicit Drugs” Peace Delegation FARC-EP. 2013.:

FARC-EP. Planning of Mechanisms for Crop Substitution (March 10, 1999). By Central High Command of the FARC-EP. FARC-EP, 2013.

[101] Felbab-Brown, 84.

[102] Kirk, 101.

[103] Castillo, Chapter 10.

[104] Labrousse, 177.

[105] Lee, 151.

[106] Schulte-Bockholt, Alfredo. The Politics of Organized Crime and the Organized Crime of Politics: A Study of Criminal Power. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2006. Print, 129.

[107] Marcy, 135.

[108] Schulte-Bockholt, 130.