Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

Vienna, 14 July 2015

Preface

The E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) and the Islamic Republic of Iran welcome this historic Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which will ensure that Iran’s nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful, and mark a fundamental shift in their approach to this issue. They anticipate that full implementation of this JCPOA will positively contribute to regional and international peace and security. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.

“From the day these talks began, the United States and our partners have been crystal clear that we would not accept anything less than a good deal — a deal that shuts off all of Iran’s pathways towards fissile material for a nuclear weapon and resolves the international community’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear program.” — J.K.

“After more than a decade of tough negotiations we have an agreement that secures our fundamental aim of preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. This is vital to the security of the UK and to the stability we seek in the Middle East. We would not have agreed to the deal unless we were sure we had robust measures in place to deliver effective oversight of Iran’s nuclear programme. Our focus now should be on be on swift and full implementation of the agreement, to make sure that a nuclear weapon remains beyond Iran’s reach. This deal is the best way to achieve that.” — Foreign Secretary of the U.K. Philip Hammond

Iran envisions that this JCPOA will allow it to move forward with an exclusively peaceful, indigenous nuclear programme, in line with scientific and economic considerations, in accordance with the JCPOA, and with a view to building confidence and encouraging international cooperation. In this context, the initial mutually determined limitations described in this JCPOA will be followed by a gradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, of Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme, including its enrichment activities, to a commercial programme for exclusively peaceful purposes, consistent with international non- proliferation norms.

The E3/EU+3 envision that the implementation of this JCPOA will progressively allow them to gain confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s programme. The JCPOA reflects mutually determined parameters, consistent with practical needs, with agreed limits on the scope of Iran’s nuclear programme, including enrichment activities and R&D. The JCPOA addresses the E3/EU+3’s concerns, including through comprehensive measures providing for transparency and verification.

The JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear programme, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance, and energy.

“We have the support of Russia, China, Great Britain, France, and Germany. If we suddenly went off by ourselves and said no to this, we’re not only going to lose the support of the international community, we’re going to lose the access, lose the accountability. We would have no mechanism to verify that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. Without this deal, Iran could go do what it wants unchecked by the international community.” — J.K.

You can see more of our international support here.

“International sanctions brought Iran to the table. But Iran continued with its nuclear programme during that time. If the US were to walk away from this deal, international unity would disintegrate, the hardliners in Iran would be strengthened, and we would lose the most effective path to stop Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. Iran could quickly return its nuclear programme to its previous levels: advanced centrifuges installed and ready to enrich, Fordow being used to amass a 20% enriched uranium stockpile, and the Arak reactor unchanged and nearing completion. And all of this without the transparency and monitoring provisions we have secured.” — Foreign Secretary of the U.K. Philip Hammond

Preamble and General Provisions

i. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) have decided upon this long-term Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This JCPOA, reflecting a step-by-step approach, includes the reciprocal commitments as laid down in this document and the annexes hereto and is to be endorsed by the United Nations (UN) Security Council.

ii. The full implementation of this JCPOA will ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.

iii. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.

“Put simply, this deal has a permanent prohibition on Iran having a nuclear weapons program and a permanent inspections regime that goes beyond any previous inspections regime in Iran. Iran is obligated as a party to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) not to seek or acquire nuclear weapons, commitments expressly defined in the JCPOA. Any Iranian attempt to design, pursue, build or otherwise seek a nuclear weapon would be an explicit and detectable violation of the NPT. In the event of Iranian non-compliance, the JCPOA will enable the United States to mobilize the international community to take swift action, including snapping sanctions back into place.” — J.K

iv. Successful implementation of this JCPOA will enable Iran to fully enjoy its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in line with its obligations therein, and the Iranian nuclear programme will be treated in the same manner as that of any other non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT.

v. This JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear programme, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance and energy.

vi. The E3/EU+3 and Iran reaffirm their commitment to the purposes and principles of the United Nations as set out in the UN Charter.

vii. The E3/EU+3 and Iran acknowledge that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

viii. The E3/EU+3 and Iran commit to implement this JCPOA in good faith and in a constructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect, and to refrain from any action inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that would undermine its successful implementation. The E3/EU+3 will refrain from imposing discriminatory regulatory and procedural requirements in lieu of the sanctions and restrictive measures covered by this JCPOA. This JCPOA builds on the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) agreed in Geneva on 24 November 2013.

ix. A Joint Commission consisting of the E3/EU+3 and Iran will be established to monitor the implementation of this JCPOA and will carry out the functions provided for in this JCPOA. This Joint Commission will address issues arising from the implementation of this JCPOA and will operate in accordance with the provisions as detailed in the relevant annex.

x. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be requested to monitor and verify the voluntary nuclear-related measures as detailed in this JCPOA. The IAEA will be requested to provide regular updates to the Board of Governors, and as provided for in this JCPOA, to the UN Security Council. All relevant rules and regulations of the IAEA with regard to the protection of information will be fully observed by all parties involved.

“The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) advances critical U.S. interests related to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, strengthening global nuclear safety and security, and promoting the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. Founded in 1957, the IAEA is the global focal point for supporting the safe, secure, and peaceful development and use of nuclear science and technology. The IAEA contributes to a central U.S. national security objective: Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It applies nuclear safeguards — consisting of monitoring, inspection, information analysis, and other activities — to detect and deter the application of peaceful nuclear activities to weapons-related purposes.” — J.K.

“We have worked tirelessly on the detail of this deal, not just with the Iranians but also within the P5+1, to make sure that the arrangements in place are watertight. The IAEA is the expert body charged with reporting on Iran’s compliance. They — and our world-leading nuclear experts — are confident that the monitoring regime that has been put in place, which includes tamper-proof seals, online enrichment monitoring, 24/7 camera surveillance and unprecedented access, will allow them to report with confidence whether Iran is complying or not.” — Foreign Secretary of the U.K. Philip Hammond

xi. All provisions and measures contained in this JCPOA are only for the purpose of its implementation between E3/EU+3 and Iran and should not be considered as setting precedents for any other state or for fundamental principles of international law and the rights and obligations under the NPT and other relevant instruments, as well as for internationally recognised principles and practices.

xii. Technical details of the implementation of this JCPOA are dealt with in the annexes to this document.

xiii. The EU and E3+3 countries and Iran, in the framework of the JCPOA, will cooperate, as appropriate, in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and engage in mutually determined civil nuclear cooperation projects as detailed in Annex III, including through IAEA involvement.

xiv. The E3+3 will submit a draft resolution to the UN Security Council endorsing this JCPOA affirming that conclusion of this JCPOA marks a fundamental shift in its consideration of this issue and expressing its desire to build a new relationship with Iran. This UN Security Council resolution will also provide for the termination on Implementation Day of provisions imposed under previous resolutions; establishment of specific restrictions; and conclusion of consideration of the Iran nuclear issue by the UN Security Council 10 years after the Adoption Day.

xv. The provisions stipulated in this JCPOA will be implemented for their respective durations as set forth below and detailed in the annexes.

xvi. The E3/EU+3 and Iran will meet at the ministerial level every 2 years, or earlier if needed, in order to review and assess progress and to adopt appropriate decisions by consensus. Iran and E3/EU+3 will take the following voluntary measures within the timeframe as detailed in this JCPOA and its Annexes

Nuclear

A. Enrichment, Enrichment R&D, Stockpiles

1. Iran’s long term plan includes certain agreed limitations on all uranium enrichment and uranium enrichment-related activities including certain limitations on specific research and development (R&D) activities for the first 8 years, to be followed by gradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, to the next stage of its enrichment activities for exclusively peaceful purposes, as described in Annex I. Iran will abide by its voluntary commitments, as expressed in its own long-term enrichment and enrichment R&D plan to be submitted as part of the initial declaration for the Additional Protocol to Iran’s Safeguards Agreement.

2. Iran will begin phasing out its IR-1 centrifuges in 10 years. During this period, Iran will keep its enrichment capacity at Natanz at up to a total installed uranium enrichment capacity of 5060 IR-1 centrifuges. Excess centrifuges and enrichment- related infrastructure at Natanz will be stored under IAEA continuous monitoring, as specified in Annex I.

“For the next 10 years, Iran will be allowed to use only the IR-1 for enrichment, the oldest and least capable centrifuges.” — E.M.

3. Iran will continue to conduct enrichment R&D in a manner that does not accumulate enriched uranium. Iran’s enrichment R&D with uranium for 10 years will only include IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges as laid out in Annex I, and Iran will not engage in other isotope separation technologies for enrichment of uranium as specified in Annex I. Iran will continue testing IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges, and will commence testing of up to 30 IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges after eight and a half years, as detailed in Annex I.

“Iran already has an R&D program for a number of advanced centrifuges (IR-2m, IR4, IR-5, IR-6, IR-8). The pace of the program will be slowed substantially and will be carried out only at the Natanz site for 15 years, under close International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring. Iran will not pursue other approaches to uranium enrichment.” — E.M.

4. As Iran will be phasing out its IR-1 centrifuges, it will not manufacture or assemble other centrifuges, except as provided for in Annex I, and will replace failed centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type. Iran will manufacture advanced centrifuge machines only for the purposes specified in this JCPOA. From the end of the eighth year, and as described in Annex I, Iran will start to manufacture agreed numbers of IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuge machines without rotors and will store all of the manufactured machines at Natanz, under IAEA continuous monitoring until they are needed under Iran’s long-term enrichment and enrichment R&D plan.

“The manufacture of centrifuges and components will be limited to the numbers of machines commensurate with the program laid out in the JCPOA.” — E.M.

5. Based on its own long-term plan, for 15 years, Iran will carry out its uranium enrichment-related activities, including safeguarded R&D exclusively in the Natanz Enrichment facility, keep its level of uranium enrichment at up to 3.67%, and, at Fordow, refrain from any uranium enrichment and uranium enrichment R&D and from keeping any nuclear material.

6. Iran will convert the Fordow facility into a nuclear, physics and technology centre. International collaboration including in the form of scientific joint partnerships will be established in agreed areas of research. 1044 IR-1 centrifuges in six cascades will remain in one wing at Fordow.

“The deep underground uranium enrichment facility at Fordow will be converted to a nuclear, physics, and technology center where specific projects such as stable isotope production are undertaken. In cooperation with Russia, Iran will pursue a limited program for production of stable isotopes, such as those used for medical applications. No nuclear material will be allowed into Fordow for fifteen years. And the IAEA will have a right to daily access at Fordow as well.” — E.M.

Two of these cascades will spin without uranium and will be transitioned, including through appropriate infrastructure modification, for stable isotope production. The other four cascades with all associated infrastructure will remain idle. All other centrifuges and enrichment-related infrastructure will be removed and stored under IAEA continuous monitoring as specified in Annex I.

7. During the 15 year period, and as Iran gradually moves to meet international qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced in Iran, it will keep its uranium stockpile under 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF6) or the equivalent in other chemical forms.

“Iran will reduce its stockpile of enriched uranium by nearly 98 percent from 12,000 kilograms to only 300 kilograms, and will keep its level of uranium enrichment at 3.67 percent or below.” — E.M.

The excess quantities are to be sold based on international prices and delivered to the international buyer in return for natural uranium delivered to Iran, or are to be down-blended to natural uranium level. Enriched uranium in fabricated fuel assemblies from Russia or other sources for use in Iran’s nuclear reactors will not be counted against the above stated 300 kg UF6 stockpile, if the criteria set out in Annex I are met with regard to other sources. The Joint Commission will support assistance to Iran, including through IAEA technical cooperation as appropriate, in meeting international qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced in Iran. All remaining uranium oxide enriched to between 5% and 20% will be fabricated into fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). Any additional fuel needed for the TRR will be made available to Iran at international market prices.

“All of Iran’s up to 20%-enriched uranium that cannot be fabricated into fuel assemblies will be removed from Iran.” — E.M.

B. Arak, Heavy Water, Reprocessing

8. Iran will redesign and rebuild a modernised heavy water research reactor in Arak, based on an agreed conceptual design, using fuel enriched up to 3.67 %, in a form of an international partnership which will certify the final design.

“The Arak reactor, which according to its original design would have been a source of plutonium for at least one nuclear weapon per year, will be transformed to produce far less plutonium than before and of a much lower quality.” — E.M.

The reactor will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production for medical and industrial purposes. The redesigned and rebuilt Arak reactor will not produce weapons grade plutonium. Except for the first core load, all of the activities for redesigning and manufacturing of the fuel assemblies for the redesigned reactor will be carried out in Iran. All spent fuel from Arak will be shipped out of Iran for the lifetime of the reactor.

“All spent fuel from the Arak reactor that could be reprocessed to recover plutonium will be sent out of the country, and all of this will be under a rigorous IAEA inspection regime.” — E.M.

This international partnership will include participating E3/EU+3 parties, Iran and such other countries as may be mutually determined. Iran will take the leadership role as the owner and as the project manager and the E3/EU+3 and Iran will, before Implementation Day, conclude an official document which would define the responsibilities assumed by the E3/EU+3 participants.

9. Iran plans to keep pace with the trend of international technological advancement in relying on light water for its future power and research reactors with enhanced international cooperation, including assurance of supply of necessary fuel.

10. There will be no additional heavy water reactors or accumulation of heavy water in Iran for 15 years. All excess heavy water will be made available for export to the international market.

“Iran will ship out all heavy water that it produces above the amount needed for the modernized Arak reactor for 15 years.” — E.M.

11. Iran intends to ship out all spent fuel for all future and present power and research nuclear reactors, for further treatment or disposition as provided for in relevant contracts to be duly concluded with the recipient party.

“Iran will ship out all spent fuel for all of its power and research reactors, preventing Iran from accumulating spent fuel that it could attempt to extract plutonium from.” — E.M.

12. For 15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, engage in any spent fuel reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of spent fuel reprocessing, or reprocessing R&D activities leading to a spent fuel reprocessing capability,

“For at least 15 years, Iran will not engage in any activity associated with the reprocessing of spent fuel, even at the R&D level.” — E.M.

with the sole exception of separation activities aimed exclusively at the production of medical and industrial radio-isotopes from irradiated enriched uranium targets.

“To those who are thinking about opposing the deal because of what might happen in year 15 or 16 — remember that, if we walk away, year 15 starts tomorrow — and without any of the long-term verification or transparency safeguards that we have put in place to ensure that we prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.” — J.K.

C. Transparency and Confidence Building Measures

13. Consistent with the respective roles of the President and Majlis (Parliament), Iran will provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol, proceed with its ratification within the timeframe as detailed in Annex V and fully implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement.

“Iran will adhere to the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, which provides for extensive access for the IAEA to investigate evidence of suspicious activities anywhere.

In addition, Iran will provide early design information to the IAEA about facilities it wishes to construct, as soon as the decision to construct or authorize construction has been made.” — E.M.

14. Iran will fully implement the “Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues” agreed with the IAEA, containing arrangements to address past and present issues of concern relating to its nuclear programme as raised in the annex to the IAEA report of 8 November 2011 (GOV/2011/65). Full implementation of activities undertaken under the Roadmap by Iran will be completed by 15 October 2015, and subsequently the Director General will provide by 15 December 2015 the final assessment on the resolution of all past and present outstanding issues to the Board of Governors, and the E3+3, in their capacity as members of the Board of Governors, will submit a resolution to the Board of Governors for taking necessary action, with a view to closing the issue, without prejudice to the competence of the Board of Governors.

15. Iran will allow the IAEA to monitor the implementation of the voluntary measures for their respective durations, as well as to implement transparency measures, as set out in this JCPOA and its Annexes.

This deal is not based on trust. It is based on unprecedented monitoring and verification. And the duration of the agreement is indefinite. Some provisions will be in place for 10 years, others for 15, and still others for 20 or 25. But transparency requirements and Iran’s most fundamental obligation — to forego a nuclear weapons program — are permanent.”—E.M.

These measures include: a long-term IAEA presence in Iran; IAEA monitoring of uranium ore concentrate produced by Iran from all uranium ore concentrate plants for 25 years; containment and surveillance of centrifuge rotors and bellows for 20 years; use of IAEA approved and certified modern technologies including on-line enrichment measurement and electronic seals;

“Many of these technologies were developed at the Department of Energy’s National Laboratories, which are home to America’s leading nuclear experts.” — E.M.

and a reliable mechanism to ensure speedy resolution of IAEA access concerns for 15 years, as defined in Annex I.

“Much has been made about a possible 24-day delay before inspectors could gain access to suspected undeclared nuclear sites. The IAEA can request access to any suspicious location with 24 hours’ notice. This this deal also creates a new mechanism to ensure that the IAEA gets the required access and sets a firm time limit to resolve access issues within 24 days. We have very high confidence that nuclear material used for advancing a nuclear program will detected in this time frame.” — E.M.

16. Iran will not engage in activities, including at the R&D level, that could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device, including uranium or plutonium metallurgy activities, as specified in Annex I.

“These are important commitments that prevent Iran from undertaking certain types of R&D that, even absent nuclear materials could contribute to their knowledge of nuclear weapons and weaponization.” — E.M.

17. Iran will cooperate and act in accordance with the procurement channel in this JCPOA, as detailed in Annex IV, endorsed by the UN Security Council resolution.

“The procurement channel allows the United States and our partners insight into Iran’s nuclear-related procurement activities. If we find Iran purchasing nuclear-related equipment outside of this channel, it could be deemed significant non-performance and result in the snap-back of sanctions — or more.” — E.M.

Sanctions

18. The UN Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA will terminate all provisions of previous UN Security Council resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue — 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010) and 2224 (2015) — simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of agreed nuclear-related measures by Iran and will establish specific restrictions, as specified in Annex V.

“Remember that sanctions did not stop Iran’s nuclear program from growing steadily, to the point it had accumulated enough low enriched uranium that, if further enriched, could be used to produce about 10 nuclear bombs. The truth is that the Vienna plan will provide a stronger, more comprehensive, and more lasting means of limiting Iran’s nuclear program than any realistic alternative.” — J.K.

19. The EU will terminate all provisions of the EU Regulation, as subsequently amended, implementing all nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions, including related designations, simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of agreed nuclear-related measures by Iran as specified in Annex V, which cover all sanctions and restrictive measures in the following areas, as described in Annex II:

i. Transfers of funds between EU persons and entities, including financial institutions, and Iranian persons and entities, including financial institutions;

ii. Banking activities, including the establishment of new correspondent banking relationships and the opening of new branches and subsidiaries of Iranian banks in the territories of EU Member States;

iii. Provision of insurance and reinsurance;

iv. Supply of specialised financial messaging services, including SWIFT, for persons and entities set out in Attachment 1 to Annex II, including the Central Bank of Iran and Iranian financial institutions;

v. Financial support for trade with Iran (export credit, guarantees or insurance);

vi. Commitments for grants, financial assistance and concessional loans to the Government of Iran;

vii. Transactions in public or public-guaranteed bonds;

viii. Import and transport of Iranian oil, petroleum products, gas and petrochemical products;

ix. Export of key equipment or technology for the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors;

x. Investment in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors;

xi. Export of key naval equipment and technology;

xii. Design and construction of cargo vessels and oil tankers;

xiii. Provision of flagging and classification services;

xiv. Access to EU airports of Iranian cargo flights;

xv. Export of gold, precious metals and diamonds;

xvi. Delivery of Iranian banknotes and coinage;

xvii. Export of graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, and export or software for integrating industrial processes;

xviii. Designation of persons, entities and bodies (asset freeze and visa ban) set out in Attachment 1 to Annex II; and

xix. Associated services for each of the categories above.

20. The EU will terminate all provisions of the EU Regulation implementing all EU proliferation-related sanctions, including related designations, 8 years after Adoption Day or when the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier.

21. The United States will cease the application, and will continue to do so, in accordance with this JCPOA of the sanctions specified in Annex II to take effect simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of the agreed nuclear- related measures by Iran as specified in Annex V. Such sanctions cover the following areas as described in Annex II:

“Iran will not receive any new relief until it fulfills all of the key nuclear-related commitments specified in the deal. Should Iran fully comply with the terms of the JCPOA, and should the IAEA verify this compliance, phased sanctions relief will come into effect.” — J.L.

i. Financial and banking transactions with Iranian banks and financial institutions as specified in Annex II, including the Central Bank of Iran and specified individuals and entities identified as Government of Iran by the Office of Foreign Assets Control on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), as set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II (including the opening and maintenance of correspondent and payable through-accounts at non-U.S. financial institutions, investments, foreign exchange transactions and letters of credit);

ii. Transactions in Iranian Rial;

iii. Provision of U.S. banknotes to the Government of Iran;

iv. Bilateral trade limitations on Iranian revenues abroad, including limitations on their transfer;

v. Purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt, including governmental bonds;

vi. Financial messaging services to the Central Bank of Iran and Iranian financial institutions set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II;

vii. Underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance;

viii. Efforts to reduce Iran’s crude oil sales;

ix. Investment, including participation in joint ventures, goods, services, information, technology and technical expertise and support for Iran’s oil, gas and petrochemical sectors;

x. Purchase, acquisition, sale, transportation or marketing of petroleum, petrochemical products and natural gas from Iran;

xi. Export, sale or provision of refined petroleum products and petrochemical products to Iran;

xii. Transactions with Iran’s energy sector;

xiii. Transactions with Iran’s shipping and shipbuilding sectors and port operators;

xiv. Trade in gold and other precious metals;

xv. Trade with Iran in graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes;

xvi. Sale, supply or transfer of goods and services used in connection with Iran’s automotive sector;

xvii. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above;

xviii. Remove individuals and entities set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II from the SDN List, the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, and/or the Non-SDN Iran Sanctions Act List; and

xix. Terminate Executive Orders 13574, 13590, 13622, and 13645, and Sections 5–7 and 15 of Executive Order 13628.

“The JCPOA will address the danger of Iran’s nuclear program — lowering the overall threat posture and freeing us and our allies to check Iran’s regional activities more aggressively, while keeping our sanctions on support for terrorist activity in place. The United States will also maintain powerful sanctions targeting Iran’s support for terrorist groups such as Hizballah and its sponsors in Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Quds Force; its destabilizing support to the Houthis in Yemen; its backing of Assad’s brutal regime; its missile program; and its human rights abuses at home. More broadly, our primary trade embargo will continue to prohibit U.S. persons from investing in Iran, importing or exporting most goods and services, or otherwise dealing with most Iranian persons and companies. Iran, in other words, will continue to be denied access to the world’s largest financial and commercial market.” — J.L.

22. The United States will, as specified in Annex II and in accordance with Annex V, allow for the sale of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts and services to Iran; license non-U.S. persons that are owned or controlled by a U.S. person to engage in activities with Iran consistent with this JCPOA; and license the importation into the United States of Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs.

23. Eight years after Adoption Day or when the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier, the United States will seek such legislative action as may be appropriate to terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, the sanctions specified in Annex II on the acquisition of nuclear-related commodities and services for nuclear activities contemplated in this JCPOA, to be consistent with the U.S. approach to other non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT.

“Should Iran fulfill all of the necessary conditions, we will have reached what it is known as “Implementation Day,” and phased relief will begin. At that time, the United States will suspend nuclear-related secondary sanctions. These are the sanctions that primarily target third-country parties conducting business with Iran — including in the oil, banking, and shipping sectors.” — J.L.

24. The E3/EU and the United States specify in Annex II a full and complete list of all nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures and will lift them in accordance with Annex V. Annex II also specifies the effects of the lifting of sanctions beginning on “Implementation Day”. If at any time following the Implementation Day, Iran believes that any other nuclear-related sanction or restrictive measure of the E3/EU+3 is preventing the full implementation of the sanctions lifting as specified in this JCPOA, the JCPOA participant in question will consult with Iran with a view to resolving the issue and, if they concur that lifting of this sanction or restrictive measure is appropriate, the JCPOA participant in question will take appropriate action. If they are not able to resolve the issue, Iran or any member of the E3/EU+3 may refer the issue to the Joint Commission.

25. If a law at the state or local level in the United States is preventing the implementation of the sanctions lifting as specified in this JCPOA, the United States will take appropriate steps, taking into account all available authorities, with a view to achieving such implementation. The United States will actively encourage officials at the state or local level to take into account the changes in the U.S. policy reflected in the lifting of sanctions under this JCPOA and to refrain from actions inconsistent with this change in policy.

26. The EU will refrain from re-introducing or re-imposing the sanctions that it has terminated implementing under this JCPOA, without prejudice to the dispute resolution process provided for under this JCPOA. There will be no new nuclear- related UN Security Council sanctions and no new EU nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures. The United States will make best efforts in good faith to sustain this JCPOA and to prevent interference with the realisation of the full benefit by Iran of the sanctions lifting specified in Annex II. The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from re-introducing or re-imposing the sanctions specified in Annex II that it has ceased applying under this JCPOA, without prejudice to the dispute resolution process provided for under this JCPOA. The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions. Iran has stated that it will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the sanctions specified in Annex II, or such an imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.

27. The E3/EU+3 will take adequate administrative and regulatory measures to ensure clarity and effectiveness with respect to the lifting of sanctions under this JCPOA. The EU and its Member States as well as the United States will issue relevant guidelines and make publicly accessible statements on the details of sanctions or restrictive measures which have been lifted under this JCPOA. The EU and its Member States and the United States commit to consult with Iran regarding the content of such guidelines and statements, on a regular basis and whenever appropriate.

28. The E3/EU+3 and Iran commit to implement this JCPOA in good faith and in a constructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect, and to refrain from any action inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that would undermine its successful implementation. Senior Government officials of the E3/EU+3 and Iran will make every effort to support the successful implementation of this JCPOA including in their public statements. The E3/EU+3 will take all measures required to lift sanctions and will refrain from imposing exceptional or discriminatory regulatory and procedural requirements in lieu of the sanctions and restrictive measures covered by the JCPOA.

“While our focus is on successfully implementing this deal, we must guard against the possibility that Iran does not uphold its side of the deal. That is why, should Iran violate its commitments once we have suspended sanctions, we have the mechanisms ready to snap them back into place. For U.S. sanctions, this can be done in a matter of days. Multilateral sanctions at the UN also can be re-imposed quickly, through a mechanism that does not allow any one country or any group of countries to prevent the reinstitution of the current UN Security Council sanctions if Iran violates the deal.” — J.L.

29. The EU and its Member States and the United States, consistent with their respective laws, will refrain from any policy specifically intended to directly and adversely affect the normalisation of trade and economic relations with Iran inconsistent with their commitments not to undermine the successful implementation of this JCPOA.

30. The E3/EU+3 will not apply sanctions or restrictive measures to persons or entities for engaging in activities covered by the lifting of sanctions provided for in this JCPOA, provided that such activities are otherwise consistent with E3/EU+3 laws and regulations in effect. Following the lifting of sanctions under this JCPOA as specified in Annex II, ongoing investigations on possible infringements of such sanctions may be reviewed in accordance with applicable national laws.

“If a company does business with Iran while the sanctions are lifted, that would be permitted. If Iran violates the deal and the sanctions snap back, they would not be able to continue doing things that are in violation of the sanctions even if the contract began before sanctions were snapped back.” — J.L.

31. Consistent with the timing specified in Annex V, the EU and its Member States will terminate the implementation of the measures applicable to designated entities and individuals, including the Central Bank of Iran and other Iranian banks and financial institutions, as detailed in Annex II and the attachments thereto.

“Recently, Treasury sanctioned several Hizballah leaders, building on designations last month that targeted the group’s front companies and facilitators. We will not be providing any sanctions relief to any of these lines of activity and will not be delisting from sanctions the IRGC, the Quds Force, or any of their subsidiaries or senior officials.” — J.L.

Consistent with the timing specified in Annex V, the United States will remove designation of certain entities and individuals on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List, and entities and individuals listed on the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, as detailed in Annex II and the attachments thereto.

32. EU and E3+3 countries and international participants will engage in joint projects with Iran, including through IAEA technical cooperation projects, in the field of peaceful nuclear technology, including nuclear power plants, research reactors, fuel fabrication, agreed joint advanced R&D such as fusion, establishment of a state-of- the-art regional nuclear medical centre, personnel training, nuclear safety and security, and environmental protection, as detailed in Annex III. They will take necessary measures, as appropriate, for the implementation of these projects.

33. The E3/EU+3 and Iran will agree on steps to ensure Iran’s access in areas of trade, technology, finance and energy. The EU will further explore possible areas for cooperation between the EU, its Member States and Iran, and in this context consider the use of available instruments such as export credits to facilitate trade, project financing and investment in Iran.

Implementation Plan

34. Iran and the E3/EU+3 will implement their JCPOA commitments according to the sequence specified in Annex V. The milestones for implementation are as follows:

i. Finalisation Day is the date on which negotiations of this JCPOA are concluded among the E3/EU+3 and Iran, to be followed promptly by submission of the resolution endorsing this JCPOA to the UN Security Council for adoption without delay.

ii. Adoption Day is the date 90 days after the endorsement of this JCPOA by the UN Security Council, or such earlier date as may be determined by mutual consent of the JCPOA participants, at which time this JCPOA and the commitments in this JCPOA come into effect. Beginning on that date, JCPOA participants will make necessary arrangements and preparations for the implementation of their JCPOA commitments.

iii. Implementation Day is the date on which, simultaneously with the IAEA report verifying implementation by Iran of the nuclear-related measures described in Sections 15.1. to 15.11 of Annex V, the EU and the United States take the actions described in Sections 16 and 17 of Annex V respectively and in accordance with the UN Security Council resolution, the actions described in Section 18 of Annex V occur at the UN level.

“The relief from sanctions will only start when Iran has taken key nuclear steps and extended its breakout time from to one year. For certain sanctions to lift, Iran must:

  • Complete the removal of excess centrifuges and infrastructure in Natanz and Fordow
  • Reduce its stockpile of enriched uranium down to 300 kg
  • Remove the calandria (the core of the reactor) at Arak and fill it with concrete
  • Take agreed measures regarding issues relating to possible military dimensions
  • Submit the initial declaration described in Article 2 of the Additional Protocol, which will include Iran’s own long term enrichment and enrichment R&D plan

Only then will sanctions relief begin to be implemented in phases.” — J.K.

iv. Transition Day is the date 8 years after Adoption Day or the date on which the Director General of the IAEA submits a report stating that the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier. On that date, the EU and the United States will take the actions described in Sections 20 and 21 of Annex V respectively and Iran will seek, consistent with the Constitutional roles of the President and Parliament, ratification of the Additional Protocol.

v. UN Security Council resolution Termination Day is the date on which the UN Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA terminates according to its terms, which is to be 10 years from Adoption Day, provided that the provisions of previous resolutions have not been reinstated. On that date, the EU will take the actions described in Section 25 of Annex V.

35. The sequence and milestones set forth above and in Annex V are without prejudice to the duration of JCPOA commitments stated in this JCPOA.

Dispute Resolution Mechanism

36. If Iran believed that any or all of the E3/EU+3 were not meeting their commitments under this JCPOA, Iran could refer the issue to the Joint Commission for resolution; similarly, if any of the E3/EU+3 believed that Iran was not meeting its commitments under this JCPOA, any of the E3/EU+3 could do the same.

“If we believe that there has been a violation — related to any commitment in the JCPOA — we can refer the issue to the Joint Commission, which has up to 35 days to consider the issue. If our concerns are not resolved to our satisfaction, we would notify the UN Security Council. Notification to the UN Security Council would trigger a vote, within 30 days, on a resolution to keep the UN sanctions lifted, which we could veto in order to re-instate the sanctions. This process cannot be blocked by any other member of the Security Council. In other words, the U.S. can snap back sanctions by ourselves and cannot be prevented by China, Russia, or any set of UNSC members.” — J.K.

The Joint Commission would have 15 days to resolve the issue, unless the time period was extended by consensus. After Joint Commission consideration, any participant could refer the issue to Ministers of Foreign Affairs, if it believed the compliance issue had not been resolved. Ministers would have 15 days to resolve the issue, unless the time period was extended by consensus. After Joint Commission consideration — in parallel with (or in lieu of) review at the Ministerial level — either the complaining participant or the participant whose performance is in question could request that the issue be considered by an Advisory Board, which would consist of three members (one each appointed by the participants in the dispute and a third independent member). The Advisory Board should provide a non-binding opinion on the compliance issue within 15 days. If, after this 30-day process the issue is not resolved, the Joint Commission would consider the opinion of the Advisory Board for no more than 5 days in order to resolve the issue. If the issue still has not been resolved to the satisfaction of the complaining participant, and if the complaining participant deems the issue to constitute significant non-performance, then that participant could treat the unresolved issue as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part and/or notify the UN Security Council that it believes the issue constitutes significant non-performance.

“We will not hesitate to snap back sanctions if we need to. Let’s not forget that EU sanctions — originally put in place fully aware of the cost to our own economies — were instrumental in bringing Iran to the table. And we can take action on our own if we feel Iran is reneging on the agreement through a UN Security Council vote to continue sanctions relief — which we as a permanent member can veto. Any one permanent member of the Security Council can, acting on its own, snap back UN sanctions on Iran. Aside from UN sanctions, the US and EU can re-impose our own sanctions if Iran is in breach.” — Foreign Secretary of the U.K. Philip Hammond

37. Upon receipt of the notification from the complaining participant, as described above, including a description of the good-faith efforts the participant made to exhaust the dispute resolution process specified in this JCPOA, the UN Security Council, in accordance with its procedures, shall vote on a resolution to continue the sanctions lifting. If the resolution described above has not been adopted within 30 days of the notification, then the provisions of the old UN Security Council resolutions would be re-imposed, unless the UN Security Council decides otherwise. In such event, these provisions would not apply with retroactive effect to contracts signed between any party and Iran or Iranian individuals and entities prior to the date of application, provided that the activities contemplated under and execution of such contracts are consistent with this JCPOA and the previous and current UN Security Council resolutions. The UN Security Council, expressing its intention to prevent the reapplication of the provisions if the issue giving rise to the notification is resolved within this period, intends to take into account the views of the States involved in the issue and any opinion on the issue of the Advisory Board. Iran has stated that if sanctions are reinstated in whole or in part, Iran will treat that as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.

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Annex I — Nuclear-Related Measures