A Window of Opportunity — Nuclear Negotiations between Iran and World Powers

In business, timing is everything; this is also true in diplomacy. Not only do you need two sides that are open to making a deal, with interests that overlap, you need something else just as critical — a steadfast determination to “close the deal” (if it is a good one) and the circumstances that allow it to go through. Pity the hundreds of Silicon Valley start-ups that were counting on a round of financing, or those of us hoping to sell a house, that hesitated just before the market crash of 2008.

As the world powers and Iran return to Geneva this week to resume talks about limiting Iran’s nuclear activities, it is the fickle nature of timing that exacerbates the challenge of the negotiating parties reaching an understanding before an informal March 2015 deadline. The contours of a good agreement exist; but there is the real danger that waiting too long and failing to seize the moment will slam shut the best window of opportunity we will have in years to address long-standing concerns about Iran nuclear program.

History’s greatest breakthroughs succeed because of careful planning to be sure, but the role of timing and the unpredictable alignment of the “stars” cannot be overstated.

President Nixon’s famous 1972 trip to China is a telling example. Nixon understood what a thaw with China would mean for the U.S. and Chinese concerns about the Soviet Union. He also had the good fortunate to have interlocutors, Mao Zedong and Zhou En-Lai, willing to consider the benefits of a new paradigm. Had Nixon delayed his bold move, his efforts would very well have been overcome by Watergate. Mao meanwhile, who had been ill and hospitalized just prior to these talks, would be dead in 4 years.

The efforts by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev that would lead to the end of the Cold War were similarly dependent on timing. After 18 years under the rule of Leonid Brezhnev and the unexpected deaths of Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko (each having served a little over one year), the Communist Party chose the younger, more moderate Gorbachev as its General Secretary. Had Andropov lived, history would likely have been very different. A former chairman of the KGB, Andropov was a hardliner who crushed dissent and was an advocate for the invasion of Afghanistan.

Over the past 15 years, there have been many false starts between the U.S. and Iran. For a variety of reasons, when one party was ready to talk, the other was not. In 2003 the Bush Administration spurned what many deemed a genuine offer by Iran to engage in comprehensive talks on all major issues. In 2009 President Obama reached out directly to the Iranian people and its leaders, only to be stymied by hardliners in Iran and the U.S. Exacerbating this difficult situation was the tenure of the ideologically extreme former President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

However, Ahmadinejad is now gone. In his place is Hassan Rouhani who in 2013 campaigned on a platform of improving relations with the West and negotiating an agreement to limit Iran’s nuclear program. His overwhelming victory surprised many, but was the product of popular discontent with Iran’s hardliners and unprecedented international economic sanctions that isolated the Iranian people.

If there is going to be a nuclear deal, it will be with Rouhani. But, such a breakthrough is hardly assured. Rouhani faces fierce opposition from Iranian hardliners. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has so far allowed negotiations to proceed, but it is unclear if he will allow Rouhani this “win,” which would bolster Iran’s moderates.

As the negotiations with Iran move toward their end game, we could be on the cusp of a truly historic moment, thirty-five years after the Iranian revolution and the takeover of the US embassy in Iran. Not only is there a possibility of an agreement that sharply limits Iran’s nuclear program, provides for intensive on-site inspections and enjoys the support of America’s leading allies, we have the chance to open Iran to the West and shift the strategic landscape in the Middle East.

America has far too many potential shared interests with Iran in the vital Middle East to turn a blind eye to what timing and circumstance may have provided, an opening that may close. We’d be wise to explore the potential very carefully, but we’d be irresponsible to discount it altogether.