Vincent Kompany: the Burnley revolution

Revolution (d): a fundamental change in the way of thinking about or visualizing something: a change of paradigm. (Meriam Webster.)

18th-century England, Lancashire

By the end of the century, the industrial revolution had permeated through Burnley but not on the scale of other towns. Burnley was still a wool town at a time when other districts had moved on to cotton, taken from their colonies. This unfolded against the backdrop of its relatively slow adoption of technology — none of the early inventions was made in the town. Raw materials weren’t the issue. The lack of ingenuity was. Bolton had Samuel Crompton, Bury claimed John Kay and Blackburn, James Hargreaves. Who was theirs?

21st-century England, Burnley (2012–2022)

Pep Guardiola’s Barcelona dissolved, but their influence on the footballing landscape was only beginning to take hold. Its product? Juego di Posicion: an in-possession philosophy that teaches the rational occupation of space. The phenomenon of merging and converging cultures belatedly reached England but not Burnley. Under Sean Dyche, they played the old English way — long balls and some more long balls — albeit with a few variations (e.g., pressing) to keep up with the times.

At two different points in history, centuries apart, Burnley slept in an era of change.

“The President.”

“Don’t… shoooot!”

But he did, anyway, producing one of the most iconic moments in the recent history of the Premier League. That 35-yard rocket of a shot against Leicester. The significance of it. In a larger context. All of this still feels like yesterday. Or maybe not. Another painful reminder of how much the random dispenser of joy, that is, football, has aged us.

This, though, is about Vincent Kompany the manager. Which begets the paradoxes that cut across different fields... Young and inexperienced... But full of ideas grounded in the laws of the game, stemming from his identification with the philosophy Juego di Posicion: “I couldn't see the game in another way. I respect every other way of the game, but this is how I understand the game.”

Retelling the story of how he started his managerial career as player-manager at Anderlecht will likely only serve to augment the word count and perhaps even cause boredom, given the extent to which it’s covered and talked about since his appointment as Burnley’s head coach. (Arguably the most important detail: the year was 2019. In other words, he only has 3 years of experience at this level.)

So, to avoid another mindless repetition of obvious facts as an excuse for an introductory passage, let's cut to the chase.

Note: skip to “Vincent Kompany’s Burnley” if you are solely interested in learning about how his Burnley team play — and not so much about the context behind their making.

(Tella and Rodriguez listen attentively to Kompany as he gives them instructions on what to do when they come on from the bench. Craig Bellamy, the assistant manager, is in the background.)

This article will attempt to answer the fundamental question, “What do Burnley do with the ball?” detailing the introduction of the manager’s sub-principles to their play on a game-to-game basis, symptomatic of a team in a transitional period while exploring the broader theme: a radical change in ideology.

The metamorphosis from a team that opposed the idea of having the ball, and thus, proved incapable, to the one that now seeks it, commands it and wields its power.

(31 minutes into the curtain raiser. Burnley fans, impressed by the aesthetics [free-flowing football] and practicalities [territorial dominance] of the performance, got off their seats to applaud their team.)

Context

• Sean Dyche, the previous manager, had been in charge of Burnley for almost 10 years.
• Iterations of his Burnley side were largely known for their deep block and long-ball passing game.
• Although, on occasion, they showed that they were capable of pressing high.
• The lack of subtlety in their poss. game affected their ability to generate high-quality chances over time.
• The burden then was on their team defence to continually defy probabilities to make up for it.
• This was not a sustainable approach, and eventually, Dyche got fired in the midst of a relegation battle.
• The u-23 coach took over on an interim basis, but it was not enough to keep Burnley up.
• Seeking a different direction, Burnley turned to Kompany, a relatively inexperienced manager.
• Reasons: Kompany's previous team played a proactive brand of football + has a track record of developing youth.

Note: much more significant than Dyche’s reluctance to upgrade his team’s chance creation methods, it should be noted, was the lack of spending by the owners. There’s substantial evidence that wages and transfer fees are the strongest indicators of on-pitch success.

(Kompany, like his former manager and biggest influence, Pep Guardiola, divides the pitch into 5 vertical zones, but with some important distinctions. “Lines from outside the box to the angles of the box because it’s where strikers and wingers have to end up to score goals” and “the double 18-yard line to kind of mark where you get your central combinations done and then there’s an element of defensive set up where you counter-press and so on.”)

“Whether it happens on the first day or not - usually not - but my goal is to absolutely have a football that’s for the fans. I want an attacking team. I want movement in the team. I want a healthy dose of aggression in the team. Something fans enjoy on a weekend — there’s enough rubbish happening in the world.”

To understand what Kompany is trying to build at Burnley, it’s imperative to use his Anderlecht side as some sort of reference, considering they’re the only team — excluding Burnley — he’s coached thus far. Luckily, there is two seasons' worth of football from which inferences can be drawn.

Here’s a quick rundown of their playing system during the time he was in charge.

1st Phase

• Short build-up, but would go long if required.
• Asymmetry and numerical sup. in the first line.
• Variation: nearside 6 dropping outside of RCB.
• Little variety w.r.t build-up patterns in general.
• Main principle in use: invite pressure to break.

2nd phase

• 4-2-2-2/3-2-5 shape in the progression phase.
• Dynamic occupation of space between the lines.
• A high degree of freedom within structure, encourages fluid movements.
• Pattern: RB tucks inside, RM drops deep and wide, signalling ST to attack depth.
• Qualitative sup. in the last line: front 4 v opposition back 4.

Out of Possession

• Not press heavy; line of engagement is around middle third.
• Counter-pressing (high); passing lanes oriented.
• 4-4-2 diamond base structure (goal kicks); the aim is to force opponent onto the flanks.
• 4-4-2 (flat) medium block oriented to where the ball is.
• Second balls: as with Burnley later, pivot drops into back line to provide extra cover.

Vincent Kompany’s Burnley

“My passion is having teams who are looking at every opportunity to score goals. It means every phase of the game,” Kompany speaking in his first meeting with the players and staff, “we have a plan — we have an idea to score a goal.”

Basic information about the central characters

Arijanet Muric (GK). Neat footwork despite size, has cognition to assess situations but can improve, never hesitates to offer passing angles, impressively calm under pressure, good range of passes, lofted ones (favourite technique), intuition to sweep behind high line and rush out of goal, etc. Comment: Muric plays a key role in the team’s commitment to personifying Kompany’s ideals — e.g., build short, attract pressure and press high.

Ian Maatsen (LB). A bit eager to dive in at times, defensive positioning is a little shaky but understandable for his age, body core is a bit weak, great athlete, can take up space in huge strides, crossing ability is decent, tends to cut under the ball, technically competent, can pull off one time passes in set routines, uses a combination of skills and pace to beat opponents, capable of playing at different angles (inside or outside), mastered art of taking forward first touch, guilty of stopping the ball sometimes, responsive to tactical instructions, etc. Comment: Maatsen ran most of Burnley’s attacks at the start, but with the team undergoing a tactical evolution, he’s adapted well.

Taylor Harwood-Bellis (RCB). Physically imposing, aerially strong, reasonably fast over long distances, usually composed but ready to throw himself in front of goal, can defend on the front foot, gets touch tight on transition outlets, mobility adequate for build, comfortable on the ball, nice variety in his passing, can rake long diagonals or break lines with driven passes, also shown ability to carry the ball if there’s space ahead, etc. Comment: Harwood-Bellis is responsible for much of Burnley’s progression via his long-range and line-breaking passes, as well as his ball-carrying.

Connor Roberts (RB). Unspectacular but nails down fundamentals, decent technical qualities to complement tactical intelligence, can stay on ball to open gaps but not receive under backwards or diagonal pressure, flexibility shown in his role to support in deep build-up, act as a placeholder in prog. phase or offer depth in final line, great work ethic, constantly make runs even if not picked and recovers well, weak in the air, etc. Comment: Roberts can come inside and play as the right-side CB of a back 3 or move up to act as one of the double pivot. His grasp of different roles elevates the team’s tactical level.

Josh Cullen (DM). Fairly resistant to pressure, good understanding of spatial concepts, 1st and 2nd phase controller, not an expansive passer but can play simple switches (width holder) or balls over the top (runners), always shows for the ball, good awareness of immediate surroundings, adopts favourable body orientation to receive in tight spaces, tactically flexible, could work on defensive positioning, a team leader, understandably weak in the air, great intensity to close down opponents, etc. Comment: Cullen is the one who sets the tempo Burnley plays at. He has a feel for the ball and the discernment to know what space to occupy or vacate.

Josh Brownhill (CM). Great physicality, decent technical base, can receive on the half turn or combine with teammates but more of a 3rd phase player, doesn’t operate in btl as much as role demands due to limitations, passing ability is serviceable, can strike through the ball, goal instincts, sometimes leads the press, high value runs, great work rate, etc. Comment: Brownhill isn’t a Kompany player by trade, but his off-the-ball intensity, disruptive runs and smell for goal make him a valuable player.

Nathan Tella (WF). A feel for attacking space in behind, understands importance of partnerships, not quite technically secure on the ball, lacks disguise in his game so not particularly great in 1v1s, relies more on momentum to beat opponents, fast over long distances, decent ball striking, has a good first touch, gets the basics right, skill-set favours him ending moves as opposed to starting them, etc. Comment: Tella brings something different to the table; where everyone navigates towards the ball, he runs in behind.

Jay Rodriguez (ST). Not exactly a last-line presence but typify a Kompany CF in terms of back-to-goal play, comes deep and drops wide to lay-off for an up-back-through, create space behind or generate overload situationally, possesses required technical quality to execute flicks-ons, displays off the ball intensity, aware of pressing angles, can halve pitch or bait opp. into trap, thinks as a team player, etc. Comment: Rodriguez is another player who is a stylistic fit. He drops off from the line to create overloads and combine with teammates in proximity.

Clarification: this is a list (subjective) of the most important players in the squad in terms of their inherent quality (adaptation of the system) and profile (enabling of the ideals).

Benson probably deserves to be profiled as well but misses out because he hasn’t been able to cement a place in the starting XI thus far. As do Vitinho, whose inclusion sees a change in the team’s dynamics. His versatility allows him to come in him for Maatsen, playing as a wrong-footed full-back. But his functions in possession are those of a left-winger, with Cullen (near-side pivot) covering for him.

One of Burnley’s general principles in possession under Kompany is an extension of the "overload and isolate" concept, which sees them working the ball from the left-hand side of the pitch to the right, and Benson is a left-footed right winger, who could be said to have a qualitative superiority over some of the left full-backs in the division.

More frequently, his inclination to cut infield — in contrast, the times Costelloe, Tella and Vitinho (all right-footed) were fielded there, the angles available to them mean they tend to attack down the outside — favours the team dynamics on the right, with Roberts (RB) instructed to bomb forward on the overlap.

( Huddersfield, first match. Upon the switch from Cullen, Roberts makes an overlapping run from his deeper starting position, but Costelloe [RW] ends up congesting the space due to his tendency to go on the outside.)

Burnley under Kompany have averaged 66.9% possession of the ball per game (Fotmob data) this season, which is the highest in the Championship. To contextualise this, Norwich and Swansea, who rank 2nd and 3rd in the category and are possession-heavy sides themselves, put up 61.8% and 61.3% respectively. This fact forms the basis of our reasoning to narrow down the scope of our analysis to what they do when they have the ball (in-possession phases) and "why" they have a gargantuan portion of it — the answer is closely linked to their ability to win (high press) and regain (counter press) possession. (Not yet updated.)

First Phase

“Football tactics. Space. The utilisation of space and the effect it has on the overall game. Managing space is the biggest thing I’ve learned with Pep.”

Most of the teams in the Championship seldom engage Burnley in their defensive third unless when “provoked.” This is mainly due to a combination of two factors: (A) Burnley’s framing of pressure as an opportunity as opposed to a problem and their adeptness at beating it. (B) The limitations of some of the Championship teams' playing systems, and by extension, their pressing schemes — e.g., full-backs may not back the press, the defensive line may stay too deep, etc.

(To add context to the second point, most of the teams in this tier are risk-averse in the 1st phase — the reasons for this vary. Hence, there isn’t a societal need to develop a complex pressing scheme, as in some cases, half-pressing will suffice.)

Despite this, there are more than enough situations where Burnley have endeavoured to build out from the back to get a good idea of what patterns and variations they employ, in addition to the collective principles that, significantly, underlie them. This can partly be attributed to their mechanisms for re-creating these conditions.

Kompany wants his team to generate superiorities out of the defensive line as often as possible, so much so that when the opposition are reluctant to press them, Burnley would tease them, using a string of ostensively inane passes. The horizontal and backwards ones that are tediously uniform. The message: “come, get the ball.”

This concept of inviting pressure, to then attack the free spaces that emerge as a consequence, is also embodied on an individual level. The goalkeeper, Muric, has taken to applying the sole technique, as have his defenders: a provocative gesture. The idea takes on greater prominence as they travel to the middle third because that’s about where the engagement line of most of the teams they face is drawn, but it is nonetheless an important part of what they do in the build-up phase.

Barring exceptional circumstances that favour an offensive transition, when they regain possession of the ball in their own half, Burnley would reset, with the relevant players moving into their designated zones — RB drops wide, CBs split the GK, LB comes down, the double 6s stagger their lines and so on — to re-create the effects of a goal kick situation.

Critical to this is the temperament of the goalkeeper or sometimes right centre-back, who is obligated by the game model to stay on the ball or pass it around during this brief window for the reformation of their shape to occur before they restart.

Burnley mostly build out with a 4-2 structure, comprising a back line of Roberts (RB), Harwood-Bellis (RCB), Taylor (LCB), and Maatsen (LB); a double pivot of Cork and Cullen, who is their orchestrator. Higher up, the positioning of the front — or three when Brownhill is lower — slightly differs depending on the ball side. For instance, they are not laid out to occupy the full width of the pitch if the play is unfolding on the right.

The far-side winger (first Bastien, and later Tella), instead, would inside the far half space to offer a direct route of progression, with Maatsen potentially offering width dynamically. Rodriguez, Brownhill and the nearside winger (less definite), on the other hand, will expand the playing area by pinning the opposition CBs and LB in the remaining vertical corridors.

This lopsided spatial occupation of the last line sometimes has the effect of disorienting the opposition’s shifting process, luring its backline a bit too much to the side where the ball is. Bearing in mind that switches of play to underloaded zones are a facet of Burnley’s game in the 2nd (and 3rd) phase, it’s plausible that this might be one of the objectives (a switch to Maatsen who would, in theory, arrive in the space), although one might question its repeatability: for it to happen, some form of poor team defence on part of the opponent is necessary — i.e., the defence has to be drawn to the ball or their players. https://files.fm/u/4mtb794ze

On the left, however, the arrangement is more symmetrical, with the far side winger holding width. One might wonder why is this so? Well, the answer lies in the asymmetry of their 4–2–3–1 structure and the characteristics of the players. Two of their best passers in defence are Harwood-Bellis (RCB) and Muric (GK). Both of whom operate from the right.

Their angles, thus, naturally favour them to play across; to play diagonally to the left-hand side of the pitch where the far-side winger and sometimes left back (game specific) are located in the half-space. In Muric’s (GK) case, it has more to do with the fact he’s right-footed, as his starting position is central.

Essentially, the structure is tweaked in that way to harness the personality and abilities of his better players. Kompany’s conception of the game is certainly distinct from his personnel. His idea of how the game should be played is perspicuous, regardless of the players he has at his disposal. But he’s also a firm believer in individual quality. The implication of this is that he is willing, perhaps more so than other adherents of Juego di Posicion, to entrust some of his players with more responsibility — and thus, freedom.

Not to deviate further, Burnley have also used different build-up shapes other than the 4-2, namely, the 4-1 (Watford and Blackpool) and 3-3 (Luton), indicative of their plasticity to adapt on a macro level depending on the tactical components of their opposition.

Against Luton, Maatsen (LB) inverted to overload their midfield 3, along with Brownhill on the far side (4v3), creating a midfield box. This posed a conundrum for Luton’s no. 6 when the nearside CB didn’t break out of his line. With two players — Brownhill and Maatsen or sometimes Bastien (LW) with whom the latter rotated — perambulating in his zone, who does he mark? Consequently, one of them, Maatsen it was, became accessible at the expense of the other and helped Burnley advance on a couple of occasions.

In their customary 4-2 shape, Burnley use different patterns of play to fulfil their objective of arriving at the middle third with positional superiority. Because most teams are oriented to prioritise the defence of the central space, these pre-planned moves are funnelled through the wide areas. Some of these are:

Finding the "10’s" blindside run

A. RB > 6 (rotates wide) > target.

B. GK > RCB > RM > target (hor. passing).

C. GK > 6 (far side) > RB > RM > target.

Playing between the lines

A. CB > W btl (effect: push line) > LB outside.

B. RCB > 10 drops into space, created by RB's deep positioning > 6 support > switch.

Attacking depth

A. GK > 6 (wall) > RCB > RB > 6's 3rd man run.

B. GK (skip passes) > RB > 6 (inside) > ball into depth.

But if the opportunity emerges for Cork or Cullen to receive the ball behind the first line without being met with backwards pressure, Harwood-Bellis, their conductor from deep, would try to find them. If he succeeds, the wide players are then expected to make well-timed deep runs behind the defence — the out-of-possession team, at this moment, is caught between holding and dropping their line — to get on the end of a ball over the top from the receiver.

Although Burnley build short whenever possible, they sometimes mix it up out of necessity or to be less predictable. The most common way they do this is by having the far side 6 gravitate towards the GK, not necessarily with the intention of receiving the ball, but to take his opposite number with him (4-4-2). This, in turn, creates the gap for his winger to drop into and collect the ball, allowing his team to effectively go over the press.

Other alternatives:

• Long pass into ST, with teammates in the help space overloading the second balls zones/offering support underneath.

• Long pass into the channel for the ST to run into, and the identification of loose balls as a trigger for counter-pressing.

After the match against Blackpool, where Burnley offered their sacrifice — i.e, gift a goal in build-up — to the Cruyffian gods, like all teams do as part of the initiation, they were labelled as naive by some sections of the media. One article from a respectable publication bore a headline that started with the words: "Burnley’s naivety." Which, frankly, is misplaced. Perhaps they were in that particular match, as they persistently diced with danger by playing short in situations that demanded the opposite, but attempts to draw overarching conclusions from it are devoid of perspective.

Furthermore, the point of focus should not be on the outcome but on the process itself which is not flawed . There is a good risk assessment involving an adequate number of players (1+), correct spacing between them (coaching), and based on their interactions, clear ideas on how to beat the press (build-up solutions).

The common denominator in all of the situations that characterize the narrative, including the one that led to the goal, is a situational proneness to errors, not indicative of a larger issue:

Bad decision-making: Roberts received the ball and had 3 options to play to on his right, but instead went back to his GK. In his defence, he’s not comfortable playing with his back to goal.

Technical mistakes: To begin with, it was a bad pass from Muric. He didn’t adjust his positioning before he got the pass that forced him into making this decision. Had he done that, there was an out-ball to his left. But nonetheless, and perhaps this is not the best example, Cullen should have simply let the ball roll.

Breach of individual principles: Cullen hid behind the cover shadow of an opponent and Maatsen didn’t drop, leaving Taylor with no support.

Ironically, this “setback” ushered in the addition of another tactical dimension to their playing system. Verticality. At around the 68-minute of the Blackpool game, we noticed a peculiar pattern we hadn’t quite seen from them before that has since become more frequent and may now be classified as one of their tendencies in the first phase.

Everything seemed like normal at first. Burnley outlined in a 4-2 build up shape, as they have almost exclusively done. However, there was a slight difference in the layout of the players in the zone of cooperation. Brownhill, who usually stayed lower for reasons, like combining with teammates or providing penetration in form of third-man runs, stayed high this time. And the double pivot simply moved towards the goalkeeper.

Cullen might have intended to act as a wall, and Cork probably wanted a pass through the first line as he was free. It’s hard to confidently say what their intentions were. But when viewed as a collective, it becomes a bit clearer: the pieces move together for a limited number of tactical objectives, and one of them was to generate artificial transitions.

Depth is created by the centre-backs and forwards; dropping movements from double 6s undo vertical compactness; right back holds width to stretch diagonal compactness; near side 6 make lateral movements to open vertical lanes; the front 2 occupy different heights, enabling quick interchange. 4-2-4. Vertical stretching.

A story in 3 parts:

Second Phase

As they advance to the middle third, Burnley would switch to a 3-2-5 structure. The asymmetry in the first line is achieved through the positional rotations of the fullbacks. Maatsen (LB) will push beyond the first and second lines, while Roberts (RB) inverts to make a back three. Its formation, in most cases, secures a numerical superiority in the first line.

That, along with the strong connections, including the diagonal pathways, provided by the double pivot of Cork and Cullen in front of them, establishes a base from which Burnley can consolidate possession as a way to build attacks, recycle the ball if they have to, or bait pressure without succumbing to it. But within that core, there are constant movements, especially from the left-side pivot (Cork), whose intention is to receive through the line or open passing lanes ahead for Brownhill and Rodriguez in the left-half space.

(One particular collective detail that’s critical to its success is the positioning of the wide centre-backs. It’s imperative that they make little adjustments based on the 4 reference points [the ball, the space, opponents, and teammates], staying as wide as necessary. This is to, amongst other things, stretch the first line of the press and retain access to all 3 options [wide area, half space and central zones]. Understandably, they’ve struggled to strike the delicate balance at times, which has, consequently, affected their progression.)

The difference in the roles of both fullbacks can be explained, to an extent, by their strengths and weaknesses (see: the bit on players). Maatsen’s (LB) relatively advanced positioning, especially in earlier games, was used as a simple yet effective method of progression. Abiding by one of their principles (attack ball-far zone), Burnley would engage in horizontal passing, patiently waiting for their opponent to commit to one side.

If and when they do, they quickly work the ball through the back 3 to the far side where, ideally, Maatsen is positioned to receive it ahead of the opposition midfield line or with separation from his marker, triggering runs from the near-side winger and striker into the space behind in anticipation of a one-time pass. Something Maatsen is particularly skilled at: the forward first touch to set himself up and then play around the corner.

But this is only an alternative to their most commonly used pattern of play. More often than not, when Maatsen receives the ball there, he would, instead, play into the feet of Rodriguez (ST), who drops into the space created by the ball side winger run’s into depth (counter-movement). Not only does the run help to clear the path, but it also pushes back the defensive line. Thus, making it possible for the striker to leave his zone untracked.

The striker would then rely on his technique (one reason why he’s preferred over Barnes) to lay off the ball to the supporting pivot , who acts as the relay player — one that mediates between the two halves of the pitch. His role? Make the switch to the ball-far zone, taking the fewest possible touches to shift the ball onto his dominant foot before looping a diagonal pass to the isolated winger.

While this is happening, Roberts (RB) would selflessly make an overlapping run from deep, outside the receiving winger , often generating a dynamic 2v1 against the defending full-back. The ball side 6 (Cork) would, at this point, react by filling in the vacated space for protection against counter-attacks. https://vimeo.com/772748229

(In all of this, the far-side full-back who, technically, began the move, may be forgotten, but his positioning is relevant. He would come inside and stay around the edge of the box to strengthen their rest-defence.)

The synchronized move bears the marks of many of their principles, namely, ball circulation, support beneath for receivers BTL, penetration through one side and its culmination in the other and dynamic movements to create overloads. That the play starts from the left and ends on the right complements a wrong-footed winger, who would innately prefer to cut inside due to the angles they play at. This came to light in the first two games prior to Benson’s integration.

But Burnley have, for the most part, failed to convert the opportunities that it yields — i.e., winger’s reception of the ball in a promising situation (1v1 or 2v1, open space, FB’s weaker stance) — into chances (shots on goal) due to some poor decision-making by key actors in the final phase.

This is not the best example, but here, Roberts attacks the space behind the defending FB (blindside), and a lobbed through ball directed at his path would’ve likely resulted in a box entry. There were good numbers to arrive in the box, too. (The understated importance of using depth, regardless of the outcome of the action, is the uncertainty that it stirs.)

Alternatively, Burnley have gone direct, balancing out their predominant approach of using the space between the lines by attacking depth, guided by a broad principle: no pressure on carrier (CB), ST drops, WFs get in behind. The pattern that then developed is a bias towards the left, given Harwood-Bellis’ superior passing range to his counterpart, Taylor and Tella’s (LW) profile.

His goal against Blackpool exemplifies it:

https://youtu.be/cUIXPH9nUNw

One concept that defines Burnley in the 2nd phase is the use of backwards passes, and the degree to which they’ve adopted it makes them unique despite their status as an evolving side. Their press resistance , a prerequisite for its application, can be largely attributed to the coaching of their 3–2 base and the relative technical security afforded by Roberts (RB), Harwood-Bellis (RCB), Cullen (LDM) and Muric (GK) when he gets involved — he rarely ever hoofs the ball when it’s played back to him. https://files.fm/u/2ufuyv5y9

But equally important is the positional discipline shown by those in the ever-changing zone of cooperation. That has improved, especially in the final third, compared to their first few matches. When the ball is in the central space, the right-side winger (whoever it may be) and left-back Maatsen will stay wide (maximum) and high, only dropping occasionally — in the case of the former — to receive against the flow of the opposition full-back and use it to his advantage or combine with Brownhill.

Burnley are generally patient and methodical in possession, but more so, when they’re in this phase. Rather than force the issue, they would happily pass the ball around the ring, probing for gaps in the opposition block or mistakes in their shifting. In this sense, their style is more horizontal than vertical. The intention that informs the entire process is the search for situational triggers (e.g., an open passing lane to the 10 BTL or the inverted RB’s reception following opposition shifting) to then deploy their concept-heavy patterns.

Unlike, say, a Conte team that is automatism-centric, this version of Kompany’s Burnley, still in its development phase, relies less on specific patterns for progression but more on contextual principles, like third-man combinations or up-back-through routines, allowing room for improvisation. This means that, while Burnley use a fair few structured plays , they don’t replicate them in specific situations with enough regularity , excluding the three we’ve analysed thus far.

The question of whether this is deliberate or simply a consequence of their growing status is not so clear. But what is, is that it makes Burnley harder to discern. The observation is worthy of note particularly because Kompany, in an interview with the club, spoke about the importance of automatism, using it as a baseline for their development: “… a point where players are no longer (consciously) thinking about what they do.”

To conclude this chapter, we’ll take a brief look at some of the other ways Burnley have attempted to access the final third, starting with a common variation of the 3–2–5 in-possession structure which sees one of the double 6s dropping outside the back 3 to aid progression.

Situation 1. Cork’s decision to pull wide opens the passing lane to Brownhill in the right half-space, with the far-side pivot offering support diagonally (principle). Cork, whose movement started the sequence, wound up becoming the third man. https://vimeo.com/772751576

Situation 2. Admittedly, there’s a contextual layer to this in that Burnley tweaked their shape — I.e., Maatsen’s (LB) inversion — for this match, but the fundamentals apply. Cork receiving the ball here in a wider position stretches the opposition’s defensive chain, opening the seam for Brownhill to exploit. https://files.fm/u/3mvgj8k4w

Situation 3. Of which I do not have a screenshot, Cullen would sometimes drop into the false full-back position, generating a 3v1 against the defending right midfielder, who must split the difference. If he steps out to Cullen, Maatsen would be free momentarily in a position of strategic importance — because of the inverted winger’s pinning actions.

Burnley’s continuous search, for numerical and positional superiorities means that at the basis of their problem-solving process lay some ideological constraints. In Kompany’s own words: “You look at different problems and solve them in a way because you’ve been taught to think a certain way.”
When faced with the problem of man-coverage in the middle zones here, for example, the solution they came up with, naturally, was to outnumber the opposition by one. Decoy movements from the sole pivot and good spatial occupation by the 8s, clear the passing lane for the CF (4v3) — the groundwork for penetration actions, like the up-back-through. Other times, the centre-backs act on their licence to dribble into space, tempting their direct opponents to jump .

Burnley have also gained entry into the final third through switches of play from the centre-backs to the width holder (LB or RM), with the nearside players making a blindside run; Taylor (LCB) drilling a pass between the lines for the left-winger (inverted), while the advanced left-back offers an exit option; the inverted RB playing inside (out-in pressure) from deeper half-space to the 6 for a pass in behind; or contrastingly, he could follow the pressure by playing the RM, who would then try to slip in Brownhill in the opposition 6’s blindside.

They’ve been a bit more adventurous, too, evidenced by the positional freedom afforded to one of the 6s (on the right) to make a forward run from deep, coinciding with Brownhill dropping down, to perhaps use the space the latter vacated, round off a third-man combination or offer a progressive option. The main idea, of course, is to cultivate an air of unpredictability, all the while maintaining team balance.

3rd phase and Rest Defence

Moving up to the final 3rd, Burnley are not as perspicuous in their play. With the time he’s had, Kompany has drilled them in the rudiments of what his game model demands from them; that is, the 5-5 structure, maximum width, wide triangles, combination plays (over crosses), as the general mood (patience to circulate the ball), but the finer points are not yet consistent in their performance.

On the right: Roberts, Brownhill, and Costelloe or Benson will form the outline (triangle), except that their interactions within it are shallow. Not to speak of their weak connections with the rest of the team, leading to structural fragments.

It’s hardly surprising, as this is one of the most common problems bedevilling teams transitioning from a counter-attacking style to a possession-based one. But football can be so unforgiving and its effects are already felt: breaking down a low, deep block has proven to be a headache for Burnley, resulting in a string of frustrating draws, where they’ve monopolized possession, but without creating enough high-quality chances.

That is not to say that they have not shown some cohesion in the creation phase. They have but in patches. And even then, the limitations come on to the fore . To use an example, in the first two matches, the left-winger Bastien (roaming role) would abandon his starting position during the game, coming over to the opposite flank. Granted, this has its benefits (e.g., overload around the ball), but the consequence of this is that the left half-space is left unoccupied, affecting Burnley’s ability to use the other half of the pitch.

Bastien was most likely acting on the manager’s instruction even though Kompany was seen, on occasion, gesturing to him to stay in his position. Perhaps what he had taken issue with was the regularity with which Bastien had vacated his flank. In the game after the next one — against Watford, Kompany experimented with a 4–3–3 — Bastien, more or less, stuck to his free-to-roam role as the inverted winger. Still, other problems persisted. This time it was the lack of progressive options between the lines.

In attempts to fix this, the front 5 or sometimes 4 when Maatsen stays a bit deeper, would all drop down towards the ball with little regard for the timing of their movements, balance in structure or occupation of different lanes. Which fixed one problem, but ignored the other: attacking depth. Their opponents, as a result, found it easy to keep the play in front of them, conceding territory without the fear of being genuinely threatened. It was especially noticeable at the start of the season. Burnley seemed to struggle to strike the balance between fluidity and organisation.

There are, of course, no quick fixes for these issues, although they can be compensated for, through specific game plans, in favourable circumstances. They can only be truly remedied in the long term through time on the training ground and team chemistry built over matches. See: the sequel at the end of the article to see how much they’ve improved since.

In an even game state, Burnley will attack the box with 4–6 players, sometimes comprised of one of their full-backs, one of their double pivot and their stationery front 4. Their fullbacks act like a pendulum in 2 of the 3 phases of play, occupying different heights. This concept of asymmetry is relevant to their attacking dynamics. On one hand, Maatsen (LB) will almost exclusively stay outside his winger, starting from a relatively higher position.

Roberts (RB), on the other hand, arrives in the space and has the liberty to alternate his runs depending on what he feels is the better option. By doing so, he may create an opening in the seam, an overload against the defending full-back or space in the inside low channel — one of their favourite crossing zones. But then, he’s rarely picked out by his teammates. The argument could be made that he’s being used as a screen; however, that’s scarcely the case. It is simply a derivative of their poor decision-making in the creation phase.

The sequence at around the 23rd min embeds many of Burnley’s principles across the thirds. Invoke pressure, play over, use the CF as a focal point, support below and finish moves in the opposite direction. But the highlight in this context is Roberts' actions . He drove forward with the ball before laying it off to his winger, creating the space in the right half-space for Brownhill. https://files.fm/u/ft5p9wbj8

Variation 2: in the lead-up to what might have been the final pass, Bastien received outside the opposition RCM to help his team move forward. His opponent had gotten out to him when the LCB was with the ball, but as he played it back to the CB, the CM had to return to covering the central space. Then followed the switch via ground passes, Costelloe’s provision of width (pull out FB) and the pinning actions of Cork. https://files.fm/u/nxuwr87kd

Variation 3: Roberts had pushed up to join the last line — another feature of their attacking play — and so the ball side pivot filled in the space behind him. Burnley passed the ball around in a sort of overloaded mini-game (5v3). The FB receives the ball, and he sees his winger make a run off the back of the opposition winger, but opts to go back to Cork (fail-safe), who passed it to Cullen and there was the situation.

The issue, however, is that even when they create these opportunities through design, they fail to apply the finishing touches. It’s not simply a matter of execution — or in other cases, decision-making — but an inability to recognize them, stemming from the collective adaptation to Kompany’s philosophy. Much like, in the deeper phases, the players have sometimes been guilty of not being able to identify the “opportunities” in a positional play system — e.g., third-man circuits.

Burnley have a tendency to attack through the right wing, specifically, the gap between the left centre back and left back — as seen in some of the game situations. It’s hard to definitively state why, but one explanation for this is their repetitive usage of a specific pattern (“the penetration and then the switch”) and the direction in which it is executed — to the right. Another is their structure. It’s far easier to create a wide triangle (and an overload) on the right than on the left due to some of the dynamics: the winger’s fixed, high positioning, and the right back’s forward run aprés the switch.

Whereas, on the left, Maatsen occupies a slightly deeper position, and while Bastien (not Tella) plays a more active role in the half-space, Cullen, is the last piece of the puzzle . The left-side pivot. For context, their base structure is a 4–2–3–1, with the nominal 10 operating in the right half-space. This doesn’t mean that it’s not workable — in fact, it is — but it is less natural.

Beyond that, there’s a legitimate question to be asked about the profiles. Kompany’s ideals encompass qualitative superiority in the wide areas, and Maatsen, simply, isn’t suited for that function. In addition to that, Cork and Roberts both have better off-the-ball movements than their equivalents on the opposite flank, increasing the threat level of the triangle.

Because Burnley are not drilled in the final third as they are in other phases of play , we have adopted a nuanced view, anticipating some changes in the near future that might render this current analysis irrelevant. It is for this reason that we have taken care not to place too much importance on specific situations, but more on general principles.

Having said that, there’s substance to the following examples in terms of their repeatability and reflection of the collective principles:

Luton: Burnley repetitively tried to gain box entries by creating overloaded sub-structures on the left and then switching the play to the right-back who, depending on his position, may theoretically carry the ball to generate a dynamic 2v1 (there was a shared tendency to cross from zone 4) or play a pass into the gap between the defensive line created by the lateral movements of the hybrid 10 and nearside winger.

Watford: Burnley have something of a habit to finish off a progressive action with a third-man combination, and 76:09 is a good example of this. Brownhill dropped outside to the wide corridor to facilitate possession, as part of the variations in the 2nd phase.Vitinho bore a half-closed body position when the ball was played into his feet, so he moved centrally and passed the ball to Cullen — the trigger for a run into space. https://files.fm/u/m729cq7yt

Hull: Against their 5–4–1 low block, Burnley attacked in a 2–3–5, with the right back moving up to the 2nd line (e.g., lock on opp. WM). The centre-backs are encouraged to take up space in order to cause the domino to fall, which the left centre-back did, enabled by the far-side pivot’s movement. The front 3 ahead were narrow, effectively pinning the back line and creating space out wide.

In their usual fashion, Burnley circulated the ball, with the relevant players moving to provide support structures. They had attempted to penetrate down the right but couldn’t. Then Taylor (LCB) skips Cullen to play Maatsen (LB) in an area of numerical parity. Cork joins in, creating a numerical superiority before initiating the pattern. https://files.fm/u/fxquegrk6

For a team that dominates the ball and manipulates opposition structures through space as means to create chances, rest-defending is an essential part of their tactical makeup. As such, an analysis of their behaviour in possession phases would be incomplete without touching on it , at the very least.

As we’ve established, Burnley shift between the 3–2–5 and 3–1–6 shapes in the 2nd and 3rd phases of play. But from a defensive standpoint, it’s important to draw attention to the LB’s positioning, which is often a bit lower than the rest of the front line to help out with backward pressing in counter-pressing situations and recovery runs when Burnley fall into their shape. The same could be said for Brownhill in the right half-space, who may cover for Cork if he makes a run into the box.

Mainly, Cullen is the one who leads the counter-press when the play comes from the left (on the right, it could be one of Brownhill, Cork and Roberts), although the principle is independent of him, but rather the player closest to the ball. The reasons for this range from his proactive mindset and closing-down ability to his comprehension of the manager’s game model, having previously played under him at Anderlecht. His midfield partner, Cork, is more suited to covering the space behind and backing up the press.

However, Burnley are somewhat selective about when they launch a counter press ; they only do so when they have a reasonably high number of players in the turnover zone. Which, frankly, isn’t a problem in itself but given that too many times the “right” option seems to be “slow down the attack” or “drop into shape” rather than “win the ball”, there appears to be a case of sub-optimal structuring behind the ball.

In their first match of the season, there were a couple of issues with Burnley’s rest defence: the absence of vertical compactness, regardless of what shape they were in, due to the height of their defensive line. The centre-backs dropped their lines rather low — or failed to push up when Burnley moved forward — inviting long passes into the transition outlets before them and thus, allowing an easy getaway to an exit from a possible counter-pressing situation. This was also aggravated by the positioning and reaction of those in the zone of intervention.

Situation: Burnley set up camp in the final third in a sort of 2–3–5 shape, but with the far side FB oriented to the side where the ball was. Realizing that the cross was not on, Maatsen dropped away from the box into a deeper, narrow position. Burnley tried to unlock Huddersfield’s wide structures, using a pass-and-move combination within the triangle but ended up losing the ball.

It left them exposed to a counterattack. With one pass, Huddersfield succeeded in cutting the rest defence open. But for Harwood-Bellis intervention, they would have broken through. This is despite outnumbering their opponents by 3. The causes: (A) the circulatory unit was too deep, perhaps to make up for the last line’s height, making it nearly impossible to put immediate pressure on the ball. (B) The flatness of the 2–4 structure created the entry point. https://files.fm/u/jtpsyw2xf

Some progress was made in the subsequent matches. The centre-backs started at a slightly higher position and became touch-tight on their opponents (Taylor), following them while one of the 6s filled in the space they left. But where the major change occurred was in the second line and by extension, Burnley’s on-ball structure in the 3rd phase. Bastien (inverted) and Brownhill became more disciplined positionally; the double pivot of Cullen and Cork moved with the team, as did the centre-backs. The left-back included became more conscious of the need to invert when the play was in the opposite flank.

In addition to that, Burnley’s playmakers, in the broadest definition of the word, became more deliberate about the areas in which they gave up possession. This naturally made it easier for them to counter-press. There was an emerging pattern in the type of turnovers they conceded — e.g., wide areas, a high percentage of players around.

Notably, in terms of the intangibles, there was also a shift in mindset: the players first thought was no longer to track back but to win back the ball, translating to a quicker reaction time. https://files.fm/u/7vwntz4jt

Generally, Burnley commit between 3–6 players for their rest defence based on factors like, game state and the transition game of their opponents. This has seen them use a number of different shapes: (a) 1–3–1, (b) 2–4, (c) 2–3, (d) 3–1 and (e) 2–1. The precepts, however, are fairly constant. 1+ in the last line, occupation of 3 vertical corridors, with emphasis on plugging up the ball side zones, the use of opponents/passing lanes and the ball as reference points, locking play on flanks via man-orientation, etc.

General principles to win the ball: the closest player (with access) to press the carrier, his teammates will man-mark or close passing lanes to options, swarm the carrier if there’s a good chance to force a turnover (ball overloads). The “second wave” is designed to act as a fall-back option. If they’re not in a position to counter-press, the players in the engagement zone would apply immediate pressure on the ball or screen the passing angles while their teammates return to their positions.

High Press

If there was one quality to associate with Burnley out of possession, it’s intensity. The intensity with which they close their down opponents. Such is their desire to unsettle their opposition that they’ve identified every back pass as pressing triggers and religiously follow through on them, sometimes pushing up from their own half.

They have, however, dialled it down in later games. This is likely to manage the workload in a congested schedule, but it nonetheless speaks to their intent. “Of course, I like teams who are good on the ball. But if anyone has seen me play as well,” Kompany said in his first meeting, “I was an aggressive defender. I like aggressive teams… we’ll have to be aggressive, we’ll have to have intensity.”

Burnley have pressed high in goal-kick situations, or situations that carry their hallmarks in open-play, deploying a variety of pressing shapes; namely, the 4–1–4–1, 4–2–3–1, 4–4–2 and then later the 4–3–3. The numerical arrangement are, of course, not as important as the reference points they use, or the individual responsibilities of those in the unit; however, they offer a starting point for understanding how the pressing schemes work.

1. 4–1–4–1 and its variations (v. a 4–2 and 3–2 + 1 build-up shapes).

Burnley use a hybrid man-oriented pressing scheme, aiming to lure the in-possession team into their wide pressing traps , where they have equal numbers (3v3 or 4v4), in addition to the theoretical advantage of the sideline as an extra player. But that’s on paper. The more likely outcome is a “forced” long ball into their last line, won by one of the centre-backs or the sitting pivot, setting the stage for another attack.

Pressing from their 4–1–4–1 base structure, Burnley made attempts to Huddersfield into their wide trap. Barnes (ST), being responsible for the back 3, curves his run onto the GK, denying access to the ball-far CB. It left the GK with one option: a pass to his nearside CB, whom the Cullen (LCM) was ready to engage, with Brownhill pivoting on the potential free player and Costelloe (RM) inverting on the player he had left.

The GK, in the end, chose to ping a long pass to his RM — Huddersfield played out in a 4–2–4 shape. Maatsen (LB) beat him in the duel and Taylor (LCB) gets to the ball as the extra defender. It was a 3v2 in the playing space, a microcosm of the 5v4 at the back made up of the back four and the single pivot.

One variation sees the ball side CM pressing the CB, while the sitting 6 picks up the free player. This was against Watford. Barnes (ST), as is custom, halves the pitch by forcing the GK to the left. Brownhill, the near-side CM, jumps out to press the LCB. Burnley had the ball where they wanted it. But, ironically, this worked in Watford’s favour. Not just in this situation, but for much of the first half. https://files.fm/u/4s6m4efd6

Watford repeatedly circumvented the cage thanks to their natural overloads from their midfield 3 and the dynamic movement of their winger. Burnley struggled, largely because the solutions proposed by the opposing team (advanced 8 pins ball-far 6, opp 6 rotates between CB and FB), increased the complexity of their roles. Perhaps Kompany should’ve adapted — i.e., switch to a 4–3–3 or a 4-d-2 — to help simplify the tasks of the players, especially considering they’re still learning how to press.

In another variation, the nearside wide midfielder would drift inside onto one of the CBs, with his FB starting at a higher position to reduce the distance between him and his opposite number for a potential switch. See here:

Burnley act on the first pass as the trigger. Costelloe (RM) runs straight at the LCB before angling his run. Barnes does the same to the GK before carrying on with the press as the pass was made to the RCB. At this point, the two CMs had man-marked their opposite numbers, and Bastien (LM), who sat deeper, was prepared to press the opposition RB. This forced Huddersfield to play over to their CF. https://files.fm/u/57jsbsqc2

It’s a scheme reflective of their philosophy. The aggression out of possession. But its implementation requires clarity over the roles of the CMs in response to situational variables. Cullen erred in that regard in the match against Hull. Example:

Having identified throw-ins as pressing triggers, Burnley were prepared to launch a high press. The ST led the press by running towards the LCB before moving on to the GK. The far side LM (Tella) then jumped on the RCB as he receives the ball, coinciding with the LB (Maatsen) stepping up to the opposition’s deep FB.

At this moment, a gap surfaced in the half-space for the opposition RM to receive a pass and help his team break forward. Cullen’s presence in the central space was redundant. He didn’t have any impact on the play there, but more balefully, Harwood-Bellis (the active CB) reacted slowly to the receiver’s movement. The responsibility was on him to slide across and get tighter on him, with Cork present to fill in the holes. https://files.fm/u/zy8vfpe2a

Against a back 5, Burnley would, as you might expect, tweak their base structure. The wide midfielders orient themselves to the wide centre-backs. Rodriguez (ST) then puts the central defender in the back 3 under pressure. In one line below, the two CMs — Cullen and Brownhill — match up with their opposite numbers. Wigan’s objective here was to loop a ball to their LWB, so that he may knock down the ball to the near side 8. Cork (6) shifted across in anticipation of that scenario. https://files.fm/u/jqydn4n2t

2. 4–2–3–1.

Burnley switched between a 4–1–4–1 and a 4–2–3–1 pressing shape during the match but without much success until Watford, influenced by the game state (1 goal advantage), started going direct. This has already been established, as were the wide overloads essential to their progression and their mechanisms, but what was not was their fleeting experimentation with the 4–2–3–1.

The centre forward’s role primarily is to split the pitch by pressing one of the centre backs and using their cover shadow to deny access to the other. Barnes made an attempt to achieve that in this situation, but the inside option for the opposition 6 was open, rendering his effort useless. This was because Watford had overloaded the no. 10 zone, with their double pivot, whereas the near side 6 was pinned by Watford’s advanced 8.

It highlights some of the issues with Burnley’s press. The ball far 6, Cullen, had no role to play in a situation where Burnley were undermanned. He later did the job of the RB, picking up the winger who dropped down.

3. 4–1–3–2/4–4–2 (staggered).

The Hull game showed a different aspect of Burnley’s press: central traps. Laying in a sort of 4–1–3–2 structure, the front 2 would press the opposition CBs from out to in, cutting off the passing angles to their FBs. As a fall option back, the WMs are in place to engage them. If Burnley succeed in getting one of the CBs to use their pivot, who would be left free on purpose, Cullen would jump on him. The objective is to win the ball and attack the opposition box immediately with the two “CFs” ahead.

The screenshot was taken from their next match (Blackpool) in which Burnley implemented the trap again; they have shown a tendency to reinforce positive behaviour. If they try something that works, Burnley will almost certainly retry it. Their adoption of the 4–2–4 build-up shape (vertical stretching) following the Blackpool game is one such example.

The distances between the pressers and their opponents are not optimal, but here, Rodriguez (LST) curved his run onto the GK, blocking the passing lane to the RCB. Brownhill, on the other side, was ready to get out to the LCB. Their collective efforts forced the GK to play through his lone pivot, whom Cullen (advanced CM) was supposed to press from behind. But he was too deep and had to make up a lot of ground, giving the player enough room to play out of it. Which was the call to fall into their 4–4–2 shape, with the players in the immediate vicinity front-screening their opponents.

The reality is that most of the teams in the league, at least in most goal-kick situations, elect not to build out from the back against Burnley. The collective disposition comes from their recognition of Burnley’s strengths and to some extent, their own weaknesses. So, teams like Luton, have instead sought to find gains elsewhere: second balls. And of course, Burnley have had to prepare for that aspect of the game, although it remains a weakness.

Luton’s game plan in the first phase was for their GK to play long passes, targeting space around Burnley’s 6. The idea: exploit Cork’s weakness in the air by having Adebayo compete with him for them. It worked. The ST won most of the aerial duels (67%), and in this example, while he couldn’t flick it on for any of his players, his teammates had overloaded the second ball zone, fostering the environment for a counter-press situation.

From there, Luton would look to strengthen their hold on the territory if they can’t attack straight away. By dominating the second balls, they generated momentum and eventually, went ahead. Burnley corrected this in the game after. Their solution — reminiscent of his time at Anderlecht — was to get their aerially superior CBs to break out of their line instead and go for those balls whilst Cork plugged in the gaps.

Post-international Break: a sequel

I started writing this article during the international break, hoping to finish it before its conclusion. But, of course, life got in the way, and I, already unsatisfied with the available sample size, decided to wait a little longer. I especially saw the benefit of Kompany and his staff having more time to drill his team in final third patterns. An area in which they were devoid of tactical creativity.

As it turned out, “a little longer” in the life of a procrastinator equated to 8 weeks. But on the bright side, Kompany has now seen his team through an appreciable number of matches (21 in the league alone) and training sessions (pre-season included) to begin laying down the foundation for his ideal team.

In what is a sequel to the original piece, we’ll analyze the leaps Burnley have made or are yet to make.

Improvement in team defending

The original article was a deep dive into how Burnley, as a team, behaved in 4 phases of play, which, obviously, did not include the medium and low block. But arguably Burnley’s biggest weakness at the time, was their team defending in settled possession, although their emergency defending was hugely impressive: they recovered well and in numbers (9-10), making a high volume of blocks by packing the centre of the box.

Without going into the specifics, Burnley mostly defended in a 4-1-4-1 medium block; the roles of the CMs are flexible (space-oriented man-marking). Their main pressing trigger was back passes. And that's where some of their problems emanated from. Burnley are a team that like to press at every given opportunity. It's a message that's probably reinforced across the board. But this, especially at the beginning, came out in negative ways.

The wide midfielders and strikers who lead the press exhibited a proneness to judgment errors, stemming from their difficulty in adapting their behaviour based on changing information. One can’t press in a medium block as one would in a high block. And sheer intensity or aggression can’t compensate for individual mistakes, like failing to cover passing lanes or breaking out of lines needlessly.

Even when they dropped off, the player responsible for putting pressure on the ball in a given situation — it could be one of the CMs, WMs or the ST — seemed to lack clarity about when to do so. The effect this had on the already strained communication between the units was disruptive, giving opponents time and space to drill in passes.

There was also the issue of diagonal compactness when defending the wide areas, say, following a switch — the ball-far CM and WM sometimes neglected their task to slide across with the rest of the midfield unit. Though it was mitigated, to some extent, by the presence of the sitting midfielder (4–1–4–1).

This has since improved, however, coinciding with the expansion of their defensive systems. A bigger contributing factor, though, is their growing understanding of individual principles and the natural chemistry that comes with time.

Case study: Swansea (H). 4–2–4 mid-press.

When defending in the middle third, Burnley, based on how their opponents set up, will switch between a distinct number of structures. The transition is not always deliberate. It may well be a collective reaction to the movement or positioning of the first and second presser.

In the 4–4–2, especially against a static or situational back 3, the WMs would take up a conspicuously high position, occupying the same horizontal line as the two CFs. This is done to be within touching distance of the CBs (context-dependent), as well as to protect the half-spaces and front-screen accessible options inside and diagonally outside the block (secondary).

As for the CFs, their role is to guard the central lanes. Either by pressuring the CBs, while cover-shadowing the 6 or by pivoting down on him if the WM goes to press. (Communication between the front two is thus necessary.) The CMs prioritize the defence of the zones; however, that will change if an opposition player wanders into the zone or becomes free to receive the ball outside of them, provided that the FB can’t get out to them — in this case, the player’s autonomy within the tactical framework is respected.

Situation 1. Possibly the most basic representation of their press, given the conditions. Both WMs maintain access to the wide CBs, but they’re conscious of the danger of cheating to avoid having their lines broken. The double pivot, a line below, defend in a zonal scheme. Rodriguez acts on the trigger, pressing the CB at a specific angle, so as to block access to the 6.

Situation 2. It gets a bit more complicated here because Tella was the one who led the press. This meant that the RCM had to get out to the LCB; subsequently, ST pivots down on the ball side 6; and Brownhill inverts on the other. For context, one of Swansea’s strategies was to find the wingers outside Burnley’s double 6s. So, the ball side winger dropped, and the RB jumped out to press him.

Burnley got outplayed by an attempted third-man combination down the line. Something they struggled with at the start. The dropping 10 played inside to the no. 6 who Rodriguez lost track of and he tried to fist a pass into the third man’s feet that ended up being a through ball.

Situation 3. Swansea, being one of the more tactically flexible teams in the division, made some in-game tweaks because they struggled to progress the ball. One of them was to have the right-side winger drop and create an overload, combined with the contrasting dynamics on the right: the far-side winger took on a static role, locking on to the LB and thus, preventing him from getting out to him.

In this situation, Burnley dealt with it using their LM to press the RCB but also cover shadow the free man. Then the LST sat on the near-side pivot, as Brownhill man-marks the other. This is to prevent the use of a wall pass to bypass the setup. Brownhill wasn’t tight enough on him so they did exactly that. However, Cork was prepared to press him, with his teammates closing off the inside options. (Detail: diagonal compactness.)

In two parts:

Situation 4. Another solution Swansea laid forward was a common build-up variation in a back 3 system that sees one of the double pivot drop outside the wide CBs in an effort to aid progression. Burnley’s response was rather straightforward: Brownhill stays on the single pivot; Rodriguez goes out to press the RCB; Tella retains access to the LB; and Zaroury splits the difference between RB and RCB.

NEW | Burnley’s 4–3–3 mid-press: the aim is to bait the opponent inside, where they have central compactness and an overload (3v2). Tella angles his run towards the RCB to prevent a low-trajectory pass to their advanced RB (less time for LCM to react). His counterpart splits the difference between the LCB and LB; if he had pressed the former, and the LB was accessed via a switch or a third-man circuit, Brownhill would’ve jump out to press to him, provided that his marker doesn’t present an immediate threat.

The functions of the CMs are flexible. In this case, Cullen (LCM) was to press the opposition 6 aggressively upon reception (trap) or get out to the advanced RB. Cork cover-shadowed the player on his blind side, while protecting the central zones, but if there was a switch (i.e., opp. RB) to defend, he would leave him and pick up the near side 6.

In the high block phase, Burnley have also favoured a narrow 4–3–3 base structure, moving away from their customary 4–1–4–1. One theory, as we pointed out in the initial piece, is that the decision was based on some of the problems that arose from implementing the 4–1–4–1, such as the redundancy of the no. 6 in certain situations and the numerical advantages against the CMs.

Against a back 3, the responsibilities of the front trio are rather straightforward: press the wide CBs from outside (wingers), preventing an easy way out (i.e., a switch), while the ST is in a position to press the CB. It’s in the middle zones that things get a bit more complicated. Depending on how many midfielders the opposition goes with, and the individual roles of their inverted wingers, they would have to adapt.

Which sometimes means compensating for the possible overloads that may arise in their attempts to rob them of the ball with positional superiority. (This is when their IF-then approach becomes valuable.) But because their press is oriented to force the opposition into the central areas, as well as the general disposition to risk, Burnley find it easier than they otherwise might. The twist, however, is that defending the wide areas is a weakness of Burnley’s press.

But this was against Cardiff, who transitioned from a back 4 to an asymmetrical back 3 when their RB pushed forward as he was instructed to. Burnley stepped up in response to Cardiff restarting the play. The ST, seeing that the GK is setting up himself to play the pass, goes to pressure him — at least to make him rush the process.

(On the far side, RW was on the LCB, but in the event that the ball was played to the free player [LB), he would jump out to him, passing on his marker to the RCM. What’s most important is not the functions because they’re standard stuff — by this point, the inconsistency in my style may be questioned — but rather their execution down to the smallest details.)

His action didn’t have its intended effect. The lobbed pass to the RB was accurate, but the RB was too low to get the needed separation and take advantage of his RM locking on to Maatsen. This allowed Tella to recover — credits to him for not cheating. The ball side CM shuffled across in case he didn’t , leaving the opposition 6 free — a point of weakness of Burnley’s high press when defending these types of situations. But after realising that he has, he oriented himself towards the opponent. 5v4 (Cork is out of the screenshot).

There are a lot of similarities with the last situation. The main difference is that both teams have had time to be more organized in their shapes. Tella curves his run, blocking a potential passing lane to the RB, but doesn’t initiate the press — a sign of improvement.

The ST, who was previously screening the single pivot, starts the press. The ball near CM picks up the free player (principle). Tella (ball-far winger) splits the difference (principle).

Following the switch, the RM was bypassed, but he was not too far off to close in the LB during the transmission phase. The ball side CM probably didn’t expect him to get back in time, so he jumped out again. Again, this created a free player inside; however, the lone pivot was there to pick him up. But oftentimes, an opposition player will occupy the right half-space (in a 4–2–4) and his presence puzzles the no. 6. “Do I cancel out the overload or stay back?” The ball side CB sometimes steps up to prevent this from happening.

During matches Burnley switch between a number of pressing schemes depending on specific information, like the height of the opposition FBs, the number of their CBs or simply what strategy deploy. A common trend amongst teams in the championship is to hit diagonal switches to their WBs or FBs. This is done to sometimes utilize the physical mismatch there, the overload underneath or initiate their combinations, having stretched the press laterally (low risk).

The other base structure they now press from is the 4–d-2, but with the nominal CF acting as a false nine would by sitting on the opposition 6. It is an update on their previous 4–1–3–2 version.

The left ST cuts off the passing lane to Cardiff’s RB, pressing the RCB from out to in. The right ST maintains access to the LCB, as does the LCM should Cardiff use him as an out ball; otherwise, he would protect the half-space. Meanwhile, Rodriguez (ST) carries out his man-marking duties on the ball-near pivot.

The only option deliberately left open was the ball far pivot: the trap. Notice how the players in the help space are trying to helm in the receiver by blocking the exit options and creating a defensive overload around the ball/receiver.

The camera panned to this scene after replaying a highlight, and it shows how Burnley defend switches of play in this shape: the RCM jumps out to the LB; the DM (out of screenshot) follows the 8; and the RB acts similarly, going with the RM. The use of man-orientation to lock the play there . See: Tella denying the back pass option, along with the Rodriguez rotating down to densify the area.

Here, Rodriguez man-marks the opposition no. 6, providing the base for the two STs to begin the press. It was evident in their implementation of the 4-1-3-2 high press that a simple bounce pass from the 6, supposing he’s accessible, can break the structure. Which, really, was how their 4–1–3–2 press was set up. The bait was the pass to the opposition 6, so the STs also had to cover the passing lanes to the CBs and GK when this occured.

This was probably why they tweaked their press, basing it around baiting passes into the opposition’s far-side 6 instead, and with Cork stepping up a bit to play a more active role in it.

Circulating back to the initial point, Rodriguez’s man orientation… Zaroury then attempts to pressure the RCB, but without angling his run, allowing an easy pass out to the RB.

Following this, Norwich went around the first line of engagement. But as with these schemes, there is a safety net. The LCM (Brownhill) was well-positioned to engage the RB and Rodriguez stayed with his marker. Cork, noticing that the opposition player has made a run off Brownhill’s back, goes wide with him.

With the said player receiving the ball, Vitinho (LB) steps up to him, leaving a 3v3 in defence. At this point, Burnley’s back line was stretched. With a bit of luck, he could have won the ball. Harwood-Bellis did, picking up the over-hit pass. (In these moments, it certainly doesn’t help that Cork lacks running power.)

Attacking dynamics

Burnley’s attacking play before and after Zaroury’s integration is not like day and night, but the difference is significant — it’s become less predictable. The development is a good example of how individual quality embedded in the “right” player profile can raise the ceiling of a preexisting tactical system. Prior to Zaroury’s introduction to the lineup, Burnley outlined in a 3–2–5/3–3–4 shape in the 2nd and 3rd phases, with Maatsen (LB) holding width — barring cases where they adapted their shape to what they might have identified as a weakness in the opposition.

This, obviously, had the benefit of enlarging the inverted winger’s space, who was either Bastien or Tella. The former is more of a ball-to-feet player, which, in theory, made him more suited to the role. But Kompany, understandably, preferred the latter for the depth (i.e., runs in behind) and goalscoring threat he offers. After all, Burnley’s lack of depth from other avenues was a contributing factor to their staleness in the final 3rd.

It yielded serviceable wide dynamics, but it was not optimal for chance creation. Tella, like every player, is of an identifiable profile and has some weaknesses: a willing runner whose all-around play leaves a lot to be desired, particularly his ability to combine with teammates.

This reflected in his tendencies in the final third, too. Rather than position himself to combine with Maatsen or let the ball come to him in an isolated position to then carry it, he’d take up central positions, looking to finish any prospective sequence.

That’s not a negative in itself — some of his qualities are undeniably valuable. But within the team context, it was. Then this became a common sight: Maatsen isolated on the left wide, given the impossible task of dribbling his opponents in order to make inroads, or more likely, put in crosses from low-value zones . Burnley primarily rely on deep circulation to unlock defences, so they were not big on details with regard to how they occupied the box, reducing their threat in crossing situations.

Zaroury’s rise to the point of being a regular first-team player altered the existing team dynamics. Burnley began to use deep, narrow FBs, who support their wingers dynamically based on specific triggers or their intuition, laying out in a 4–1–5 structure and allowing Zaroury replace Maatsen as the width holder on the left.

As expected, there were notable differences in terms of how they operated because, at the most basic level, they’re different players who play in different positions. Zaroury naturally started at a higher position, receiving protection from his LB or ball near 6, and the constant presence of an 8 in the left half-space (Brownhill or Bastien) opened the door to interchanges and aided in his receiving with separation (which, for him, was a positive).

This is without mentioning the many possibilities that his inherent quality (1v1 prowess, shooting, crosses from both feet) yields. It might seem like a minuscule detail, but by simply being wrong-footed and creative, the angles allow him to play Mahrez-esque disguise passes to the golden zone. (Burnley also benefitted from their left-back staying back in terms of their rest-defending.)

An emerging pattern in Burnley’s attacking play, precisely in the 2nd phase, is based on the concept of switching fields but with the ball-far FB, positioned in and around the opposite half-space, as the receiver . Here, Harwood-Bellis switches the play to Maatsen. The fullback’s receiving position shortened the time of the transmission phase, prevented a double team for his winger, and created a diagonal passing angle to roll him in. (A diagonal pass, in this situation, is more favourable than a horizontal one because it allows the winger to take the first touch with the inside of his foot, and face the defender.)

Maatsen didn’t go on a run to support him after making the pass, possibly because his point of reference is the opposition winger . The move developed regardless thanks to the qualitative superiority Zaroury offers out wide.

He beats the defender using a signature move of his: an open fake shot. The defender, anticipating a cross, changed his footing and faced him head-on. In that moment of weakness, Zaroury rolled the ball to change direction and burst past him, relying on his quick acceleration.

The movements in the box are an indication of the improvement they’ve made in that regard. Rodriguez made a decoy run towards the near post, dragging away almost 3 defenders. The third defender was the one who headed it away. 2v2 in the target area. https://files.fm/u/s52uwzcnw

Burnley’s adoption of this concept, perhaps to a greater extent than before, can be seen in their increased usage of long diagonal balls to their wide and high wingers, preceding a common decoy run from the ball-side 8 to clear the path before repositioning to attack the seam if the winger manages to bring it down. (It’s one aspect of his game Brownhill has improved on — the synergy between him and the ball side winger in his role as an off-the-ball disruptor.)

This gives the receiver a couple of options (hypothetical): (a) slip in the teammate, (b) cut inside and shoot, (c) pass to LB in the half-space, or (d) simply go back. The fourth option is sometimes followed by another switch, albeit via ground passes to the opposite flank (principle) where Benson (quick acceleration) or Gudmundsson (creative passing) is waiting for the ball to come to them, with the RB making an overlapping or underlapping run dependant on where the space is.

Another player whose inclusion in the first XI improved the team dynamics is Beyer. Taylor used to be something of a weak link in Burnley’s defence when they had the ball in the first line as he sometimes takes a poor touch or fails to adapt his body position. There was also one specific tactical problem that came with this: his reluctance to dribble into space, resulting in a prolonged period of stale possession.

But Beyer, unlike the latter, is a good progressive carrier. He does not only use the space ahead of him to tempt opponents to jump out of their block but also carry the ball all the way into midfield sometimes if not engaged, opening up new possibilities.

As an aside, one noticeable change is the greater autonomy given to the CF when he gets the ball in their rehearsed moves — e.g., Maatsen receiving on the shoulder of opp. RM. In contrast to earlier in the season when he would, as though he were on autopilot, make the switch to the right without any thought, he now seems to show more independent thinking. Given how predictable it used to be, this can be described as a positive change.

As much as Kompany encourages wing plays in his team, he sees central combinations just as a viable means of progression — not just as a pretext for attacking through the outer corridors. But as this quote from Alan Launder says, "What is tactically desirable must be technically possible." Burnley’s lack of players who can roam between the lines, receive on the half-turn and combine with teammates has made it a bit difficult for his team to embody that.

In matches where opposition teams, who are vertically compact to press aggressively between the lines, have curbed their wide attacking play, this becomes visible. But due to the fact they’re also teams in the division who leaves space between their units, especially when baited to shift or press, central combinations remain a facet of Burnley’s tactical make-up. (As we’ve written about extensively over the piece, attracting pressure is Burnley’s defining principle and their most effective tool for undoing vertical compactness.)

Kompany has established the initial conditions for its possibility through the team’s phase-specific collective principles. One theoretical example is their generation of central overloads in staggered lines to manipulate the opposition’s second line, taking advantage of the CBs’ aversion to stepping up (in a back 3) and the poor pressing angles of the first line.

(Rodriguez is probably the player who makes the most receptions between the lines because of his back-to-goal play, with Harwood-Bellis being the defender who breaks the lines the most — he has a knack for stabbing driven passes through blocks . And there exists a relationship between them.)

Below: not just the CB, but when the pitch opens up to him in that way, with the opposition shuffling across to defend the previously ceded space, he tends to drill in a pass for the ST against the grain. The movements of the 8s are crucial to opening the passing lane. If they succeed, Burnley would attempt to break quickly; the ST would look to play behind the last line or go wide to his wingers. (See the gap that emerged between the opposition’s CMs where Rodriguez likes to arrive in.)

Burnley’s variations for creating numerical superiority in the central and half space range from the ST simply dropping down against a double pivot, as they did against Norwich to Maatsen (LB) inverting next to Cullen and Brownhill to overload their midfield 3, with Cork (6) at the base.

Here, they did well to manipulate the opposition structure with the overload around the ball. Vitinho moves up (RB) and his participation draws out the opposition LCM (WM was pinned by Benson); Cullen rotating down had the same effect on the ST, opening the gap to slip in Cork, where Burnley had a numerical advantage (3v2). https://files.fm/u/3hzswhm52

The change in their in-possession shapes is not simply a case of positional rotations, but a modification in the base structure itself . From the 4–2–3–1 to a 4–3–3 as Cullen advanced to play as a sort of controller-type 8 on the left, leaving Cork as the single pivot. What this achieved was equal access to both wing zones.

It has also affected how Burnley play out from the back. They’ve exclusively used a 4–1 build-up shape since then — a departure from their 4–2 iteration, although Brownhill and Cullen will drop deep situationally — using deep FBs to create space inside the block or diagonal pathways for progression. But if that’s not an option, they would deploy their common wide combination plays. The trigger: when the FB collects the ball.

To aid this, the ball-near 8 would drop wide — a pattern that’s also practised in the second phase — combined with the efforts of the ballside winger to pin the opposition FB. Rodriguez (ST) may join in as well, particularly on the left, forming a diamond-like structure.

When faced with a back 5, Burnley would switch to a 3-1-6, with one of the FBs forming the back 3. A rotation down the left involves Maatsen pushing up to the left-half space, effectively pinning the LCM and allowing Brownhill to come deep and receive the ball. On the right, Vitinho’s positioning is dedicated by Benson’s. If the latter occupies the wing zone, he would move inside. This may overload the opposition LM or drag him in, creating access to the outer corridors.

Thoughts on their evolving status

The piece, as it is, is long enough. But I felt compelled to adopt a different point of view in order to give a more definitive answer to the original answer.

Burnley are currently first in the Championship, and their underlying numbers are not far off. According to Fbref, their xGD of 7.2 is the fourth-best in the league. This is even more impressive when you consider that only 4 players in their starting XI — Roberts, Cork, Brownhill and Rodriguez — had been at the club before this summer. To get them playing together with the new arrivals the way they have done in less than 4 months is a testament to Kompany’s coaching ability.

Not to mention under Sean Dyche, Burnley played a completely different brand of football: low possession, direct attacks. (The squad overhaul certainly helped in this regard.) It’s easy to forget that sometimes because of how quickly Kompany has placed his imprint on the team, and combined that with getting results in the short term.

To clarify, this is not an opposition analysis report. Hence, for much of the piece, I have adopted a theoretical tone, but not at the expense of objectivity. Burnley have their weaknesses. They struggle to defend set-pieces and until recently, their team defending in the low and medium block phases of play has been sub-optimal. It hasn’t been exploited enough because of how good they are at keeping the ball. The trend of conceding late goals (positive game state) points in that direction.

Now, one may look at that differently and say, "they don’t control the game" by continuing to do what they’ve done: keep the ball. But a more pragmatic answer is that only a few teams are capable of resisting the influence of game state on a consistent basis. These are teams with technically sound players in a well-drilled system. Burnley may have the latter, but not the former (yet) — even in relation to the league. That’s the baseline before intangibles like mental toughness are considered.

There’d be spells in matches when they would have to reduce variances by protecting the space; when their opponents inevitably overpower them. (The previous iteration of Arteta’s Arsenal are a good example of this.) Granted, in recent weeks, they’ve worked on that aspect and have made strides, but there is still room for improvement, and ultimately, it boils down to individual defending principles.