TURN AWAY: A STRATEGY TO PULL ISIS SYMPATHIZERS AWAY FROM TERRORISM?

Ryan Pereira is a first year Masters Student in Georgetown’s Security Studies Program. In the past, Ryan has worked for the National Consortium for the Studies of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) and ARTIS Research. Ryan is currently involved in a START project analyzing small arms terrorism attacks. Research interests include jihadist terrorism, Countering Violent Extremism, and the Islamic State.

Despite existing efforts to weaken the Islamic State (ISIS), the group continues to steadily influence and recruit Westerners. In the past 18 months, it is estimated that roughly 150 Americans have attempted to travel to Syria to join Sunni jihadist groups.[i] Responding to a perceived increase in radicalization among American Muslims, the White House recently convened a summit on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). However, the CVE concept remains poorly defined and places a disproportionate emphasis on preventing radical beliefs instead of violent behavior, making it nearly impossible to quantify success.

For the purposes of this analysis, CVE entails the use of non-coercive means to reduce the overall number of American residents who attempt to join ISIS.[ii] This strategy calls for exploiting ISIS’ social media networks to identify supporters in the United States, using disinformation to sow doubts about Western recruits’ loyalty, and attempting to delegitimize ISIS’ narratives. The main policy recommendation is that Congress should authorize and fund an intervention program along the lines of the United Kingdom’s Channel Program. This intervention program recommendation does not aim to change extremists’ religious views. Rather, the program will try to encourage ‘law abiding supporters’[iii] to disengage from extremist networks by offering positive alternatives to violence. The analysis concludes by showing how this plan might be implemented and why it is unlikely the US government will support this strategy.

INTELLIGENCE
The government could try to limit the availability of ISIS’ propaganda by pressuring private companies to suspend supporters’ social media accounts. However, efforts to do so are unlikely to succeed, set a dangerous precedent in regards to free speech, and conflict with the government’s imperative to gather intelligence. Trying to remove ISIS’ propaganda from social media platforms represents an impractical game of “whack-a-mole;” popular disseminators usually maintain backup accounts in case one is flagged and suspended.[iv] Because ISIS’ propaganda is so widely available on the Internet, potential recruits and extremists who wish to find it will still be able to.

If the supply of ISIS’ material on social media is further reduced it is unlikely to significantly diminish the propaganda’s reach; mainstream media organizations will continue to act as willing gatekeepers, broadcasting ISIS’ sadistic theater to wider audiences. Even if social media companies were willing and able to identify and suspend most ISIS supporters’ accounts, doing so would be counterproductive, eliminating a valuable supply of intelligence.

Instead, we should exploit social media networks to gather intelligence on supporters in the United States. Western foreign fighters are rather unsophisticated operatives, often posting incriminating photos of themselves on social media.[v] Because of this, the FBI has a better opportunity of identifying American recruits who might otherwise have gone undetected. Once American foreign fighters are identified, the FBI should prioritize investigating these individuals’ social networks to try to identify other ISIS supporters. The FBI can map out known recruits’ social media networks to identify any US residents who are openly celebrating ISIS propaganda or ‘following’ the group’s official accounts or popular disseminators.

Once recruits are identified, the FBI should try to gain access to these individuals’ private social media accounts. Although companies have incentives to protect users’ privacy, this is not an insurmountable obstacle. In 2014, Twitter cooperated in roughly 80% of the cases in which authorities requested access to Americans’ accounts.[vi] Since these foreign fighters’ social media posts have already demonstrated their connection to a Foreign Terrorist Organization, it is expected that companies will comply with these specific requests for information.

The government should highlight information gathered from recruits’ private social media conversations to spread disinformation about the level of infiltration by security services. By sowing doubts about Westerners’ loyalties, intelligence agencies might encourage ISIS leaders to recruit fewer Americans.[vii] Disinformation can help to weaken the group’s solidarity and exacerbate tensions between factions. If American recruits are seen as potential spies, local fighters might assume that they can mistreat them without being punished. This may increase the number of recruits who are mistreated, become disillusioned, defect, and choose to speak out.

TURN AWAY
This intervention program aims to dissuade ‘law abiding supporters’ from attempting to travel to Syria to join the Islamic State. If social media ‘friends,’ peers, or family members suspect that an individual is radicalizing, they can refer that person to “Turn Away.” A designated Turn Away employee from the nearest FBI field office will then be responsible for assessing suitability for enrollment or, in serious cases, whether FBI informants should be used. Similar to the Channel Program, “Turn Away” uses a vulnerability framework to assess extremists along three dimensions: their degree of engagement with ISIS’ networks or ideology, their intent to cause harm, and their capability to do so.[viii] Possible indicators of capability include having a history of violence or crime, having military training, and having occupational skills like civil engineering that can enable acts of terrorism. When these dimensions are considered together, they provide a rounded view about an individual’s vulnerability to recruitment and the security risk that he or she poses.

Many of the individuals who celebrate terrorist propaganda online would now fall under “Turn Away’s” jurisdiction. This allows the FBI to distinguish more serious threats that will require confidential informants from less-serious threats in which local authorities would approach the supporter and suggest that they enter “Turn Away.” Informants should only be used against extremists who are deemed most vulnerable to recruitment or individuals who are referred to but refuse to participate in “Turn Away.” Rather than trying to build criminal cases against non-violent extremists who might support terrorism if given the right encouragement and support, informants will only target extremists whose vulnerability assessments suggest that they are least likely to be dissuaded. This allows the FBI to apportion scarce intelligence and law enforcement resources more effectively.

Since “Turn Away” enables the FBI to be more selective in its use of informants, the number of indictments filed against ISIS supporters may decrease. These frequent indictments attract media attention and reinforce the perception that ISIS is the preeminent threat to the homeland.[ix] This may have the unintended effect of encouraging supporters to join; they might feel that they’re missing out on a chance to be a part of a larger cause. Even if aspiring recruits are arrested, sensationalized media coverage may increase their status among jihadist fan boys.

If an individual is referred to “Turn Away” and agrees to participate, support packages will be tailored to resolve participants’ unique motivations for supporting ISIS; potential services include but are not limited to anger management, substance abuse interventions, housing support, and peer mentoring.[x] Once Congress establishes “Turn Away,” it should earmark funds to finance support providers. Ideological or theological mentors must currently oppose violence; repentant terrorists and non-violent extremists are eligible. These ‘formers’ and non-violent radicals are more likely to be viewed as credible. Support providers do not need to be experts in counter-radicalization but should at least be informed about the indicators “Turn Away” uses to assess vulnerability so that they can assess participants’ progress. Local “Turn Away” police practitioners will be responsible for approving support providers, supervising the delivery of the support package, monitoring high-risk participants, assessing participants’ progress with his or her providers, and updating extremists’ vulnerability assessments.[xi] If the risk of criminality related to terrorism increases, the police practitioner will determine whether the intervention should continue or the case should be referred to the FBI.

COUNTER-MESSAGING
Because the vast majority of “homegrown” jihadists were radicalized, in part, through interactions on the Internet,[xii] any counter-terrorism strategy must attempt to contest the messages that the terrorists use to try to encourage supporters to travel to Syria. The counter-messaging campaign will not try to challenge sympathizers’ religious convictions but to delegitimize some of the non-religious narratives that might motivate Westerners to join the Islamic State.

One way to do so is to de-romanticize the notion of ‘jihad cool.’ Counter-messaging should highlight Western defectors’ complaints about being mistreated by local fighters, forced to perform menial tasks like cleaning toilets and washing dishes,[xiii] and living without electricity, clean water, and access to medical care.

Pragmatic arguments that highlight the hardships that Western recruits will experience might dissuade some supporters from attempting to travel to Syria. When ISIS’ media outlets claim that they’re winning military battles only to be defeated, these statements can be juxtaposed against images of ISIS’ insurgents fleeing, leaving dead and wounded members behind. These counter-narratives may help to dissuade aspiring recruits who are searching for excitement or solidarity.

Rather than framing recruits as committed terrorists motivated purely by religious ideology, we should investigate other possible explanations. If recruits have a criminal history or known mental illnesses, the government should publicize this information. If supporters suspect that they will be framed as confused teens or petty criminals, they might be less willing to risk arrest by trying to travel to Syria.

We must crystallize the difference between ISIS’ words and deeds. While humanitarian motivations may be becoming less important for Westerners trying to join ISIS, we must contest the group’s claim that it is defending the ummah from repressive governments by showing that Muslims will be the greatest victims of ISIS’ expansion. If the intelligence community intercepts communications between senior leaders and emirs that reveal disagreements over how fighters are treating local Muslim populations, the government should publicize this information. We can also exploit the infighting within the global jihadist movement, pointing out that even al-Qaeda condemns ISIS for its wanton violence against Muslims.

COUNTER-MESSAGING IMPLEMENTATION
ISIS sympathizers are unlikely to view agencies like the US Department of State as credible messengers so the government’s primary role should be to encourage private companies to elevate existing counter-narratives. Public officials should solicit help to establish an initiative similar to Google’s Network Against Violent Extremism. The idea would be to lobby social media companies to establish a global network of Westerners who defected from ISIS and Muslims who survived its attacks and wish to share their experiences. The government should frame social media companies’ participation in the program as a way to discredit allegations that they have not done enough to prevent terrorists from using their platforms to communicate and proselytize.

To have any hope of influencing sympathetic fence sitters, activists must produce material that can compete with ISIS’ high-definition propaganda films. The Department of State can organize competitions and provide grants for start up companies who design the most compelling music videos, short films, or comedic skits challenging ISIS’ narratives. The intelligence community can help these companies to identify and connect with defectors and survivors so that they have a larger platform to broadcast counter-narratives.

ASSESSMENT/FEASIBILITY
The government has a role to play in convening activists to counter the Islamic State’s narratives. However, those messengers whom ISIS’ supporters are most likely to listen to are the same individuals who the government would be least willing to partner with. Defectors are credible messengers but amplifying their criticisms might require working with individuals with blood on their hands. Similarly, officials might decide not to provide grants to online activists who wish to publicize al-Qaeda ideologues’ condemnations of ISIS; doing so could expose the administration to allegations that it is giving these jihadist ideologues attention and publicity and connecting them with a wider audience.

The government can try to solicit social media companies’ participation in a counter-messaging campaign by framing it as a form of corporate social responsibility. Nevertheless, most companies will be unwilling to invest large amounts of equity in the program and even if they do, this will be insufficient without significant financial support from the central government. However, this is unlikely to materialize. Most government funding goes towards kinetic solutions to terrorism, interdicting or killing terrorists, as opposed to preventive measures.[xiv]

Additionally, it is unclear how effective a counter-messaging campaign can be. Many fence sitters will not be dissuaded by a counter-messaging campaign unless they decide to disengage from extremist networks. Inserting counter-narratives into ISIS’ online networks does not guarantee that they will have the desired impact. Since ISIS’ online social networks are incredibly interconnected,[xv] they act as ‘echo chambers’[xvi] in which sustained interactions with other supporters may reinforce radical views. In these ideologically segregated free spaces, accepting counter-narratives is costly because doing so will expose an individual to vocal criticism from within the network and may lead to the loss of valuable relationships.

Federal, state, and local law enforcement will vigorously lobby against an intervention program. Building criminal cases against “law-abiding supporters,” regardless of their competence or the likelihood that they will join ISIS, increases public concern about the possibility of domestic terrorism and helps the FBI to demonstrate its role in protecting Americans and provides justification for budgetary increases. From the FBI’s standpoint, it is risky if ISIS supporters, even incompetent ones, enter “Turn Away.” The agency would not receive any credit for successful interventions but would shoulder a large part of the blame if one of the program’s participants went on to attack the United States.

While local governments across the United States have established intervention programs for gang members, it is unlikely that there would be political support for similar programs designed to dissuade aspiring terrorists. Since most of the public perceives non-incarcerated terrorist supporters as irredeemable,[xvii] the American people likely would not support an intervention program. It is psychologically reassuring to know that the FBI is disrupting terrorist plots. Americans will remain convinced that trying to interdict all supporters is the least risky approach; they are unlikely to be swayed by arguments that some terrorists might not have acted without informants’ encouragement and support. Thus, an intervention program will remain a political non-starter. There are few benefits but significant risks for voting for the program. If one of “Turn Away’s” participants attempted or succeeded in carrying out a terrorist attack, it is likely that most of the Congressmen who authorized the program would lose reelection.

If Congress authorizes “Turn Away,” there are limits to what it can achieve. Some youth will spend long hours online interacting with ISIS supporters but will successfully conceal their ongoing radicalization from family members and peers. In other cases, parents or friends might suspect that an individual is radicalizing but choose not to bring the case to authorities’ attention. Some parents might assume that preventive measures, taking the teen’s passports or monitoring his or her computer access, will resolve the issue. In other cases, parents might ignore the problem, fearing that intervention will fail and their child will end up in prison.

Even if an individual is accepted into to the program, the government cannot force non-incarcerated extremists to participate.[xviii] Inevitably, some people who are referred to the program will decide not to participate. Furthermore, interventions will only succeed if extremists remain convinced that the potential costs of joining the Islamic State outweigh the benefits. By offering support packages and reminding participants about the criminal consequences of supporting terrorism, the government can somewhat influence extremists’ cost-benefit calculations.

However, the likelihood that interventions succeed or fail is greatly influenced by factors largely outside of the government’s control. Interventions will work best when individuals and their families “fully engage with the program.”[xix] In cases involving minors, parents can monitor teens’ activities, reprimand children if they are caught interacting with extremists on the Internet, and emphasize the pain that the child’s support for terrorism would cause his or her family. Nevertheless, if extremists do not disengage from the networks that are pulling them towards terrorism, even the most supportive families might not be able to dissuade them.

While beyond the scope of this analysis, another concern is that by making it seem less attractive to join ISIS the government may unintentionally make other behaviors more attractive. For example, an ISIS supporter might accept the argument that life in Syria will be miserable, that local fighters will treat him poorly, and that he will be forced to perform unexciting, menial chores. While this might dissuade the putative expatriation of a terrorist to Syria, it might then become more attractive for this extremist to conduct a terrorist attack in the United States.

It will be difficult to measure the program’s efficacy. In the vast majority of cases in which extremists who participate in “Turn Away” do not try to join ISIS, there is no way to prove that the intervention itself is the reason why. Alternatively, if a “Turn Away” participant carries out a terrorist attack or is arrested for trying to join ISIS, the public will likely deem the program a failure and demand that it be ended.

CONCLUSION
Congress should authorize “Turn Away.” By providing support packages to address extremists’ unique motivations for joining terrorist groups, we may be able to prevent some individuals from ruining their lives. Furthermore, “Turn Away” may enable the FBI to be more selective in its use of informants, allowing the agency to focus on more serious domestic terrorism threats.[xx] Unfortunately, the overly politicized nature of the terrorism and counterterrorism debate will likely limit or completely preclude effective implementation of this strategy.[xxi]

Endnotes

[i] Kukil Bora, “ISIS Continues Steady Recruitment As 20,000 Foreign Fighters Join Extremist Groups in Syria, Iraq: Report,” International Business Times, Feb. 11, 2015.

[ii] Humera Khan, “Why Countering Extremism Fails,” Foreign Affairs, Feb. 18, 2015.

[iii] William McCants, “Countering Violent Extremism, Pt. 2: Scope,” Jihadica, Mar. 1, 2012.

[iv] JM Berger and Jonathon Morgan, “The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and Describing the Population of ISIS Supporters on Twitter,” The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, Mar. 2015. 41–42.

[v] Stewart Bell, “Kodaimati Criminal Complaint,” Apr. 23, 2015.

[vi] “Twitter Transparency Report,” Twitter, Dec. 31, 2014. https://transparency.twitter.com/information-requests/2014/jul-dec

[vii] Daniel Byman and Jeremy Shapiro, “Be Afraid. Be A Little Afraid: The Threat of Terrorism from Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq,” Foreign Policy at Brookings, Nov. 2014. 26.

[viii] “Channel: Protecting Vulnerable People From Being Drawn Into Terrorism,” HMGovernment, Oct. 2012. 17.

[ix] Tom Porter, “Majority of Americans Believe ISIS Poses Greatest Threat To USA,” International Business Times, Feb. 14, 2015.

[x] “Channel,” 17.

[xi] “Channel,” 22.

[xii] Michael Jensen, Patrick James, and Herbert Tinsley. “Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States: Preliminary Findings,” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Jan 2015.

[xiii] John Hall, “European ISIS Fighters Who Are Seen As Cannon Fodder By Their Commanders Desperately Try to Prove Their Worth By Committing The Most Sickening Atrocities, Says Former Prisoner,” The Daily Mail. Apr. 10, 2015.

[xiv] William McCants, “Don’t Be Evil,” Foreign Policy, Jun. 30, 2011.

[xv] JM Berger and Jonathon Morgan, “The ISIS Twitter Census,” 45–50.

[xvi] Ines von Behr, Anais Reding, Charlie Edwards, and Luke Gribbon, “Radicalisation in the Digital Era: The Use of the Internet in 15 Cases of Terrorism and Extremism,” RAND Europe, 2013.

[xvii] William McCants and Clint Watts, “U.S. Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism: An Assessment,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, December 2012.

[xviii] “Channel,” 24.

[xix] “Channel,” 15–19.

[xx] “Homegrown Extremism 2001–2015,” New America Foundation, Feb. 2015.

[xxi] For a discussion of right-wing terrorist attacks being labeled hate crimes see: Peter Bergen and David Sternman, “US Right Wing Extremists More Deadly Than Jihadists,” CNN, Apr. 15, 2015.

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