Synthetic biology, a precautionary tale.

We are not taking the precautions with synthetic biology a wise species would take with a technology of this power and consequence.

The entire discussion about whether the virus came from the lab or the wild is a red herring that hides the fact that the lab was researching, and succeeded in uncovering, techniques that could be used to engineer epidemics.

Were the scientists in the Wuhan Lab researching technology that would enable the creation of the COVID19?

Yes.

The Wuhan lab director Shi Zhengli freely admits that the lab was doing research that would indeed enable modification of, for example, bat coronaviruses with increased transmissibility in humans.

It doesn’t matter whether this is technically “gain of function” or not.

The lab’s stated purpose is to study infection between species in order to prevent future pandemics like SARS, MERS, etc.

Is it possible that this research could be used for military purposes?

Yes. The research into increasing transmissibility of animal viruses in humans done in Wuhan is easily weaponized, regardless of the intention of the researchers.

That fact must be recognized before such research is allowed to be conducted.

Whether the coronavirus leaked out of a lab or came from a wild animal, is, in a particular way, irrelevant.

While the evidence for the lab leak hypothesis is not conclusive, claims that there is zero or low chance that the virus could have come from the lab are blatantly biased. Because “the wrong guy” highlighted the theory, half the population automatically rejects the theory. That’s not how science works.

The fact that the virus could have come from a lab should be enough for us to seriously consider how we, as a species, want to work with synthetic biology.

I believe that we should ban all research into synthetic biology globally until we can put these safety measures into place. There is no agency or government that could enforce this ban, but regardless, I believe it must happen.

Synthetic biology is a field that combines biology, engineering, and computer science to design and construct new biological parts, devices, and systems.

Some of the already accomplished, thought provoking results of synthetic biology include:

1. genetically modified fluorescent fish available in various colors
2. a cat with a fluorescent protein derived from jellyfish, making the cat’s skin glow green under ultraviolet light
3. bacteria that produce insulin
4. goats that produce spider silk proteins in their milk
5. featherless chickens to improve meat production efficiency
6. pigs that produce organs that are more compatible with human transplantation

Arguments in favor of synthetic biology include:

1. advancements in science and medicine,
2. the possibility of designing organisms that can produce renewable fuels, chemicals, and materials,
3. the possibility to engineer crops with enhanced traits
4. the possibility to develop organisms capable of cleaning up pollutants and toxins from the environment.

While all of these are beneficial outcomes, none of them are the only options available to solve the problems they address.

The existential risks posed by unregulated synthetic biology, on the other hand, don’t have any solutions.

The first one is the focus of the Covid lab leak hypothesis:

• Biosecurity risks: Synthetic biology can accidentally or intentionally be misused to create dangerous biological weapons or pathogens like the Coronavirus. The Coronavirus pandemic hints at the severity of consequences that intentional or accidental release of engineered organisms could pose to human health.
  To make matters worse, with new tools like CRISPR-cas9, viruses could be created to target specific populations.

Biosecurity is only one of the existential threats synthetic biology poses.

• Unequal distribution of benefits: Synthetic biology represents a financial bonanza for big biotech companies. In fact, many believe that pharma managed the world response to the pandemic to ensure maximal profit.
  Monsanto corporation’s strategy for producing genetically modified crops has been to corner the world market on food seed and raise prices. Thusfar, the strategy has been well-executed.
  Corporate management of synthetic biology would inevitably lead to disparities in access to advanced healthcare, agriculture, and environmental solutions.
  As Noah Harari stated in his books, including Sapiens, this could lead to an irreversible genetic split (speciation) between the haves and have nots, with the haves having access to a potentially god-like genetic code.
• Environmental risks: Introducing synthetic organisms into ecosystems could have unintended ecological consequences. If engineered organisms were to escape or interact with natural organisms, they could disrupt ecosystems, harm biodiversity, or lead to the proliferation of invasive species.
• Unknown long-term effects: Given the complexity of biological systems, some argue that we cannot fully predict the long-term effects of synthetic organisms or the ecological and health risks they may pose. This uncertainty raises concerns about unintended consequences and the potential for irreversible damage.
• Ethical concerns around creating new life forms and modifying our own could cause despair and violence.

We, as a species, are writ large pushing safety, environmental, and ethical boundaries far beyond what is prudent. As a result, we find ourselves facing a wide range of crises, like environmental collapse, nuclear annihilation, economic collapse, mass extinctions, and many more. The risk (or recent reality) of a synthetic biology crisis is not something to be dismissed.

Some say that synthetic biology research is necessary to prevent future pandemics.

I don’t believe this is true.

There are many avenues of research into preventing pandemics that don’t involve technologies that could be used to create future pandemics or bioweapons, including:

1. Epidemiological Surveillance: Strengthening global surveillance systems to detect and monitor infectious diseases is crucial. This includes enhancing early warning systems, improving diagnostic capabilities, and establishing robust reporting mechanisms to track disease outbreaks.
2. Antiviral Therapies: Investigating and developing antiviral treatments that can effectively combat various viral infections can be a significant contribution to pandemic prevention efforts.
3. One Health Approach: Adopting a One Health approach, which recognizes the interconnectedness of human, animal, and environmental health, can aid in identifying and addressing potential disease spillover events early on.
4. Behavioral Interventions: Conducting research on human behavior, social norms, and cultural practices related to disease transmission can provide insights into designing effective behavioral interventions and public health campaigns.
5. Infrastructure and Health Systems: Strengthening healthcare infrastructure, particularly in vulnerable regions, can help improve disease surveillance, diagnostic capabilities, and response capacities.
6. Education and Awareness: Investing in public health education and awareness programs to promote hygiene practices, disease prevention measures, and understanding of infectious diseases can empower communities to take preventive actions.
7. Zoonotic Disease Research: Studying zoonotic diseases, which originate in animals and can potentially spill over to humans, can help identify high-risk areas, develop early warning systems, and implement preventive measures to minimize future outbreaks.
8. Global Cooperation and Research Networks: Collaborating across borders and sharing research findings, data, and resources can enhance pandemic preparedness and response globally.
9. Socioeconomic Factors: Researching the socioeconomic determinants of disease transmission and vulnerability can guide the development of interventions that address underlying issues such as poverty, inequality, and access to healthcare.

I’ll say it again:

The research into increasing transmissibility of animal viruses in humans done in Wuhan is easily weaponized, regardless of the intention of the researchers, and that fact must be recognized before such research is allowed to be conducted.

So how would a wise species handle the risk associated with technology like synthetic biology?

Here are some measures a wise species might take to mitigate risks associated with synthetic biology:

1. Rigorous risk assessment frameworks to evaluate the potential environmental, health, and societal impacts of synthetic biology applications. This would involve multidisciplinary collaboration among scientists, policymakers, ethicists, and other stakeholders to ensure a holistic understanding of the risks involved.
2. Precautionary approach, especially when dealing with novel and potentially high-risk applications. This involves carefully evaluating the potential risks before proceeding with certain experiments or applications, even in the absence of complete scientific certainty, to prevent irreversible harm to ecosystems, public health, or societal well-being.
3. Robust regulation and oversight: Implementing stringent regulations and oversight mechanisms is crucial to ensure responsible development and use of synthetic biology. Wise species would establish regulatory bodies with the authority to assess and monitor synthetic biology research, ensuring compliance with ethical standards, biosafety protocols, and environmental impact assessments.
4. Public engagement and education: Encouraging public engagement and dialogue on synthetic biology would help foster understanding, transparency, and accountability. Wise species would prioritize public education initiatives to enhance awareness of the potential benefits and risks associated with synthetic biology, empowering individuals to make informed decisions and contribute to policy discussions.
5. International cooperation and coordination: Given the global nature of synthetic biology, a wise species would promote international collaboration and information sharing. Establishing platforms for scientific exchange, harmonizing regulations, and developing shared ethical frameworks can help address potential risks and challenges on a global scale.
6. Ethical considerations: Integrating ethical considerations into the development and application of synthetic biology is crucial. A wise species would prioritize ethical principles such as respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice, ensuring that synthetic biology research and applications align with ethical standards and promote the well-being of all beings involved.
7. Continuous monitoring and assessment: As synthetic biology evolves, a wise species would establish mechanisms for continuous monitoring and reassessment of the technology’s impact and potential risks. This would involve ongoing research, surveillance systems, and periodic evaluations to adapt regulations and responses based on new scientific insights and emerging concerns.

We are not doing any of these.

The level of risk of this technology should be considered on par with nuclear technology. Proper risk assessment around nuclear energy would likely prevent placing nuclear power plants at known earthquake fault lines like fukushima.

There are perverse incentives to continue doing this type of research regardless of whether it is in the best interest of humanity.

My position is that we should ban all research into synthetic biology until we can put these safety measures into place.

How could liquid democracy help us manage risks like synthetic biology?

Liquid democracy allows groups to deliberate and find solutions in a new way.

This is how users of a liquid democracy platform could coordinate to manage the risk of synthetic biology:

1. Creating a group to manage multidisciplinary collaboration among scientists, policymakers, ethicists, and other stakeholders.

• This group could debate and propose rigorous risk assessment frameworks to evaluate the potential environmental, health, and societal impacts of synthetic biology applications.
• This group could also propose standards and other legislative measures to reduce risk.
• The discussion and proposals this group produces could be publicly visible.

2. Creating another group made up of representatives from the various nations that are engaging in synthetic biology research. This would promote harmonizing regulations, and developing shared ethical frameworks can help address potential risks and challenges on a global scale.

3. Creating a parallel public discussion on synthetic biology where citizens and experts could discuss and propose solutions. The exchange would help foster understanding, transparency, and accountability, and enhance awareness of the potential benefits and risks associated with synthetic biology.