Nato needs a long-term strategy to fight hybrid warfare beyond its borders

Secretary General of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg, visits the static display from the Portuguese Navy, and Portuguese Marines presented by Commander Martins de Brito, on NATO exercise Trident Juncture 2015. Photo Credit: NATO, Horta Pereira

Recent discussions on hybrid warfare within NATO have habitually evoked the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict as an illustrative case study in spite of differing views as to what the term may entail. Hence, disagreement, not only the alliance’s institutional inefficacy, hardened the corresponding action plan’s prescription to tackle hybrid threats effectively.

Puzzling over definition

Put simply, if the Kremlin’s allies including a far-right European political network combined with occasional financial support is considered a hybrid war tactic, there is little, if anything, NATO can do. In the meantime, the likes of the Front National (France), Jobbik (Hungary) and Golden Dawn (Greece) help Russia to great effect in achieving its geopolitical objectives. They range from undermining Euro-Atlantic integration from within to shifting political empathy towards the Kremlin in Europe and backing the annexation of Crimea.

Whatever differences they might have, all scholars and military experts concede in principle that “hybrid war” is a blanket term embracing the utilisation of varying conventional and unconventional tactics, techniques and equipment, whether blended or simultaneous, to advance desired political interests. Most importantly, the key to success is “staying below the threshold of clear armed aggression” while seizing the initiative and throwing adversaries off guard through “strategic surprises” and “tactical deceptions”.

As has been observed, prime targets of the Russian hybrid offensive have so far been its former satellite countries. Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and Armenia to a lesser extent, were caught in the crosshairs of Russia’s political, economic and semi-military coercion combined with cyberspace attacks, as they revealed pro-European orientations. Consequently, with its swift, authoritarian-like decision-making style, the Kremlin easily took advantage of its neighbors’ vulnerabilities including weak governance, political corruption, deep ethnic polarisation and economic malaise.

A long-term strategy — that is what NATO needs

As highly complex and ambiguous as the term “hybrid” is to grasp, it nevertheless does not let the alliance stand idly by. A few measures have already been taken to strengthen the eastern frontier, although mainly in a reactionary and military-centric way, unable to prevail over long durations. In addition, despite growing uneasiness among some members, the probability that Russia will wage a full-scale hybrid war against NATO allies is very low, yet Moscow is expected to sporadically continue playing a dangerous game of brinkmanship.

Moving forward, NATO needs a long-term strategy with a wider spectrum of responses to effectively address the breeding ground for hybrid warfare. Though the fundamental question is: Does NATO have the capacity to fight the root causes of hybrid warfare beyond its borders alone?

The short answer is no, though NATO has a few instruments at its disposal through which it can deliver effective results which cannot be matched by other organisations or state actors. Consider the following:

Unified resistance — a higher pay-off in collaboration

Policy recommendation 1: NATO and the EU need to combine their institutional capacity to tackle the root causes of hybrid warfare effectively.

NATO-EU cooperation in dealing with hybrid root causes is not only desirable but inevitable. First of all, the EU has much more credence among ex-Soviet republics than NATO, since they are potential Russian targets. Second, through regular development assistance, the EU has long been engaged in promoting good governance and representative democracy in this area.

Third, the EU is better positioned to leverage preemptive diplomacy and has crisis management ability to prevent the emergence of hybrid threats. Hence, a convergence of NATO’s military and EU’s civilian institutional capacity and expertise with a clear division of labor and delegation of tasks between them would significantly augment the alliance’s overall deterrence posture.

Enhancing NATO Partnership Policy

Policy recommendation 2: NATO needs to develop an anti-hybrid warfare cooperation strategy with the partner country which is under the threat of a hybrid offensive.

It is recommendable for the alliance to design an anti-hybrid warfare cooperation strategy with each partner country. NATO should offer to conduct a thorough country analysis in unison with them, in order to identify potential hybrid threat sources. Based on that, they should develop preemptive master plans including but not limited to intelligence gathering, information sharing and drafting country-specific capacity-building programs and regular joint exercises.

Commitment to Open Door Policy

Policy recommendation 3: Admitting new members to NATO would send a strong signal to Russia that its hybrid tactics do not yield the results it aspires to.

As reckless as it may be deemed, NATO’s commitment to enlargement will definitely send a clear and strong signal to Russia that its hybrid war tactics cannot reach desired goals. Simultaneously, admitting new members will provide them a safe haven to continue growing as free, democratic societies with steady economic progress, a solid foundation to show resilience towards hybrid threats. Just as a reminder: it is entirely conceivable to assume that in the absence of the North Atlantic Treaty protection the Baltic States would have shared Ukraine’s current unfortunate plight.