Chapter 1: Will Ukraine and Russia reach an agreement in 2023?
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I got this one wrong, but only in part. In January 2022, I predicted Russia would not invade Ukraine; instead, I expected a limited proxy war in the Donbas region. My prediction was based on the effects of a large military incursion into Ukraine. That part was correct because I predicted the exact consequences for Russia if they decide to invade: severe economic sanctions, significant military losses, and the unification of NATO.
The war is settling down in 2023. After Russia’s major offensive tactics failed in the early stages of the conflict, the Russian army is now focused on three goals: protecting captured regions, maintaining at least a stable front line, and damaging Ukraine’s infrastructure before launching another large-scale attack.
We do not foresee dramatic war turnarounds in Ukraine this year. As long as Russia defends the land bridge to Crimea, home support will be sufficient to keep the conflict going in Ukraine. Despite Russia’s significant damage to Ukraine’s electricity, water, and communication lifelines, support for Volodymir Zelensky’s leadership will remain strong.
Neither Ukraine nor Russia will achieve large territory gains in order to push the other side into negotiations and a forcible cease-fire. Russia, on the other hand, will continue its military buildup in Belarus, and we predict a new major attack to begin in the first half of 2023. Belarus is unlikely to join Putin’s conflict, but if it does, the Lukashenko regime will be severely weakened.
Ukraine will increase its strikes on Russian territory using drones and, ultimately, missiles. Such strikes would increase Ukrainians morale but also would enhance Putin’s propaganda to define the fight in Ukraine as a ‘survival battle against NATO’.
We anticipate the European allies to make the most considerable changes to the war. The energy crisis is already driving populist attitudes; by 2023, these emotions will be reducing political support for Ukraine and clamping down on Zelensky to negotiate a compromise ceasefire with Russia, which would include abandoning the annexed lands. However, the EU has no military influence over Ukraine and only economic leverage, so the US remains the key decisional force that may drive Ukraine into a compromise with Russia, which we do not see occurring in 2023. Even if some EU states propose a compromise in Ukraine, I anticipate that the EU will continue to support Ukraine as long as Ukrainians are committed to fighting despite the energy crisis.
Will Putin be overthrown?
We believe Putin will stay in power in 2023 as long as no catastrophic choices, like as widespread mobilization or permanent territory losses in Ukraine, are taken.
The land corridor to Crimea is vital to Russia’s policy in Ukraine, and its loss would cause instability and animosity among Russian officials.
Despite the tough economic contraction, Moscow will prevent serious disruptions in 2023 by seeking allies in the East. Russia’s attention will be drawn to China, India, and possibly certain parts of Southeast Asia. Putin will take advantage of the energy and food crises in countries who are not affiliated with the West or are willing to reduce their dependency on the West. China’s influence over Russia will grow, while Kazakhstan’s relevance to both Russia and China will thrive. Please see the Swing states chapter.
