We have the earth, and it is well and truly ours. Also, it is all we have.

Building an Evergreen History

Re-Telling the Story of Finance, and All That Finance Touches

History is a time series of provisional knowledge that is right for its times, but changing over time, as times change and people evolve prosperous adaptations to life’s constant changes. It is a collaboratively co-creative individual-and-social process that is on-going, open-ended, endlessly self-regenerating and evergreen.

When we study history, we experiment with different knowledge to find out which works well in what time and place. As we develop proficiency with the provisional nature of historical knowledge, we strengthen our capacity to create by design a future history of having enough prosperous adaptations to life’s constant changes, beautifully fit to their function and authentically right for their times.

In our times, today, we are living through changes that are creating the need that is also the opportunity to adaptively evolve new financial-decision making people, places, processes and frameworks for deciding, as a society, which ideas for creating by design prosperous adaptations to life’s constant changes can, should and will be evolved through enterprise.

The change that is creating this need and opportunity is a change in our experience of Space, and therefor also a change in our experience of Time.

Today, we continue to live within a dominant narrative of Space as an infinitely receding horizon, into which the consequences of our actions disappear, without conequence, and out of which we can always extract more.

This is a narrative that has deep roots going back to human pre-history, anthropology and acrheology. It is the narrative that contains the Euro-American migration into the New World. It is the narrative that underlies the modern American narratives of enterprise as corporation, finance as securities trading and prosperity as Growth.

It is a narrative that no longer fits the facts. We have, as a people, expanded out to the Ends of the Earth, and discovered that the earth is a sphere taht closes back in upon itself. It is vast, but it is not infinite. Our actions do have consequences that we cannot escape.

Having filled the earth, we left it, traveling into Space is search of new worlds and new civilizations, “boldly going where no man has gone before”, expecting to repeat the European experiences during the Age of Discovery.

We did not. We left the earth and traveled to the moon. When we got there, all we found was rocks. Beyond the moon, there is only a vast emptiness, a sea of nothingness that separates from the stars — which we now know are huge balls of thermnuclear explosion that we cannot approach- from other planets that are as cold and lifeless as the moon, and from gaseous proto-planets that are posinous to us.

Scientists continue to speculate that there are other earth-like planets in the universe. They may be right. We do not know. We cannot say either way. For us, right now, today, in the short span of time that is our own, it does not really matter. For us, today, in our times, we have the earth and it is well and truly ours. Also, it is all we have.

What does this mean for a philosophy of prosperity built on Growth, for a financial decision-making system built to value Growth and for enterprise design for unending Growth?

It means enterprise will fail to meet our expectations. It means finance will fail to meet our expectations. It means prosperity will always feel illusory, as the economy gyrates through alternating cycles of boom that go bust.

It means the time has come to adaptively evolve a new narrative, and to collaoratively co-create a new philosophy of prosperity as evolutionary adaptation, a new financial decision-making framework that values evolutoinary adaptation and a new enterprise designed for evolutionary adaptation.

This begins with a radical — in the Latin sense of “going to the root” — rethinking of finance.

When we drill down on finance to understand its root we see that it performs two related, primary functions.

1. Finance aggregates surpluses saved by individuals dispersed throughout a population; and
2. Finance deploys those aggregations to sponsor enterprises for doing work and sharing wealth within an economy and society.

We see that the financial system is actually a system of decision-making frameworks, each with its own unique processes, places and people for amassing our collective savings and for deploying those aggregations. Each of these frameworks is a best-fit for its own proper purposes and the right choice for financing enterprise at the right time.

Reflecting on these systems of financial decision-making frameworks brings to the top of our minds the fundamental truth that change, especially co-creative, collaborative, and evolutionary adaption to change, is the true story of all of human history. Change is the engine of our prosperity, as people and peoples.

Looking back over this history of change and our evolutionary adaptation to change, it becomes possible to identify six historical financial aggregation and deployment decision-making subsystems that comprise our modern financial system of today:

1. In the aboriginal human economies of hunting, herding, fishing, gathering, and subsistence farming, surpluses were aggregated and deployed through the social power of tribal leaders for the benefit of the entire group, acting essentially as an extended family unit.
2. With the invention of grain agriculture, communal granaries evolved into temple complexes, where the bounty of the harvest was stored for safekeeping and distributed back out to the people by a priestly class. They were the ones who spoke to the heavens and knew the will of the season-giving gods to deliver sustenance.
3. As surpluses of grain supported surpluses of people, artists and artisans evolved into craftspeople and tradespeople, increasing the diversity of luxuries and necessities that could be enjoyed and used by people to take the world about us as we found it, and to change it to be more a way we want it to be. Growing diversity of work and wealth brought increased competition. Competition brings contention. An artisanal aristocracy evolved the form we know commonly as a king, with a treasury funded by taxes and other imposts (often plunder of adjacent kingdoms) and deployed for public works, which included the work of supporting the aristocracy in sometimes appropriately and sometimes excessive, royal style.
4. Kings can rule their realms through fiat and the kings’ currencies, but as kingdoms proliferate, the need and the opportunity for trade between kingdoms also increases. Bankers and banks evolved to move money among kingdoms and to equalize the currencies. Inventions of accounting and bookkeeping supporting lending on credit, and the system we know as modern banking, became the frontier of finance for indirect trading and exchange among the King’s subjects and between sometimes warring or remote kingdoms. Fire power in weaponry gave way to fire power in industry.
5. Fast forward to coal unleashing steam to drive engines. Craftsmanship becomes industry. Scale becomes the new frontier. The corporation was invented to aggregate savings from individuals by selling shares in small increments. People traded them as commodities in public trading markets, which deployed the aggregations as equity in free enterprise organized and operated at ever-increasing scale. This expansion gave way to an increasingly global economy that expanded exponentially into a Western Frontier which the consequences of industry and society would blur. Racing across the horizon toward(s) scale was possible seemingly without consequence. We could always extract more from farther away. Growth, growth, more growth. Industry at scale created both the need and the opportunity for the retirement of individuals (and of enterprise, as Evergreen posits and as finance was originally conceived).
6. Enter the modern era.. with the invention of actuarial risk pooling, using the new science of statistics and the law of large numbers, life insurance expanded in the 19th Century to socialize the costs of dying too soon. This system adaptively evolved into defined-benefit pensions in the 20th Century, which protected us from living too long.

We ultimately have expanded so far into the horizon that we have gone on a journey of circumnavigation, landing us right where humanity started, but with billions more mouths to feed. To some, the conversation here goes vertical into space; to others it becomes another generation’s problem.

Evergreen, however, is focused more on possibility as the world exists today and could function tomorrow using the tools at our disposal redirected/modified toward a more equitably shared future. We all have a contribution to envision and create this new frontier… this new horizon, especially our superfiduciaries.

These histories inform our mission…

Fiduciary Duty for Superfiduciaries

Fiduciary duty is a legal concept with deep, ancient roots in the European Middle Ages. It began in the time of the Crusades when French nobility heading off to save Christendom would transfer lands and titles to a friend whom they trusted to give them back upon the owners’ safe return, or to pass them to their heirs if they did not make it back.

The landed aristocracy later used this legal artifact when transferring lands to monasteries, on condition that the lands be used for proper ecclesiastical purposes. These included providing board and upbringing to scions of the aristocracy and thus giving birth to what we know today as the university system.

During the Enlightenment, as enterprise broke free of aristocratic bonds, and a wealthy merchant class came into its own, at a time when women couldn’t own property under the law in their own name, the trust form of ownership was co-opted by wealthy families to provide for widows and for orphans during the continuation of their minority, upon the premature death of a patriarch.

As the free enterprise system flourished, the use of the trust form of ownership for all manner of estate planning purposes proliferated.

Inherent in this trust form of ownership is the role of the entrusted owner, or trustee, as the fiduciary for the trust beneficiaries. This role has historically hinged on the nature of the relationship of the trustees to those in whose interest they must act, but core themes endure.

The first duty to be recognized under the law was, and still is, a duty of utmost loyalty to the terms oad,v;l,glof the trust. At its core, this is essentially a prohibition against self-dealing, or dealing with others to the disadvantage of the trust and its beneficiaries. This duty expanded over the years into a duty of prudence as the law of fiduciary duty applied specifically to the activities of managing the trust corpus. This idea originally meant running the estate wisely and well, or at least not neglecting it.

As free enterprise replaced landed aristocracy as the dominant form of finance in modern economies, entrusted assets (the “corpus”) increasingly came to consist of money, and managing the corpus came increasingly to mean investing that money, as principal, to generate income for distribution to the beneficiaries (or expenditure on their behalf by the trustee).

In the industrial age, the idea of fiduciary duty began to evolve independently of the trust form of ownership, so that today various relationships in which one person has power over another often give rise to limited forms of fiduciary duty to limit abuses of such power. In some contexts, particularly the corporate one, the law sharply limits certain fiduciary duties. These changes responded not only to society’s lust for growth, but also to the disparate pool of beneficiaries.

Until 1972, the law of fiduciary duty evolved as court-made common law. Under this common law of fiduciary duty, fiduciaries could not speculate with fiduciary funds entrusted to their good judgement. If you look it up, you will see that the dictionary definition of speculation includes buying and selling company shares — a practice that has expanded today to include all manner of financial assets bought and sold as securities.

So, up until 1972, the law of fiduciary prudence prevented pension trustees, and others whom we identify as evergreen superfiduciaries, from using trust funds to trade in securities. Superfiduciary funds were invested only in real estate, government bonds, some high-grade corporate bonds, and loans secured by real estate.

Before 1972, what we now call the capital markets, or markets for trading in securities, consisted almost entirely of the stock exchanges, the markets for trading in municipal and corporate bond issues. Commodities markets were mostly specialist affairs, participated in by people who were “in the business.”

At this time, something on the order of 80% of the aggregated savings of society invested in market came directly from individuals investing their own money in pursuit of their own proper purposes. Professionals participated in these markets, as buyers and sellers of last resort — specialists in the pits — and as freelance speculators adding liquidity so that individuals could always sell when they needed to sell, and buy when they wanted to buy, even if the price was not what they were hoping it would be. Mostly, however, the rhythm of these markets, the pace of trading, and pressures on companies to manage their share prices were set by the cash management needs of individuals who for the most part bought when they had new money to invest and sold when they needed that money back to spend on something else in the real, physical economy.

Nonetheless, these markets were volatile, share prices could sometimes gyrate wildly for mostly mysterious reasons, and the entire economy moved through alternating periods of boom and bust in what came to be catechized as the “Business Cycle,” with some company stocks moving in opposite cycles to other company stocks.

Economists studying these individual-dominated markets in the 1950s began articulating a theory that the risks of volatility and the Business Cycle could be effectively neutralized over time by buying and holding, and occasionally rebalancing, a portfolio of securities positions diversified across industries and issuers. This theory has to be known in modern parlance as Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT).

In 1969, the US Congress changed the federal income tax laws governing tax-exempt status for what are know in the tax law as public charities, and what are known in evergreen as endowed foundations. This new law required foundations to give away (or spend on operating expenses) amounts at least equal to 5% of the value of their endowment each year in order to maintain their tax-exempt status.

In the 3% interest rate environment that prevailed at that time, it was impossible for a superfiduciary (pension funds, university endowments, foundation endowments) investing only in government bonds and real estate mortgages — the stuff of fiduciary prudence in that day — to generate current cash flow equal to this new federal requirement. That meant that foundations faced this choice: they could give up their tax-exempt status, or they could slowly pay-down their endowments — essentially go into liquidation mode.

Unless…

…a foundation could begin investing in the stock market.

Fiduciary law of the time said “No”, but could that law’s time have passed; especially if this new-fangled notion of Modern Portfolio Theory was right. Could proper diversification across industries and over time take the speculation out of securities trading, generating consistent returns on a portfolio basis, even if individual trading positions still represented speculation?

The Ford Foundation commissioned two lawyers, Messrs Carey and Bright to investigate.

They did their research and came back with this answer: the law of fiduciary duty only requires that a fiduciary be prudent in how it deals with the fiduciary funds entrusted to its good judgement. If reasonable men of recognized prudence participate in the stock market through diversification, then a fiduciary may also be considered equally prudent investing fiduciary funds in a properly diversified portfolio of company shares.

By 1972, the National Commission on Uniform State Laws had drafted and circulated for comment the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act, effectively writing the position of Messrs. Carey & Bright about the prudence of trading stocks according to Modern Portfolio Theory, using statutory law — what lawyers call Black Letter Law — to do what the common law had not.

By 1973, the Uniform Act as the law of the land in 43 states.

Although the Ford Foundation had taken the lead in changing the law, it was the Harvard Endowment who first made use of this new freedom. Problem was, it takes a certain amount of experience and expertise to build and manage a properly diversified portfolio according to the principles of Modern Portfolio Theory, and virtually none of these self-identified institutional fiduciaries personally possessed the requisite experience or expertise. Many, if not most, were, in fact, terrified by the prospect of picking stocks with their fiduciary funds. What if they made the wrong picks? They could lose everything!

Harvard stepped forward with the invention it is perhaps most famous for. It hired consultants — Cambridge Associates, to be precise. Curiously enough, the consultant they hired was a lawyer, not an investment banker or other stock market professional.

Cambridge Associates thus pioneered the new profession of professional portfolio manager for so-called institutional investors. The Institutional Investor that we now know sometimes as Asset Owners was born.

The movement into the markets started slowly, but rapidly built momentum as early entrants realized attractive returns on their shiny new stock portfolios, in the self fulfilling prophecy of rising stock prices driven by rising demand for stocks from these new market participants. Think about it. Demand for shares went up. The number of shares available, not so fast. What does the law of supply-and-demand teach us about the effect this will have on share prices?

This movement got accelerated even further when, in 1978, Congress created the tax-exempt 401(k) retirement savings plan, giving the once-sleepy mutual fund industry vast new sources of other people’s money to manage, for a fee.

This one-two punch of the Uniform Act, giving superfiduciaries license to speculate, and the 401(k) plan, giving tax subsidies to speculation with retirement savings on a so-called “seggregated account” basis, unleashed a massive rush of money into the markets, causing share prices to boom, as a lot more money started chasing not a lot more companies whose shares they could trade.

Not many on Wall Street get caught sleeping when there is an opportunity to make a lot of money manufacturing new trading opportunities, the so-called investment banking industry responded with a flurry of what came to be sold as financial innovations. Many different ways for constructing securities for trading, mostly engineered specifically for sale to this burgeoning new business of professional money management, for institutional fiduciaries and mutual funds that mostly managed money for individuals in their 401(k) plans, proliferated, and continues to this day.

In the 1980s, we had “merger mania”, a reprise of the widely disproved craze for conglomeration that failed to deliver on its promise of a better life when it was first trotted out in the 1960s.

The 1990s gave us IPO Fever, fueled by the financial innovation of venture capital investing in iconic Silicon Valley garage start-ups, using money they secured from so-called Institutional Investors seeking better returns than they were actually getting in the stock markets.

In the 2000s, we were treated to securitizations, mostly of individual home mortgage loans, and the Global Financial Crisis of 2008.

Today “innovations” such as derivatives, hedge funds, and high frequency trading marking the current frontier of invention of new securities to trade and new strategies for trading in securities.

So great has been the ingenuity of the investment banking industry at giving institutional money managers new ways to place their bets, that the new standard for fiduciary prudence has itself evolved, from Modern Portfolio Theory to Asset Allocation.

Today, the primary job of the individual in an institutional fiduciary role is to decide from time to time which of a bewildering array of so-called Asset Classes they are going to speculate with the fiduciary funds entrusted to their good judgement, and which paid professional speculators they are going to hire to do that speculating for them.

It is a reality that has been described by one pundit as “a battle-for-returns, war-for-talent world”.

This is the world to which we are looking for income security in our retirement, and for social responsibility in our financial.

Any wonder we are being consistently disappointed?

How did we allow this to happen?

What went wrong?

When Messrs. Carey and Bright did their radical rethinking of the laws of fiduciary prudence for the Ford Foundation back in 1969, they did not consider — probably because they evidence had not yet been accumulated — the important differences that size, purpose and continuity make between a fiduciary of a personal trust and a fiduciary of a public trust, such as a retirement plan, university endowment or endowed foundation, when choosing to deploy the aggregated savings of others that are entrusted to their good judgement.

A 40+ year experiment with Modern Portfolio Theory as the standard for fiduciary prudence has taught us that what may be prudent for a trustee to do, acting for the benefit of a few named individuals for a limited period of time (personal trusts cannot continue indefinitely) may not be prudent for a trustee acting on behalf of a large, diverse and constantly self-regenerating population of current and future beneficiaries, under a trust that continues indefinitely.

We have learned a number of useful things through this experiment with Modern Portfolio Theory becoming Asset Allocation as the standard for institutional fiduciary prudence.

1. (What history has shown) is that institutional fiduciaries deploying fiduciary aggregations as equity into enterprise is good for enterprise, for the fiduciaries, for the economy, for society.
2. We have learned that institutional fiduciaries deploying equity into the economy through securities trading is not.
3. We have learned that institutional fiduciaries, because of their size, their purpose and their continuity, cannot be thought of the same as the individuals they count among their beneficiaries, but constitute themselves a unique class of actor in our financial system, and are, in fact, the center of their very own financial decision-making subsystem, a subsystem for aggregating surpluses for a public purpose and deploying those aggregations in pursuit of that purpose as fiduciaries for a class of individuals that is so large, so representative of the whole of society and so on-going, and evergreen, as to make them evergreen superfiduciaries for all of us.

If superfiduciaries cannot achieve their superfiduciary purposes to us all through speculation, what can they do?

The answer comes from looking more closely at their own experience in Real Estate. The only so-called Asset Class that is actually giving them the experiences that they need, want and expect. In Real Estate, superfiduciaries do not just buy and sell securities derived from the enterprise they are choosing to finance. They negotiate a share in that enterprise itself, directly. And the share they negotiate is a share of the cash flows that are expected to flow through that enterprise over the entire duration of its enterprise life. Evergreen. Also, because they are negotiating directly with enterprise for direct participation in current cash flows shared currently, they find themselves negotiating not only their shares in those expected cash flows, but also important details about the way in which those cash flows will be generated by the enterprise they are financing. This includes everything from design aesthetics to community impacts, employment practices and environmental sensibilities.

The problem with Real Estate for superfiduciaries is that there is not enough of it.

The Solution: Evolving Evergreen Superfiduciaries

The solution is to copy the proven reliable equity payback method of financing enterprise through current participation in current cash flows that works so well in Real Estate, and apply it to finance enterprises of various kinds all around the real economy.

The result will be a constant flow of current cash flow flowing into the superfiduciary from diverse enterprises working in diverse domains within a diverse economy, generating current cash flows currently through the current business that they do with their customers, currently, and repeatedly over time, as experts in doing work that matters to those customers in the time that is now.

Consideration of the continuity of these cash flows brings to top-of-mind a truth about enterprise that the securities trading system works very hard to hide. Every enterprise is time-limited. Times change, and people adapt. We figure things out. We invent new knowledge that empowers new work that adds new to the wealth of choices we can make for how we want to take the world about us as we find it, and change it to be more a way we want it to be. As people add new to the wealth of choices we can make, pre-existing choices lose their relevance, and we let them go. New enterprises get organized to bring new choices to the people. Pre-existing enterprises organized to make previously popular choices fade, as the popularity of the choices they are organized to bring to the people fade.

In securities trading, this simple truth is denied. Suppressed. Replaced by the myth of Perpetual Growth in Share Price for the incorporated enterprise, giving us the New Aristocracy of Corporate Bureaucracy. Enterprises may come and go, as a physical reality of any free enterprise economy, but the Corporation must continue, and continue to Grow in assets, earnings and share price.

This is needed because Growth in Share Price is needed to produce liquidity in the securities markets, and liquidity is the primary value that the securities trading system is engineered to deliver. Liquidity is what makes new buyers buy, and existing holders sell. Without liquidity, new buyers won’t buy, and existing holders are trapped holding a trading position in a bundle of legal rights that are derived from an enterprise generating cash flows they have no right to share in, directly. In order to get their money out, they have to sell (an exit). In order to sell, they have to find a buyer. And a price. In order to find a buyer at a price, the buyer has to believe that it will, in its turn, be able to sell (exit), by selling on to the next new buyer, at a hoped-for higher market clearing price.

This imperative for Growth is the rule that rules the securities trading markets. It also rules all the enterprises that finance their capital needs by selling shares as securities. These trading markets are engineered to be non-prescriptive on everything except this overarching need for Growth in future selling price — or at least to support present expectations of continued growth in future selling price. The enterprise as corporation is free to conduct itself however it pleases, as long as it delivers Growth in the process. If there is no Growth, the markets will abandon that security, the price will fall, and leadership will be replaced. In the worst extreme, bankruptcy, and forced liquidation.

In securities trading, companies grow, drift or die.

Presently, chasing growth in securities trading forces transitions of change all too often in the legal context of a bankruptcy that disrupts and destroys. This exaggerates the ebb and flow of adding new and letting go that is the real story of human history and the healthy heartbeat of prosperity into the boom-and-bust of the so-called Business Cycle, and the recurring cycles of growth, recession/depression/collapse and recovery that characterize our modern economy.

Imagine this as a better way.

Superfiduciaries using equity paybacks to finance enterprise directly, sharing currently in current cash flow to first, recover their original investment, then, second, realize a minimum fiduciary return (i.e. generate the current cash flows they need to achieve their chartered purposes currently, paying income in retirement, salaries to university, grants to public benefits), and thereafter keep sharing in current cash flows, currently as the enterprise continues to prosper in the economy, on an evergreen basis.

Over time, the social contract between every enterprise and the population it works for will not be renewed. The relevance of the enterprise to the economy will change, as times change, and people adapt to changing times, making new connections to new enterprises, and letting pre-existing connections to established enterprises go.

This is how the economy works, and society prospers.

If we fight it, through a monomaniacal (we know it to be true, but…) pursuit of Growth, we get recurring cycles of boom that always, eventually, go bust. Sometimes with catastrophic consequences for society and the economy. As in 1907. 1929. And 2008. (precedent even more significant if we look at mild disruptions that are nonetheless still disruptions.)

If we, instead, ride the ebb and flow of change, and evolutionary adaptation to change, adding new from time to time, and letting go gracefully, which we can do with superfiduciaries using equity paybacks to finance enterprise on a current cash flow basis, we won’t have booms. We also won’t have busts. It is the boom, after all, that causes the bust. Every boom sooner or later must and will go bust. The bigger the boom, the bigger the bust.

If we want to avoid going bust, we need to avoid starting booms.

Superfiduciaries can help us do that, by financing enterprise using equity paybacks that are specifically engineered to ride the ebb and flow of adding new, and letting go.

The equity payback portfolio of an evergreen superfiduciary becomes a time series of cash flows that wax and wane over time, with new enterprises delivering new cash flows being added to the portfolio from time to time, as existing enterprises fade away into the history of an earlier time, when the work they did was a good fit for the way that people lived in those times.

This gives us a future-facing between Pensions and People, and between superfiduciaries and enterprise, all looking towards the changing needs of the times, that are creating new opportunities to invent new knowledge that enables new work and adds new to the wealth of choices the people can make, through the organization of new enterprises to do that work.

Enterprise becomes re-humanized, as the expression of the personal genius — the unique insights, knowledge and initiative — of its leaders.

The economy also becomes re-humanized, as a network of intellectual and interpersonal connections between people for doing work, and sharing wealth, a network that is constantly being formed and re-formed as people add new connections, supporting new work and enjoying new wealth, letting others go.

Surprisingly enough, education also becomes re-humanized, as teaching and learning, through talking and doing, the intellectual and interpersonal skills and patterns required to participate fully in the adaptive evolution of the network that is the economy.

The focus of teaching and learning, of enterprise and of finance becomes the new frontier of future possibilities for figuring out new ways to adapt to changing times in all the many different domains of choice and action that make up our shared experience of being human.

The results have not been great for funds entrusted to superfiduciaries. Evergreen asks whether these types of securities and the trade-driven focus on deriving income for beneficiaries might never have been built for superfiduciary involvement. We posit that there is a relatively simple way to escape this system in the funds’ own context.

We see superfiduciary collaboration with enterprise, in collaboration with public opinion, figuring out where in the economy change, and evolutionary adaptation to change, is creating the need and the opportunity for the use of equity paybacks by superfiduciaries to finance new enterprise, and the disinvestment by superfiduciaries in enterprises the economy is letting go, across the different domains of choice and action in the economy.

Different ways of organizing these different domains may be developed. One possible domain structure that we are starting with is as below.

This also gives us a new map of the financial system, as a system of six decision making subsystems for aggregating savings and deploying those aggregations to finance enterprise, each of which is fit for its own proper purpose, and the right choice at the right time.

These six systems consist of:

1. the Social Power of Family & Friends
2. the Moral Authority of Church & Philanthropy
3. the Public Works of Taxing & Spending
4. the Counting Accounting of Money & Credit
5. the Expansive Growth of Securities Trading
6. the Evolutionary Adaptation of Superfiduciary Stewardship