👋🏼 Hey you progressive: don’t even try to run from identity politics 👇🏼

It is one of the most common discussions I — a Green campaigner — have with progressives at the bar: “What is behind the rise of the populist right, and how do we stop it?” There is always the one group that says ‘It is about racism, and we should talk about it’. Then there is the other that says ‘It is about economic anxiety, and we should address that!’

Lately there is a new contender for the top spot of beer-in-hand topics for progressives: “What is the deal with identity politics, and (again) how do we stop it?’ Here the one group says ‘it is polarizing and it feeds into the populists‘ and the other that says ‘we have to stand with the marginalized and increase our fight against racism, sexism and bigotry’

Both topics always ruin the mood… So let’s discuss them! Because I think both sides are correct and that only if we, progressives, understand both sides to the story can we retake the grounds we lost to the cynics, xenophobes and authoritarians.

Part 1. The angry white man.

After each populist-right win, journalists flood the people with articles about the supposed ‘angry white man’ and why he voted for the new right. 50% of the articles try to make the point that these ‘men’ are afraid, neglected and not heard. The other half is about the economic crisis. And sometimes, about once every hundred articles, a journalist — recently more often in the United States than in Europe — dares to dive into racism as a possible explanation.

So what is it? Is at a ‘ group’ that is unaddressed, is it economic anxiety or is it racism? I believe it is all three. So, let’s dive into it a bit more shall we? I will focus on Trump (mostly) because it has led — at least according to what I have seen — to the most interesting analyses. Let me share some that I have read:

• Economy: There is really no statistical proof that Trump voters were economically doing worse than those that voted for Clinton. However: Economic explanations don’t necessarily require that Trump’s supporters were themselves in dire economic straits. They may simply have heard about economic problems that seemed to require “change.” In other words, the lack of correlation between the Trump vote and personal economic indicators does not necessarily mean that Trump voters did not care about the economic conditions of other Americans. And exit polling suggests that they did. [Jeffrey Friedman, Niskanen Center]
• Racism: Recent research done at Penn University shows that white Americans’ 2012 views of black Americans strongly predict switching to/away from Trump in 2016, even accounting for 2012 party, vote, etc. And it predicts backing Trump in GOP primaries [Dan Hopkins, political scientist]. By playing into white fears of crime and concerns that minorities are taking their jobs, he’s signaling to his white supporters that he’s a politician who is finally taking their problems seriously. This is very much racialized, but Trump does it through dog whistles that somewhat mask the racial element. [German Lopez, Vox] So in fact: identity politics.
• Group: Trump’s main differentiator during the primary was doubling down on cultural grievance: grievances against immigrants, against Muslims, against political correctness, against the media, and sometimes against black people and women. [Nate Silver, 538]. Voters who supported Trump in the primaries “score high on authority/loyalty/sanctity and low on care.” These voters, according to researchers, “are the true authoritarians — they value obedience while scoring low on compassion.” [Thomas Edsall, New York Times] So in fact (again): identity politics.

When you look at most new right movements in Europe, I am confident most of the above will apply just the same as it does with Trump.

Part 2. Tribalism.

It is important to note how racism can play into tribal politics and vice versa. Trump did not simply win because the electorate is mostly racist. Obama is his predecessor.

Racism has always been a factor in ideology (New research shows how 19th century slavery predicts modern political attitudes through intergenerational transmission of white supremacist ideology. Link) just look at the change from democrats to republicans in the U.S. South during the sixties. And so has religion.

What Trump effectively did, not unlike many republicans and news outlets such as Fox and Breitbart, is increase the salience of the (white) group identity in politics. He increased the sense that people are under threat (Make America Great Again) and doubled down on an us-versus-them narrative in which migrants and the political- and media elite are both the scapegoat and the enemy.

Lilliana Mason, professor in politics at the University of Maryland, just released an amazing book about the science of social identity and how it is increasingly forming people’s party preferences and ideology: identity politics. And a group-identity does not require values and policy attitudes; it simply requires sense of inclusion and a sense of exclusion.

In our time, for many, the terms “liberal” and “conservative” is enough to designate who is “us” and who is “them” (reference). Through increased polarization, for voters the consequences of a policy are increasingly secondary to who wins: us, or them? (link)

The World War II volunteer, Polish Jew and holocaust survivor Henri Tajfel really pioneered with the research into the social psychology and impact behind group identities. He wanted to know why people were motivated to attack ‘the other.’ In one of his first experiments he showed similar people dots on a wall, and divided them into a group of ‘overestimaters’ and ‘underestimaters’ —and it directly led to bias. He asked the participants to chose between a scenario where everyone gets five dollars, or the one group gets four and the other two.. many chose for scenario two. A scenario where you get less, but as a group you win compared to the other. (wtf)

The more polarized things get, for voters the consequences of policies become secondary to who wins and who loses.

Part 3. Downstream

It is hard to say ‘who started’ the polarization. Some blame it on the ‘social justice warriors’ who are — rightfully — fighting for an equal playing field for women and people of color, and by doing that have increasingly made white men aware of themselves as a group. Others blame it on the rise of the populist right (from the early 2000s, such as Fortuyn in the Netherlands) that in the wake of 9/11 started scapegoating ‘the other’ (i.e. Muslims and the political correct elite that brought them in) with great electoral success.

However, the idea that it were solely the ‘social justice warriors’ that started the polarization or that is the ‘cultural marxist / politically correct elite’ who started it through ‘an attack on the Nationalist identity’ — another blame-frame the populist right often uses — are clearly false. Dog whistle politics from the right, that tap into existing group identities, go back decades. Take this fascinating quote from Lee Atwater, republican campaigner, on Nixon:

[N-word edited as to not repeat the racist slur] You start out in 1954 by saying, “N-word, n-word, n-word.” By 1968, you can’t say “n-word” — that hurts you. Backfires. So you say stuff like forced busing, states’ rights and all that stuff. You’re getting so abstract now [that] you’re talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you’re talking about are totally economic things and a byproduct of them is [that] blacks get hurt worse than whites. And subconsciously maybe that is part of it. I’m not saying that. But I’m saying that if it is getting that abstract, and that coded, that we are doing away with the racial problem one way or the other. You follow me — because obviously sitting around saying, “We want to cut this,” is much more abstract than even the busing thing, and a hell of a lot more abstract than “N-word, n-word”

Steve Bannon’s most famous quote, and for good reason, is the following: “Politics is downstream from culture” with which he means that it is the discourse (from the news to popular culture) that shapes politics and not the other way around. In other words, and he has made that explicit often: we have to change what people hear and listen to, to win in the political arena.

It ties into the idea of ‘cultural marxism’, the conspiracy theory that increasingly is being sold by politicians and opinion-makers from the new right about the progressive elite that have brainwashed people through popular culture and education since 1968. Here is a quote from Breitbart that shows that these narratives are similar:

The messaging reinforces Liberal narratives — that is, Liberal stories. These are the same narratives you see in Liberal politics. The popular culture backs up Liberal policies, morals, ethics, values, and standards. Liberal political candidates are the embodiments of those Liberal tenets. The goal is to associate them in voter minds via the vehicle of popular culture.

It is highly interesting to see how more and more people believe in the conspiracy theory of cultural marxism, or a mistrust of hollywood, universities and journalists. The more strongly you believe in an us-versus-them, the higher your cognitive bias, and the easier it is to start believing in conspiracies that reinforce such an us-versus-them world. I believe the polarization and resulting cognitive bias also helps explain the rise of fake news.

But let’s snap back from fantasies, and go back to the real world. Clearly journalists, together with politicians that benefit from it, have brought every symbolic issue of identity politics to the foreground of the discourse recently.

The notion that ‘free speech’ is under attack, that we should able to discuss that [insert-scapegoat] is responsible for [insert-problem], the idea that diversity ‘is bad’, a reinforcement of pride about the national identity and the notion that ‘social justice warriors’ want to take it away. Never has there been more attention for crime and statements from ‘the other’; never has there been so much attention for the ‘angry white man’ that deserves to be heard; increasingly women and people of color have their voice heard. Futhermore, to spark interest from the audience, more and more articles are about what political party won in any power struggle, than what the results of it are [listen to that analysis here] effectively reinforcing the idea of politics as tribal through an us-vs-them lens.

There are two important conclusions here, one is ideological and the other pragmatic:

1. You cannot ignore talking about identity issues, as they have risen to be the most important topic in discourse and will remain so for quite some time.
2. You should not ignore talking about these issues, because the underlying issues are real and important. Progressive politics should stand for the marginalized and the conservatives/new right are increasingly scapegoating them (which leads to increased threat of policies that affect them negatively).

Part 4. (F*ck) appeasement

Among many progressive parties you find an internal discussion between moving further to the center (i.e. take over the discourse and issues of the radical right, such as fear for migrants or policies against illegals, or showing ‘understanding’ for ‘the angry white male’), finding a new narrative that changes the political agenda or to shut up about identity politics. It is part of the search for an answer to the question of ‘how do we stop the populist right from gaining ground.’

Certainly you see among centre-right parties great electoral success in taking over part of the narrative of the radical right. The VVD, the ‘centre-’right in the Netherlands, has come out as the largest for the last 8 years by, amongst others, very targeted dog whistle politics such as defending black face ‘as just a tradition, stop complaining” and saying to Turkish Dutch that “if you don’t feel allegiance to the Netherlands, just f*ck off” (in Dutch the wording is a bit lighter). It is a tactic copied by many centre right political parties, sometimes with success.

In Denmark the Social Democrats are having some success doing the same. The Social Democrats have supported policies of the (radical right) People Party including a call for a ban on prayer rooms in universities and school. And they are symbolically, for example in the way of giving interviews together with the People Party, giving the voters the idea that the Social Dems are on the side of ‘migration realists.’ Here’s a quote from Mette Frederiksen, their leader:

“I feel sad when I see poor, unemployed people in the US voting for Trump. They are voting for him because they could not find a voice for them in the Democratic party. I need to avoid that in Denmark,”

It is important to note that her position is quite unique, as the social democrats are in the opposition while the right (including the People’s Party) govern. Nonetheless, the Danish show that it is possible for the left to win — in the short term — by tapping into the anti-migration sentiment. My ideological position is that this ethically unacceptable, but here’s my more pragmatic analysis of why progressives should not go for appeasement politics:

1. Most research still shows that taking over the narrative of the radical right does not win seats but merely strengthens the penetration of radical right views into mainstream discourse. (Cas Mudde, scholar of extremism, here’s a link)
2. It is a centrist policy that can only work short term, even if it does, as it will have an alienating effect on much of the base.
3. There's scientific proof that Social Democratic parties fare better when they combine investment-oriented economic and open-cosmopolitan cultural policy positions. [Tarik Abou-Chadi, PoSci professor Zurich, link]

The most convincing reasoning against it, but one that requires that progressive politicians take their more radical partners and their narrative seriously, is that there is a new movement brewing and it is gaining traction and power. The movement of ‘social justice warriors’, of feminists, anti-racists and much of the young.

Part 5. A new narrative

I believe it’s movements that change the world and politicians show up and take the credit for it. For progressives, it is the movement of MeToo and BlackLivesMatter. Now is there anyone out there that dares to take the credit?..

Politicians such as Corbyn and Bernie Sanders and (to an extent) parties such as GroenLinks and PoDemos pave the way towards a new left narrative. One that can succesfully put new issues on the agenda, with truly leftist and aspirational claims (i.e. really addressing economic anxiety and the need to change the economy), whilst (to an extent) defending the marginalized against discriminating societal structures and radical right parties.

Being silent is not an option. Moving towards bigotry is a huge risk. And if taking over the narrative of social justice warriors is too much for you, heed the words of David Graeber, the coiner of the 99%-frame that sparked interest in Occupy and was a big part of the Bernie narrative:

“An important reason why the right is so much more successful than the left, is that the right understands they should cherish their radicals to seem reasonable themselves”

But perhaps we should even move a step further. We will soon find out in Georgia, where Stacey Abrams, bids to become the first black female governor. Openly supported by BlackLivesMatter activists and not staying away from identity issues, but doubling down on them. Read more about her battle here. And if you have time, make sure to listen to this podcast with Tom Perriello, who recently lost in the democratic primaries in Virginia (another southern state) but performed unexpectedly well in rural communities with a narrative on monopolies and automatization, whilst at the same time doubling down on leftist identity politics.

Part 6. Another identity

We are never singular in our identity. First: there is the color of your skin, gender, nationality and the traditions that came with it. In the category 'nationalist angry white male' all these identities can come together as being one and the same; a mega identity.

But then there is the identity of class, both economic and cultural. An identity that was highly salient up until the eighties and (thus) dominant in the discourse of both media and politics. An identity that has been strongly reinforced by the 99% of Occupy and Bernie, a class identity, a people versus multinational identity. The class identity can be more salient than that of the color and nationality, when addressed.

Our identities are numerous. Some are relevant, some are mythical. Some require we create scapegoats, others have existing enemies. Such as the 99%.

Our identities are numerous. The notion of a mega identity makes it singular. A discourse that reinforces the multitude, makes it harder to align with just one. Such as MeToo for (white) women.

We can change the narrative. But not by being silent about, or even reinforcing, radical right identity politics.

p.s. I did not talk about sexism. Here is a very interesting insight: A heighted tendency to endorse hostile sexism & low gender discrimination perceptions explain high support for Donald Trump among white women, particularly those with lower education. (link)

p.p.s. I can’t explain this better than Vox can, so I recommend watching and reading this:⚡ ️ https://www.vox.com/2017/12/21/16806676/strikethrough-how-trump-overton-window-extreme-normal ⚡ Where the radical right makes radical identity politics and radical policies normal, Corbyn and Bernie did it for ‘radical’ economic policies. Aspirational politics can be seen as radical at first, but create change close after.