The Challenges For The United Nations Peacekeeping Operations to Maintain Host State Consent
The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has been facing dramatic challenges during their peacekeeping missions from the host states whether through host state consent withdrawal or through confronting severe restrictions from the host state on their missions. As a result of the failure of many UN peacekeeping missions, it is really vital for the DPKO to start adopting new policies in order to engage the host state in their operations and to be ready to handle the situation if the host state consent suddenly withdraws in the future missions (UNDPKO, 2010). This policy brief addresses some problems faced by the DPKO during their missions:
Failure of getting the host state consent to their mission on its territories.
Failure to handle the worst case scenarios during their operations in the host state, such as the sudden state consent withdrawal or host state restrictions.
The previous presented problems were faced by the UN peacekeeping operations in Sudan which delayed the work of the UNAMID (UNDPKO, 2010), (Beck, 2010). This policy brief stipulates some policy recommendations that would assist the future UN Peacekeeping missions to maintain their host state consent:
Presenting the UNDPKO clear incentives: such as working on infrastructural and quick-impact projects in the host state, as well as their mission of keeping peace in order to get the host state cooperation and consent.
Getting involved in continuous realistic and detailed contingency planning for handling the worst case scenarios situations such as host state consent withdrawal or host state restrictions on the peacekeeping mission.
Introduction
There is an obvious consent that the globalized sophisticated world that we live in, is still in severe need of a global comprehensive peace to settle all the humanitarian miserable disputes we confront everyday of our life. According to article one of the United Nations Charter (1945), the UN was established to “maintain peace and international security” which means that it ought to work hard towards preventing any threat to world peace deploying peaceful measures with respect to the international law and disputes settlement principles. Despite the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) efforts to maintain peace in the whole world, it could be blamed for the withdrawal of host state consent over the time of its mission on its territory. The previous fact brought that the DPKO should start an immediate reform to its policies concerning the effectiveness of the cooperation between the host state and the PKO in order to avoid and handle the withdrawal of host state consent and in order to understand how to maintain the situation even if the host state decided to suddenly impose obstacles on the PKO. This policy paper is attempting to find out the main challenges and problems that PKO face from the host states and to point out some policy recommendations to handle such situation (Henderson, 2015).
The Challenges to the UN Peacekeeping Operations in Darfur
The main challenge to the PKO in Darfur was the operational constraints imposed by the host state and this was due to the fragility of the UNPKO as the Sudanese government could easily delay their work by its restrictions. In addition, the UNAMID was not preparing a back-up plan to deal with these sudden restrictions by the host state. According to the Brahimi Report in 2000, peacekeeping has three prerequisite principles in order to occur, one of them is host state consent as it plays a crucial role in highlighting the difference between peacekeeping operations and multilateral interventions. Unfortunately, host state consent has been very breakable and fragile which might be one of the difficulties the Peace Keeping Operations confronted recently from some of the states such as Chad, DRC, and Sudan (Piccolino, 2011). According to Beck, it has been very challenging and dangerous for the PKO to work in a “nonconsensual environment” which might transform the PKO to an “enforcement activity” rather than a peacekeeping operations (2011). Furthermore, there are many levels of consent between the peacekeeping operations and the host state, but this policy recommendation aims to reform the operational level of host state consent (Piccolino, 2011). I will tackle specifically the failure of the cooperation between the host and the UNAMID in Darfur that appeared to be easily thrown as a result of the restrictions by the government of Sudan.
According to the DPKO (2010), the PKO faced many obstacles that led to the failures and to the delay of their work in Darfur, where the government of Sudan has reduced the mission operational freedom and choices on ground and that didn’t allow the meaningful operational space they needed in order to reach their ends. Going back to the deployment of the PKO in Darfur, it was due to the events of 2004 in Darfur where the government of Sudan as well as its Janjaweed militia were committing brutal assaults in the western part of the country targeting whole villages. Additionally, the agreement that allowed the United Nations/African union hybrid operation in Darfur to take took place was in 2007 after long negotiations with the government of Sudan who was refusing the idea of making the mission UN- led rather than AU led and despite the formation of a hybrid mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the operations faced many restrictions that dramatically decreased their effectiveness over the term of their mission in Darfur (DPKO, 2010).
As it was mentioned before, the restrictions imposed by the government of Sudan over the UNAMID highlights the operational challenges to PKO as they couldn’t neither engage the host state in their mission, nor present their incentives for the host state to cooperate. One of the operational restriction the UNAMID faced was about the night flying as the Sudanese government allowed the night flying only on the condition that the UN is obliged to upgrade the airports in Darfur or to fatal purposes, in addition to the the curfews imposed, limitations on patrols, and many other operational restrictions that slowed down the movement of UN personal and their visas (Beck, 2011). On the other hand, the UN as well as the African officials clarified that their mission of protecting civilians couldn’t be done over night and it couldn’t also be realized without the consent and the help of the Sudanese government especially on the operational level(ereeves, 2008)(Security Council, 2008).
Policy Recommendations
It has been a reality that the United Nations peacekeeping missions are not always engaging the host state in order to get its consent, bearing this previous fact in mind the DPKO should always put into considerations an essential matter which is that their peacekeeping policies and regulations should always meet their strategic plans that should also apply to the best and worst case scenarios and not only to deal with situations where state consent withdrew but to work and operate under the worst circumstances to avoid allowing any exceptions during its operations. My subsequent policy recommendations to the department of peacekeeping operations of the united nations will aim to approach the obstacles they face from the host state, and will also suggest some policies that would assist the peace operations and that they are still missing till their late operations ( 9 Beck, 2011)
First Policy Recommendation
The first policy recommendation is that the DPKO should present a clear cut operational plan with their direct incentives for cooperation with the host state, rather than approaching the problem after the host state places its impediments on the mission. The DPKO should show their incentives for the host state providing material gains for in return of its cooperation since the mission deployment, in other words, the DPKO should present its operational plan for “quick impact projects” such as infrastructural work to get the host state patronage and consent. The previous suggestion would enhance the cooperation between the DPKO and the host state as it will see the concrete impact of the PKO sustained and continuous involvement (Beck, 2011). Nonetheless, if the UN incentives didn’t encourage the host state to cooperate operationally and strategically, so it is still the DPKO fault as this means that it could not present the desired incentives for the host state to consent to their presence. As a result, the most vital thing to implement this policy recommendation is to use the available PKO resources efficiently to implement their “quick impact projects” over the course of their time on ground. In addition to the quick impact project the PKO should definitely gain the host state consent concerning their “peacebuilding assistance “which is hugely vital for the UN Peacebuilding Commission to gain its legitimacy as well as the host state consent (Piccolini, 2011).
Second Policy Recommendation
The second policy recommendation for the DPKO is to always be involved in “contingency planning” not to be shocked by any exceptions over the time of the mission and this is what the DPKO failed to realized in Darfur (Piccolini, 2011). The DPKO must plan in advance for all the possible obstacles that they might face from the host state even if they have given its consent at first. The major problem is that some states withdraw their consent upon the change in the internal regime or the change of the external allies, which proves the necessity of the contingency planning of the DPKO to determine their actions in the worst case scenarios. Concerning the case of the UNAMID for example, it was obvious that even before the mission’s deployment that the Sudanese government wasn’t welcoming the peace operations on its territory and it was imposing many constraints on the UNAMID operations (UNDPKO, 2010). However, The DPKO was not involved in contingency planning face and avoid such situations and to determine exactly what the operations should achieve in case of a sudden host state consent withdrawal. In addition, the fact that the peace operations will have their own contingency planning will allow them to react immediately to the host state consent withdrawal which will also show that could not be easily thrown without reaching the ends of their mission (Beck, 2011). The contingency planning could solve all the previous challenges to the effectiveness of the UNAMID by having a realistic contingency set plans that can deal with all the scenarios that might occur during the operations (Renwick, 2015).
Conclusion
The Department of Peace Keeping Operations remains the most blamed for any failure of cooperation between the host state and the PKO as it is the one who has the capability to shape the status of the mission and to back it up with alternative plans in order to be able solve any operational problems that take place over the time of the operations. In addition, the DPKO should always take into consideration two important matters which are that the host state relinquishes some of their sovereignty for the PKO to take place, in return host states always calculate the concrete benefits they will get in return from the involvement of the PKO on their territories. The main conclusion here is that the DPKO should consider the host state consent as their own responsibility and it is not the host state’s. Furthermore, the operational planning of the DPKO should always be realistic and attainable in order to gain the host state consent. At the end, the enhancement of the cooperation between the host states and the DPKO could realize huge successes on the international level and it could be a model for any future operations with the implementation of the previous policy recommendations.
Cario, Egypt
References
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