“Fire and fury”: Gauging the North Korean nuclear crisis
In the “fire and fury” around North Korea and its rambunctious actions, it’s easy to get caught up in the quotes and slights instead of the bigger picture. Today’s report will help you understand the North Korean crisis in a greater context.
Ever since the two Koreas separated, the world has observed a rather abnormal and aggressive isolationist policy put forth by North Korea. Most recently, the Kim regime has shown off their efforts through ballistic missile tests. Most analysts say that North Korea’s ultimate goal is to perfect an ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) armed with a nuclear warhead that can reach the United States.
North Korea’s thirst for such a weapon is part of their larger pursuit of deterrence, known as the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD). The strategy of MAD is to be armed with nuclear capabilities on both sides so that neither will aggress due to nuclear war.
This concept can be seen during the Cold War, where the Soviet Union and the United States stacked up on nukes but never attacked for fear of retaliation. North Korea desires this form of security because the Kim regime believes the U.S. will eventually try to remove Kim Jong-Un from power as they tried with Castro. Thus, nuclear weapons would dissuade the U.S. from taking aggressive actions against North Korea. Thinking about it from Kim’s perspective, wouldn’t the United States be reluctant to attack if the North had nuclear weapons?
Pyongyang seems to believes so. The North Korean leadership has studied cases such as what happened in Libya. Bending to the West’s demands, Libya’s government gave up their nuclear weapons and were then overthrown by rebels backed by the U.S. Because they gave up their only source of deterrence, Libya became embroiled in a civil war that lasts until this day. It’s very likely that Kim Jong Un sees nuclear weapons as the key to sparing his dynasty from a similar fate.
There have been several approaches taken so far since the Korean War armistice. The nuclear game of chess has spanned the leadership of three members of the Kim Dynasty, eleven South Korean heads of state, and twelve U.S. presidents. Multiple approaches have been suggested, implemented, and failed.
The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons
With the Cold War brimming in the background, the U.S. and the Soviet Union became worried about the growing number of countries with nuclear weapons. Ratified in 1968, the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) was put together as a safeguard against such a scenario.
Since its inception, all countries except four have abided, with only one country withdrawing from the agreement. The NPT agreement has three main pillars:
- First is nonproliferation. All parties pledge to never transfer or assist in the development of nuclear weapons in other nations. They must comply with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to prevent nuclear energy from being used for weapons.
- Second is disarmament. All parties must work towards agreements that lead to the disarmament of nuclear weapons stockpiles and prevent any further nuclear arms races.
- Third is the right to peaceful use of nuclear technology. The NPT can’t be used to take away a country’s right to develop nuclear technology for peaceful means. Parties able to help others with their own development of peaceful nuclear technology ought to do so.
As mentioned above, there has only ever been one withdrawal from the NPT, and with little surprise, this was North Korea. When North Korea ratified the NPT in 1985, they failed to reach an agreement with developing their own nuclear weapons. In early 1993 the IAEA decided to take action, but when North Korea refused special inspection, they were reported to the UN Security Council. That same year, North Korea announced that they would be withdrawing from the NPT. Since then, many efforts have been made to bring the country back into the agreement, or bring policies that prevent their buildup of a deadly nuclear arsenal.
Agreed Framework
In November 1993, shortly after withdrawing from the NPT, North Korea reached out to the U.S. in hopes of normalizing relations. The Clinton Administration agreed and set the terms that North Korea would resume IAEA inspections and reopen talks with South Korea before the two countries could make negotiations.
Eventually, North Korea agreed and the formation of a deal began. In 1994 the so-called “Agreed Framework” was struck. The terms of the agreement were as follows: The U.S. would:
- Deliver heavy oil to North Korea as a form of alternative energy.
- Build two light water reactors (LWRs) in North Korea by 2003.
- Provide formal assurance to North Korea that the U.S. would not use nuclear weapons on them.
North Korea would:
- Remain part of the NPT
- Freeze all nuclear reactors capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium
- Work towards the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
- Take down graphite-moderated (nuclear) reactors once the LWRs are completed.
The U.S. followed through with oil deliveries and established the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) to build the light water reactors. North Korea kept to their terms and stopped operation of their nuclear reactors. They also “withdrew” their declaration of secession from the NPT.
In 2001, George W. Bush was elected president, and members of his administration were skeptical of Clinton’s deal. At the same time, U.S. intelligence was informed that North Korea was still developing uranium-enrichment facilities, and funding for KEDO was dying off. The agreement broke down as the U.S. accused North Korea of developing nukes while North Korea accused the U.S. of purposely delaying oil shipments and KEDO progress.
Although it can be seen as a failure, many experts theorize that without the Agreed Framework, North Korea may already have hundreds of nuclear weapons.
Sunshine Policy
The Sunshine Policy was South Korea’s more passive approach towards the North that began in 1998. Similar to the Agreed Framework, it was focused on attempting to normalize relations between the two Koreas. This was to be done through humanitarian aid to the North, increased communication, and business cooperation. Initially, there was clear progress — there were two Inter-Korean summits, joint business ventures, and the June 15th North-South Joint Declaration that allowed North and South families to visit one another.
Much of the policy began falling apart, however, as North Korea continued to pursue a nuclear program. After the 2008 South Korean election, Lee Myung-bak and his administration refused to continue cooperation with the North until they resolved the nuclear issue.
United Nations’ Sanctions
In response to North Korea’s aggression, the United Nations and the US placed economic sanctions on North Korea. These pacts would try to cap North Korea’s oil imports, ban textile exports, suppress smuggling efforts, stop joint ventures with other nations, and sanction North Korean government entities. Similar sanctions have been enacted by South Korea, Japan, and the European Union against the North.
Unfortunately, these attempts to stop North Korea’s trade have been quite ineffective. The UN published a report this year that addressed the North’s smuggling and illegal trading of arms and minerals. In October, a North Korean ship carrying 30,000 rocket-propelled grenades was captured off the coast of Egypt. Egyptian officials had ordered the stash for the country’s military, and were the latest in Egypt’s attempts to buy weapons from North Korea.
These sales have been the lifeline for Kim, who according to the Washington Post, has sold to countries such as Iran, Burma, Cuba, Syria, Eritrea, and at least two terrorist groups. The sole shipment to Egypt would have been a $23 million dollar deal for North Korea.
As political scientist Ed Goldring puts it:
“New sanctions may not be enforced; if they are, they probably won’t affect North Korea’s missile program; and they will probably hurt ordinary North Korean people.”
With heightened tensions between the two countries, there are several approaches the United States could take against North Korea.
Aggression & Preliminary Attacks
The Trump Administration seems to be favoring a preemptive strike against North Korea. Currently, multiple heavy bombing squadrons on Guam are prepared to attack if so ordered. Two Navy destroyers and an aircraft carrier strike group have been stationed 300 miles away from North Korean missile test sites, the first of many warships that Trump plans to send into the area.
These military maneuvers are complemented by what South Korea and the U.S. calls decapitation strikes. In such an attack, missile strikes would be launched at North Korea’s nuclear missile facilities while special forces would be deployed to eliminate the North’s leadership. Decapitation strikes have been heavily criticized by military directors such as James Faeh, who say that it’s unlikely that the U.S will be able to take out North Korea’s arsenal in a single attack. What’s concerning is that threatening North Korea only pressures them to produce nuclear weaponry, since they see this as evidence of the West’s heavy-handed threats to destroy their country.
Perhaps there is no way to take an aggressive approach because of South Korea’s proximity to the North. The South Korean capital of Seoul is already a prime target for the North, and retaliation against its 28 million residents is likely if the U.S. attacks. There is no reasonable way to move millions out of Greater Seoul, and as such, the risks of a preemptive strike may be too great.
China’s ‘Iron Fist’ over North Korea
China is the North’s closest ally and arguably the country with the most influence on Pyongyang. Historically, the PRC came to the North’s defense during the Korean War, and until recently, they have enjoyed friendly diplomatic relations with each other.
Indeed, North Korea’s largest trade partner is China, who provides nearly 85% of North Korea’s imports, and buys up 83% of their exports. The PRC is the North’s largest provider of food, fuel, and industrial machinery, and is one of the main reasons why sanctions haven’t worked against the North.
However, the recent missile tests have China backtracking on their relations with North Korea. They have largely supported North Korea because of the idea that a sovereign rogue state is still better than a U.S. controlled Korean Peninsula. But, numerous issues would arise if North Korea goes to war with the U.S. For one, it could create a massive refugee crisis with thousands of North Koreans pouring into China’s borders — something that they cannot ignore.
The unfortunate part is that China is caught in a dilemma, where President Xi Jinping is attempting to cement his power politically and publicly. Public opinion in China has increasingly soured towards Kim, and more elites are considering North Korea as a liability rather than an asset in the longer run. However, the death of North Korea, one of the sole Communist countries left, could possibly turn criticism against Xi himself.
But even in these struggles, potential coordination with the Chinese may still prove to be the best chance to stop North Korea. The last thing that China wants is “war or chaos on the peninsula,” said Chinese defense ministry spokesman Ren Guoqiang. The intense economic pressure that China could apply onto the Kim regime would, according to some, be enough to force North Korea to the negotiations table.
Classical Deterrence
Although ‘waiting the North out’ gets a lot of heat from both sides of the aisle, many experts think it’s the best way of dealing with the crisis. Such a theory is known as “classical deterrence”, where the U.S. will largely do nothing about the North since it is unlikely that they will attack. Journalist Fred Kaplan has been a firm advocate of this policy.
He explains that we shouldn’t worry too much about the North Korean threat for two reasons: deterrence, and Kim Jong-un’s desire for self-preservation. Kaplan argues that the reason why North Korea desires an ICBM so ferociously is that they want to be able to defend themselves. Thus, a real war is unlikely because “[the] classical deterrence theory tends to work very well against that sort of leadership.”
There have been multiple cases of where countries tried to stop their enemies from gaining nuclear weapons but failed. The U.S. tried to stop the Soviet Union, who pressured China, who threatened India, who did the same to Pakistan. It’s isn’t far-fetched to think that the U.S. will never be able to stop North Korea. But, if Kim’s main objective is to keep his regime floating in one piece, it’s quite likely that there won’t be a war unless the U.S. attacks. As Retired Army Col. Douglas Macgregor says, the right course of action for Washington is to not take the bait.
Much of what happens next in this crisis will be dictated by the U.S.’ hand. The Trump Administration has much to worry about, but unless irrationality strikes, war isn’t as imminent as it seems.
For now.
This article was written in conjunction with Alexander Ge and William Cheng.
Originally published at rootpolicy.org on December 18, 2017.
