Hi Justin,
Maybe we should cut out some less important strands of the discussion and focus on what is probably the more important argument you’re trying to make. I think the more important claim has to do with prior probability and there being some problem with fallible access to infallible books.
If automobiles alone were the only allowable way to get from from point A to point B, ever, then it would be quite startling to discover needing to get from point A to point B while not having, and never able to have, an automobile.
This is supposed to correspond to the Protestant canon. But that’s not analogous to the Protestant situation because it doesn’t follow from the fact that we may be wrong in our assessment of the canon that we are wrong in our assessment of the canon. And it certainly doesn’t follow that we are “never able to have” a canon.
If such an odd restriction wasn’t arbitrarily assumed a priori, then, clearly seeing people were getting from point A to point B in the past, one wouldn’t be startled, as travel is still possible without an automobile (e.g., walking, being carried, etc.). Having an automobile just makes the trek more efficient.
This is supposed to correspond to the magisterium and tradition (assuming these things aren’t collapsed into one thing). But it only pushes your startling conclusion back a step: why was no one walking or being carried from point A to point B on essential doctrines like the bodily assumption of Mary until just recently (last 60 years or so)?
Do you really think your own personal systematic theology or dogmas are a contextually viable apples to apples comparison? I am not sure why I should think that is a good comparison.
I do think it’s a good comparison because you’re talking about the Catholic church having greater prior probability before we bother to look at the facts of history etc., correct?
So suppose an atheist, Thurston, is out sailing one day when he gets caught in a storm and ends up shipwrecked on an island. Thurston finds that the island is only inhabited by two people: Skipper and Gilligan. Skipper tells Thurston that he has found a survival guide on the island that he has good reason to think it is infallible. Gilligan tells Thurston that he guarantees that the survival guide, plus his guide to island cuisine, is infallible because he is, himself, infallible.
Why do you think Gilligan has the more plausible claim, prior to any investigation by Thurston?
I’ll happily divulge an assumption of mine which flows from Christ’s promise to Peter, the resurrection, and the outpouring of the Holy Spirit. I assume we, as Christians, would be able to do better than opinions. Of course, that means God would have to provide some way to transcend mere subjective opinion.
Unless you’ve already committed yourself to Roman Catholicism as an axiom, this assumption rests not only on your fallible grasp of the canon, but on your fallible interpretation of that passage. (I assume you’re referring to Matt. 16:19, which mentions nothing about infallibly guiding the church through successive apostles or traditions.)
How will you make the startling leap? It seems you’ve already boxed yourself into a corner of having to assume not just that we would be able to do better than opinions, but Roman Catholicism.
If Skipper is in trouble for not being able to infallibly say that his survivor’s guide is infallible, then how are you in any less trouble not being able to infallibly say that your assumption (or tradition or church teaching) is infallible?
Also the word ‘opinion’ can have different connotations. We often hear people say by way of rebuttal “That’s just your opinion.” And what they mean is that you may think that such and such is the case but you don’t have any good reasons for thinking that such and such is the case. If this is what you mean by “able to do better than opinions” (beliefs without good reasons), then I share that assumption. But if you mean something more like “infallibly know” then the assumption looks gratuitous.
If all appeals to Scripture are appeals to interpretations of Scripture (P), then either one’s interpretation of Scripture is the final and authoritative norm of doctrine and practice, or Scripture itself cannot be the final and authoritative norm of doctrine and practice (QvR).
Wouldn’t this line of reasoning also make the argument that “tradition” simply means whatever the Roman Catholic church says and Scripture simply means whatever the Roman Catholic church says? So the three sources of Roman Catholicism gets caught in this argument and you end up with Rome’s (current) interpretation of Scripture and tradition is the final and authoritative norm of doctrine and practice.
So you’re trading sola Scriptura for sola ecclesia. You’re trading ‘my interpretation of Scripture and church history’ for ‘The magisterium’s interpretation of Scripture and church history’. But you’re still fallibly passing the buck. You don’t escape the need for interpretation. It’s your opinion of Roman Catholicism. You still have to interpret the magisterium. So if you’re argument is the death cycle of Protestantism you won’t be escaping it unless you find some way for God to bypass your need to interpret.
Every time you read a papal bull or the Catholic catechism you need to interpret that. Every time you listen to your priest give a lecture or sermon, you need to interpret that. All your appeals to what the Roman Catholic church teaches are appeals to your interpretation of what the Roman Catholic church teaches.
Both traditions, Catholic and Protestant, have extra-biblical theological prescriptions one must affirm (externally fallible affirmation) to proceed forward. Think of these prescriptions as different math axioms. Are we infallibly sure 2+2=4? Yes, internally. Why? Because the axiom provides the internal means to clearly define terms and logical relationships as necessary. 2+2 cannot equal anything other than 4, but only because the axiom can dogmatically specify what each symbol means. The Catholic axiom is analogous to this situation.
As I pointed out above, you have to get there at the cost of baptizing your interpretations of Catholic axioms as infallible.
Once one has made the fallible move into the axiom, there exists no means to clearly
That would seem to be false. That something ins’t infallible does not entail that it isn’t clear.
and definitively define terms and logical relationships so as to provide internally infallible results.
Right. Protestants typically don’t declare their doctrine to be infallible.
Why? Because the system allows each individual equal authority to define terms and relationships as they see fit
This seems to be resting on a possible equivocation (or at least any rhetorical force it might have is resting on an equivocation). By saying that the Protestant system allows each individual authority to define terms and relationships as they see fit we might get the impression that a Protestant must think that each person’s interpretation (including the Pope’s) carries authority. In fact the Protestant system simply says that no one’s interpretation carries infallible authority and some carry no authority. And we could somehow make this situation better by electing a Protestant Pope?
Translate those contradictory numbers into theological propositions and one has a good working concept of the internal logic of Protestant epistemology.
This, again, could give a false impression. As though there is a Protestant system that a Protestant (and all Protestants) subscribes to that leads him into holding contradictory theological doctrines. In fact, all you’re pointing out is that not all Protestants agree on theological details. So what? Same goes for Roman Catholicism, despite Rome’s claims to unity (e.g., sedevacantists like Gerry Matatics — though he rejects the term, I use it because it’s more easily recognizable for some of his positions).
If an axiom, or prescriptive theology, is attempting to correspond with what is actually true, internal contradictions are a massive point against its plausibility as a potential explanatory framework.
As I said above, there is no Protestant who has the internal contradictions you’re suggesting, in virtue of being a Protestant. And there is no pixie dust which removes all internal contradictions from a person who becomes a Roman Catholic :)
P.S. Even trying to ignore parts of our discussion which are not directly relevant to the important point I have tried to identify at the beginning of my reply I see that we are still potentially budding out beyond what is necessary… So in the future we may need to do some further pruning.